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NOTE BY THE ENGRAVER.

The likeness is taken from the original print engraved in the year 1797, by J. GODEFROY, which print was drawn by CHAUDET, from DAVID's original sketch after life.

Towards the end of the year 1797, about the time of general Bonaparte's return being expected from his victorious campaign in Italy, a gentleman in order to pay his court to Josephine (madam Bonaparte), wished to present her with a fan illustrative of the general's victories in Italy, he applied to CHAUDET, the celebrated draughtsman and sculptor, and member of the Institute, who made an allegorical and emblematical design, in the centre of which is a medallion portrait of general Bonaparte. CHAUDET drew the likeness from the sketches which DAVID had made from nature, when the general had sat to him about the year 1796, before he left Paris for the Italian frontier. CHAUDET completed his drawing with the assistance of FONTAINE and PERCIER, architects, who drew the other medallions and ornaments with their accustomed ability, and I was commissioned to engrave this drawing, which I did by the end of 1797.

J. GODEFROY, July, 1834.



J. Godefroy del. & Sculp.

GENERAL

March
1796

BONAPARTE

THE LIFE
OF THE
EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

WITH AN APPENDIX,
CONTAINING AN EXAMINATION
OF
SIR W. SCOTT'S "LIFE OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE;"
AND
A NOTICE OF THE PRINCIPAL ERRORS OF OTHER WRITERS,
RESPECTING HIS CHARACTER AND CONDUCT.

BY
H. LEE.

VOL. I.

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PREFACE.

THE general impression, that an impartial and accurate biography of the Emperor Napoleon does not exist, and that Sir Walter Scott, in his "Life of Napoleon Bonaparte," did injustice to his subject, authorises an endeavour to supply that defect and repair that injustice. In the body and appendix of the work, the first volume of which is now submitted to the public, this double object is attempted.

The fame and amiableness of the author of Waverley, since they give importance to his errors and effect to his detraction, are far from alleviating his faults as an histo-

rian. His name is less glorious than that of Napoleon; his memory less sacred than truth.

It may be that the causes of his failure in one walk of literature, were the sources of his success in another. But a bigoted and fantastic zeal for the hereditary privileges of rank and royalty, when displayed ostentatiously in the light of reason, and mischievously obtruded on the business of nations, is not the less absurd and offensive, that, transmitted through the twilight of romance, it has conduced to the creation or embellishment of unreal characters and fictitious scenes. Their music and innocence, although they qualify the choristers of Rome to fill with harmony the domes of temples, and to touch with ecstasy the forms of devotion, would not exempt them from pity and aversion, should they go forth into the world and meddle with the affairs of bearded men.

The propriety of annexing to a life of the

Emperor Napoleon, an examination of the work of Sir Walter Scott, is enforced by several considerations. In the first place, that work controverts the assertions of Napoleon respecting matters of his personal experience, in the sketches which he dictated of his own life ; and so far raises a question, the decision of which is essential to a just estimation of his moral character. In the next place ; for an unknown writer to demand of the public the acceptance of his own narrative and the rejection of that of the most eloquent and popular author of his age, without demonstrating the fallacy of one and the faithfulness of the other, would be a proceeding as presumptuous as the example of Norvins has proved it to be vain.*

* Norvins announced (see his preface) his work as expressly designed to refute and discredit that of Sir Walter Scott—an effect which, notwithstanding his zeal and opportunities, he does not appear to have had the slightest agency in producing.

An engineer, rather than see his fortress overcrowded and commanded, will not hesitate to demolish a neighbouring edifice, however costly its materials or curious its workmanship; however pompously its foundations may be laid in the earth, or gracefully its spires may spring into the air.

Again; if it shall be found that the scheme of the great novelist embraced such misrepresentations as he could decently repeat or plausibly imagine, their correction will counteract, in its most imposing form, and by a single operation, a diversified mass of historical falsehood, and establish in the reader's mind, various and important truths. It is observed by Lord Bacon, that "the enquiry of truth, which is the wooing of it; the knowledge of truth, which is the presence of it; and the belief of truth, which is the enjoying of it; is the sovereign good of human nature."

Within the compass of the design here

indicated the task of noticing kindred and, conflicting errors of lesser writers, naturally falls. The author, removed from the influence of national or personal feeling, in relation to his subject, is sensible of as little disposition to respect the follies of French, as the unfairness of British, historians, while he records the actions of a man, whose character, in rising to a level with the noblest examples of any former age, provoked and encountered the vilest prejudices and passions of his own.



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THE LIFE
OF THE
EMPEROR NAPOLEON.

CHAPTER I.

From 1769 to 1785.

Corsica—Birth of Napoleon—His family—Circumstances attending his birth—Anecdotes of his infancy—His father, a deputy of the nobles to Versailles in 1779—Places him at the military school of Brienne—Anecdotes respecting him while at Brienne—Pichegru his comrade and tutor—His admiration for Turenne—His early transfer to the school of Paris—The Chevalier Keralio's opinion and report of him—Admiration of his instructors at Paris—His favourite authors—Anecdotes in regard to him while at the school of Paris—Noticed by the Abbé Raynal—Death of his father—His comrades at school—Examined by La Place—Receives his first commission as second lieutenant of artillery—Joins his regiment at Valence, in Dauphiné—His character at the time.

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THE island of Corsica, though known from the earliest ages, of considerable extent, and

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adjacent to the coasts of Italy and France, does not appear to have been the scene of any memorable event, until it became the birth place of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was born at Ajaccio, on the 15th of August, 1769. (1) His father was distinguished for eloquence and liberality; his mother respected for the pride of virtue, and the prudence of an independent spirit.

As the exertion of power awakens our wonder, its origin excites our curiosity. After contemplating the actions of great men, we are pleased to trace the course of their parentage; as travellers leave the currents of rivers to explore their sources, in untrodden wilds, in the clefts of rocks, and in barren mountains. In compliance with this general inclination, the following particulars respecting the Bonaparte family have, with more or less detail, been before related.

During the wars of the Guelph and Ghibelline factions in Italy, the Bonapartes were among the adherents of the latter, which was the liberal and defeated party. Expelled from Florence, the city from which Dante had been banished, a younger brother

of the family found a refuge and a home in Corsica. From this adventurous exile was descended Charles Bonaparte; who, though unprosperous and shortlived, was the sire of sovereigns, and among them of a monarch, to whom Emperors were suppliants, and who prostrated, pardoned, and created kings.

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The great grandfather of Napoleon had three sons—Joseph, Napoleon, and Lucien. The first of these had an only son, Charles; the second an only daughter, Elisabeth; the third who was a priest, long survived his brothers, and died in 1791 archdeacon of Ajaccio. The father of Napoleon was thus the eldest in descent, and the sole representative of his name in Corsica. From these circumstances, as well as from the ancient distinction of the family, which had been eminent in the church, had figured in the politics and literature of Italy, and which besides mingling its blood with the Orsini, the Lomellini, and the Medici, claimed descent from the imperial house of the Comneni, (2) great care was bestowed on his education. He studied at Pisa and Rome, and took the degree of doctor of laws.

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Returning home, handsome, intelligent, and accomplished, he won the affections of Letitia Ramolino, a young lady of the island, descended from a noble family of Naples, and remarkable for personal beauty and strength of character. They were married so young, that a connection which was deemed eligible in other respects, their friends disapproved as premature. The fruits of this marriage were, besides five children who died in infancy, Joseph, king of Spain; Napoleon; Lucien, prince of Canino; (3) Louis, king of Holland; Jerome, king of Westphalia; Eliza, grand duchess of Tuscany; Pauline, princess Borghese; and Caroline, queen of Naples.

The war of 1768, in which the Corsicans contended against the power of France in vain, found Charles Bonaparte at the head of his island clan (or *pieve*), and a friend and follower of Paoli. His wife, prompted by congenial spirit and the fervour of youthful love, resolved to share, if not his dangers, at least his hardships. In the disastrous campaign of 1769, accordingly, she followed the head quarters of the Corsican army, throughout that series of mountain

marches, which terminated in the battle of Ponte Novo, and the final defeat of Paoli.

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Charles Bonaparte at first resolved to accompany Paoli in his voluntary exile, being like him indignant at the subjugation of his country. But the situation of his wife requiring his immediate care and her longer residence in the island, he deferred his departure until a safe conduct was obtained for her from the French commander in chief. Then, while the father of Napoleon repaired to Porto Vecchio with intention to seek an asylum in England, his mother regained her solitary residence in Ajaccio, there to bring into the world, the future Emperor of France.

The period of her pregnancy was approaching, when influenced by distress and apprehension, rather than by the spirit of youth or beauty, Madam Bonaparte attended the celebration of mass on the day of the feast of the assumption. (4) The solemn ceremony was not concluded, when the first pangs of childbirth surprised her. Hastening home, she was met by a gentleman who, observing an uncommon glow in her countenance and lustre in her eyes, with

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a gallantry more natural than seasonable, made these effects of pain and agitation, subjects of compliment and praise. She was just able to reach her house and throw herself on a sofa in the parlour. When discovered by her domestics, the child was born and the mother had swooned. He came into the world as he rose to greatness, without assistance. (5)

About this time, Charles Bonaparte, overcome by tenderness for his family, and the expostulations of his uncle the archdeacon, declined his purposed emigration, and returned home.

In conformity with a custom of the family, the second son was christened Napoleon. Of his infancy little is known, as probably little was remarkable. He was healthy, sprightly, inquisitive and wilful; mastered his elder brother who was of a gentle disposition; disobeyed his father who was indulgent; but was submissive to his mother, who being of a firm and discreet character, united discipline with affection. He said of her, that she never overlooked a good or a bad action of her children; she said of him, that though wild and head-

strong, he was a kind brother and a good son. He was the favourite of his father, who by averting sometimes, and sometimes inviting the mother's authority, curbed or licensed the frolics of his darling boy (6). Thus lightly swayed were the impulses of a mind, which was soon to dazzle and to awe the world.

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When he was between five and six years of age, he was placed at a day school with some little girls who were older than himself. Caressed by them all, he was most attached to the little Giacominetta. Her companions, jealous of this preference, resented it as graver persons sometimes resent more serious slights, by ridicule and rhyme. When they walked out, he always held her hand, while his stockings often fell about his heels. His arch tormentors followed them singing. "Napoleone di mezza calzetta, fa l'amore a Giacominetta." (Napoleon with his stockings half off, is making love to Giacominetta.) This was the signal for instant battle. With sticks, stones, or whatever came in his way, he invaded the little throng; then, as afterwards, prompt in his attacks, and fearless of numbers.

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When he was somewhat older, his mother forbade the children climbing the fig trees in the vineyard. At length Napoleon took it into his head to long for some of the figs. They were ripe and tempting, the opportunity seemed good, and he embraced it. Having satisfied his appetite he was filling his pockets, when the keeper of the vineyard came upon him. Petrified with terror he clung helpless to a branch of the tree. The keeper threatened to tie him and conduct him to his mother. He begged for mercy, fear made him eloquent, and the keeper appeared to relent. The next day however his mother expressed an ominous wish to gather some of these figs. They were all gone; and the keeper being summoned, the culprit was exposed and chastised. How difficult to conceive the twice-crowned conqueror, whose frown darkened the face of Europe, trembling in a fig tree at the threat of a peasant!

It was observed by his mother, that when he first went to school, he was not remarkable for quickness of apprehension; but that having once surpassed his comrades, he was greatly delighted, and never after-

wards lost his superiority. (7) It would seem that, while his mind refused the influence of ordinary incitements, it was highly stimulated by the consciousness of merit, exercising a degree of free will, and requiring a certain dignity of motive, even in its infantile efforts.

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It is said that his favourite plaything was a small cannon, and his chosen retreat, a grotto, formed by an arching rock, and overlooking the sea. The first circumstance is too common to be characteristic; fondness for handling arms betrayed the sex, not the disposition of Achilles. The second, if true, probably expanded his mind with some of its earliest visions; for grand must have been the impression of the sea, even on the infant energies, of a soul as boundless and sublime as itself. In manhood, the sight of the desert, which he called *a solid Ocean*, affected him strongly, elevating his imagination with a sense of immensity.

It having been the object of the French government to incorporate Corsica with France, their policy was of consequence conciliating. They established a provincial parliament, thus placing the new conquest

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on a footing with the old provinces; and as an additional favour, continued the existing magistracy of the twelve nobles, in whom the local executive authority resided. Charles Bonaparte was a member of this magistracy; and although he had resisted to the last, both in the army and in a convention which was held after the battle of Ponte Novo, the domination of France, (8) he was induced to acquiesce in the new order of things, by these and other favourable measures. He was soon gratified by the appointment of assessor to the Royal Court of Ajaccio; a situation which, besides increasing his influence, augmented his income, scarce adequate, in consequence of sacrifices and losses in the war, to his liberal habits and growing family.

In 1779, the parliament of Corsica sent a deputation to Versailles. Charles Bonaparte, who besides his other qualifications for such a mission, was an eloquent and enlightened advocate, was chosen deputy for the nobles, as was the bishop of Nebbio for the clergy, and one of the Casa Biancas for the commons. It was time to provide for the education of his two sons, Joseph and Napoleon,

the first being eleven and the second near ten years of age; and as a situation in France was now preferable to one in Italy, for that purpose, he determined to take them with him to Paris. He passed through Florence, where his name and the rank of his family, were remembered. The Grand Duke Leopold, gave him a letter of recommendation to his sister, the queen of France. He was graciously received by that unfortunate princess, and was a guest at the banquets of Versailles. Having discharged his public duty, he proceeded to dispose of his sons. Their inclinations probably determined their destination. Joseph was placed in a classical seminary at Autun; and the policy of the government facilitating it, admittance was obtained for Napoleon, in the month of April, as a king's scholar, at the royal military school of Brienne. (9)

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At this period there were two French generals in authority in Corsica, whose conflicting pretensions created two parties. M. de Narbonne Pellet, was haughty and violent; M. de Marbeuf, was mild and affable. The former, being of high birth and superior interest, was likely to prevail

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over his rival. Fortunately for M. de Marbeuf, the deputation, with Charles Bonaparte at its head, arrived at the moment when this competition was under consideration. He was consulted by the minister, and made representations which effectually sustained M. de Marbeuf.

The nephew of Marbeuf, who was archbishop of Lyons, and minister of ecclesiastical affairs, acknowledged this act of well-timed justice; and, learning that M. de Bonaparte was conducting his son to the school of Brienne, introduced him by letter to a noble family of that name, residing there. This was the commencement of that kindness which the families of de Brienne and de Marbeuf extended to young Bonaparte, and which, from sportive malice or disappointed emulation, was ascribed by his school-fellows to a different cause. The aspersion being nourished by the press, and the policy of England, outlived the usual date of such ephemeræ. The manly beauty and graceful accomplishments of Charles Bonaparte, the advanced age of M. de Marbeuf, and the character of Madam Bonaparte, were circumstances which rendered the story ri-

diculous, while they proved it to be untrue. (10)

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At the school of Brienne, the young Corsican was not long in showing a disposition and ability to excel. He seemed to abound in sensibility and genius. If the last obtained him triumphs, the first exposed him to mortifications. His preceptors praised, but his comrades persecuted him. They ridiculed his Italian accent, mocked his imperfect French, and derided his comparative poverty; they called him a foreigner, the brat of a Corsican attorney, the bastard of the Count Marbeuf. As love for his parents, and affection for his home, were heightened by recent separation from both, he keenly resented these insults; and his spirit in combating boys his superiors in age and in size, associated in a cabal against him, soon secured him friends. It was observed, that even when worsted, he never succumbed nor complained; and, though provoked and injured, could not be induced, when in the routine of duty he became superintendant of the class, to report the misconduct of the boys by whose annoyance he himself had suffered. Rather than swerve from this point

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of honour, he preferred enduring imprisonment, which he submitted to on one occasion, for the space of three days. (11)

These injuries and mortifications, though manfully supported, as they were felt to be unjust and found to be unavoidable, sunk deep into his youthful heart, which was disposed to overflows of feeling and ardent attachments. Their influence on his temper soon discovered itself by a change in his habits. From being sprightly, confident, and joyous, he became quiet, sensitive, and solitary; fonder of his books than of his schoolfellows. (12) He naturally associated, in the same resentment, the wrongs inflicted on his native island with the sneers aimed at himself, and unconsciously infused the merit of public grief into his own puerile vexations. Thus was kindled that intense patriotism which animated his whole life; which warmed his boyish indignation; directed his youthful studies; inspired his greatest actions; and sanctified the dignity of his last request.

He was too capable of acquiring knowledge to be long insensible of its value. His application accordingly seemed less a matter

of duty than of choice; and his attention to discipline to be directed more by a sentiment of order than by the force of rules. Studious and reserved, he was rather respected than popular in the school; but when he did engage in the sports or enterprises of the little republic, his strength and fertility of character made him at once its dictator.

From 1769
to 1785.

The following anecdotes, relating to this period of his life, are accounted authentic.

Soon after his arrival at Brienne, with all his natural vivacity about him, he was shown into a hall in which was a portrait of the Duke of Choiseul. The sight of this minister, who had defrauded Corsica of independence, excited his indignation so strongly, that he indulged it in epithets of abuse, in defiance of the rank and power of its object, and in spite of the reprehension and menaces of the professors.

The first time he dined at the table of the principal, that person, with a view of trying the spirit of his guest, spoke ill of Paoli. The young Corsican interrupted him instantly, stoutly exclaiming — “Paoli is a great man, he loved his country, and I shall never forgive my father for consenting to

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the union of Corsica with France. He ought to have followed the fortunes of Paoli."

When some of the boys were reproaching him with his Corsican birth and accent, he expressed warmly to a friend this comprehensive menace.—"I will do these French of yours all the harm I can:" a sense of power thus early quickening within him. His threat expired with the flash of temper which prompted it; for he befriended with unequalled liberality the companions of his early days: his only revenge consisted in excelling them.

In the severe winter of 1780, he persuaded his comrades to construct a fortress of snow; and applying rules drawn from the science of their common study, protected the work by regular fortifications. Passing from the duties of an engineer to the functions of a general, he divided the stripling band into two parties, and had the fortress attacked and defended with a degree of vigour and skill, which besides evincing his proficiency, was thought to exhibit a remarkable power of rousing and directing the energy of others.

On the days of the fêtes of Brienne, for the purpose of preventing an influx of strangers into the school, guards were mounted, with orders to admit no person without a pass. It happened once when Bonaparte was the officer on duty, the portress, who was in the habit of selling milk, fruit, eggs, cakes, etc., to the students, counting on her personal consideration among them, presented herself without a pass; and, upon being stopped by the sentinel, loudly insisted on admittance. The sergeant of the guard reported the fact to Bonaparte, who, though only thirteen years of age, did not hesitate between the inclinations of the boy, and the duties of the officer; but, with that firmness of character, and aversion to disorder, for which he was always remarkable, called out in a tone of command,—“Remove instantly that woman, who is bringing here the license of a camp.” This woman, who was named Hauté, he afterwards established with her husband comfortably at Malmaison.

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A fair was to be held in the vicinity of Brienne, and the students were desirous of attending it; but, as they had quarrelled with

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the country people on a previous occasion, the professors issued an order confining them on the day of the approaching fair, within the gates of the college. This painful restriction excited the enterprise and invention of young Bonaparte. Under his direction the students undermined a segment of the wall, conducting the operation so secretly, and adjusting it so nicely, that the sapped space tumbled down on the morning of the fair; which, by this stratagem they were enabled to visit without violating the order.

His superiority of genius and efficiency of character, while they secured his ascendancy in the school, and, generally, the respect of the faculty, seem to have been considered as reprehensible forwardness by illiberal observers. Accordingly one of the teachers, taking advantage of some slight irregularity, condemned him to wear a penitential dress, and to dine on his knees at the door of the refectory. He uttered neither complaint nor supplication, yet felt the indignity so acutely, that, at the moment it was about to be inflicted, he fell into convulsions; distress overcoming the strength of his body, but not the

fortitude of his mind. The principal of the school happening to pass by, and father Patrault, professor of mathematics, warmly interposing in behalf of his favourite pupil, he was rescued from the undeserved punishment, and the brutal pedagogue.

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It is worthy of remark that Pichegru, who was a charity scholar at Brienne, was his tutor in the mathematical class, and that France was rearing together in one of her schools, the conqueror of Holland, and the dictator of Europe—the patriot who was the terror of Bourbons and foreigners, and the traitor who was a tool in their hands.

In matters of principle he manifested, even at Brienne, an inflexibility so striking that it made a lasting impression on Pichegru. In 1796, when this last was conspiring to betray his country, being consulted by a royalist agent upon the expediency of attempting to gain over the commander of the army of Italy, he bore unwilling testimony to his former comrade's integrity and firmness. "It would be a waste of time; I knew him at school; his character is inflexible; he has taken his side and will never change it."

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The studies in which he excelled were those chiefly pursued in the school, and directly embraced in the profession of arms—mathematics, history, and geography. But as the instinct of power is the early consciousness of a vigorous mind, a desire of influence was probably one of his primary motives; and it is therefore reasonable to infer, without reference to his subsequent career, that he might have been at Brienne, as ardent and successful in the study of eloquence and politics, as he was in acquiring the rudiments of war. (13)

A lady who was conversing with him on the subject of his studies, mentioned the name of Turenne, reproaching the memory of that great general with having laid waste the Palatinate. “And why not, madam,” eagerly demanded the future victor, “if it was necessary to the success of his designs?” This anecdote, in the spirit of which may be discovered the embryo of that gigantic decision which was exemplified in his raising the siege of Mantua, as well as his ardent admiration of Turenne, shows how soon his understanding was capable of com-

bining the extended reasoning of military policy, with the technical conclusions of the art of war. (14)

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From observations which dropped from him at St. Helena, it appears his powers of reflection were so active and strong in the season of early youth, that the sentiments of religious faith which the affection of his mother, and the piety of his uncle, had instilled into his childhood, became disturbed in the course of his fourteenth year, by those doubts of reason, from which ordinary minds are free, until they are infested by the pride of manhood.

In 1784, the Chevalier Keralio, who, as inspector-general of the military schools, was charged with the selection of pupils for promotion to the school of Paris, selected Bonaparte, though he was rather under the proper age, as one of the number to be sent from Brienne. As he was better acquainted with the sciences than the languages, the masters of the school proposed detaining him a year longer, in order that he might improve his knowledge of the classics, alleging that he was not yet fifteen. "No," replied M. de

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Keralio ; “I know what I am doing ; if I transgress the rule respecting age, it is not from favour to any particular family, for I am not acquainted with that of this lad ; it is solely from regard to his merit. I discover in him a spark of genius which cannot be too carefully cherished.” (15) The chevalier, who was an author on tactics, had conceived a great affection for the young Corsican. Soon after the examination, this inspector of the school was advanced to other employment ; but his successor adopted his decision, and Bonaparte, with four other students, was transferred in October, 1784, from the Royal school of Brienne, to that of Paris. (16)

Marshal Ségur, was then minister of war. Among his official papers, there exists a minute under the head of *the school of Brienne* (a transcript of the report of M. de Keralio to the king), which shews that scientific acquirements were much less esteemed in the French army, when Bonaparte commenced, than when he ended his military life. For after noting his age, size, and assiduity, and remarking that he

was *tractable, honest, and grateful*, the writer of the minute adds—"would make an excellent seaman." It is remarkable that when Washington was about the same age, a midshipman's warrant in the British navy was obtained for him; and he was prevented from becoming "an excellent seaman," solely by the timid objections of his mother.(17) Had both or either of these suggestions been effectuated, how different from what it now is, might have been the state of the civilized world!

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His faculties being developed by growth and strengthened by exercise, Bonaparte's superiority was more marked and impressive at the school of Paris even than it was at that of Brienne. The celebrated Monge, who was his instructor in geometry, formed a high opinion of his capacity. M. de l'Eguille, the professor of history, declared he would become a great man, and to his name in the class-book affixed this note, "A Corsican by birth and character; he will distinguish himself if favoured by circumstances,"—alluding probably to his vivacity of genius, ardent sensibility, and passionate application, which gave an unsocial cast to his character, and an orien-

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tal warmth and splendour to his elocution. The professor of belles-lettres was so forcibly struck by this property of his style, that he at once imitated and described it, by calling his original and vivid amplifications, "blocks of granite issuing hot from a volcano." As Bonaparte discovered no aptitude for the German language, the German teacher was no believer in his extraordinary intelligence, affirming, when told that he was already undergoing his examination for the artillery, that he "always thought mathematicians blockheads."

Study, the labour of most young minds, was, to his, recreation, and seemed now to engross his faculties with the absorbing force of a passion. His preference for history continuing to prevail, Polybius and Arrien, but more especially Tacitus and Plutarch, were his favourite authors; one presenting to his mind admirable portraits of heroes and legislators; the other enriching his judgment with profound maxims of political wisdom—both inculcating lessons of patriotism and virtue, contempt for weakness, and abhorrence of vice. His application was as fruitful as strenuous, for though

his succeeding years were too active to admit of much reading, he displayed through life, a familiar and accurate acquaintance with ancient history. There are probably few exercises in which mental vigour is more readily discovered, than in imbibing and assimilating historical knowledge.

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Macpherson's *Ossian*, which was then sanctioned by the Scotch critics as a collection of genuine translations, and had been recently rendered into Italian, he read like most youths of his time with curiosity and admiration; and as it was really an ingenious compound of the finest thoughts, expressions, incidents, and characters to be found in Homer, Virgil, Milton, and Tasso, and was recommended to his taste by the beauty of Cesarotti's version, it was one of the poetical works in which he most delighted.

The boast and glory of his native tongue also shared his youthful admiration. In the dreadful campaign of 1814, he observed a tree near Brienne, under the shade of which, in the days of peace and boyhood, he had read the *Jerusalem Delivered*, and admired deeds and battles less heroic than his own.

During his stay at the school of Paris, two

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occurrences have been mentioned which appear characteristic, one of the reach of his mind, and one of its readiness. The archbishop of Paris held a confirmation at the military school. At the name *Napoleon*, he expressed surprise, and said there was no saint of that name in the calendar. "That is no objection to him," promptly observed the youth, "since there are a host of saints, and but three hundred and sixty-five days to dispose of among them."

The expense of education and living maintained in the royal school he found very great; proportioned rather to the habits of the rich and the luxuries of the capital, than to the expectations of the students, or the value of the instruction imparted to them. He prepared a memoir on the subject, pointing out the disadvantages of sumptuousness, as well to those who could, as to those who could not afford to continue it. In this remarkable paper, after insisting that this expensive living tended to render the students frivolous and self-sufficient, he recommended that they should be made to eat coarse bread, to brush their own clothes, and clean their own boots, adding that fru-

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gal allowances and simple fare would make them "robust, able to support the inclemencies of weather and the toils of war, and fit them to inspire the soldiers with respect and attachment." Remarks like these, while they must be allowed to show a surprising range of observation and maturity of judgment, in a youth of fifteen, discover also how soon the self-exalting spring of his genius was beginning to act, elevating him above his own situation, and enabling him to look down on that of others.

About this period also he is said to have formed liberal political opinions, which he indulged so far as to express himself in a letter to his parents, disrespectfully of the kingly office. The letter being submitted, according to the regulations of the school, to the professor of belles lettres, this sentiment was of course reprobated, the letter was destroyed and the writer rebuked. Afterwards when he was first consul, having occasion to employ a preceptor for his brother Jerome, he sent for his old instructor in belles lettres, and reverting kindly to their former acquaintance, reminded him of the fate to which he had doomed his unlucky epistle.

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In the course of one of his lectures, the professor of history at Paris introduced the revolt of the Constable of Bourbon, and enlarged, with loyal emphasis, on the enormity of his fighting against his king. This view of the subject did not satisfy the mind of Bonaparte, whose finer feeling and nicer judgment, discriminated at once between patriotism and loyalty. The Constable's crime he justly apprehended, consisted not in fighting against his *king*, but in uniting with foreigners to make war on *his own country*. A mind like this, it was not in the power of temptation or adversity, to degrade to the part of Bernadotte or Moreau.

His reputation soon reached beyond the limits of his school, and attracted the notice of the Abbé Raynal, who paid him flattering attentions.

While he was thus enlarging the circle of his knowledge, and unfolding the rich promise of his character, his father died of a cancer of the stomach, at Montpellier. (18) In this son were centered his hopes and affections—so strongly, that although Joseph was the attendant of his sick bed, his dying

thoughts were fixed on Napoleon. On his name he was heard frequently to call, and in moments of delirious agony, to invoke the succour of his *mighty sword*. As if the clouds which darkened the death-bed of the parent, were tinged with prospects of the greatness and glory that were to descend upon his son. As it does not appear that Napoleon had visited Corsica from the time of his entering the school of Brienne, his last interview with his father most probably took place when the latter came to Paris for medical advice, on the first access of his disorder. Of course he knew very little of this parent.

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Among his fellow students, two individuals are mentioned, whose names are eventually connected with his own. Philippeaux, who, at Acre, under hostile banners, contributed to arrest the course of his Syrian conquests; and Lauriston, his favourite aide-de-camp, whose protracted and ineffectual negotiations with Kutusoff, contributed not to shorten his delay at Moscow.

In September, 1785, his diligence and aptitude having again accelerated his examination, he received his first appointment in the army; a second lieutenancy in the regi-

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ment of La Fère, or the 1st artillery. (19) His success on this occasion was the more creditable, as his examination in the important branch of mathematics, was conducted by the great La Place. He is said to have been transported with joy at finding himself an officer; an emotion proportioned less to the inconsiderable event itself, than to the vast career which it opened. He joined his regiment forthwith at Valence in Dauphiné, and there first did duty as an officer.

Pausing to contemplate him, when thus emerging from the restraints of adolescence, it will appear that he was a youth fit to be loved with devotion by a friend, and with pride by a parent; that he was sensitive yet ingenuous, grateful but not vindictive, and though obstinate against injury, tractable to kindness; capacious of knowledge, and ardent in pursuing it, not as a badge of boyish superiority, but as an instrument for intellectual purposes. The progress of his understanding though rapid was steady, proportioned, not only to the strength of genius in which its impulse originated, but to the extent of advancement which its maturity was to reach. It was natural that his pre-

ceptors should have entertained, with affection for his person, anticipations of his greatness; and it is probable they were not more gratified at seeing their predictions fulfilled, than surprised at the degree to which they were surpassed by his exploits.

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CHAPTER II.

From 1785 to 1793.

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Napoleon in garrison at Valence in Dauphiné — Madam Colombier's kindness and esteem for him — In love with her daughter — His success in society — His comrades in the regiment — His prize essay successful in the academy of Lyons — His history of Corsica — Commended by the Abbé Raynal — In garrison at Auxonne — Near being drowed in the Saône — Prince of Condé — Bonaparte's public letter to the Corsican deputy Buttafoco — Kindness to his brother Louis — Promoted to a first lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble — Returns to Valence — Anecdote — General Dutheil — Bonaparte's liberal political opinions — Rescues a brother officer — Visits Corsica — Death of his father's uncle — Anecdote — Promoted to a captaincy — Commands a Corsican battalion, and suppresses a riot at Ajaccio — The first slander against him — Goes to Paris — Remarks on the horrors of the 20th of June, and 10th of August — Reflection — Interest about his sisters — Returns to Corsica — The expedition against Sardinia — Paoli — Anecdote — Refuses to join Paoli — Paoli's cruelty to the Bonaparte family — Civil war

in Corsica — Bonaparte active on the side of France — Paoli calls in the English — Corsica subdued by England — Madam Bonaparte takes refuge on the continent, and settles at Marseilles — Bonaparte joins the army of Italy — Writes and publishes “Le Souper de Beaucaire.”

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At the head of the society of Valence, when Lieutenant Bonaparte joined his regiment, was Madam Colombier, a lady of amiable character and penetrating mind. The officers of the garrison were invited to her parties, where she soon noticed and liberally encouraged, the strong and brilliant faculties of young Bonaparte. She introduced him to her acquaintances and recommended him to her friends, especially to the Abbé de St. Rufe, by whose hospitality he was associated with the most distinguished persons of the province. His mother supplied him with an allowance which, added to his pay, placed him above the inconveniences of a narrow income. He became a favourite with his commanding officer, was of an age to feel the allurements of society as well as the attractions of knowledge, and entered its circles with pleasure and success. His slight elegant form, classical expressive face, original

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conversation, in which flashes of genius incessantly appeared, excited general admiration; and being new to life and its fashions, he pleased without the rules of pleasing, and therefore pleased the more. (1)

Mademoiselle Colombier was about his own age. It was natural that he should see the graces of his friend's daughter, that she should perceive the merits of her mother's favourite; and a sentiment of tenderness arose between them. Having established the usual intelligence of lovers, they met one morning by day break in an orchard, where their passionate indulgence consisted in eating cherries together. This was his first love; pure as the dew on the cherries, it proved to be as transient, and appears to have been as cool.

It was not without incurring the envy of his comrades, that he led this life of privilege and pleasure in the kind and happy society of Valence. This feeling does not appear to have disturbed his enjoyment at the time, nor to have stood in the way of their future good fortune; for, of his messmates at Valence, six lived to receive marks of his particular favour; viz., Lariboissière,

Sorbier, Desmazzis, d'Hedouville, Roland, and Mabilie. (2)

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Madam Colombier died soon after the commencement of the revolution, in the success of which she is said to have taken a warm interest. Her enthusiastic esteem for young Bonaparte continued to the last. Though he had left Valence, she mentioned him on her death bed, and told those around her, that if he was not prematurely cut off, his career in life would certainly be glorious. He always spoke of her as his benefactress, and when he had more than verified her predictions, testified his respect for her memory by making a munificent provision for her daughter. If Madam Colombier deserved his gratitude, she demands the notice of his biographer, as being the only person to whom his *infant fortune* was indebted.

Society, its charms and flatteries, the envy of young men and the favour of young ladies, did not allay his thirst for knowledge or for fame. He chanced to be quartered at the house of a bookseller who allowed him the free use of his miscellaneous assortment of volumes. Most of those during his stay at Valence, he read over and over, pushing his

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studies beyond the limits of his profession and the taste of his class, into the distant regions of ecclesiastical history and papal government. Even from this irregular reading he appears to have gleaned a fund of sound and applicable knowledge. At the age of eighteen he became a competitor for literary honours. The academy of Lyons offered a prize for the best essay on the following question, proposed by the Abbé Raynal.—“What are the principles and institutions, the application of which is most conducive to the happiness of society?” A subject so abstract and comprehensive, it required boldness to undertake, and ability to manage. Bonaparte it seems, though but a stripling, was deficient in neither prerequisite, and his anonymous essay not only gained the academical prize, but general applause. Cast in a liberal political mould, it coincided with the literary spirit and popular feeling of the time, and to that circumstance doubtless, owed in some degree its success. But there was a force of logic, and an energy of feeling and expression in the essay, which under any circumstances must have been admired. The upward progress of its author, soon left this

small title to credit beneath him. When however he had risen high in the firmament of power and glory, it was retrieved by the officious flattery of Talleyrand. The Emperor, with a fastidiousness proper to his elevation, and common to men of great genius, saw, in his juvenile essay, nothing but its imperfections, and threw it into the fire. A copy, it seems, had been taken by his brother Louis, and the essay is now in print.

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About this time too, actuated by a noble veneration for the place of his birth, and the land of his fathers, he undertook to compose a history of Corsica. He made some progress in the work, which, with a proper feeling of respect, he dedicated to the Abbé Raynal. But though thus early and strongly inclined to authorship, the disposition appears to have proceeded more from the abundance of his resources, and the creative ardour of his mind, than from a predilection for pursuits so meditative. His essay toward a history of Corsica was read and commended by the Abbé Raynal, who in vain advised its publication. The production itself is lost, but the familiarity which its preparation had given its author with the subject,

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no doubt furnished his retentive memory with the materials, out of which was constructed the clear and succinct account of Corsica, which he dictated at St. Helena.

In consequence of popular disturbances at Lyons, in the year 1788, his regiment was ordered to that city. From Lyons it was transferred to Auxonne, and it was while there that he was near being drowned in the Saône. In swimming, he was seized with the cramp, and sunk so suddenly, that his companions thought he was diving. After struggling some time he lost his recollection, and drifted to a distance by the current, was lodged on a sand bank. Here his comrades, after giving him up as lost, recovered him before it was too late.

In 1790, while he was stationed at Auxonne, the Prince of Condé announced his intention of inspecting the school of artillery at that place. The name, as well as the rank of this personage, rendered his visit an important occasion for the garrison. The Commandant therefore, determined to place the most accomplished, instead of the oldest, officer, at the head of the battery, and Bonaparte was of course the officer selected. His

comrades, to revenge their being postponed to him, secretly spiked his guns the night before the review. But the military glance of the future conqueror, was already too quick and pervasive to be surprised. Before the prince came upon the ground, he had detected and frustrated the scheme, and at the appointed hour, was in full readiness to receive him.

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Little could the prince have foreseen that in the youth before him stood the chief, who was to eclipse the renown of his name, and to shorten its succession.

The young officers of the garrison, who were *élèves* of the royal seminaries, were associated in the exercises of the school at Auxonne. A mathematical problem of great difficulty having been proposed for their study, Bonaparte, in order to accomplish its solution, confined himself to his chamber seventy-two hours without intermission. His power of application, in truth, seems to have been as remarkable as his genius.

It was during his residence at Auxonne, that he wrote and published his letter to Buttafoco, the Corsican deputy of the nobles in the national assembly. Besides force of

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invective, and reasoning, this letter exhibits a patriotic spirit, and a sense of popular rights, which must have removed all doubt as to the political inclination of the author, with regard to the revolution. It concludes with an apostrophe to the great patriots and orators of the assembly, which would alone be sufficient to show that, like Cæsar, had Bonaparte cultivated rhetoric, he would have rivalled the greatest masters of eloquence. The effect of this letter was equal to its intrinsic excellence, and greater than any expectation which the age or station of its author could have excited. It was adopted and republished by the patriotic society of Ajaccio, who, under its influence, passed a resolution, attaching the epithet *infamous*, to the name of their noble deputy. About this period, he was in treaty with M. Joly, a bookseller of the neighbouring town of Dôle, for the publication of his history of Corsica. But partly from diffidence, and partly from the indecision occasioned by his approaching transfer to another regiment, he seems to have dropped the project, without putting the last hand to his work, or completing the agreement.

The office of chaplain having been abo-
lished by the government, the clerical orna-
ments and sacred implements of the regi-
ment, were deposited in Bonaparte's care at
Auxonne. He showed them to M. Joly, and
expressing himself respectfully with regard
to religious observances, said: "If you have
never heard Mass I can repeat it to you."

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The functions of his uncle and his mother's example had made him from his childhood, familiar with the forms of the Catholic church.

That course of protection, which he extended so liberally and so constantly, to the members of his family, he seems to have commenced when a simple lieutenant. At Auxonne, his brother Louis, then but ten years of age, was under his care and instruction, shared his meals, and occupied a room in his quarters. (3) It was by his care that Louis received the religious information necessary for a communicant, and by his exhortations, that he took the sacrament of the Lord's Supper—conduct on the part of Napoleon, which was not only kind and considerate as a brother, but affectionate and respectful as a son.

In consequence of his promotion to a first

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lieutenancy in the regiment of Grenoble, or the 4th artillery, he left Auxonne in 1790, and returned to his old station of Valence, where the regiment of Grenoble was quartered. Here he became acquainted with young d'Hedouville who was an officer in that regiment. They were in the same mess, and sat beside each other at table. Among the rules of the mess was one imposing a fine on any member, who at meals, should introduce a professional subject. Bonaparte's fondness for his profession made him, it was observed, the most frequent infractor, and a constant victim of this rule. (4)

Attended by his friend and comrade Desmazis he made an excursion from Valence into Burgundy as far as Mont Cenis, a town, famous for its manufacture of chrystal. On his way he stopped at Nuits and was invited to sup with Gassendi, a captain of his regiment, who had married the daughter of a physician residing there. Gassendi was a royalist, his father-in-law a patriot. Their opposition was displayed by a warm discussion at supper, in which Bonaparte's superior intelligence and logic, were so efficient on the side of the doctor, that he visited his guest

next morning in his chamber, and thanked him in flattering terms for his interposition. The eloquence and patriotism of the young officer, became the subject of conversation in the town. It was Sunday, and when he walked out, the people in the streets pulled off their hats to him as the champion of their cause. But the triumph of the morning was overcast at night. He was invited to pass the evening at the house of Madam Méry, a lady of wealth and fashion, who entertained all the aristocracy of the district. Here having expressed some of his opinions, they were assailed and reprobated with the utmost violence. He attempted a war of words, but overpowered by noise and numbers, was able to extricate himself only by the assistance of his hostess, who gracefully parried the blows which he could not resist. This incident, though it mortified him for the moment, contributed still farther to connect his name and feelings with the cause of the people. Of this trip, in which his curiosity and friendship were both gratified, and which appears to have been the last as well as the first, he ever performed from mere motives of pleasure, his recollection was so agreeable, that he conceived for the moment

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an idea of writing a description of it after the manner of Sterne, and spoke of it in after life with peculiar complacency, calling it his *sentimental journey*.

Though reflective in the general bent of his mind, it would seem that when under the influence of professional duties and pleasing recreations, the shade of early mortification having passed away from his temper, he was become companionable and cheerful. His success in society at Valence, has been mentioned already, and at St. Helena he himself recorded various little anecdotes, indicative of the sportive disposition of his youth. As a sample of these anecdotes, this may be repeated. An octogenary general undertook to exercise the young officers in gunnery, and was very intent on tracing the balls with his spy-glass. Bonaparte persuaded the young men to fire blank cartridges. The veteran could not of course discover where the balls struck, and reproached the wags with taking very wide aim. Their amusement consisted more in fun than in wit; in witnessing the general's eagerness in looking out for balls which were not fired, and asking the bystanders where they struck. After five or six rounds, he suspected the trick and ordered

the balls to be counted. He laughed heartily at the joke, but notwithstanding, had its prepetrators put under a momentary arrest. This veteran was General Duthiel, for whose memory, evidence of respect and a title to honour, are found in Napoleon's will.

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The revolution was now decisively in progress, and the political disunions by which it eventually distracted the nation, were making their way into the army. The soldiers, having the soundest feelings, were first affected by the patriotic spirit. Gradually it spread from them to the officers, and after the famous and comprehensive oath of allegiance "to the nation, the law, and the king," was prescribed by the national assembly, officers of superior rank and aristocratic connections, espoused the popular side of the question. Bonaparte who had given early and frequent evidence of this disposition, and who was confirmed in it by the promulgation of the oath, acquired in addition to the authority conferred by professional talent, the influence arising from political sympathy with the men. In consequence, he and his adherents were able to manage the corps, although a preponderance of officers in rank if not in

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number was against them. This control he exercised with generosity, and rescued from a military mob an officer who had excited the fury of the soldiers, by singing, at the window of the mess-room, the famous royalist song, "Oh Richard, Oh my King;" a song, which was one day to be proscribed on his account. Thus, though deeply imbued with the liberal principles by which the revolutionary party was actuated, he was not tainted by their cruelty, nor even their intolerance. Indeed in reference to the motives of the opposite parties, he made subsequently this sound and just remark; "Had I been a general officer I might have adhered to the king; a young lieutenant, I sided with the revolution." (5)

It appears that about this time he was in correspondence with the celebrated Paoli, on the subject of his history of Corsica, and on the prospect of a more liberal state of things, which by the enlightened labours of the national assembly, was dawning on the nation. Paoli, in consequence of the success of Mirabeau's motion for the recal of the Corsican exiles, left England in 1790, and after being received with signal honour at Paris, was

hailed on his arrival in Corsica with joyful demonstrations of general respect. The Corsicans placed in his hands whatever power they had to confer; the confidence of the Government was not inferior to the attachment of the people; and Paoli was appointed Lieutenant General in the army, and Commander in chief of the military division which comprehended the island.

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This was the state of things in Corsica when in September, 1791, Bonaparte, after an absence of more than twelve years visited his native town on furlough. He had left it a wild, sprightly boy, he returned to it an accomplished officer, with powers of conception and expression singularly strong, and with a name already known in politics and letters. He joined his family in time to witness the last days of its second father, the good arch-deacon, who had bestowed on it a parent's care. This venerable relative was so firmly persuaded of Napoleon's worth and genius, that on his death-bed he called the children around him, and accompanied his last blessing with this advice: "Joseph, you are the eldest of the sons, but remember what I say, Napoleon is the head of the house."

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As Joseph was by no means deficient in promise, the spirit of the injunction could not be misapprehended. It seems to have made a deep impression on the mind of Napoleon, and to have influenced his conduct as well as the expectations of his family, through life.

His power in the circle of his brethren, was the same which he exerted in the world at large, and the judgment of the secluded and expiring prelate, was confirmed by the devoted obedience of armies, and the deliberate confidence of a great nation. The feeling of the relative was directed by sagacity, the judgment of the people was actuated by affection, so that the ascendancy of Napoleon, whether viewed in its domestic or public character, may be said to have arisen from those legitimate sources, which nature implants and reason consecrates—the light of man's understanding, and the warmth of his heart.(6)

Her protecting son being in the army, Madam Bonaparte was compelled to assume the personal superintendence of the family affairs. These were by no means prosperous; for although the archdeacon left some ready money, his ecclesiastical income of

course ceased with his life, and the costly and unsuccessful experiments of Charles Bonaparte in reclaiming an extensive salt marsh, had seriously impaired his estate. (7) In these circumstances, however, the fortitude and good sense of his widow effected much. She managed her property with care and economy, and her children with that prudence and affection, which have evinced through a long and eventful life, the excellence of her character.

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In February, 1792, a general promotion, which was accelerated by the emigration of many officers, raised Bonaparte to the rank of captain. The divisions generated by the revolution had extended themselves to Corsica, where, modified by circumstances peculiar to the history of that island, they appeared in the shape of a party in favour of maintaining the union with France, and a party opposed to it. For the purpose of preserving the public peace, and supporting the legal authorities, a corps of local troops was raised in Corsica, and the provisional command of one of the battalions was intrusted to Bonaparte. The insurgents, or anti-union party, had at first the sympathy, and

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finally the countenance, of Paoli; and Ajaccio was the focus of its proceedings. Hence it happened that Bonaparte's first act of war, was exerted in opposition to the sentiments of his father's commander, and in the suppression of a tumult in his native town. Peraldi, a popular leader of a rival clan and the opposite party, who breathed hereditary enmity to the Bonaparte family, was at the head of the discomfited rioters; a circumstance which was not likely to soften the inveteracy of a clannish feud. Accordingly, he denounced Bonaparte to the government, as the secret instigator of the disorder which he had openly quelled. This accusation, prompted by vengeance, was unsupported by truth. But it rendered a journey to Paris advisable, where, though the sanguinary temper of power was beginning to encourage delation, Bonaparte found no difficulty in vindicating his conduct.

This slander of Peraldi is memorable as being coeval with the earliest of Napoleon's public services, and as the first in that long succession of falsehoods, which under the warmth and lustre of his merit, were exhaled from the disorder, malice, and corruption

of his age. Though frustrated in its aim, it was not without effect in his history, as it From 1785
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was the occasion of his witnessing the outrages of the populace on the 20th of June and the 10th of August. On the first occasion, it is said, that upon seeing from the river terrace of the garden of the Tuileries the King present himself at a balcony of the palace, wearing the red cap of liberty, which, intimidated by the rabble, he had clapped upon his head, Bonaparte expressed indignation at the monarch's weakness, and exclaimed:—

“How could they suffer the mob to enter the palace? It was only necessary to sweep off a few hundreds of them with cannon, and the rest would have been running now.” His contempt for a rout of this kind, originating in his love of order and pride of discipline, and his confidence in the application of military force, were both strengthened doubtless by his recent experience in Corsica. (8)

He was still more shocked by the sanguinary excesses of the 10th of August. The brave and immolated Swiss guards, their bodies lying in heaps on the pavement of the court, and their heads paraded about on

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pikes by demons in human shape, struck him with horror, and presented a spectacle which he remembered as "hideous and revolting." Instinct with heroic fire, his soul shuddered at scenes of cruelty and murder, and his just understanding regarded the violence of a mob as the ferocity of a monster.

But he was not in a position to reflect, that the fault, instead of being in the infuriated populace, was in the oppression which had maddened them. They were born with natures askind, with sensibilities as generous as the rest of mankind, but a bigoted and dissolute priesthood, a privileged and rapacious aristocracy, and a line of cruel and voluptuous kings, had driven them through all the extremities of persecution and shiftings of servitude, to the rage of despair. The great body of the French people had been treated like brutes until they were become brutal. Their mental vision had been so long obscured in depths of degradation, that the light of liberty affected them with blindness, the air of relief with convulsions. Exhausted by ages of oppression, a nation, renowned for generous devotion to ungrateful monarchs, was excited to paroxysms of

frenzy by the first sensations of freedom. But is this an argument in favour of divine right and legitimate monarchy, or a motive for distrusting the capacity of the people for self-government? The people of France were no more to blame than is the solitary maniac, who escaping from unrighteous chains, kills a stranger under the belief that in that stranger he is destroying the oppressor, whose cruelty tortured his limbs and distracted his brain. The objects of their fury were not the victims of popular rage, but of the royal vices which engendered it; and the axe which beheaded Louis XVI was raised, not by his subjects, but his ancestors.

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Through all the violence of the revolutionary struggles, the people had but one object of desire, freedom, but one subject of dread, tyranny; and their great leaders, the patriots of the revolution, pursued the noblest aims of human ambition, the liberty of their fellow citizens, and the independence of their country. That the good which was desired and proposed was not all effected, and that unforeseen misery and crime could not be avoided, was their mutual misfortune, not their common fault. He therefore, who

stigmatizes the revolution because of its incidental atrocities or unexpected catastrophe, might consistently reproach a miner, whose enterprise and labour afford comfort to millions, because the fire-damps of the earth explode, when touched by the flame of his useful torch. And he who can lament over the downfall of a throne, and the suffering of the individuals connected with it, without execrating the tyranny of which it was the seat, might he expected to sympathise with the murderer, against whom the blood of his victim rises in judgment, without feeling indignation for the cruelty with which that blood had been shed, or pity for the pangs, which sent forth life in its current. The truth of these observations is too plain to be contested. They shew that as the excesses of the French revolution were the natural consequences of hereditary rule, the votaries of that system have no right to complain, when the vices of one king, descend in vengeance on his successor. They also shew, that if long continued submission strengthens the hands of the oppressor, it makes his ultimate accountability the more perilous, by perverting the nature and the energies of the oppressed.

Of no great political event have all the consequences been beneficial. The struggle which emancipated the United States, was not unattended by the sorrows of innocence, and the sufferings of virtue. Unmingled advantages were not to be expected from the French revolution, of which, however, while the horrors were confined to France, the advantages redounded to mankind. That these were important, may be conceived by reflecting on the probable condition of Europe, had the first coalition against France been successful. Those who rail against the French revolution, and describe its excesses as effects of the natural propensity of the people and the press, would do well to compare them with the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the acknowledged offspring of the altar and the throne, since it was perpetrated by the order of Charles IX, and eulogised by the thanksgiving of Gregory II. The virtuous Sully records some of the horrors of this *legitimate reign of terror*, in which seventy thousand French protestants were massacred in the course of eight days.

While Bonaparte was on this occasion at Paris, he seems to have felt the weight of

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the inheritance which his dying uncle had turned aside from Joseph, and devolved upon him. His mother, though not in affluence, was in possession of comfort and independence, and for his own wants, his pay as Captain of artillery, constituted adequate, though not ample provision. But his younger brothers and his sisters were to be educated, and the latter provided for. About these last he felt most anxiety, for in writing at this time to his uncle Paravicini he observed: "Allow yourself to feel no uneasiness concerning your nephews; they will be able to take care of themselves." Accompanied by Bourrienne, he went from Paris to St. Cyr, to visit his sister Eliza, who was then at school there; and it is said, in speculating upon the means of making money, formed the momentary project, of renting a number of houses in Paris, and subletting them at profitable prices. (9)

Returning to Corsica; and resuming the command of a local battalion, he was directed in January, 1793, to join the expedition of Admiral Truguet, against the neighbouring island of Sardinia. A second battalion was added to his corps, which constituted a

part of the land force of the armament. The expedition sailed, the main body under the admiral to attack Cagliari; and the Corsican detachment to make a diversion on the opposite side of the island. Bonaparte with his militia force, executed his part of the enterprise so far as to get possession of several islets and forts, in the straits of Bonifacio. But the principal attempt under Truguet having failed, in consequence, as was alleged of Paoli's machinations, Bonaparte's subordinate success was unavailing. Consequently, he abandoned the positions he had taken, and re-embarking his men, returned to Ajaccio; where the spirit and ability which he had displayed were applauded, in spite of the inefficacy of his exertions, and the failure of the expedition.

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Paoli, who had for some time given reason to suspect that his former enmity to France was reviving in his mind, was completely alienated by the outrages of the 10th of August and the 3d of September. He had been much caressed in England during his exile, and had conceived admiration for the leading men and principal institutions of that country. His discontent with the state of

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things in France, exaggerated by these inclinations towards her enemy, induced him to form a design, and finally to take measures, for separating Corsica from France, and annexing it to the possessions of the crown of England. At length being denounced to the French Government by the popular societies of Provence, he was summoned to the bar of the convention to justify himself, under the penalty of being punished as a traitor. Whatever had been his motives, his conduct he was conscious, had placed him in a position in which success could alone justify or protect him, even before a temperate tribunal. He declined compliance with the fearful summons, under the pretext of age and infirmity, and then throwing off the mask with which he had hitherto veiled his proceedings, invited the assistance of England, and raised the standard of revolt. (10)

Before taking this final step he communicated his intention to Bonaparte, who was already a person of influence in the island, and commanded as we have seen a corps of Corsican militia. As he had engaged the personal regard of Paoli, his co-operation was desirable from the double motive of policy

and friendship. The Corsican chief was a man of venerable age, imposing appearance, and elegant conversation; skilful in war, and sagacious in government. He discoursed much with his young friend on the distracted state of affairs in France, enlarged on the advantages of Corsican independence, referred to the united efforts of himself and Charles Bonaparte in support of it; and riding over the ground of their campaigns, pointed out its memorable spots, and explained its military positions. Bonaparte though pleased with his anecdotes, and probably instructed by his experience, was far from agreeing in his political conclusions. He admitted that the condition of public affairs in France was frightful, but with his characteristic judgment argued that whatever is violent in degree is short in duration, and urged that as Paoli was possessed of extensive authority and great influence in the island, it was his province to maintain the laws, and preserve tranquillity, until the fury of the convulsions in France should subside. He added that Corsica belonged geographically to Italy or France; that religion, language, and position, rendered its cordial union with England im-

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practicable, and that as Italy was insignificant, by reason of its subdivisions, the most natural and advantageous connection for Corsica was with France; a connection which in good policy no temporary inconvenience should be allowed to disturb, and in sound patriotism, not even great calamities should be permitted to sever. It was during one of these conversations, that Paoli, struck by the force of Bonaparte's logic, and the dignity of his sentiments, exclaimed "Oh, Napoleon, you are not a man of modern times, your opinions belong to the men of Plutarch. You will rise to greatness." These expressions it appears, Paoli often repeated. (11)

Their last and decisive conference took place in the neighbourhood of Corté, a town in the interior, and the ancient capital of the island, the date and tone of which rendered it evident that they must part either as confederates or enemies. Paoli persisted in his shortsighted designs in favour of the English connection; Bonaparte adhered to the country of his father's adoption, and his own birth and allegiance. Their separation shows a remarkable diversity of conduct in two great men disposed to act from honourable mo-

tives, and placed on the same stage of affairs. But Paoli had recollections of pride and power to look back upon, which though definite, and converged to the microscopic scene of Corsican history, were magnificent and endearing to the memory of age. His original hostility to France, though soothed and tranquilised by the homage and confidence of the leading men in Paris, had not been converted into hearty attachment. Bonaparte on the contrary, was born a Frenchman and educated in France, was young, passionate for glory, vivid with hope and talent, and naturally looked forward to the undefined future, and the ample theatre of France, for opportunity and distinction. His professional pride and instinctive feeling were affected as he says with *antipathy* for the treasonable project of Paoli, and as vigorous plants shoot upward to the sun, his genius, which would have been imprisoned in the contracted circuit of his native isle, gravitated towards the important events of France, and the powerful emotions which produced them.

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Paoli, persevering in his unjustifiable project of delivering up Corsica to England, temporised with Bonaparte not a moment after

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this last interview; and accordingly, the latter in retracing his steps toward Ajaccio, found himself surrounded and made prisoner by the partisans of Paoli at a place called Bocognano situated in a pass of the mountains. Escaping by a singular stratagem, he reached Ajaccio, whence with the assistance of a friend, he succeeded in joining the force which the committee of public safety had by this time assembled at Calvi, under the direction of the representatives of the people, Salicetti and La Combe St. Michael.

A civil war now broke out in the island. Paoli having failed in the attempt, first to mislead Bonaparte's judgment by persuasion, and next to secure his person by force, now resorted to threats, and warned him by letter that, if he continued to support the French authorities, he would treat him and his family as public enemies. This menace being disregarded or defied, the exasperated veteran proceeded to execute it with vengeful severity. The French party was driven from Ajaccio; the house in which Bonaparte was born was given up to pillage, and converted into a barrack for British troops; the farm laid waste, and in the blind impotence of rage and

wrong, a decree of banishment was issued against Napoleon and his brother Joseph. (12) From 1785
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Salicetti and St. Michael made several ineffectual descents, in which Bonaparte either commanded or engaged; but the English forces having interposed, and the mountaineers of Paoli joining them in numbers, the French cause was lost in the island.

On one occasion Bonaparte was sent from Calvi to surprise Ajaccio. He embarked in a frigate, and landing on the north side of the gulf with a party of fifty men, took possession of a fort called the *Torré di Capitello*. He had no sooner carried this point, than the frigate was driven to sea by a gale. While thus insulated and unsupported, the insurgents attacked him with great violence, by land and water. He defended himself with spirit, and with such pertinacity, that he and his heroic little garrison were reduced to rations of horse flesh. During the siege, he called out from the walls to a party, and harangued his misguided countrymen in a strain of eloquence so impressive, that he made many converts. After five days of conflict and starvation, the frigate returned

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to her station, and he re-embarked, having first partially blown up the fort.(13)

He himself mentions, that in one of his landings, he got a few guns ashore, and with a round or two of grapeshot, dispersed a body of the insurgents who opposed him. They returned to the attack however, and mixed reproaches with their warfare, expressing indignation that he, a Corsican, should be fighting for France. In order to make themselves both seen and heard, they ascended the neighbouring hills, and even mounted up into trees. Bonaparte had a gun loaded with ball, and aimed it so well, that he cut off a limb on which one of these exclusive patriots was perched. His fall, which created a general laugh, was followed by the instant flight of his party.

These partial efforts, however spirited, were of no avail against the united force of Paoli and the English. The French representatives, accordingly, determined to abandon the contest, and withdraw to France. Bonaparte contrived to communicate with his mother. Under his protection, she withdrew from the storm which overwhelmed

Corsica, and sought shelter on the continent, stopping first at Nice, and settling finally in Marseilles, with the dependence of a large family, and the remnant of a small fortune.

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This expulsion of his father's family from their home, and of himself with circumstances of odious solemnity, from the place of his birth, was probably the first occasion on which he felt the iron pressure of calamity. The severity of the blow, was not lessened by the reflection, that it was dealt by the hand of his paternal friend. Yet it neither embittered his affections, nor discouraged his enterprise, nor damped his liberality. After providing for the temporary establishment of his mother, he made immediate preparations for joining his regiment, which was then at Nice. He preserved to the last a warmth of affection for his native isle, (14) and an affectionate respect for Paoli; while the Corsican Phoenix, languishing in the cold and compulsive caresses of England, (15) expressed paternal joy at the deeds and triumphs of his youthful friend. (16)

Before he joined his regiment, his services in several delicate operations, the precise nature of which has not been explained,

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were required by general Dugear. This general, who commanded the artillery of the army which, encamped around Nice, was called the army of Italy, although it had never crossed the Alps, nor tasted the waters of the Po, had obtained authority from the war department, to employ young Bonaparte, upon his return from Corsica.

About this time the insurrection of Marseilles broke out, a movement, consequent upon the arrest of the leaders of the Girondist party, in the Convention, on the 31st of May and 2d of June; and which extended with violence into departments of the south and west. The insurgents of Marseilles organized a force of six thousand men, with which, in order to cooperate with the malcontents of Lyons, they took possession of Avignon, and thereby intercepted the communications of the army of Italy. This greatly embarrassed the commanding general, who found his convoys of provision and ammunition, seized upon by the insurgents. In the emergency, which threatened to uncover the frontier on the side of Piedmont, the intelligence and address of Bonaparte were relied upon. At the instance of general Dugear

he was despatched on a mission to the insurgents, in order to prevail on them to allow the convoys of the army to pass. He repaired to Marseilles and Avignon, conferred at both places with the leaders of the insurrection, convinced them that it was against their interest, whatever might be their sentiments respecting the convention, to provoke the hostility of the army, and succeeded in persuading them, to offer no further interruption to its communications and convoys. From a statement made incidentally by himself it may be gathered, that while he was employed in reasoning with the rebellious leaders at Avignon, general Cartaux appeared before that town, with a body of conventional troops; a display of force which probably lent to, and borrowed from, his arguments, additional weight.

His observations during this excursion, of the weakness, violence, and mismanagement of the insurgents, as well as of their lawless and unattainable objects, furnished the occasion and materials for his "Supper of Beaucaire;" a political essay thrown into the shape of a dialogue, and published during his stay at Marseilles, explaining the causes

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of the revolution, justifying the motives of its leaders, and deprecating the proceedings of the insurgents. After reminding them of the superiority of disciplined battalions to untrained multitudes; of light artillery in field operations, to their heavy cannon; and suggesting, that although poor mountaineers or starving peasants, might well afford to run the hazard of rebellion, the citizens of an opulent town, stored with the fruits of industry and commerce, had reason to support the authority of government, he warned them that perseverance in their lawless project would result in failure, disgrace, punishment, and misery. Of this piece, the principles and object of which were consistent with the language he held to Paoli, and the conduct he pursued in Corsica, the doctrine was patriotic, the topics persuasive, the reasoning sound, and the style vigorous. It contained no metaphysical cant nor jacobinical violence. The author spoke in the character which he really bore, that of a soldier; and endeavoured to dissuade his countrymen from proceedings, which had the double effect of plunging the nation into civil war, and exposing it to foreign invasion.

His essay was well adapted in time and form, to the occasion, and accordingly is From 1785
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represented to have contributed in no small degree, to allay the violence, and restrain the misdirection, of the popular excitement, by which the army he belonged to was annoyed.

(17) This useful production, although it deserved to be remembered and preserved, he cast upon the tide of events, and after it had answered its purpose, abandoned to oblivion.

It was recovered at a riper season of his fortune and judgment, by those who prized it as a plume from the eagle's wing. But neither the discretion of his patriotism, nor the fastidiousness of his taste, was to be disarmed by flattery. He justly argued, that a work composed expressly for the crisis of a civil war, and bearing the weight of his name, would be out of season, and probably mischievous, in time of domestic concord, and doubtless felt that a hasty and juvenile pamphlet, might add nothing to his mature and majestic fame. Influenced by these considerations he directed, it is said, the work to be suppressed. (18)

These special duties, upon which he was employed by the order, or at the instance of

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general Dugear, by separating him from the army of Italy, until the month of August, prevented his taking part in the two unfortunate actions with the Sardinians, of which, while he would have been exposed to the danger, the extreme subordination of his rank, could hardly have afforded him the opportunity of altering the issue.

It was during this visit to Marseilles, that he became acquainted with the family of M. Clary, a rich banker. His brother Joseph married, a few months after, one of the daughters, and he himself seems to have paid rather flattering attentions to the other, who subsequently became the wife of Bernadotte, and is now the queen of Sweden. (19)

CHAPTER III.

From August 1793, to March 1794.

Siege of Toulon—That place betrayed to lord Hood
 —Sensation produced by it—Situation of Toulon—
 Strength of the allied garrison — Measures of the
 committee of public safety — Their plan for the
 siege—Bonaparte chief of battalion — Appointed to
 command the artillery of the siege—General Car-
 taux—Ignorance at head-quarters—Difficulties to
 contend with—Bonaparte's plan — Rejected by Car-
 taux—Folly of that general—Vigour and activity
 of Bonaparte—Council of war—Bonaparte's plan
 adopted—Its execution commenced — Little Gib-
 raltar—Battery of the convention—Mischievous
 interference of the deputies — Sally and capture of
 general O'Hara — Repulse of the sallying party—
 General Doppet — His cowardice and incapacity —
 General Dugommier — His courage and experience
 —Discouragement of the besiegers—Confidence
 of Bonaparte—His batteries play on little Gibral-
 tar—Advises the storming that place—Little
 Gibraltar carried by assault — Bravery of the gar-
 rison—Swaggering of the deputies—The allied
 squadron weigh anchor—The town, forts, and har-

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hour plundered and evacuated — The French fleet, arsenal, and magazines set on fire — Dreadful conflagration — Distress of the Toulonese — Anecdotes — Junot — Humanity of Bonaparte — Duroc — Affection and admiration of Dugommier for Bonaparte — Bonaparte brigadier general — Is ordered to join the army of Italy — Prescribes a system of fortifications for the coast — His horror of the cruelty of a mob — His respect for the memory of Gasparin, and of Dugommier.

Hitherto, the genius of Bonaparte had been manifested chiefly, in the shade of schools, the confidence of friendship, or the circles of society, by brilliant but aimless flashes, which disappeared like meteors bursting in the air. An event now occurred, which was to be the occasion of elevating him permanently to public view, and of displaying the strength and lustre of his mind, while dealing a decisive blow in his country's defence.

The overthrow and arrest of the Girondists in the convention, events which as was before observed, took place on the 31st May and the 2nd June, 1793, were the occasion of popular disturbances in the south of France. Lyons and Marseilles became the seats of open insurrection, which spreading

to the neighbouring towns, resulted in the treason of Toulon, and in the delivery of that superb naval station, with its forts, fleets, crews, arsenals, magazines, and stores, to a combined English and Spanish squadron then blockading it, under lord Hood. Having negotiated successfully with the malcontents, and effected an understanding with the naval officer in command (1) of the port, this Admiral took possession of Toulon on the 29th of August, in the name and on behalf of Louis XVII. (2)

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This disaster was felt by the French nation, as the most severe and shameful calamity of the war. Their chief naval force and finest station, were delivered up to their most powerful maritime foe. To England and her allies was surrendered by French citizens, with an immense squadron, an apparently inexpugnable position, in the heart of a strong and populous country, deeply infected by a rebellious spirit, and partially in arms against the national government. The flag of France it was naturally apprehended, would be exiled from the Mediterranean, and her extensive coast on that sea, exposed to all the evils, which the arms and intrigues

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of her inveterate enemies and emigrant princes, could inflict, by civil war or foreign invasion. The pride and the safety of the nation, both required, instantaneous and strenuous exertions for the recovery of Toulon. On this occasion the government could but feel like the people; and the deputies composing the committee of public safety, which had not as yet failed in daring plans and energetic measures, bent the whole force of their means and counsels to the important task. But their preparations however prompt, and their efforts however earnest, seemed not commensurate with the difficulties of the crisis.

General Cartaux, having succeeded in suppressing the insurrection of Marseilles, was ordered to advance with a column of eight thousand men from that side against Toulon, while general La Poype with six thousand drawn from the army of Italy, was directed to approach it from the east. (3) The former general was attended by the deputies Albite, Salicetti, and Gasparin; the latter, by Fréron and Barras, who having escaped from the malcontents of Toulon, had taken refuge with the army of Italy. With these were spee-

dily associated Ricord and the younger Robespierre, who had been attached to the army of the Alps. These preliminary measures could only be expected to annoy the enemy, and straiten their communications with the surrounding country, until vigorous and decisive operations could be undertaken.

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Toulon is situated at the head of a capacious harbour, stretching, in a southern direction, to the sea; and at the foot of the mountains of Pharon, which recede in successive ridges to the north. It formed thus the middle point of an extensive barrier, which separated the two divisions of the French army, rendering their communication difficult, and cooperation precarious.

The allies on the other hand held their force collected, possessed the power of directing it entire against either division of the besiegers, occupied the fortifications of the town, the line of forts on both sides of the harbour, and the works and passes in the adjacent mountains. Their fleet, which covered the harbour, commanded the Mediterranean, and enabled them to collect reenforcements and supplies from all quarters. Detachments of Spanish, Sardinian, and Neapo-

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litan troops, were speedily brought to their aid; and lieutenant general O'Hara, an officer who had been distinguished under lord Cornwallis in the American war, and was at the time governor of Gibraltar, arrived with a reenforcement of British troops, and took command of the allied forces, amounting, exclusively of a formidable fleet, a population of twenty thousand inhabitants, and bodies of insurgents from Marseilles and other disaffected towns, to fourteen thousand men. (4)

A garrison thus strong, supported, and supplied, felt little apprehension from the divided and inconsiderable forces of Cartaux and La Poype. Accordingly, lord Hood, after disarming the French fleet, manning the fortifications of the town, and occupying the forts which protected the harbour, as well as the various mountain passes contiguous to Toulon, employed himself in fitting out a squadron of four French ships of the line, with French crews and royalist commanders, which he sent round to Brest and Rochefort, with the double object of reducing the strength of the French force in Toulon, and

of spreading treason and exciting revolt, along the Atlantic frontier of France. (5)

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But the committee of public safety, were busy in concerting preparations, on a scale of adequate extent and vigour. By their direction, general D'Arçon, an engineer of high reputation, in conjunction with the board of ordnance at Paris, drew up a plan for the conduct of the siege, which prescribed a series of regular approaches against the town, a succession of attacks against the surrounding forts, and the erection of works of protection, against the broadsides of the fleet. It also required the formation and supply of an army of sixty thousand men, at a time when men and money were of difficult collection, and in the midst of a disaffected and exhausted country. Thus operose, regular, and progressive, the plan of the government promised success, only at the expense of much time and toil, and proceeded on the direct and obvious system of warfare; that of employing a greater portion of physical force in the attack of a given position, than can be exerted in its defence. However unexceptionable it might be, therefore, in a tech-

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nical point of view, this ministerial plan for the siege of Toulon, was not adapted to the critical nature of the operation, nor to the urgency of public affairs. But the choice of a commander for the artillery of the siege, though a matter, doubtless, of secondary importance in the eyes of the functionaries who made it, was destined to supply the defects, and compensate the errors, of their means and calculations.

Shortly after his successful negotiation with the insurgents of Marseilles, Bonaparte had been promoted to the rank of chief of battalion; (6) and some occasion requiring such a mission, he was sent by general Brunet, the commander of the army of Italy, with written despatches, and verbal communications, to Paris. The committee of public safety was employed, in organizing a force for reducing Toulon, and had required of the committee of ordnance the designation of a regular officer, well qualified for commanding the artillery of the siege. It was the humour of the time to overlook age and rank, in search of zeal and talent, as in the cases of Hoche and Marceau. The decided patriotism of Bonaparte was evinced by his writ-

ings, and signalised by his firm opposition to Paoli. Of his professional abilities and personal merit, the files of the war office, furnished ample testimony, which his reputation in the garrisons and corps he had served with, completely sustained. These facts, enforced by the pressure of public danger, arrested the attention of the committees, and determined their choice in his favour. Neither interest, patronage, intrigue, nor solicitation, was employed. His own merit was his sole recommendation to a post, in which that merit was to become conspicuous.

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Having received his orders, he left the capital without delay, and reached the headquarters of the besieging army, on the 12th of September.

General Cartaux was a painter of Paris, who by popular caprice and accidental success, had been raised from the adjutancy of a municipal battalion to the chief command of a regular army; being thrust by the force of these causes, in one day's advancement, through the degrees of brigadier and major general. He had the ignorance incidental to this career, and the presumption natural to that ignorance.

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When the young commander of the artillery, presented himself to this aspiring dignitary, whom he found glittering in lace and embroidery, he was told, in accents of disdainful benevolence, that although his services would not be required in the recovery of Toulon, he was welcome to share in the glory of the operation ! He was invited to sup that evening with the general, and early the next morning, to accompany him in visiting the posts of the besiegers, who were preparing, he was informed, to open a cannonade, which was to burn the allied squadrons. His astonishment may be conceived, at finding that the few guns which had been awkwardly mounted, were at least two gunshots from the harbour, and that the balls which were destined to destroy the fleet, were sent to be heated in the neighbouring country houses, as if their reconveyance was likely to be easy, or their glow unremitting. A suggestion of the last mentioned difficulty, having somewhat perplexed the general and his staff officers, the commander of the artillery proposed, that a few cold balls should be fired in order to see, whether the hot shot when produced, would be within point blank

range. After some difficulty the experiment was made, and the balls fell half way short of the mark. Upon this, the general found fault with the powder, and execrated the aristocrats, for having purposely damaged it. This excessive ignorance prevailing at head quarters, was owing as much to the great emigration of the well educated officers, as to the inconsiderate manner in which demagogues and their retainers, had been appointed in their places. In the midst of the confusion, the deputy Gasparin rode up to the spot. Being a man of sense, zeal, and of some military experience, he was readily convinced of the absurdity of the measures in progress, and of the propriety of confiding to the commander of the artillery, the uncontrolled direction of the siege. With this view, he desired Cartaux to issue directions for the general conduct of the operation, leaving the details to be devised and executed by Bonaparte; a request, which the general complied with, in the following fulminating order. "The commander of the artillery will batter the town with shot and shells, for and during three days, at the end of which time, I will attack in three columns, and carry the place."

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CHAP. III. Such was the state of affairs — so ill disposed and desperate on the part of the French, so formidable and encouraging, on that of the English—when Bonaparte joined the army of Cartaux.

It may be proper to remind the reader, that he had but just completed his twenty-fourth year, and with exception of the slight and unsuccessful service in which he had been engaged in Corsica, was totally inexperienced in war; that the means of attack which he was to direct, or cooperate with, were slender and separated, while the resistance to be overcome was formidable and united, consisting of a fortified town, a powerful squadron, a defended harbour, connected forts, and mountain passes. These, as they had been hitherto regarded, whether by the scientific plan of D'Arçon, or the ridiculous order of Cartaux, had been considered, simply, as a mass of obstruction, presenting a certain force of resistance, which could be overcome only by the application of greater force; and under the obvious view, of converging the means of attack, upon the place in dispute, that is, upon the town itself; contemplating this as the cardinal point of the position.

But Bonaparte, though thus young, inexperienced, and subordinate, had no sooner cast over the ground, that glance which was to direct the current of future battles; had no sooner looked around upon the fortifications, the harbour and the fleet, than he penetrated the complexity of the position, and traced the relation of its component parts. He discovered at once, that the town, though the object to be gained, was far from being the point to be attacked; that in a military view, it was a dependent position, instead of being the essential one. Perceiving that the harbour was divided by two opposite and approaching promontories, into the outer or great road, and the inner or little road, and that the western promontory was crowned by an eminence, he comprehended instantly, that batteries established on the summit and at the base of this promontory, would search completely both roads, and either destroy the hostile fleet, or drive it out to sea; and that in either case, Toulon must be abandoned or surrendered. This fine conception, which, considering his want of acquaintance with the ground and of military experience, could only be the offspring of the highest genius, he immediately communicated to general

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Cartaux; recommending at the same time, the occupation with a force of three thousand men, of the eminence in question, which as yet the English commander had neglected. But general Cartaux could not understand its importance, nor the probability of reducing Toulon, by taking up a position so remote from it. Yet with that perverseness of incapacity which omits all the good, and does all the mischief practicable in a given case, he sent general Laborde with four hundred men to take possession of the promontory; a measure which had the effect of apprising the enemy of its value, causing Laborde to be dislodged, and the position to be seized upon and fortified by the English commander. Bonaparte's suggestion, which was above rules, being thus worse than disregarded, the toilsome plan of approaches against the town, which was according to rules, was persisted in.

The commandant of the artillery it appears, did not on this account relent in his zeal; but was as bold and skilful in executing the project of others, as he had been prompt and sagacious in the invention of his own. His first care was to select and em-

ploy officers, upon whose zeal and capacity, he could place reliance. Among these were Muiron, whom he made his adjutant, and his former comrade at Valence, Gassendi, whom he placed in command of the arsenal at Marseilles, from which his military supplies were to be drawn. His next object was to collect a park of artillery; and so active and well directed were his exertions, that in less than six weeks, he had two hundred guns, completely furnished. Urging on the operations, he advanced his batteries, placed them on the most advantageous points, and opened a fire so effective, that he soon dismantled several ships of the line, sunk some smaller vessels, and forcing the squadron to withdraw to a distant part of the harbour, relieved his batteries from its broadsides, and broke ground yet nearer to the enemy.

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Still he was not free from the interference of general Cartaux, and the embarrassments of his ignorance. On one occasion, this general insisted on his planting a battery against the walls of a house, where there was no room for the guns to recoil; on another, upon an insulated hillock, which as he alleged, would enable him to fire on several

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forts at once. Nor was he convinced of the folly of this order, by the observation, that if this point was in reach of these forts, it would be exposed to their concentrated fire. At this period of the siege there can be little doubt, that had the English commander acted on the offensive, and assailed with the whole force, either division of the French army, he must have succeeded in relieving the place. He however remained on the defensive, contenting himself with manning and strengthening the fortifications, and gave time for reenforcements to join the besiegers.

Bonaparte, while engaged in executing a plan which he could not approve, thus submitting the inspiration of his own mind to the yoke of inferior judgments, and in obviating the blunders of a general whom he could but despise, exhibited a degree of soldiership and gallantry, which gained the attachment of the men. He slept by his guns, assisted in aiming them, was present wherever danger appeared, headed parties in taking ground in advance, and was foremost in repelling the enemy's sallies. The troops looked up to him with admiration, and regarded him as their real general, calling out

for the commander of the artillery, when-
ever an attack was determined on, or a sortie
was apprehended.

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He had thus secured the devotion of the army, and the good opinion of the deputy Gasparin, when, on the 15th of October, the deputies convened a council of war, for the purpose of deliberating on the plan of the siege, which had been sent down by the government, and of deciding whether it should be executed by operations on the west or the east side of the harbour. This council, of which Gasparin was president, and Cartaux and Bonaparte members, decided at once, that the principal operations of the siege should be prosecuted on the west side of the harbour; but they were greatly embarrassed when they came to consider the disproportion of their force, to that which the plan of general D'Arçon required. It was then that the young commander of artillery submitted to the council the suggestion, which he had previously made to general Cartaux, and explained the certainty of its success, even with the means already at their command. He showed that the position on the western promontory commanded

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the entire harbour; that batteries erected on it would force lord Hood, either to abandon the garrison to an unavoidable surrender, or, to withdraw it; and that consequently the time, the expense, and the army, necessary to the success of the ministerial plan, might, in a great measure, be dispensed with. He expressed his conviction that the garrison would be withdrawn, rather than abandoned, and concluded by assuring the council, that in two days after they should get possession of the promontory, Toulon would be in their power.

Though clearly stated, and cogently explained, his proposition was not received without much hesitation, nor adopted without long discussion. It was hard to turn the minds of men, suddenly, from a direct to an indirect mode of attack; or to make them believe, that so simple a measure as taking possession of the height alluded to, would be attended by such important and decisive consequences as were assigned to it by the commander of the artillery. When at length, upon the earnest recommendation of Gasparin, it was adopted, it was only in the light of a preliminary and partial ope-

ration, and in consequence of the statement of the engineers, ^{From 1793 to 1794.} that the occupation of the promontory would effect a blockade, an operation indispensable, according to the maxims of their art, to a regular siege. This was the opinion of general Marescot, who was then a major of engineers, and did not participate in the grand and confident inferences of Bonaparte. Perhaps invention in so young a man, and instruction from a subordinate officer, were not acceptable to men of higher rank or greater pretensions. Probably the result of the proposed measure was less evident *then*, than it seems *now*. But, at any rate, an operation which was to be decisive and final, was resolved upon only as an incipient and conducive one. Considered in this point of view, the vote for it was unanimous.

Before, however this resolution was taken, the English general, become apprized of the importance of this position, had constructed on it a fortress, consisting of a main work with two flanking redoubts, which was rendered so strong and complete, that although it was named fort Mulgrave, it was called *Little Gibraltar*. It was defended by three

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Bonaparte who had in vain urged Cartaux to reenforce Laborde, and drive the allies from this important point before they were firmly established, was even at this late stage of the contest, of a different opinion from the British commander, and commenced his operations against it, with that energy, which confidence inspires. He ordered six batteries of twenty-four pounders, and platforms for fifteen mortars, to be raised immediately against Little Gibraltar, and at the same time, directed a battery of eight twenty-four pounders, and four mortars, to be constructed against Fort Malbosquet; a strong, though less formidable work, situated higher up the harbour. To render this latter operation more efficient, he selected a position for his guns, which was masked by a clump of olives; and directed that the fire of this battery should not be opened, until his attack on Little Gibraltar should be commenced;

so that the effect might be augmented by surprise. (7) It happened however, that be-
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fore this proper time arrived, the representatives of the people visited this work, which was called, *the battery of the convention*. From the cannoneers they learned it had been finished for eight days, and that although it was expected to do great execution, no use had as yet been made of it. In perfect ignorance of what they were about, these deputies, without consulting the chief of the artillery, ordered a fire from this battery to be instantly commenced; an order which the gunners with alacrity obeyed.

General O'Hara was greatly surprised at this sudden attack on one of his principal defences, and feeling the importance of ridding himself of so serious an annoyance, prepared for storming this battery next morning. Accordingly, about an hour before day, he sallied out at the head of a column of six thousand men, (8) and succeeded without much difficulty, in carrying the battery, and spiking the guns. The alarm meanwhile was sounded at head quarters. General Dugommier, the new commander, rallied the troops, who having been disposed in line,

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were not capable of withstanding, on the sudden, so heavy a column. Bonaparte after directing several field pieces to be turned against O'Hara's force, which threatened by its farther advance, his grand park near the pass of the Ollioules, hastened to an eminence, on which he had established a depot of ordnance, and from which, an arm of the trench communicated with the captured battery. Behind this eminence was stationed a battalion of infantry, and with this, he determined to make a vigorous attack on the enemy. He led his party along the trench unperceived, and emerging from it behind a screen of brambles, surprised O'Hara by a close and destructive fire. His attack was so spirited, and the surprise so complete, that the Neapolitan troops fled, as if they had been assailed by overwhelming numbers; while the English officers supposed that a party of their own men, in the obscurity of the morning, were firing by mistake. The panic of one party, and the confidence of the other, were equally unfounded. General O'Hara himself, under this false impression, advanced for the purpose of stopping the fire when he was wounded in the hand with a

musket ball, and taken by a French sergeant, who pulled him suddenly down into the trench. Thus it happened, that the commander in chief of the allies, was a prisoner to Bonaparte, while his own troops were ignorant of his fate, and while the French general was unaware that Bonaparte was engaged. In this conflict, he received a bayonet thrust in the left thigh, which though a serious flesh wound, he did not suffer to withdraw him from duty in the trenches.

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General Dugommier having brought up the reserves, had now taken a position which threatened to intercept the retreat of the sallying party. Already disconcerted by the vigour of Bonaparte's attack, this movement threw them into confusion. The English followed the example of the Neapolitans, and fled in the utmost confusion. They were pursued to the walls of the town, which they entered, not more discouraged by the unexpected failure of their sally, than by the strange disappearance of their general. The allied officers, who had already become jealous of the English commanders, and suspicious of their good faith, expressed an apprehension that general O'Hara had given himself up to the enemy, for the purpose of ne-

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The French on the contrary had reason to exult. The commander of the artillery, who by energy and promptness, had repaired the mischief occasioned by the folly of the deputies, had offered the chief opposition, and occasioned the principal loss, to the enemy. In consequence he was promoted to the rank of colonel.

Previously to this affair, the incapacity of Cartaux had become so evident as to cause his removal, and the committee of public safety had given the command of the siege to general Doppet; a physician, who had been thrown up from noisy insignificance to military rank, by the whirls and eddies of popular excitement, and at the siege of Lyons had obtained a reputation, which concealed for a moment his real demerit. To the faults of ignorance he added the vices of cowardice and envy. His arrival which soon made the army regret the departure of Cartaux, was near being followed by an event equally surprising, and more momentous. The French troops on duty in the trenches before Little Gibraltar, had one of

their comrades taken by a Spanish company on guard in the fort. This unfortunate prisoner, the Spaniards beat and abused in sight of his brother soldiers, whom, at the same time, they insulted by provoking shouts and indecent gestures. Irritated beyond endurance, the French, by a spontaneous impulse resembling such as we read of in the Roman legions, seized their arms, and in a paroxysm of fury, rushed to the assault. Bonaparte, whose vigilance let nothing escape his observation, hastened to report this affair to the general, and saying, *as the wine was drawn, it was better to drink it*, assured him it would be more difficult to draw off the troops in safety, than to follow up the attack with success. Doppet consented: the reserve was put in motion, and Bonaparte at its head. But while he was in the act of moving to the support of the assailants, who, having driven in the enemy's light troops and reached the gorge, were on the point of forcing their way into the body of the work, an aid-de-camp of the general was killed by his side. At so dangerous a symptom, the doctor was panic struck, and instantly retiring, ordered a retreat. This palpable poltroon-

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ery could not but rouse the indignation of the men. They complained aloud, that, instead of having generals to lead them to victory, they were thwarted and disgraced by painters and doctors. In consequence, the committee recalled Doppet, and felt at last the necessity of employing a military man. Their choice fell upon general Dugommier, a veteran with the scars of fifty campaigns, and a courage as well-tempered as his own good sword. (9)

The garrison being strengthened by fresh supplies and frequent reinforcements, the hopes of the besiegers began to decline, and the dissatisfaction of the public to be manifest. The prudence of directing the chief operations against a remote and apparently unimportant work, was again denied, and the necessity of turning their principal efforts against the town itself, loudly insisted on. The popular societies denounced the ill-directed and tardy progress of the siege, in terms of crimination, which the people of Provence, distressed by famine, reechoed. Even the deputies became alarmed; and Fréron and Barras, although in the council of war they had concurred in the qualified

adoption of Bonaparte's plan, now despair-
ed of its success, and wrote to the committee
of public safety, proposing that the siege be
abandoned and the army withdrawn to the
strong and plentiful country north of the
Durance. This counsel they enforced by
observing that after constant operations of
three months, Toulon was not yet even at-
tacked; that the garrison was receiving
strong and constant accessions; that in all
probability the besiegers would soon be
compelled to retreat with precipitation;
whereas, it was now in their power to retire
in good order and without loss. To this
they added, that the English would be
placed under the necessity of providing sus-
tenance for the population of Provence du-
ring the winter, and that in the approach-
ing spring, the army, recruited, refreshed,
and supplied, could undertake the siege with
renewed vigour and every prospect of suc-
cess. Happily for the safety of France, be-
fore this sinister counsel had time to make
an impression at Paris, Toulon was in pos-
session of the French army.

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In this season of dejection and discon-
tent, when the chief authorities themselves

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were blind to the efficacy of the operations in progress, the commander of the artillery remained unshaken in his opinion and unceasing in his activity. Repeating to general Dugommier the assurance which he had given his predecessors, that to take Toulon, it was only necessary to carry Little Gibraltar, and infusing his confidence into those around him, he pushed on the works with unabated vigour. On the 14th December when his batteries were ready, he opened a rolling fire of round shot and shells from thirty twenty-four pounders and fifteen mortars upon that fortress, and maintained it incessantly, for sixty hours. The guns being well posted and well aimed, the cannonade was destructive. The enemy's pieces were dismounted, their palisades destroyed, their bastions demolished, and their men forced to withdraw from the fort and take shelter behind the crest of the hill.

Bonaparte, attentive to the effect of his fire, perceiving that the time for an assault had arrived, proposed preparing for that final operation. The deputies consented, and midnight of the 17th, was fixed on for the attack. But when the moment ap-

proached the rain fell in such torrents, that general Dugommier was inclined to defer the assault twenty-four hours longer. At this suggestion the deputies manifested both impatience and indignation, and protesting against it, offered, in a conference with Bonaparte, to suspend Dugommier, and confer the chief command upon him. (10.) He refused to supplant his gallant general, but undertook to convince him that the rain was not an obstacle to success, as the bayonet was the weapon to be chiefly employed; and apprising him of the extreme discontent of the deputies, prevailed on him not to delay the assault. Accordingly the infantry and reserves were moved forward to a position in attacking distance, and every preparation for the onset made. But now the deputies either grown cautious from the approach of danger, or wishing to shift the responsibility of failure from themselves to the general, or deterred by the arguments of certain officers, who contended that the place could not be stormed, proposed calling a council of war, and deliberating afresh on the propriety of an attack. But Dugommier had become as determined as Bonaparte. He rejected their proposal,

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ridiculed their doubts, and refused to hesitate a moment longer. Dividing his force into two columns, he himself took command of the first, and placed the second under the conduct of Bonaparte. In this order, supported by light parties on their flanks, they advanced through rain and darkness to the assault.

As it was known that the body of the garrison was sheltered behind the hill, the assailants hoped to reach the fort unperceived and unresisted, and to force an entrance without much opposition. But in this conjecture they were deceived; for the English commander had stationed a dense line of light troops at the foot of the eminence, who receiving the leading column of the French with a volley of small arms, recalled the garrison to their guns. Their fire, which was rapid and constant, was chiefly of grape shot, and did great execution. After a dubious and bloody struggle, the brave Dugommier, who had at one time forced his way into the work, was driven back. In despair, and expecting to expiate on the scaffold, misfortune in the field, the aged warrior exclaimed, "I am a lost man."

Rallying the fugitives, Bonaparte, whose

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horse had been killed under him, and who was severely bruised by the fall, pushed forward undismayed by his leader's repulse, prompt to revenge, and skilful to retrieve it. Perceiving that the enemy continued their fire directly in front, he detached a battalion of light troops under captain Muiron, who was well acquainted with the ground; ordering him to ascend the hill circuitously and under cover of certain inequalities in its surface. Muiron conducted his party so adroitly that he reached the fort undiscovered, and rushing in through an embrasure with a small party, threw the garrison into confusion. Bonaparte who followed in supporting distance, and had been joined by Dugommier in person, attacked with his column at this critical moment, and overpowering all resistance, carried the fort. The garrison though vanquished was not disgraced; the English and Spanish cannoneers vied with each other in valour and pertinacity, and resisting to the last, were cut down to a man at their guns. Bonaparte was slightly wounded; Muiron, Victor, and Laborde severely. The enemy being reinforced from the two fortifications at the foot of the hill, made three spirited attempts to retake the important

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post, but their own guns were turned against them, and they were repulsed with considerable slaughter. Their loss including prisoners exceeded two thousand men; that of the French in killed and wounded amounted to one thousand. About three hours after Dugommier and Bonaparte were in quiet possession of Little Gibraltar, the deputies, who had first encouraged, and then dissuaded the assault, came gallantly forward sword in hand, lavishing praise, with the warmth of witnesses and the confidence of fellow labourers, upon the victorious troops. (11.) This swaggering was contemptible; but the vanity, assentation, and injustice, which followed it, were infamous.

The commander of the artillery, having thus gained the position, to the possession of which he attached such decisive consequence, lost no time in employing its advantages, and in bringing his plan of proceeding to the test of experiment. At the dawn of day he directed an attack to be made upon l'Eguillette, and Balaguier, as the forts at the two extreme points of the promontory were called. These though they were commanded by Little Gibraltar, more immedi-

ately commanded the two roads, and menaced the fleet, than even that fortress itself did. Their garrisons however evacuated these places without waiting to be driven out, as they must have been by the guns of Little Gibraltar. Bonaparte then ordered up the heavy artillery from his own batteries with a view of mounting them in l'Eguillette and Balaguier, of closing the communication between the two roads, and opening a fire upon the allied squadrons, which were now in their turn blockaded. But upon examining the works he discovered that they were constructed of masonry, and that close in front of each was a tower serving for a lodgment and redoubt. These towers were also of stone and so incommodiously situated that rebounding shot and splintering stones would glance from them upon the gunners in the forts. He therefore determined, at the expense of a delay of some hours, to throw up batteries of earth on the surface of the hill. In the mean time he was so confident of success that he said to Dugommier, and repeated to the officers—"To-morrow night, or the night after, you shall sleep in Toulon."

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But already began to be manifested the efficiency of his plan of operations, and the magnitude of its results. Lord Hood had no sooner discovered that the forts on the summit and at the base of the promontory were in possession of the French, than he made signal to the fleet to weigh anchor and get out to sea. A council of war assembled in Toulon, at which it is said he proposed an instant and powerful effort to recover possession of Little Gibraltar and the fortified points which it commanded (12). This proposition which did credit to his spirit, was rejected by a majority of the council, who decided that the place, being no longer tenable, should be immediately abandoned.

In the course of the evening the evacuation was commenced, in the midst of increasing dismay and confusion. Although the allies had obtained possession of Toulon upon the assurance of protecting its inhabitants, and of preserving and restoring its vast military and marine establishments, sensible of their danger and of their force, but forgetful of their faith and honour, they resolved to carry off as prizes whatever ships they could get to sea, to burn the rest, to

destroy the forts and arsenals, and *then* to convey into banishment such of the citizens as had been tempted by the promise of lord Hood into a degree of guilt which exposed them to the utmost rigour of justice, and had been plunged by its violation into a depth of responsibility, which placed them beyond the reach of mercy. Orders for destroying the fleet and arsenals were given accordingly ; and their execution entrusted to the courage and activity of sir Sidney Smith. But the French army was approaching on all sides. General La Poype had got possession of fort Pharon ; Bonaparte from the promontory which he had stormed, and from Malbosquet which the English had abandoned, was throwing hot shot and shells into the harbour and the town ; and the rapacity of the allies, unallayed by considerations of justice or humanity, was restrained by their fears. Many of the ships, most of the arsenals, and the principal fortifications were preserved. The French galley slaves broke their chains and extinguished the English fires. Four ships of the line and several frigates were loaded with stores and carried off ; nine ships and

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four frigates were burnt; but thirteen ships which had been dismantled, were left undestroyed in the harbour. The allied fleet, eager for pillage and intent to escape, offered but a tardy refuge to the distracted inhabitants, who hurried in the midnight conflagration to the wharfs, and rushed into the boats, as they were directed by chance, or driven by terror. Suddenly the floating magazines which had been fired, not sunk, exploded with a shock and a glare that illumed and suspended the surrounding horrors. But Bonaparte soon revived his cannonade and continued it with fury throughout the night. Some of the English ships were injured, and several boats loaded with emigrants were sunk. After a night of terror, violence, and confusion, the hostile squadrons were seen at day break just clearing the harbour, freighted with plunder, ignominy, and grief (13).

Lord Hood, who was the principal agent in this transaction, sacrificed to the passions of his government, the honour of his flag. The rage and rapine of his last hold upon Toulon, threw a dark colouring on his cautious entrance, and his hasty retreat; ag-

gravating the insidious aspect of the first, and giving a corsair appearance to the second. From 1793
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In this spirit the war in which Bonaparte had now effectually entered, was commenced by the allies, and in the same spirit it was concluded.

The joy of the public at the event of the siege, was the greater, because the success was unexpected. The people classed it with the greatest triumphs of the republic, and, a proceeding unprecedented in the history of France, it was celebrated in conformity with a decree of the convention, by a national festival of careful ostentation and elaborate pomp. But neither in the report of the deputies, nor in the solemnity of the convention, was the name of the real captor of Toulon even mentioned. His merit, though slighted, could not be suppressed. General Dugommier, upon reading the minutes of lord Hood's council of war, which that assembly had left behind, was lost in wonder at the precision with which the proceedings of the enemy had corresponded with the conclusions of Bonaparte. His admiration was increased by the reflection that, as he owed the capture of Toulon to the skill of

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that officer, so he was indebted to his disinterestedness for the command of the siege. Therefore he not only included his name in a list of officers whom he recommended for promotion, but assured the committee of public safety, that, *his merit and talents were so great, that, if he was neglected by the government, he would advance himself.* The officers confessed his excellence, the soldiers were loud in his praise, and the clubs of Marseilles extolled his services; so that military candour and popular feeling, counteracted the silence of the deputies, and the indifference of the government. Even Madam Cartaux, who had witnessed the altercations between the general and Bonaparte, applauded those talents which made the folly of her lord more conspicuous. At a public entertainment she praised the young officer of artillery, and observed that he had too much sense to be a *sans culotte*. "Then," said the indignant husband, "we must be blockheads, all of us." "Not at all," replied the lady, "I don't pretend to say that; but he is not one of your class, that you may be sure of."

Bonaparte appears to have been indiffer-

ent to the praise, and insensible to the neglect of which he was the object. But he doubtless felt great satisfaction at vindicating the safety and reputation of his country, and at embodying in an exploit so useful and glorious, a ray of that genius whose untried force and impatient consciousness, he had felt amid the clouds of fortune, and the fluctuations of hope.

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Anecdotes of his personal conduct have been related, which repetition can hardly render trite. On one occasion, when he was superintending the erection of a battery under the enemy's fire, being anxious to despatch an order, he called for the attendance of a soldier who could write. A handsome young sergeant stepped forward, and resting the paper on the parapet, wrote as he dictated. A ball struck the parapet, covering the amanuensis and his paper with earth. "Very good," coolly remarked the sergeant, "we shall not want sand this time." The eye and favour of Bonaparte were attracted by a courage thus playful on the brink of death, and the unknown sergeant was transformed eventually into general Junot, governor of Paris, and duke of Abrantes. (14)

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Soon afterwards, while throwing up works against Little Gibraltar, the besiegers were exposed to a destructive fire, which was so fatal at a certain battery, that the gunners refused to stand by it. It was of importance to serve these guns, since, however exposed, they were in a position to do great execution. Bonaparte neither punished nor reproached his men, but, resorting to that magic by which genius subjects to its authority the impulses of mankind, directed his favourite sergeant to post up conspicuously above the deserted guns, a card with these words : — “The battery of men without fear!” The appeal flew electrically through the ranks, and the soldiers, instead of avoiding the dangerous post, contended for the honour of serving at it. To confirm their spirit, the commander of the artillery took his station upon this battery, and ordered “the men without fear,” to open their fire. Thus out of discouragement he created heroism.

So great was the slaughter at this post that one of the guns was left without its complement of men. Bonaparte seized the rammer of an artilleryman who had just fallen, and

assisted in loading and firing repeatedly ; and thus contracted a cutaneous complaint, with which the poor soldier had been affected. By unskilful treatment its tendency to the surface was repelled, with effects, from which his constitution was not perfectly relieved, until after his Italian campaigns, when he was able to take the advice of Corvisart.

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The milder virtues of justice and humanity he also displayed at Toulon. When the besieging army entered that place it was attended by the deputies, two of whom, Fréron and Barras, had been compelled to fly when it was delivered up to the public enemy, and consequently were disposed to exceed in their punishments the ordinary rigour of the convention. The popular societies and volunteer companies of the surrounding country and neighbouring towns, soon followed, with tempers averse to mercy or moderation. But when the destruction of public property came to be viewed in all its extent of vastation ; when the remains of the magazine, the ruins of the forts, the half-burnt arsenals and half-saved ships, were seen yet smoking with hostile fire ; when

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it was considered that the traitors of Toulon had given up to the enemies of their country which belonged to all France; which fed her pride, nourished her strength, and contributed to her safety; and when the troops beheld or remembered the number of their dead and wounded comrades; then indeed were the army and the people excited to furious indignation and unqualified revenge. (15) A revolutionary tribunal was established by the deputies for the punishment, rather than the trial of offenders. But it was found that the principal agents in the treason had fled with the allies. Of those who remained, few were culpable but in a venial degree. Nevertheless upwards of a hundred victims were selected and sentenced to be shot. General Dugommier discountenanced this ill directed severity, and Bonaparte lost the favour, and braved the resentment of the government, by refusing to order the execution of the sentence, (16) which was carried into effect by a detachment of the revolutionary militia.

Thus the wretched Toulonese suffered not only for the crime of their fellow citizens

and their own guilt, but for the bad faith of the allies. A melancholy but wholesome example of that dreadful retribution which awaits those who in time of war, direct the dagger of the enemy against the bosom of their country. The indiscriminate sacrifice of these unhappy men was doubtless cruel, but every lover of his country must confess, that the popular resentment which overwhelmed them was natural, and that its effects were salutary, as they had a direct tendency to destroy the connection which had been formed, between the foreign enemies of France and her domestic factions. (17)

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It was at this siege that Bonaparte conceived a regard for Duroc, who rose so high in his confidence and favour. (18) On the same occasion Victor, Suchet, St. Hilaire, and Marescot, first felt that ascendancy which they were destined so often to witness and so long to obey.

In effecting the reduction of Toulon, the commander of the artillery not only performed a most important service at a most critical moment, but young and subordinate as he was, displayed the qualities of a consummate general ; personal intrepidity, pro-

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fessional skill, humanity which neither interest could tempt nor power overawe, efficiency in collecting the means of warfare, and genius in kindling the enthusiasm of the troops, and in detecting in a complex and extended position the true point of attack. These qualities which rank him with great captains, entitle him to the praise of history; but what is especially memorable in a record of his life, is that sublime judgment which enabled him to foreshow with perfect accuracy of discernment, the consequences of a proposed operation, in the fears and necessities of the enemy. This crowns the glory of his success at Toulon, and associates it with all his subsequent victories, in which judgment bore so great and fortune so small a part.

The account of his conduct at this siege might be deemed unfaithful, were the offer of personal civility to his prisoner, general O'Hara, omitted. "All I ask," replied the latter, "is to be left alone, and to owe nothing to pity," with a dignity of mind, which though obscured by a surliness of temper, was perceived and respected by Bonaparte.

General Dugommier after completing the

reduction of Toulon, was appointed to the command of the army of the eastern Pyrenees. He was desirous that Bonaparte should accompany him, and with a view of ensuring so important an acquisition, issued an order, directing that officer to follow him to the neighbourhood of Perpignan. But the committee of public safety, though tardy in acknowledging, and penurious in rewarding Bonaparte's services, were prompt and free in employing his talents. This they did by sending him in the opposite direction, and by assigning to him a duty, which though it promised no accession of glory, was likely to be attended by unpleasant responsibility and vexatious difficulties. During its performance he received his promotion to the rank of brigadier-general, and instructions, after its completion, to rejoin the army of Italy, and take command of its artillery.

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The recovery of Toulon, with the exile or punishment of its misguided inhabitants, although it had humbled the spirit of insurrection in the southern departments, had not extinguished it. The English had been forced to relinquish their hold on this impor-

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tant station, but they had not done so without augmenting their own naval power, and impairing essentially that of France. Their flag in consequence ruled the Mediterranean, and the French territory on that sea, vulnerable from the factious temper of the population, was exposed more than ever to insult and aggression. It became therefore a matter of pressing importance to supply by fortifications on land that protection to the coast which the fleets and forts of Toulon had formerly afforded. This task was entrusted to Bonaparte. It was barren and deterring; yet he performed it in a manner which was in the highest degree useful, and gave striking evidence of the analytical power of his understanding.

At that time no rule had been observed in the construction of fortifications on the coast of France. Their numbers, situation, and strength, had been determined, not by the nature of the ground, or the degree of its exposure, but by the caprice of the government, or the interest or apprehensions of the local authorities. This gave rise to frequent altercations between the magistracy of the maritime towns and the officers of artillery, and left the

coast but feebly defended. Bonaparte pro-
ceeded on a system, which was to leave no-
thing to the chances of ministerial humour,
or to the effects of local importunity. Di-
viding the positions of this coast into three
classes, of which, the great naval stations
were the first, important commercial har-
bours the second, and capes or promontories
favourable to sudden descents the third, he
prescribed for each class, fortifications adapt-
ed to its importance and exposure. Sup-
posing a scale of the expense of constructing
them, to denote with sufficient accuracy the
relative force and magnitude of these batte-
ries, it may be observed, that a fortification
of the first class was to cost sixty thousand
francs; one of the second, forty thousand;
and one of the third, six thousand.

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It appears that he assigned to these works
ordnance of a calibre proportioned to the
danger they were intended to repel, and
embraced in his regulations the angle of ele-
vation, proper to be provided for in the
gun-carriages at the various stations, accor-
ding to the range which was expected to be
covered by their pieces. The observations
on this subject, which he dictated at St. He-

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lena, must be useful to the engineers of all countries which are exposed to the annoyance of a maritime foe.

While engaged in superintending these fortifications, he was an unwilling witness of the barbarous excesses of the populace and their leaders, at Marseilles. They seized upon a rich merchant named Hughes, whose age and infirmities would have entitled him to mercy, had he not been innocent. He was accused by these brutes, and by them pronounced guilty of conspiring against the republic, although he was eighty-four years old, feeble, deaf, and almost blind. His real crime in their eyes, was his enormous wealth, which was estimated at eighteen millions of francs. This the unhappy man offered to resign, only entreating that half a million might be spared to him, urging that in the course of nature he could enjoy it but a very short time. But neither his bribe, nor his tears, nor his age, nor his innocence, could soften the ferocity of the butchers around him, who thirsting for his blood as well as for his money, hurried him to the guillotine. The pain with which Bonaparte witnessed this mur-

der, he expressed at St. Helena by exclaiming, "Truly I thought myself at the end of the world," a form of speech which he employed to denote the strongest detestation and horror. It seemed that the nerves of his body as well as the feelings of his soul, shuddered to the quick at spectacles of cruelty.

It appears, he always deemed the support he received at Toulon, first from Gasparin, and afterwards from Dugommier, instrumental in opening his way to fortune and to fame. The value of his services not only to the country but to themselves, greatly overpaid the general and the deputy. Nevertheless, in his will, he left substantial memorials of his respect and gratitude for their names; thus by a magnificent retrospect, looking from the melancholy end of his career, to its bright beginning.

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CHAPTER IV.

From March, 1794, to October, 1795.

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on a charge which is withdrawn—Attached to the armament prepared for an attack upon Rome—By his advice that project abandoned—Mob at Toulon—Saves two deputies of the assembly—Rescues the Chabrillants—Rejoins the army of Italy—Ordered to take a command in the infantry—Is dissatisfied and proceeds to Paris—Visits his mother on his way and stops at Châtillon-sur-Seine—Anecdote—His interview with Aubry, the minister of war—His retort—Tenders his resignation—It is not accepted—Appointed to command the artillery of the army of the West—Kellerman's disasters—Danger of the Italian frontier—The committee of public safety consult Bonaparte—He draws up instructions which are sent to Kellerman—Is employed in the war office in directing the operations of the armies—His reputed idea of obtaining orders to seek a command in the army of the Grand Signior—Independent in his circumstances, though not rich—His disposal of his time while at Paris—His impression in society.

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Having digested the order, arranged the position, and prescribed the structure of suitable fortifications along the coast of France, from the Rhone to the Var, general Bonaparte proceeded in March, 1794, to the head quarters of the army of Italy, which were established at Nice. He was preceded by the reputation he had acquired at Toulon, and accompanied

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by his first aides-de-camp, Muiron and Junot. The commander in chief, general Dumerbion, was a veteran, who by hard service had gained high rank. He was intrepid, upright, and well informed ; and having served the two previous campaigns on this frontier, was acquainted with its positions. He was severely afflicted with the gout, but as he discovered the merit and relied on the counsels of the young general of artillery, his efficiency was by no means impaired by his infirmities. (1) Macquart, d'Allemagne, and Massena, were his generals of division.

The French army was stationed in the county of Nice, which is situated on the Mediterranean side of the maritime Alps, and between the rivers the Var and the Roya. On the declivities of the Alps overhanging this territory, the Sardinian army of twenty thousand men, occupied the camp of Fourches ; a formidable position resting on the strong fort of Saorgio, which commanded the principal route from Nice to Turin. Fixed on this height, unassailable on his flanks from the nature of the ground, inexpugnable in his front as experience had demonstrated, and fortified both by nature

and art in his rear, the Sardinian commander menaced the French frontier, communicated by his left with that of Genoa, and with the line of Austrian posts which were extended across the mountains from the valley of the Bormida to the harbour of Oneille; and with the English cruisers and privateers, which intercepting from that port, the commerce between Genoa and Marseilles, interrupted the alleviation and supply afforded by it, to the French army and to the famine of Provence. The importance of dislodging the enemy from this effective position, had been felt so sensibly by general Brunet, that on the 8th and 12th of the previous June, he had assailed it with a superiority of force and with persevering vigour. His efforts were vain and his loss considerable. With the government, which he served, as suspicion and proof were equivalent, failure and guilt were identical. General Brunet, unfortunate in battle, was charged with treason and punished with death. General Dumerbion who was to contend with equal difficulties, was subject to similar misfortune, and exposed to the same fate, for neither the interest of the nation nor the temper of the

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convention, would tolerate an inactive campaign. Thus circumstanced he must have regarded his antagonist, with feelings akin to those of the shepherd, who sees the eagle that preys upon his lambs, perched upon an inaccessible rock, where neither his shouts can alarm nor his missiles reach her. But a hunter approached, from whose daring footsteps, and unerring eye, the only security was in instant flight.

The first care of the general of artillery after his arrival, was to make himself acquainted with the station and force of the several divisions of the army. The performance of this duty gave him an opportunity of studying the ground, of observing the enemy's position, and of tracing on the spot the unfortunate operations of general Brunet. He perceived that the camp of Fourches was too strong to be carried by a direct attack, however skilfully or gallantly conducted, and felt convinced that if general Dumerbion repeated the attempt of his predecessor, he would meet with no better success. The same military penetration which had revealed to him the mode of expelling the English from Toulon, now suggested to

him the method of dislodging the Sardinians from Saorgio. (2.)

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His plan was projected on a scale of sagacity and enterprise which was as yet new and unattempted in this army, whose headquarters during two campaigns had been stationary at Nice. It proposed extending the right wing divided into two columns, along the precipitous and narrow slope, between the sea and the Alps, as far as Oneille and Loano; separating the Austrian and Sardinian armies from communication with the British squadron; passing with the further column across the crest of the mountains and seizing Ormea and Garessio, two Sardinian forts on the sources of the Tanaro; ascending with the nearer column to the heights of Tanardo and Tanarello, and occupying the route from Nice to Turin at a point in the rear of Saorgio. This movement, if successfully executed, would expel the English cruisers and privateers from Oneille and Loano, protect the French coasting trade, cut off the enemy's communication with the sea; by endangering his retreat, compel him to abandon the camp of Fourches, from which, after sanguinary efforts it

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had been found impracticable to force him; and would place the French army on the summits of the Alps, where, while their posts could neither be turned nor commanded, they would disquiet one member of the coalition for the safety of his country, and the security of his capital.

If the Sardinian general should attempt to counteract this operation by assuming the offensive and attacking the French in their positions on the Var, besides that these positions were in themselves strong and capable of being maintained against a superior force, his advance would place the French right more completely on his flank and rear and render the movement proposed by Bonaparte still more efficacious and successful. Or, should he, which was not probable, detach a corps from his left in time and strength sufficient to arrest the progress of the French column, he must thereby expose his main position at Fourches, to a direct and victorious assault. So that whether the enemy remained quiet or moved forward, his eventual retreat was equally certain; he would lose all the advantages of superiority of ground, which, in-

dependently of other favourable consequences, would result in their full force to the French (3).

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In forming this plan, Bonaparte appears to have reasoned on principles deduced from the nature of mountain warfare; in which strength of ground becomes a consideration so preponderating, that even in the conduct of an offensive campaign, an able general endeavours to conquer his enemy by positions. By these he forces him to fight to disadvantage or to retreat without fighting, losing in the first case the moral impulse and physical momentum of attack; in the second relinquishing the command of territory which otherwise he might have held (4).

To this mode of commencing the campaign there was no serious military objection, while it was easy to remove the political one which was suggested. It involved the necessity of violating, or to use an equivalent for the softer French term, of *borrowing* the neutral territory of Genoa. But in the previous campaign, a detachment of Sardinian troops two thousand strong, had been permitted to pass in martial array, with drums

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beating and colours flying through the territory of the republic, and to embark at Oneille as a reenforcement to the allied armament in Toulon. About the same time, so domineering was the influence of England on that coast, while she held possession of Toulon, that a British squadron had been suffered to attack and take, with circumstances of outrage and cruelty, the French frigate *La Modeste* while at her moorings in the harbour of Genoa (5). The neutral rights of this once proud republic, thus prostituted, were entitled on principle to no respect from France. It was true that the importance of the commerce, which, under the Genoese flag, was maintained with the south of France, had impressed on the policy of the convention a character of unusual forbearance, from which it was not expected, that the commander would deviate. But the operation in question would free that commerce from obstruction, would establish a French force on the Genoese frontier, and be more likely to overawe than to irritate, so small and so mercantile a state.

General Dumerbion yielded full attention and a ready assent, to the plan proposed by

the general of artillery, and submitted it to a council of war, composed of his principal officers and the deputies of the convention. It was no sooner explained than it was adopted; its intrinsic advantages concurring with the fresh and rising reputation of its author, to obviate unreasonable doubt and pertinacious discussion.

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To carry this bold plan into execution, Massena, on the 6th of April, crossed the Roya at the head of fourteen thousand men, with the first division of which, after taking the small castle of Vingtimilia, he turned to his left, penetrated into his native mountains, and took post on Mont Tanardo and Monte Grande, inferior elevations of the Alps; thus beginning his career of glory in the rough cradle of his infant sports. (7) Bonaparte, who conducted the second division, taking a wider range between the English fleet on his right, and the Austro-Sardinian posts on his left, passed rapidly the Nervia and the Taggia, routed a strong body of Austrians at St. Agata, and taking possession of Oneille, put that sea-port in a condition of repelling hostile cruisers, and sheltering French trading vessels. Ardently prosecut-

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ing his movement, he ascended from Oneille to the pass of Ponte di Nave, where an Austrian force waited to oppose him. This he defeated on the 15th of April, and driving it over the mountains before him, compelled the neighbouring garrison of Ormea, consisting of four hundred men, to surrender. Twenty pieces of artillery, several thousand muskets, and a quantity of military clothing, of which the troops were in want, fell into his hands. (8) His next object was Garessio, which being instantly attacked, fell an easy conquest. From Garessio, the ultimate point of his invasion, while he threatened the plains and capital of Piedmont, he secured his communication with the sea at Loano, by occupying, on the 18th of April, Monts St. Bernard and Rocca Barbena.

Thus, in the short space of twelve days, Bonaparte had advanced the positions of the French army a distance of about eighty miles, through a tract of the most difficult country in Europe, driving the British cruisers from the coast on one side, dislodging the Austrian army from the mountains on the other, and had gained a

position which overlooked the plains of Piedmont, and menaced that kingdom with invasion.

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Massena, meanwhile, had conducted his operations on a line nearer to the enemy's camp, and in a manner equally vigorous and successful. Pushing onward from Tanaro, he reached the higher position of Tanarello, and posted himself, after several conflicts, on the route from Nice to Turin, and, in conformity with the indications of Bonaparte, at a point in the rear of Saorgio. The effect of these daring movements, on this skilful plan, was as decisive and complete as that which attended the storming of Little Gibraltar at Toulon. The Sardinian army, its flank turned and its retreat endangered, evacuated, in haste, the camp of Fourches, and leaving behind numerous cannon and immense stores, retreated higher up into the Alps to a pass called the Col de Tende. So great were the alarm and precipitation that Saorgio, though strongly garrisoned and regularly fortified, surrendered to Massena, after a show of resistance, on the 29th of April; and the intrenched camp of Fourches, which had been so triumphantly defended

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the year before, was now resigned without resistance, and taken without an attack.

On the 8th of May, Massena having refreshed his troops by a few days of repose, passed the Col Ardent, and moved upon the left and rear of the Sardinians in their new position in the Col de Tende; while Dumerbion, no longer apprehending a counteracting effort of the enemy, directed the division of Macquart against their front. This combined attack succeeded, and general Dumerbion becoming, in consequence, master of the maritime Alps, extended his left into communication with the nearest post of the army of the Alps, which, in emulation of his success, had lately dislodged the Sardinians from Mont Cenis.

Thus the army of Italy, which, after repeated change of commanders, and frequent bloody actions, had been unable, in the space of two years, to advance a step beyond the valley of the Var, was empowered, by the bold and original combinations of Bonaparte's judgment, in a single month, to surmount and to hold the frowning barrier of the Alps, from the Col de Tende to the Appenines, to rend asunder the tenacious

connection of the allied forces, to expel the Sardinians and Austrians from the mountains, and the English fleet from the coast, with inconsiderable loss, to take three thousand prisoners, an intrenched camp, three mountain fortresses, a numerous train of artillery, with large stores of provisions and ammunition; and, cutting off the enemy's communication with the sea, to transfer the danger of invasion from the frontiers of France to the Sardinian capital. (9)

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The court of Turin, no longer supported by intercourse with the British fleet, was thrown into the greatest consternation upon finding that frontier of the kingdom, whose natural obstruction was its greatest strength, overpassed without difficulty or delay, by a powerful and active enemy. The king, in his alarm, ordered a levy, *en masse*, of his subjects. Nor could the cabinets of London and Vienna regard, without serious apprehension, a rapidity of conquest which was then unexampled in the French armies, and which, if not counteracted, seemed likely, by placing the Sardinian monarch at the mercy of the French Republic, to create an important alteration in the state of the war:

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Such was the outline, and so great were the effects of this second stroke of Bonaparte's military genius. Though his glory was again shaded by superior rank, though a secondary station still kept his name unknown to the annals of Europe, and his subsequent exploits soon outshone the lustre of his present deeds, this expedition in the Alps, in the boldness and rapidity of its movements, and in the exact correspondence between its result and its conception, must be admitted to bear impressions of the same originality and excellence which distinguish his greatest campaigns. It ought to be mentioned, in justice to General Dumerbion, that so far from desiring to suppress the merit of his general of artillery, in his despatch to the government describing his successes, he said, "It is to the talent of general Bonaparte that I am indebted for the skilful plans which have assured our victory."

The positions of the army of Italy on the Alps, though safe and formidable, were attended by many disadvantages. The air and water of these snowy regions were both unwholesome, and the routes so difficult that the posts were insulated and the sup-

plies irregular. The men fell sick, the horses perished, the guns were left behind, and the cavalry dismounted; so that the strength of the army rapidly diminished, while its expense was greatly increased. On the other hand, the rich plains of Piedmont which reposed and refreshed the Sardinian army, tempted the French forward to plenty and conquest. The committee of public safety, emboldened by the success already gained, were impatient of delay, and directed that offensive operations should be incessantly pursued. But as his adversary was now in connection with his fortresses and reinforcements, general Dumerbion, whose sickness probably damped his enterprise, did not think himself, reduced as he was in artillery and cavalry, in strength sufficient to invade Piedmont, and meet the enemy in the plain. He, therefore, endeavoured to procure the cooperation of the army of the Alps, and for that purpose authorized the general of artillery to confer with general Dumas and his principal officers. Bonaparte, on this occasion, submitted a plan for invading Piedmont, by uniting the two

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armies in the valley of the Stura, which was approved by the deputies Ricord and Robespierre, and by the committee of public safety, to whom it was transmitted. But a difference of opinion on the part of the deputies employed with the army of the Alps, which could not be reconciled, and an insufficiency of means, especially in regard to cavalry, which could not be provided for, retarded its execution until the events in the convention of the 9th Thermidor prevented it altogether. (10) In September, however, the preparations of the Austrians and the English put an end to this state of irksome inaction. An Austrian corps, under general Colloredo, was assembled on the Bormida, which, by establishing magazines as high up as Dego, near the source of that river, indicated a movement towards the sea coast, and a design of reopening a communication between the Austro-Sardinian army and the British fleet. Corresponding with this demonstration, the English, it appeared, were to effect a landing at Vado, a Genoese port, and uniting with the Austrians, take possession of Savona, and force

the republic of Genoa, straitened by sea and land, to abandon her gainful neutrality, and declare war against France.

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In forming this project, the allied powers, who were now strengthened by the renewed accession of Prussia to the coalition, with an army of sixty-two thousand men, (11) proposed taking advantage of their own wrong. Having first violated, as we have seen, the neutrality of Genoa, they were making the lawful consequence of that outrage, a pretext for further encroachment and oppression upon the rights of that feeble state; thus unjustly continuing a course of injury which they themselves had wantonly commenced.

To counteract this dangerous and lawless scheme, which, besides its military consequences, would have had the effect of cutting off all relief to the scarcity which still prevailed in the South of France, Bonaparte advised general Dumerbion instantly to advance his right wing, take possession of the heights above Vado, and establish a communication across the mountains, between that point on the coast and the positions which the army already held on the sources of the Tanaro, by the way of St. Jacques and Montenotte.

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He would thus be in a situation to countenance the friends of France in Genoa, to prevent any direct attempt of the allies on that city, in case it should be meditated, would assure the neutrality of that republic, place the French in command of the entire coast from the frontier of France to the neighbourhood of Genoa, protect the French commerce, maintain the separation between the Austro-Sardinian forces and the British fleet, and disconcert completely the projects of the allies on this theatre of the war. (12)

General Dumerbion and the deputies having considered and approved this suggestion, a column of eighteen thousand men, with twenty pieces of light artillery, was put in motion to execute it. This force, from the impregnable nature of the French posts on the great chain of the Alps, could be detached without danger. Bonaparte, who advised, directed the movement, although the commander in chief was present. He first penetrated through the pass or Col de Bardinetto, into Montferrat, along the road which borders the Bormida, and on the 5th of October, having left the heights of Biestro, descended rapidly into the plain.

His intention was to get into the rear of Colloredo's corps of Austrians, amounting to twelve thousand men. But by retreating upon Cairo, and thence upon the fortified town of Acqui, Colloredo prevented the full success of this attempt. Nevertheless, the French vanguard, under general Cervoni, maintained so active a pursuit, that the Austrians, besides abandoning their magazines, sustained the loss of a thousand men.

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General Dumerbion was not in a condition to prosecute his movement in this direction, or in other words to invade Italy. Want of forage had compelled him to send his horses to the pastures on the Rhone; so that he had no cavalry, a force indispensable in the plain; and no heavy artillery, without which a country strong, populous and studded with fortresses, could with difficulty be deemed be conquered. Moreover the authority which had been given by the government for uniting the armies of the Alps and of Italy, at the suggestion of Bonaparte, in the valley of the Stura, had been revoked, not without expressions of suspicious displeasure. Declining to expose himself to the frowns

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of a jealous authority, and to the Austrian and Sardinian forces which had been united in the neighbourhood of Acqui, he withdrew to his positions on the head waters of the Tanaro, and completed the object of his expedition, by taking possession of Savona, and fortifying the heights which command the town and harbour of Vado.

Thus the French were placed in command of a still greater extent of the coast and of the impending mountains; and had their advanced parties securely established within a forced march of Genoa. While the allies—their formidable projects both by sea and land completely frustrated, the English expelled from the coast and their confederates driven beyond the mountains—appeased the mortification of their common defeat, by mutual suspicion and reciprocal censure. (13) This ill humour though not among the military effects, was a desirable consequence of the successes of the French, and might, it was hoped, loosen the ties of the coalition.

So ended this active and victorious campaign of the army of Italy.

The leisure of autumn and winter Bonaparte employed in completing the fortifi-

cations of Vado and Oneille, in inspecting the line of maritime forts from the Var to the Rhone, which were in the progress of construction under his superintendence, and in perfecting his acquaintance with that part of the grand chain of the maritime Alps, in which he had not been personally employed. So intent were his observations that in company with St. Hilaire, he passed a night in January on the top of a mountain near the Col de Tende; whence at sunrise, in the gorgeous light of the eastern horizon, he descried the lovely plains of Italy, and the distant waters of the Po. So strong was his emotion that he was tempted to exclaim, *Italiam! Italiam!* his ardent genius prophetic of future glories, and dazzled by the visions which itself inspired.

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But his time was not altogether engrossed by the toils of war or the rude grandeur of mountain prospects. Scenes less inclement and softer contests occasionally engaged him. Among the members of the convention in attendance on the army of Italy, was M. Thurreau—a gentleman whose personal insignificance in the deputation, was redeemed by the wit and beauty of his wife.

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This lady was not insensible to the merit, nor unkind to the devotion of the young general of artillery, who proud of his success, ventured to manifest his adoration, by ordering for her amusement, as they walked out on the great theatre of the Alps, an attack of the advance posts stationed below them.

The French party was victorious, but they lost some of their number, and as the affair could lead to no result, it was in every sense of the term a *wanton* sacrifice of brave men's lives. In his youth, his infatuation, and the compunction with which he remembered and confessed this criminal folly, indulgent readers may find some excuse for it. The incident is worthy of being recorded, because the faults of such a man are sacred to history, and because the intimacy out of which it sprung was the means probably of saving his life. (14)

Robespierre the younger, who with his colleague Ricord, had joined the army of Italy after the siege of Toulon, became a great admirer of Bonaparte's talents, and a steady advocate for the plans he recommended. The character of this deputy it appears, was very different from that of his infamous

brother—he was capable of feeling and inspiring a virtuous friendship. (15) Being recalled to Paris by the elder Robespierre a few days before the 9th Thermidor, he earnestly invited the general of artillery to accompany him, his instances proceeding probably, from a desire to promote Bonaparte's professional advancement. That the latter resisted, at this inactive period of the campaign, these imposing solicitations, and thereby escaped being sacrificed in the unlooked for catastrophe of Robespierre and his partisans, was owing doubtless in no slight degree, to the force of his attachment for Madam Thurreau.

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Years had revolved ; the general of artillery filled the imperial throne, whilst the fair one whose attractions had pleased and preserved him, was become a poor and faded widow. After many petitions which failed to pass the barrier of indifference that environs power, Madam Thurreau obtained by accident, an interview with the Emperor—"Why," said the sovereign kindly "have you not before made known your situation : many of our former acquaintances at Nice, are now personages

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of the court, and in constant intercourse with me." The answer of the widow is yet another proof, that friendship is faithful only to prosperity.—"Alas, sire, since my misfortunes, they have ceased to know me." He felt for her distress, and if he remembered her former weakness, was certainly not the person to chastise it. Her wants were instantly relieved, and her future comfort liberally provided for.

Before the downfall of Robespierre, while the army held its positions on the higher crest of the Alps, Bonaparte had been directed by secret instructions which bear the signature of Ricord, to visit Genoa, to notice the state of the fortifications of that city, to penetrate if possible the political intentions of the republic with regard to the belligerent powers, and more especially to observe the conduct of Tilly, the French chargé d'affaires, respecting whose fidelity or fitness, some doubts were entertained. Soon after the 9th Thermidor, Ricord being superseded, and Robespierre, the younger, guillotined, Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, who had previously been in attendance on the army of the Alps, succeeded them in superintending the

army of Italy. Heated by the passions of the new government, and acting on its principles of distrust towards the agents of the defeated party, they interpreted this mission to Genoa into an act of secret correspondence with the enemy. The plan which Bonaparte had proposed, and which shortly before his death the younger Robespierre had approved and transmitted to the government for their adoption, they affected to think a scheme for placing the army of France in the power of the enemy. About the same time they were informed by an anonymous letter from Genoa, that a million of francs had been sent from that city, to corrupt one of the French generals. As Bonaparte was the most conspicuous among these, and was known to have planned and conducted the successful operations of the campaign, they believed, or pretended to believe, that he was a mercenary accomplice of Robespierre the younger and Ricord, in a scheme to betray the army into the power of the allies. Early in August accordingly, these deputies ordered the arrest of general Bonaparte, and the seizure and examination of his papers. Instead of finding evidence of his

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guilt, they found such strong proofs of his innocence, that in the course of a fortnight, he was released without trial.

Junot his aide de camp who was faithfully attached to him, had with other military friends determined, rather than he should be transferred to the dreaded tribunals of Paris, to rescue him from confinement by force and convey him beyond the French territory. (16) In effecting this design they would have experienced little difficulty, inasmuch as general Dumerbion who knew and had confessed his merit, and the troops, who here, as they had done at Toulon, looked up to him as the real commander, were indignant at his arrest. Junot made known to him the project which had been formed in his favour; but he mildly rebuked his friendly zeal, interdicted every thing like forcible interference, observing calmly, that he would trust for safety to his innocence, and that Junot's interference might commit him. (17) It appears nevertheless, that he wrote a letter of very bold remonstrance which, (Laporte having rejoined the army of the Alps,) he addressed to Albite and Salicetti. From the personal acquaint-

tance of the last two deputies, of Salicetti more particularly, with his services at Tou-

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lon, he regarded Laporte as the real author of his arrest. In the despatch of Albite and Salicetti to the government, mentioning the release of general Bonaparte from arrest, they not only admit that there existed no foundation for the charges which they had made against him, but they allege, that his talents were too great, and his services too important, to justify at so critical a period of the campaign, his longer suspension from duty. (18) The officer by whom he was released, found him poring over a map of Italy.

During the succeeding winter, in one of his visits of inspection to the fortifications along the coast, Maignier the representative of the people at Marseilles, expressed to him an apprehension that the popular societies of that city, which was then agitated by violent tumults, would attack and plunder the magazines of powder and arms, established in the dismantled forts of St. Nicholas and St. John. On the requisition of this representative, Bonaparte sketched a plan for protecting these magazines, by a wall with battlements, on the side next the town.

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This plan was sent to Paris, and denounced by the successors of Maignier, as a project for reconstructing those fortresses, in order to bridle and oppress the people: for it often happened in this season of political passion, that conduct which appeared laudable to one deputy or at one moment, would be held culpable the next, by another deputy. The convention, countenancing the charge of their colleagues, directed by a special decree, the commander of the artillery at Marseilles to repair to Paris and justify himself at their bar. Bonaparte who was attached to the army of Italy, had returned to his post, and colonel Sugny, being actually the chief officer of artillery at Marseilles, was designated by the terms of the decree. Sugny accordingly repaired to Paris, and as the thirst for innocent blood was in some measure allayed since the overthrow of the reign of terror, satisfied the convention, that he was not the author of the project in question. In the course of the investigation it was readily discovered that the plan had been furnished by Bonaparte; and a decree was pronounced requiring his appearance before the convention, in place

of colonel Sugny. From the violence of the reaction which the thermidoriens, in the tide of their ascendancy, directed against all who were suspected in the remotest degree, of having been partisans of Robespierre, there was just ground to apprehend, that the convention would deal with severe injustice toward a general, who after being recently arrested as an accomplice of the tyrant's brother, was again involved in an offensive charge. Fully comprehending the danger of his position, Bonaparte was unwilling to encounter a prosecution, in which, it was probable, innocence would constitute but a feeble defence. He exerted himself therefore to procure a repeal of the decree, and the enemy happening to make serious demonstrations at the time, he was successful. The deputies, upon whom rested great responsibility, became alarmed, and wrote to the government, that the presence of general Bonaparte with the army was indispensable. By their exertion, the accusation which had been transmitted to the convention was withdrawn, and the decree revoked. (19)

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These were the principal dangers to which he was exposed from the fury of the revolu-

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tionary government. (20) In every situation through which he had passed, it appears, that whether the balance of his fortune inclined to depression or turned to advancement, he was indebted to the force of merit alone, for safety or preferment. His proficiency as a student antedated his transfer from Brienne to Paris. His attainments there, accelerated his promotion to a lieutenancy. The same causes produced his selection for the command of the artillery at Toulon; where his services protected him from the rage of the terrorists at his fearless humanity; as his commanding talent at Saorgio, shielded him from the blind reaction of the thermidoriens. And it may be added, that while the firmness of his principles exposed him to the umbrage of both parties, neither was able to fix a stain on his integrity.

The English, under the guidance of the unfortunate Paoli, having succeeded in subduing Corsica, and establishing a government in that island, and the Holy See having perpetrated a variety of insults, besides permitting the murder of Basseville, the French minister at Rome, the committee of public safety, actuated by just indignation, pre-

pared, in the early part of the year 1795, for sending an expedition to Corsica, and then for making an unexpected attack upon Rome. With the ships of war which had been rescued from the English at Toulon, they composed a squadron of sixteen sail of the line, to which were attached a hundred transports, having on board ten thousand select troops. This fleet, commanded by Admiral Martin, was lying in Toulon, while a British squadron of equal force cruised off the harbour. The French government, after some fluctuation between the two objects, finally determined to direct their first effort against Rome, and a member of the convention, Letourneur, was sent down to Toulon invested with extraordinary powers, and with authority to equip the expedition, and conduct it, without delay, to the capital of the Catholic world. This deputy, upon his arrival, held a council of war, which he acquainted with the intentions of the government, and consulted upon the best mode of executing them. General Bonaparte, whose reputation for patriotism seemed to have been corroborated by repeated and abortive accusation, had been selected to command the artillery of the armament, and

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in this capacity had arrived at Toulon and was summoned to the council. His opinion was adverse to the expedition, and to the wishes of the deputy Letourneur. He argued that the squadron would probably be worsted, and the transports taken, if attacked by the unincumbered English fleet, and insisted that the expedition could not be safely attempted, unless the French were masters of the Mediterranean. He, moreover, affirmed, that it would be sacrificing ten thousand troops to land them in the neighbourhood of Rome without cavalry and without artillery horses, to convey which an augmentation of the convoy, of the delay, and the risk, would be necessary. His arguments were the less palatable to the deputy, as they were perfectly convincing to the other members of the council. In pursuance of his advice, Admiral Martin leaving the transports in the harbour, sailed on the 1st of March with the deputy on board, for the purpose of engaging the English fleet, and gaining the mastery of the Mediterranean. The hostile squadrons came in sight off Leghorn, when Letourneur thought it prudent to retreat, and the English admiral to chase.

Admiral Martin, after capturing a single ship, the *Berwick*, on going to sea, and losing two, the *Ca Ira* and the *Censeur* in retreating, took shelter under the *Iles d'Hyères*.

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(21) Any doubts which the deputy might have felt respecting the opinions of the general of artillery, seem to have been removed by the experimental terrors of his voyage. The ill judged expedition against Rome was abandoned, and the ten thousand troops marched back to the camp near Nice.

The party which had triumphed in the convention on the 9th Thermidor had not yet obtained predominance in the cities of the south. In Marseilles and Toulon the impulse of that movement had been felt violently, but the Jacobin leaders, animated and abetted by the existing resentment at the treasonable proceedings of the opposite party in 1793, had been able still to maintain a control over the passions of the populace. At Toulon, the thermidorean deputies, Mariette and Cambon, were extremely obnoxious to Jacobin hatred, and were accused in their societies of being disposed to lead back the revolution to legitimacy. In this state of things a French privateer had brought in a Spanish prize, on board of which were

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twenty French emigrants, consisting, for the greater part, of the family of Chabrilant. They were conveyed to the jail of the town, and there confined. In the course of the succeeding tumults, a crowd collected at the arsenal, and rushed to the jail for the purpose of murdering its unhappy tenants. The deputies interposed, harangued the populace, exhorted their leaders to desist from violence, and promised to have these unfortunate emigrants brought to trial in twenty-four hours. But being themselves already suspected, instead of allaying the tumult, their exertions only served to inflame it. It was late in the evening, they were lighting the lamps, and a voice answered the harangue of the deputies by shouting, *let us hang up to the lanterns these protectors of emigrants.* At this dreaded signal the outcry became more furious, and "deep calling unto deep," the disturbance more extended and stormy. The military guard being summoned, approached, and was instantly repulsed. Bonaparte, who was present, recognized, among the leaders of the mob, several cannoniers who had served under him at the siege of Toulon, and calling out to them, at this awful moment, mounted a pile of

timber. The cannoniers caused their general to be respected, and his voice to be heard. He calmed the infuriated crowd in the arsenal, and the deputies were permitted to withdraw in safety. In the streets, however, the uproar continued with fearful violence, and the prison guard were upon the point of being overpowered by the mob. Thither Bonaparte hastened, and there his interference was again successful.

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The populace soothed and controlled by his address and manner, retired, and in the night he had the unhappy emigrants concealed in ammunition waggons, conveyed out of the town and safely embarked in the road of *Hyères*. Thus bold and active was he in the cause of humanity, at a time when mercy seemed banished from France. (22)

About the end of March general Bonaparte rejoined the army of Italy in the maritime Alps. It was soon afterwards incorporated with the army of the Alps, and the command of the united force given to general Kellerman. This arrangement was accompanied by a new classification of general officers, which restored to active service, those among

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them, who, in consequence of personal imbecility or political disaffection, had estranged themselves from the cause of their country from the moment of the overthrow of the monarchy, in the year 1792. Its effect was to exclude from employment a number of generals of artillery, and, in its application to Bonaparte, who was the youngest on the list, to place him in the infantry. His command of the artillery in Kellerman's army being thus annulled, he set out for the seat of government, with a view of applying for other and suitable employment. On his route he visited his mother at Marseilles, to whose heart his safety from danger, and his rising fame, must have communicated the tenderest pleasure. He found too his brother Joseph happily married, and the comforts of the family, which had been seriously impaired by the cruelty of Paoli, in a great measure renovated by his mother's prudence. At Marseilles he met general Kellerman, on his way to Nice, and communicated to him much information respecting the theatre of war, on which the hero of Valmy was not destined to gain laurels. Then adopting his brother Louis,

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whose education he had particularly superintended, as an extra aide de camp, he proceeded on his way to Paris. At Chatillon-sur-Seine he met intelligence of the insurrection of the 1st of Prairial, in which the Jacobins were, after temporary and terrible success, again overcome. The father of his aide de camp, Marmont, resided at Chatillon; and to gratify this officer at whose instance he had taken Chatillon in his route, as well as to wait the return of public order in the capital, having been sufficiently disgusted with popular tumults, he remained there several days. The father of Marmont, a knight of St. Louis, was a rich proprietor of iron works in Burgundy. His son who felt a strong inclination for a military life, after failing to obtain entrance into the royal artillery, had been contented to join a provincial regiment. He was recommended to the friendship and protection of Bonaparte by an uncle who was a schoolfellow of the latter at Brienne, and his comrade and friend in the regiment of La Fere. A royalist, this uncle forsook his country to follow the emigrant princes, and bespoke of Bonaparte that care of his nephew, which he himself could no

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longer bestow on him. It is needless to say that this confidence of the exile was not misplaced. Marmont's father, though avaricious, was profuse and extravagant in entertaining the hero of Toulon and Saorgio, and the liberal patron of his son. Though the weather was warm, his hearths blazed with fires, so that his hospitality amused more than it comforted his guest. (23)

Upon arriving in Paris, Bonaparte presented himself at the war office. In the changes which had followed the revolution of parties of the 9th of Thermidor, and had succeeded more recent convulsions, Aubry, an ancient captain of artillery, who as an indifferent patriot, and a spiritless officer, had been, though not an emigrant, aloof from service throughout the war, was elected to the convention, chosen a member of the committee of public safety, and entrusted with the management of military affairs. To this minister, who was moreover a secret enemy of the revolution, (24) the character and services of Bonaparte could not fail to present an unpleasant contrast with his own. Accordingly when in applying for active employment, Bonaparte represented that he had com-

manded the artillery at the siege of Toulon; From 1794
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had superintended the work of fortifying the coast and harbours of Provence; had ever since commanded the artillery of the army of Italy; and added that it would be extremely painful for him to leave a corps in which he had served from his very infancy, Aubry coldly observed, that there were a great many artillery generals, that Bonaparte was the youngest of the number, and could not be employed out of turn. As Aubry had not been on duty during the war, and nevertheless had the effrontery to promote himself from a retired captaincy to the rank of general of division, and inspector of artillery, this observation was received and retorted as unjust and impertinent. "Officers soon grow old on the field of battle," was the mixture of irony and logic, with which Bonaparte abashed and irritated the inexperienced veteran. A few days afterwards, more in punishment than reward, he was ordered to join the army of the west engaged in the Vendean war, and take command of a brigade of infantry. (25) The service was unpleasant to his feelings, the destination an outrage to his pride, and actuated by a

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proper feeling of dignity, he sent in his resignation. This was not accepted, nor was it at once refused. In the meantime Aubry's selfish and reacting system, by which a number of officers, who like himself had been out of danger and service from the beginning of the war, were put in the place of those who had been constantly in the field, excited violent dissatisfaction and provoked a number of remonstrances. Of the persons thus displaced not a few were officers of science and merit, while many like those who attended general Cartaux at Toulon, were the mushrooms of popular clubs, noisy, imbecile, and ignorant. They all however, by referring to Bonaparte's case, as the most glaring example of their common oppression, furnished the best evidence of his undisputed superiority. Unwilling to lose such an officer, the committee of public safety corrected very soon the procedure of Aubry, so far as to restore general Bonaparte to the corps of which he was the acknowledged ornament, though not to the army in which he wished again to serve. The order to command the brigade of infantry was revoked, and he was nominated to command the artillery of the

army of the west; a destination, which though not agreeable was not degrading. But from this crisis of displeasure and embarrassment, he was extricated by causes which had often relieved him before; the public danger, and his professional excellence.

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General Kellerman, whose abilities were not so high as his reputation, had been driven on the 27th June from the positions in which Bonaparte had placed the right of Dumerbion's army; and had written to the committee of public safety that if he was not speedily reenforced, he should be compelled even to abandon Nice. This intelligence excited great alarm, as Kellerman's defeat opened that vulnerable frontier again to invasion. The committee of public safety convoked and consulted such of the members of the convention, as had been on mission to the army of Italy, who instead of presenting any opinions of their own, with a unanimity like that of the dissatisfied officers, concurred in referring the committee to general Bonaparte, as the individual most capable of affording them information and giving them advice, in this unwelcome emergency. He was immediately ordered to attend the

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committee of which Sieyes, Ponte-Coulant, Jean-de-Brie, and his former acquaintance Letourneur, were members; after several conferences with whom, he drew up instructions for Kellerman which the committee adopted. They are preserved in his memoirs, and shew, his perfect comprehension of the ground on which Kellerman had been beaten, of the means by which that disaster might have been avoided; the position which it was now advisable to take, and those to be taken in case of farther retreat, as well as the total incapacity of the hero of Valmy to act upon the exact and extended combinations which had led to the successes of the previous campaign. (26) When received at the headquarters of Kellerman, the military skill which they displayed excited surprise; but the officers who had served with Bonaparte, soon recognized the hand of their author. Under these instructions, on the 7th of July, Kellerman took up the line of Borghetto, his right touching the sea at an eminence which commanded the plain and port of Loano; his left on a steep and insulated rock, upon which Massena had erected a strong fortification. This line the Austrian general

attacked several times, but not with much vigour, as he had no hopes of success. The committee of public safety were so well satisfied with the first fruits of Bonaparte's labours in the war office, that they revoked the order appointing him to command the artillery of the army of the west, (27) and by a special decree, attached him until further orders to the department of war, with his rank of general of artillery, and charged him with the special duty of directing the active operations of the forces. This station which he held until October, was important and pleasing, as it ascertained his proper rank, gave scope to the exercise of his talents, and enabled him though he could not command the army of Italy in person, to guide its movements and light its way to success. In November, general Scherer, who superseded Kellerman, attacked and worsted the Austrians, cut off their communication with the British fleet, reestablished his own with Genoa, and retrieved that command of the coast and of the Alps, which the skill and enterprise of Bonaparte had gained, and the incompetence of Kellerman had lost.

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It has been asserted, and with some pro-

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bability, that in the interval of eight days, which elapsed between his conference with Aubry and his restoration to suitable employment, Bonaparte conceived for a moment the design of obtaining authority from the government to offer his services as general of artillery, to the Grand Seignior, who was at that time disposed to enter into the European war as an ally of France (28). It was natural that his imagination, all passionate for glory, when forbid the heroic fields of Italy, should spread its classical wings, for the shores of the Hellespont. And the idea once implanted in a mind so rich and ardent, might well shoot forth into a luxuriance of brilliant details and illustrious fortune. The likelihood that he did conceive and entertain this spirited project, is strengthened by the fervid activity of his intellect and habits. For, as the youthful reader will do well to observe, from his entrance at the school of Brienne, in 1779, to the moment which our narrative has now reached, comprehending the entire season of boyish folly and juvenile effervescence, his exertion of mind and body appears to have been strenuous, voluntary, and unintermitting.

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Against all probability, it has been pretended, that during his residence in Paris on this occasion, he languished in professional destitution and personal poverty; a friendless object of casual pity and uncertain assistance. As his resignation was not accepted, he was never deprived of his commission; and his pay as a general officer, independently of other resources, renders it certain, that he could not have been exposed to greater inconveniences of this sort, than such as were common to men of his rank. To suppose that in a season of general scarcity, and under the pressure of a depreciated currency, he was exempt from ordinary discomforts, would be to form an hypothesis, at variance with his admitted superiority to all mercenary considerations. In the French revolution, as in the American, few that were honest were rich. But from Bonaparte's prudent habits and simple tastes, incessant application to duty, and long absence from the capital, it may be safely inferred that in this crisis of national difficulty, he was subjected personally to but slight annoyance. (29) For, although it appears that he sold his carriage and a set

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of books soon after his arrival in the metropolis, it is certain that, about the same time, he placed his brother, Louis, at a provincial military school, and at his own expense maintained him there.

His time was chiefly devoted to official duty and professional studies ; his hours of recreation, to the society of his early friends, and the entertainments of the theatre. Private circles felt the energy of his language ; public men, the scrutiny of his look. His conversation was remarked as picturesque and original. His demeanour, which was generally sedate, sometimes indicated intense meditation. For he looked into himself, and lingered to contemplate the glorious inspirations of his genius ; as a beauty gazes with secret pride, on the reflection of those charms, which are to delight, she feels, and to subdue mankind.

CHAPTER V.

From October 1795, to March 1796.

The convention adopt the constitution of the year III—
Its principal provisions—Likely to be acceptable to
the nation—The additional acts engrafted on it ex-
cite dissatisfaction—Wisdom of those acts—Com-
bined opposition of the royalists and jacobins—
The people of Paris stirred up to opposition—They
vote for accepting the constitution and for rejecting
the acts—A majority of the nation and the armies
give their suffrages for both—Resistance and insur-
rection of the section of Paris—Violence of the
section Lepelletier—Measures of the convention—
General Menou commander in chief of the army of
the interior—He attempts to disperse an armed body
of insurgents—Hesitates and fails—Danger of the
crisis—Bonaparte an accidental witness of Menou's
miscarriage—Repairs to the gallery of the conven-
tion—Agitation of that assembly—His conference
with the executive committee—Protests against being
fettered by commissaries of the convention—Is ap-
pointed by the committee to command the troops—
Barras made nominal commander in chief—Bona-
parte's prompt and judicious measures—Gets pos-

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session of the cannon and occupies the bridges—Danican, commander in chief of the insurgents, summons the convention to dismiss their troops—Bonaparte furnishes the members with arms—Movement of the insurgent leader Lafonde, upon Pont Neuf—Cartaux abandons that post, and falls back to the Louvre—The insurgents close in and fire upon the Tuileries—Bonaparte orders his troops to act—Spirit and success of his operations—Courage and repulse of Lafonde—The insurgents defeated on all points—Humanity of Bonaparte—The insurrection quelled—Exultation of the convention—Meanness of Barras—The appointment of Bonaparte, as commander of the army of the interior, confirmed by the convention—Their moderation—Trial and danger of Menou—Saved by the influence of Bonaparte—Bonaparte disarms the national guard, and executes other unwelcome but salutary measures—Scarcity in Paris—Discontent of the populace—Anecdote—Recomposes the legislative guard for the new government—Organises a legion of police, and a guard for the directory—Becomes acquainted with Madam Beauharnais and her son—Interesting interview—The Italian frontier again in danger—Bonaparte consulted by the directory—Furnishes a plan of campaign—Appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy—Marries Madam Beauharnais—State of his fortune and his probable reflections—Leaves Paris and takes command of his army.

In the summer of 1795, while general Bonaparte was employed in the war depart-

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ment at Paris, the convention discussed and adopted the constitution of the year III. By this plan of government, which was a manifest improvement on the one it was intended to supersede, the executive power of France, under certain limitations, was lodged in a directory of five members; the judicial power in a body of elective magistrates, whose sentences, in criminal cases, were to be founded on the verdicts of juries; and the legislative power, in two houses, the upper, or council of ancients, consisting of two hundred and fifty members, and the lower, consisting of twice that number and called the council of five hundred. The legislative bodies were to appoint the members of the directory, and to reappoint one out of the five every year, and were themselves to be chosen by electors delegated for that purpose by the people in their primary assemblies. One-third of each council was to be elected annually, so that the entire legislature was to be triennially renewed by the popular will, and the entire directory quinquennially, by the will of the legislature. There was not only a proper separation of the great branches of power in the state,

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and an approved subdivision of the legislative branch, but an approximation to unity in the executive, and to independence in the judicial departments. The advantage of a single executive magistrate, like the president of the United States, was not overlooked in the deliberations of the convention, but a long line of paternal princes had created such a natural horror of monarchical power, that a nearer approach to unity than five, had it been proposed by the convention, would have been repelled by their constituents. (1)

Although, in this form of government, there was much to recommend it to the nation, it was modified by two supplementary decrees or additional acts, which, after animated debate, the convention thought fit to adopt, and which exposed their work and themselves to mischievous misrepresentation and violent resistance.

By these decrees, the one engrafted as an unavoidable sanction (2) on the other, and both made inseparable parts of the constitution, the delegated choice of the people was to be so restricted, on the first occasion, as to compose two thirds of the new legislature of members of the existing convention.

(3) So that, by this constitution, five hundred members of the assembly which framed it, were to enter, by privilege, into the composition of the legislature which it proposed to create, while two hundred and fifty members only were to be drawn, by right of election, from the nation at large.

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Whatever might be the motives of prudence, or prospects of advantage by which this arrangement was dictated, it could scarcely be expected to escape exceptions, even from a constituency united in political concord. The people, it was true, in their primary assemblies, might reject both the constitution and the additional acts incorporated with it. But the necessity of a better organized government than the rule of a popular assembly, in which all the authority of the state, in spite of theory and experience, was accumulated, was generally felt and acknowledged. In this state of things, when the heaving of recent convulsions, and the pressure of foreign war, rendered hesitation in domestic councils critically dangerous, to submit to the nation a form of government, which, desirable in itself, was clogged with offensive conditions, was a proceeding

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tending to place the prejudices of the people directly in the way of their judgment. But a faithful physician offers to the lips of his patient the salutary draught, although it may disgust his taste and nauseate his stomach.

This natural irritation of public feeling it was the business of the existing parties to increase. The jacobins were smarting under the severity of the thermidoriens, while the royalists had profited by their indulgence. These were grown bold, those desperate. Both parties saw, in the tranquil vigour of public affairs, likely to follow the adoption of the new constitution, the defeat of their hopes and projects. Thus, while their opinions differed, their interests coincided and their passions combined, and they readily cooperated in reprobating the additional acts, and opposing the adoption of the constitution, as well as in exciting resistance to it after it was accepted and proclaimed. The jacobins adhering to their theories, and the royalists speculating on the accidents of domestic confusion and foreign aid, insisted, with equal violence, on leaving with the people the unlimited choice of their representatives, and denounced the supplementary

decrees as acts of gross usurpation, of self-created privilege, and incipient tyranny. But the motives of these parties were as foul as their professions were fair; while the conduct of the convention, though to appearance selfish and absurd, was really founded on considerations of foresight and caution, which prudent and patriotic men could not well disregard. (4)

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In 1791, the constituent assembly, acting upon a principle of disinterestedness, in which there was more of prudery than wisdom, had decreed the exclusion of its own members from the legislative assembly. By this respectable but inconsiderate delicacy, the new republic was deprived of the services of her most enlightened and experienced statesmen, at a season when she most needed them; when howling factions were to be chained down with one hand, and rapacious kings to be held off with the other. To this error of the constituent assembly, many of the military miscarriages, financial blunders, and political crimes which ensued, were generally and justly attributed. Without, therefore, a downright defiance of experience, and a violent sacrifice of the public

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good to popular humour and personal reputation, the members of the convention, it is plain, could not have repeated a measure, which, in the moment of transition from one form of government to another, was not likely to be less mischievous in its second trial than it had proved to be in its first. They determined to serve their countrymen faithfully at the risk of offending them; not only to avoid the indiscretion of their predecessors, but to profit by their example; and, instead of debarring the men who were already in power from participation in the new government, to render their exclusion, for a limited time, impracticable.

The wisdom of this determination, had it not been sanctioned by recent experience, and by regard to the newness of the French people in the duties of self-government, was demonstrated by its effects on the two factions, to the hostility of which the real friends of the republic were exposed. The royalist and jacobin leaders were sorely disappointed to find they would still have to contend against the resolute, experienced, and incorruptible men, who had abolished monarchy, overthrown Robespierre, could

neither be bribed nor terrified, and in the midst of civil discord had kept more than half the European world at bay. In the agitation of a general election, in the disaffection of untried men, or in the folly of inexperienced counsellors, both parties hoped for the destruction of liberty; one sighing for the despotism of clubs and demagogues, the other for the rule of concubines and kings. Although the operation of the additional acts was expressly limited, and with decreasing force, to the two first years of the proposed government, it was not the less objectionable to these parties. For it was precisely in this early stage of its existence that they hoped, the royalists with the help of foreign gold, the jacobins by the effect of declamation and turbulence, to introduce into the two councils a majority of members opposed to the new government.

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The opposition, thus compounded, was felt, more or less, in various parts of France, but in Paris it became overwhelming; so that the timid, the imitative, and the idle of the capital, followed in its train and swelled its numbers. The convention, however, maintained a firm tone; submitted

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their work fairly to the judgment of their countrymen, and waited the decision with becoming confidence.

In Paris, the focus of the factions, as well as the centre of the government, the result was, of course, to be first known, both to the convention and its leading adversaries. Orations in the halls, essays in the journals, the arts of intrigue, and the force of intimidation, were all employed by designing or intemperate malcontents, to embolden and augment the opposition. At first, their efforts were more successful than they deserved to be. Of the forty-eight sections into which the population of the metropolis was divided, forty-seven voted for accepting the constitution, but rejecting the decrees. This decision was pronounced at the expense of the most scandalous injustice and violence. In some sections the friends of the convention were turned away by force from the polls, and in others they were deterred by threats from approaching them. However, the ill got triumph was short lived. The returns from the departments exhibited a great majority for the constitution and the decrees; the returns from the armies on the

frontiers an enthusiastic unanimity. Having been formed by the requisition of 1793, or by subsequent conscriptions, the armies were composed of the soundest part of the population. Their camps, or their battle plains, reechoed their acclamations in favour of the constitution and additional acts. The army of Jourdan, the victors of Fleurus, sent to the convention from beyond the Rhine, sixty thousand suffrages in favour of the new government.

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In some of the departments strong minorities voted for rejecting the decrees, while here and there, individuals proposed a king instead of the directory. These exceptions to the general and decided approbation of the country were fortunate for the convention, as they manifested the perfect freedom with which public opinion had been expressed. The votes having been all received, the result, importing that the constitution and the additional acts had been ratified by the people, was proclaimed by the government on the 23d of September, and the constitution with the acts was declared the fundamental law of the state. The convention, acting with a prudent des-

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patch, next decreed that the people, in their primary assemblies, should nominate their electors by the 2nd of October, that these should complete the election of members of the two councils on or before the 21st, and that the legislature, under the new constitution, should assemble on the 6th of November. (5)

The factious leaders of Paris questioned the accuracy of the returns, and demanded of the government a formal inspection of the registers. These were submitted to them, and, to their chagrin, were found faithful and exact. In this situation of affairs, their only expedient was seditious violence, and their final resource a general insurrection of the capital, in hopes of destroying the actual government before the proposed one could get into operation.

The section Lepelletier was particularly active and violent. At their instance a number of the electors appointed by the people of Paris, in conformity with the new constitution, instead of waiting until the time prescribed by the decree of the convention for exercising their functions, met at the theatre of the Odeon on the 2nd of October, under

the protection of several battalions of the national guard. The police attempted to disperse them, but were themselves easily and shamefully driven away. An armed force, under general Menou, was then employed, but it did not arrive until after night, when the crowd had separated, and the assembly retired.

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In the course of the night and the next morning, the government delivered arms to the few well-affected citizens of all parties who volunteered their services, and placing them under the command of general Berruyer, attached them to general Menou's regular force. During the same time, the section Lepelletier, in conjunction with seven others, declared itself to be in a state of rebellion, and took instant measures for rousing the whole city to arms. Its leaders despatched emissaries, and sounded the tocsin throughout Paris; and the people, inflamed and deluded, seized their arms, and hastened to the places of rendezvous.

The convention, upon this, decreed their session to be permanent, and charged their appropriate committees with the maintenance of public order. The executive

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committee, composed of the committees of public safety and general security, then proceeded to direct that the section Lepelletier should be instantly disarmed by military force. About eight o'clock in the evening of the 3d, general Menou, who commanded the army of the interior, accompanied by the three representatives of the people who were in attendance as commissaries of the convention, proceeded, at the head of a strong force, with a detachment of cavalry and two pieces of cannon, to carry this order into execution. The force of the section was drawn up in the court of the convent *des Filles St. Thomas*, at the head of the street Vivienne, where the Exchange is now situated. Their parties occupied the windows of the street, and the interior of the convent. Menou entering this street from that of St. Honoré, marched towards them, and got his troops wedged into this long and narrow space, where neither his horse nor his infantry could act to advantage. Afraid to advance, and ashamed to retire, the general and the deputies resorted to words. They summoned the insurgents to obey the order of the government, to deliver up their

arms, and retire to their homes. But they gained as little by parley as by force; for Delalot, the leader of the rebels, not only refused obedience to the summons, but delivered an inflammatory harangue to the troops, in which he boldly declared, that force alone should deprive the citizens of Paris of their arms. Instead of ordering a charge, Menou and his council of deputies, were glad to enter into a compromise, by which the insurgents agreed to disperse themselves, if Menou would first withdraw his troops. This capitulation enabled the regular troops to retreat, and the insurgents to maintain their ground, continue their violence, defy the government, and proclaim their triumph.

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Fortunately for the convention, the taste of Bonaparte for dramatic entertainments had led him that evening to the theatre Feydeau, which is close by the head of the street Vivienne. Informed of the threatened conflict, he left the theatre for the purpose of observing this more important scene. He witnessed the unfortunate check of the government force, and, by a natural movement of concern and curiosity, hastened to the

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gallery of the convention to see what would be done to repair it. He found that assembly in the greatest agitation; the commissaries, who had accompanied Menou, in order to shift the blame from their own shoulders, were accusing the absent general of treason. On their representation, Menou's arrest was decreed; and, of consequence, a successor was to be appointed. The danger was great; and the intelligence of every moment proved that it was increasing. Various members proposed different commanders, some Barras, some Bonaparte; the leading thermidoriens the former, because of his activity in the defeat of Robespierre; the commissaries of the army of Italy, and the members of the committee who were in daily intercourse with him, the latter, because of his military talents, and energetic, but moderate character. (6) Attending in the gallery, he heard these suggestions, deliberated whether he should accept a service, which, from Menou's fate, was not inviting, might prove more distasteful than the war of Vendée or the mobs of Toulon, might bathe him deep in civil blood, and blight for ever his hopes of serving his

country. But, reflecting, that if the in-
surgents succeeded in overturning the go-
vernment, the proposed improvement in the
constitution of the country would fail to be
effected, and the royalist, or foreign party,
would gain the ascendancy, and surrender
France to the coalition, he resolved, if he
could, to defend the convention. (7)

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Having come to this decision Bonaparte repaired to the executive committee, told them he had been a witness of the affair in the street Vivienne, and that the deputies were more to blame than Menou was ; assuring them it would be impossible for him, should he be appointed to command the troops, to execute their orders on this critical occasion, with his hands tied by a commission of deputies. The members of the committee, struck by his confidence, were convinced by his representation ; but it was not in their power, without exciting a debate, for the issue of which there was not time, to procure a decree of the convention innovating their long established custom so completely, as to send forth a general in chief unattended by a deputation of their own body. In this exigency they devised an expedient, which, while it conformed to

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their rule, obviated its inconvenience. They resolved to nominate their colleague Barras as general in chief of the army of the interior, and to appoint Bonaparte second in command; so that while Barras was to have the attendance of the deputies, Bonaparte was to take the direction of the troops.

This being agreed upon, Merlin de Douai, an active member of the committee, at half-past four in the morning, reported the project of a decree appointing Barras, provisionally, commander in chief of the army of the interior, and the deputies Delmas, Goupilleau de Fontenay and Laporte commissaries to attend him. Bonaparte who was immediately appointed by the committee second in command, had in consequence of this arrangement previously entered on his duties. It will be readily conceived as he had controlled the warlike veteran Dugommier, when he was only lieutenant colonel, and had, as fifth in command, actually conducted an important campaign, that Barras though nominally his superior officer, was really nothing more than his aide de camp. (8) His actual independence in command, on this occasion, becomes still more evident, when we reflect, that

having just refused to subject himself to the supervision of the deputies, he would naturally have rejected the authority of Barras as an additional incumbrance.

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Having undertaken this service with deliberation, he proceeded to perform it without delay. From Menou, who was detained in an adjoining apartment of the Tuileries, he procured information respecting the force upon which he was to rely. This consisted of five thousand troops. The artillery, composed of forty pieces, was at the camp of Sablons guarded only by twenty-five men. With promptness, quickened probably by his familiarity with this instrument of war, he despatched Murat, then a lieutenant colonel of cavalry, with three hundred horse, to secure these guns and convey them instantly to Paris. The insurgents, not inattentive to this object, had sent a battalion of national guards to seize the artillery. But the distance being considerable, Murat arrived first, and the insurgent party not daring to face his horse, by five o'clock in the morning this active officer had the cannon safe at the Tuileries.

The insurrection was now too deeply rooted and too widely spread, to be sup-

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pressed by effecting the measure which Menou had attempted. The section Lepelletier was in concert with nearly all the other sections, and the insurgents were capable of collecting a force of forty thousand national guards. A plan of operations was to be adopted suited to this new state of things; and this Bonaparte determined to make a defensive one, of which the safety and independence of the convention, the palladium of his party, was to be the main object. His measures accordingly were taken to repel any attacks that might be made on the Tuileries, to collect a supply of provisions and ammunition; to protect and encourage as far as possible the well-affected part of the population, and to keep open a line of retreat to the country, should that be necessary, in order to obtain support from the departments and the armies. For this purpose, he seized the bridges over the Seine and defended them with cannon; and occupied in a similar way the issues leading to the Tuileries and the river from the street St. Honoré, which is long and parallel to the Seine. Thus on one side he was defended by a long range of houses, on the other by the river. The *place Vendôme*, and the *place de la*

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Concorde, he also occupied with infantry and artillery, placing his reserves to which all his cavalry was attached, in the *place du Carrousel* and the garden of the Tuileries. He sent a detachment to hold the heights of Meudon, as a point to retreat upon, and another to guard the road from St. Germain, so as to intercept any cannon that might be sent from that place to the insurgents. He ordered all the ammunition and provisions that could be collected, to be brought to the Tuileries, and sent a supply of small arms to the section *Quinze Vingts*, the only one which had voted for accepting the decrees.

It is only necessary to examine a map of Paris, in order to be satisfied of the advantage of occupying these positions. As long as they were held, the convention, inaccessible on all sides, was safe even from insult, and a line of retreat through the *Champs Elysées*, and the plain of Grenelle, free for the operation of cavalry and artillery, and out of reach of fire arms from barricades and windows, was open for them and their troops, to the friendly population of the country and the approaching support of the armies. Each position was in itself strong;

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the troops were concentrated under the eye of the commander, and within reach of immediate reenforcement and direction. Having made these dispositions, and placed in command of the several posts, officers, who from rank or character were entitled to confidence, Bonaparte, in conformity with the recommendation of the government, ordered his troops to wait the attack of the insurgents, and in no case to provoke it. This was politic, as it cast the blame of aggression on his adversaries; and it was prudent, as it held his force collected, which was too small to be risked in narrow streets, and exposed to be overpowered or seduced while in the pursuit of separate parties. For with the addition of the volunteers under general Berruyer, the gendarmes and police, his aggregate force did not exceed eight thousand: and as the passions when carried to extremes are apt to run into their opposites, the best mode of striking a panic into the multitude, was to allow at first a free indulgence to their audacity. (9)

Meanwhile, the insurgents, who had not been idle, had assembled, on the morning of the 4th of October, an armed body of twenty-seven thousand men. Their com-

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mittee, which renewed its meeting in the convent at the head of the street Vivienne, had issued a decree of outlawry against the executive committee, and established a tribunal for passing sentence on all persons found in arms against the sovereign people of Paris. Several generals had offered them their services, among whom were Danican and Duhoux, who had commanded the republican troops against the royalists in La Vendée. By a strange association, count Maulevrier, a Vendean chief, and an emigrant royalist Lafond, young, enthusiastic, and daring, were also among their military leaders. Danican, who had been a friend of Hoche, was not without talent, and being restless and declamatory, took with the factious leaders, and was appointed their commander in chief. They intercepted the arms destined for the section Quinze Vingts, as well as a quantity of provision which was being conveyed to the Tuileries. Their troops were well armed, and being composed of the national guard, had been in regular training since the 9th Thermidor, the year before. In addition to the corps of twenty-seven thousand men, which was already embodied, they had, in reserve, about

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half that number. The women of the lower classes were all in their favour, and were busy in efforts to shake the fidelity of the troops of the convention. So that, if Bonaparte had adopted the most skilful plan of defence, the means of attack in possession of the insurgents, whether consisting of force or seduction, were truly formidable. (10)

The executive committee, as the danger thickened around them, debated various propositions, but came to no effective resolution. Some members proposed that they should dismiss their forces, and receive the insurgents as the Roman senators did the Gauls. Some advised that they should retreat at once to the camp of Cæsar on the heights of St. Cloud, and wait for reenforcements from the army of the west. Others recommended the appointment of commissioners to make propositions of accommodation to the different sections, a suggestion which, though it was adopted, led to no important result.

While these vain discussions were prolonged, Lafond, at the head of a column of the insurgents who had intimidated Menou, marched about half-past two o'clock from the section Lepelletier to the bridge called Pont Neuf. At the same time, another column from the

place de l'Odéon approached in the opposite direction, and formed in the *place Dauphine*, at the south end of the bridge. General Cartaux, Bonaparte's former commander at Toulon, had been stationed at this bridge with four hundred men and four pieces of artillery, and with orders to defend both ends of it. But unwilling to come to blows, he retired down the quai to the railing of the Louvre, and allowed Lafond, without obstruction, to join in triumph his friends, in the *place Dauphine*. The insurgents, at the same time, took possession of the *jardin des Enfants*, and occupied, in force, the front and steps of the church of St. Roch, the theatre Français, and the hotel de Noailles, so as to hold possession of the Palais Royal, and the great street of St. Honoré, and to close in upon the posts of Bonaparte as nearly as possible. Women were sent forward, at all points, to tempt the men from their colours, and even the popular leaders themselves advanced, with flourishing and fraternal gestures, in the hope of corrupting them.

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Thus the day was passing away, one side threatening to attack, the other resolved on defence, when about half-past three in the

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afternoon, the rebel commanders, apprized of the state of feeling in the mass of the nation and the ranks of the army, saw the necessity of precipitating matters. (11) To cover their violence with the respectability of peaceful forms, and probably in hopes of overawing the convention, they summoned the government by a flag of truce, to remove the troops whose presence menaced the good citizens of Paris, and to disarm *the men of terror* as they denominated the volunteers, who were arrayed against them. Their herald was conducted blindfold to Bonaparte, by whom he was introduced to the executive committee, as to the council of a besieged garrison. His threatening language agitated them sensibly, but did not overcome their resolution. The shades of evening were now approaching, and parties of the insurgents had glided from house to house, so as to get into windows within gun shot of the Tuileries. Bonaparte, with a view of strengthening his reserve, had eight hundred muskets and a supply of cartridges, conveyed to the hall of the convention; a measure which although it alarmed some of the members, by shewing them the

full extent of the danger, committed all irretrievably in the contest, and enabled the resolute in case of need, to give the modern Gauls a warmer reception, than their ancestors had experienced from the senate of Rome.

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About half past four, when an orderly dragoon had been already shot in the street St. Honoré, and a woman wounded on the steps of the Tuileries; and when the head of Lafond's column was seen approaching the Tuileries on the opposite side of the river, Bonaparte determined to put forth his strength. Sending orders to his posts on the Seine, to open a fire of artillery on Lafond, he hastened to the street Dauphin, where one of his detachments was menaced by a large body of the national guard, drawn up in front and on the steps of the church of St. Roch, and preparing to force their way to the Tuileries. To run forward his pieces, and pour upon this party repeated discharges of grape shot; to drive them with general Berruyer's volunteers from the front and steps of the church into its body; and then, pointing his cannon up and down the street, to clear that important avenue of the enemy, was the work of a few minutes. Leaving

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that post and a very guarded pursuit, in charge of an approved officer, he galloped to the river. Danican and Maulevrier had united themselves by this time with Lafond, and they were all three, with about seven thousand men, advancing in close column and at the charging step, along the quay upon the Pont Royal, which emboldened by Cartaux's indecision at the other bridge, they hoped by one determined effort to carry. With the battery at the Louvre, that at the Pont Royal, and with pieces planted at intermediate points along the quay of the Tuileries, Bonaparte directed a rapid discharge of grape shot on the front, flank, and rear, of this dense mass. The effect was of course murderous. The insurgents shewed no want of courage, and though they several times wavered and broke, were as often rallied. Lafond proved himself a hero. Remembering the weakness of Menou, and impelled by his own fierce valour, he collected his bravest followers, and while his main body fired from the quay, twice threw himself upon the bridge, attempting to seize the guns and force the pass by a headlong charge. But Bonaparte was there in person,

and twice repelled him by volleys of grape and musketry. The undaunted zealot, who had been a subaltern in the royal guard, rushed a third time to the charge, and desisted not till the fire of his adversary had by death or terror, destroyed his column. At this point and at the church of St. Roch, the loss on both sides was considerable. At six o'clock, the insurgents after an action of an hour and a half, were defeated in all their attacks, and their cannon sent from St. Germain being intercepted, had lost all hope. Bonaparte in taking in his turn the offensive, with a sentiment like that of Cæsar at Pharsalia, ordered blank cartridges only to be fired, justly inferring, that when such crowds, after the indulgence of confidence and a desperate exertion of courage, were once put to flight, the sound of a gun would keep up their panic. (12) This forbearance saved many lives. During the night he cleared the streets of barricades, patrolled the rue Royale and the Boulevards, dislodged a party from the church St. Roch, and surrounded with detachments of infantry and artillery another party in the Palais Royal. The next day it was easily dispersed, as was

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a body who had collected in the convent at the head of the rue Vivienne. By noon on the 5th of October, the insurrection was suppressed, and tranquillity perfectly restored. The killed and wounded, of which rather the smaller number belonged to the troops of the convention, amounted to between four and five hundred. Bonaparte had a horse shot under him. The deputies Sieyes, Louvet, and Fréron, behaved with remarkable firmness.

This victory, which caused infinite satisfaction to the real friends of the republic, who saw in it the defeat of Bourbon hopes, foreign intrigues, and domestic treason renewed and augmented the authority of the convention, very seasonably for the establishment of the new constitution. The members of that assembly were sensible of its value, as well in regard to the imminence of danger from which it rescued themselves, as to the series of convulsions from which it saved their country. In a report from the committee of public safety, which was adopted by the convention in the sitting of the 5th, it is described as, "a victory gained over a coali-

tion of royalism and anarchy, the most glorious of the revolution, and also the most fortunate, as it was likely to close that great struggle." As in spite of Barras's efforts to appropriate the credit to himself it was known to be the work of Bonaparte, this report placed him by the hands of the government itself before the eyes of the nation, as a great public benefactor, and in consequence of the nominal superiority but real insignificance of Barras, brought more clearly into view his previous services at Toulon and in the Alps. The invidious meanness of Barras, it appears, he disdained to notice.

On the 9th, Barras having formally declared to the convention that public order and tranquillity had been reestablished, Bonaparte, with the officers who had fought under his orders, were received at the bar of that assembly. As his extraordinary authority, conferred by the committee of public safety, might be considered liable to terminate with the suppression of the insurrection, his appointment, as second in command of the army of the interior, upon the reluctant motion of Barras, was confirmed by the unanimous vote of the convention,

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with the knowledge that the chief command, nominally held by Barras, was, in a few days, to be resigned, and, in the midst of acclamations attending the avowal that the convention was indebted to Bonaparte for its safety (13). In conformity with this arrangement, Barras resigned his nominal command on the 26th of October, having held it, in conjunction with his incompatible office of deputy, for the short space of three weeks.

The government, loathing the exterminating punishment of the reign of terror, used their victory with the utmost moderation. The ringleaders of the insurgents were, of course, capitally condemned, but Lafond alone was executed. He avowed and exulted in his offence, with such defiance and pertinacity, that, although a disposition to spare him was felt, it could not be prudently indulged. A different sentiment prevailed towards Menou, who had exhibited weakness, and was accused of treason. The triumph of his successor, contrasted with his failure, exposed his weakness, and aggravated his disgrace. The government was disposed, and the witnesses were interested, to sacri-

fice him. But the influence which Bonaparte had acquired, by repairing the consequences of Menou's indecision, was generously exerted to save his life. He declared to the members of the court, whom he assembled for the purpose by an invitation to breakfast, that if Menou deserved death, the three representatives who had directed the military operations, and parleyed with the insurgents, deserved the same punishment. This opinion, coming from the vanquisher of the insurrection and the protector of the convention, awakened a sentiment favourable to Menou. The members of the court, seeing no reason that in a parity of guilt, death should be the lot of the military officer, and impunity the privilege of the civil agent, acquitted Menou.

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As commander in chief of the army of the interior, Bonaparte had to keep down the slumbering factions, of which, one having root in the gold of England and the intrigues of emigrants, and the other in the ambition of demagogues and traitors, neither mercy nor severity could effect the extinction. He had also, in the infancy of the new government, to execute the rigorous measures of

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disarming the obnoxious sections, and of disbanding and reorganising the national guard. The task, which required energy and address, was increased in difficulty by an extreme scarcity of money and food, a grievance which could not but excite discontent, and embarrass authority. Nevertheless, he succeeded in executing the orders of the directory, and maintaining the tranquillity of the capital. He was sometimes obliged to intimidate the clubs, at others to harangue the populace. On one occasion he was surrounded by a mob, menacing in their gestures and language, and clamorous for bread. A large fat woman was particularly violent. "These dandy officers" (*épauletiers*), said she, "laugh at us; so that they eat and get fat, they care not if we starve." "My dear," replied the general, "look at me, and say which of us is the fatter of the two." He was then so very slender, that the striking contrast and the seasonable jest, excited the mirth of the crowd at the woman's expense, and separating peaceably, they made way for Bonaparte. In these collisions with the inhabitants of Paris, it was his own remark, that the population of the faubourg St. An-

toine, composed principally of the poorer people, was the most susceptible of reasonable impressions and generous impulses; a fact, which shows that he possessed that true eloquence which, while it might be lost upon artificial classes of society, such as nobles or priests, fell with irresistible force on the common people, whose feelings flow fresh from the fountains of nature, and whose interests are inseparably connected with the general good.

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Among the least unpleasant of his duties was that of securing the members of the new government from a repetition of those outrages to which their predecessors had often and recently been exposed. For this purpose he recomposed and strengthened the constitutional guard of the legislature, and formed one for the directory. After organizing the national guard, which consisted of a hundred and four battalions, and of the volunteers who fought so bravely under general Berruyer having created a legion of police, he established a camp of discipline and exercise in the plain of Grenelle. In executing these various duties, he was brought into intimate relation with the people of

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Paris, who, together with the military corps which he constituted, felt and retained the impression of his plastick hand.

It was while he commanded the army of the interior, and some time after he had executed the decree for disarming the sections, that he formed the acquaintance of the lady who became his first, his most amiable, and his devoted wife. She was the widow of general Beauharnais, one of the last victims of the guillotine. The incident which led to this acquaintance was marked by the most interesting emotions of our nature; and the account which Bonaparte has left of it, shows how deeply sensible he was to their influence.

“ The measure of disarming the sections had been carried into execution, when there presented himself one morning at the headquarters of the commander in chief, a boy, ten or twelve years of age, who intreated to have the sword of his father restored to him. This boy, was Eugene de Beauharnais, afterwards viceroy of Italy. Napoleon, touched by the nature of his application, and the graces of his youth, granted his request. On receiving the sword of his father, Eugene

burst into tears. The general, affected by the emotion of the son, treated him with so much kindness, that Madam de Beauharnais felt herself under an obligation to wait on him the next day with the expression of her thanks. It is unnecessary to speak of the extreme grace, the soft and enchanting manners of the empress Josephine. Their acquaintance thus commenced, soon became intimate and tender, and resulted, without much delay, in marriage."

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It would be difficult to conceive circumstances more natural, feelings more affecting, or language more artless, than are found in this domestic memorial; the personages a graceful boy, a lovely woman, and a youthful hero; the sentiments, of which it may be said with truth,

"He best can paint them who shall feel them most;"

filial piety, manly benevolence, maternal gratitude, and generous sensibility. The altar of love never burned with a purer flame; nor does ancient poetry furnish anything of higher interest than this scene of actual life, which, it is surprising, the pencil of modern

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art has not yet consigned to the canvass. (14)

In producing it, fortune seems to have decided that the history of Bonaparte's love should be as simple and as grand as the progress of his glory. As this was the exclusive effect of his services and merit, so that was the independent result of his taste and affection; interest and indirection, the usual instruments of successful ambition, having been utter strangers to his public advancement and his marriage-tie. (15)

The winter passed away, the capital was quiet, the government through all its departments, in unobstructed operation, and the season for military operations approached. The plans of the directory were enterprising, and their project on the side of Italy particularly bold. But general Scherer, instead of profiting, as it was supposed he might have done, by the victory of Loano, had remained inactive, and demanding urgently supplies and reinforcements, expressed apprehensions of retreating behind the Var before the formidable preparations of the allies. The directory displeased and disconcerted, did what they had done when they were members of the con-

vention, and when Kellerman instead of Scherer was the inefficient general : they consulted Bonaparte, whose claims to their attention, continued personal acquaintance, and recent events had strengthened. In January 1796, he furnished in writing the plan of an offensive campaign on that frontier, which, added to their own conviction, and the well known confidence of the army of Italy, in regard to his talents, determined the directory to trust for safety and conquest on that oft-contested frontier to general Bonaparte. In the beginning of March he was appointed commander in chief of the army of Italy; and on the 9th of that month was married to Madam Beauharnais.

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This it may be supposed was one of the happiest periods of his life. The woman of his choice was the wife of his bosom, and the field of glory in which he longed to shine, was now expanded to his enterprise. Around him were the pleasures of love; before him the prospects of honour; and within him the impatience of a martial spirit fretted with the reluctance of an enraptured heart. In the pauses of hope and joy, if he

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looked back on the growth of his fortune, from its infancy when he was the orphan scholar of Brienne, to the vigorous promise of its present state, his reflections must have been fraught with pure and solid satisfaction. In a season of faction, strife, selfishness, suspicion, and cruelty, he had passed from subordination to eminence, without swerving for a moment from the path of independence, openness, and honour : had condescended to no solicitation, stooped to no compliance, mixed with no intrigue, contracted no obligation, participated in no injustice. Persecuted by the deputies, he had not sunk into submission ; flattered by the army, he had not been inflated with self love : so that he escaped the guillotine without propitiating the government, and more difficult still, excelled his own commanders, without disobliging them. His opportunities, which were common to officers of his rank, had in every instance been surpassed by his exploits, while his advancement always lagged behind his services. Conscious of being indebted to no man, he felt that to him generals owed their fame, armies their success, individuals their lives, and the govern-

ment its existence. Such may well have been his reflections at this dawning season of his fame; for nothing is more remarkable in his history, than the direct, unassisted, and undesigning steps, by which his elevation was accomplished. (16) Filled with such thoughts as these, and “snuffing the battle from afar,” upon the difficulty of succeeding where older generals had failed being suggested to him, he said, “in one campaign I shall be old or dead;” meaning that he would have gained immortality or lost his life.

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A few fleeting days were given to Josephine; when, in an evil hour for his country's foes, he left Paris, and paying a brief visit to his mother at Marseilles, proceeded by rapid journeys to Nice, where he arrived on the 20th of March; and on the 27th of that month took command of the army of Italy. (17)

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Voltri—Directs Argenteau upon Savona—Bonaparte resolves to detain Beaulieu at Voltri, and to attack Argenteau—Combat of Voltri—Of Montelicino—Good conduct of Cervoni—Heroism of Rampon—Battle of Montenotte—Defeat of Argenteau—Advance of the French—Beaulieu and Nelson disconcerted—Battle of Millesimo—Gallantry of Joubert—Surrender of Provera—Passage of the Bormida and storming of Dego—Defeat of Beaulieu and further advance of the French—Surprise of Dego—Retaken by the Austrians—Countermarch of Bonaparte—Battle of Dego—Heroic conduct and death of general Causse—Promptness and activity of Bonaparte—Gallantry of Lanusse and of Lannes—Sanguinary defeat of the Austrians—Recapture of Dego—Bonaparte prudent after his surprise—Sends to reconnoitre Voltri—The Austrians and Sardinians completely separated—Laharpe's division posted on the Belbo—Serrurier's division advanced against the Sardinians—The action of the army reversed—March of the French upon Ceva—They reach the commanding height of Montezemoto—The plains of Italy in view—Feelings of the troops—Emotion and remark of Bonaparte—Attack upon Ceva—The Sardinians driven with loss from their intrenched camp—Alarm of the court of Turin—The French pass the Tanaro—Their active pursuit—General Colli retreats behind the Corsaglio—Serrurier passes that river—Driven back—Bonaparte's dispositions for advancing—Directs Augereau to march down the right bank of the Tanaro—With Serrurier and Massena passes the Corsaglio—Battle of Mondovi—Defeat of the Sardinians—Pursued

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by general Stengel with the French cavalry—His death and character—Gallantry of Murat—Rapid advance of the French army towards Turin—Serurier enters Fossano, Massena Cherasco, and Augereau Alba—Bonaparte fortifies Cherasco—His preparations for strengthening his army—The king of Sardinia sues for peace—His general proposes a suspension of arms—Answer and conditions of Bonaparte—His frankness and moderation—Armistice of Cherasco—Suffering of the French troops for food—Their plundering—Discontent of the officers—General Laharpe tenders his resignation—Firmness and equity of Bonaparte—His measures to supply food to his troops, to repair his losses, and to strengthen his position—He equips his cavalry and prepares a park of artillery—His victories celebrated by the French legislature—His conduct approved by the directory—He resolves to invade the Italian possessions of the house of Austria.

The country which general Bonaparte was about to invade, nature and time had rendered strong and magnificent. Its mountains, rivers, and lakes, constitute barriers of formidable opposition, and objects of the utmost beauty and grandeur. Its monuments of glory and taste are equally great and equally enduring. In the bosom of its loveliest plains a foreign despot ruled its people with a leaden sceptre. It was a field tempt-

ing to the ambition of a youthful warrior, who drew his lineage from princes of the land; but whether for the purposes of subjection or deliverance, it was not to be entered but by the boldest efforts of enterprise and skill. (1)

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Bonaparte has left a description of Italy, which, as a specimen of geographical painting, and statistical fulness and precision, is unrivalled. This, it would be useless to transcribe, and is dangerous to abridge. That portion of Italy, which, as distinguished from its peninsular and insular divisions, he calls the continental part, the great valley of the Po, embraced between the Alps and the Appenines and stretching eastward to the Adriatic Sea, was to be the theatre of his first campaigns. Through the centre of this vast and fertile plain rolls the stately current of the Po, increased on each side by the tribute of numerous rivers. Those from the Appenines are short and rapid, and, except when swollen by the rains of winter, are generally fordable. Those from the Alps are longer and more copious, spread into frequent lakes, and fed by melting snows, are at their full in summer. This charming

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country, comprehending Piedmont, Lombardy, the duchies of Parma and Modena, the Roman Legations and Venetian States, thus fortified by mountains and intersected by streams, contained many proud cities, much wealth, and a dense population. Supposing it reduced within the outlines of a regular figure, its extent might be adequately defined by stating its length from west to east at three hundred miles, and its breadth at eighty. It was defended against Bonaparte not only by its mountain ramparts, but by the forces and fortresses of the king of Sardinia, the well known and wily porter of the Alps; by a powerful army under a distinguished general of the emperor of Austria; by contingents from Naples, Modena, and Parma; these active adversaries, supported by the less direct, but not less effectual cooperation of the other states of Italy, Tuscany excepted, and by the fleets and subsidies of England. (2)

As the instructions of the directory to their general bear a date anterior to his departure from Paris, there is reason from that fact to suppose, they were prepared after a full consideration of his own suggestions. This inference, which is confirmed by his affirma-

tion, (3) arises from the character of the instructions themselves. They are contained in a letter dated the 6th of March, and consist of a series of military subtilties interspersed with inconsistent directions and counteracting exhortations and restraints, superinduced upon a bold and sagacious design. This design is divided into two stages; the first comprising a detailed and limited plan of invasion; the second sketching an extensive and undefined project of conquest. The object of the immediate and elaborated plan was, to compel the king of Sardinia to abandon the coalition against France, and to force Austria to enter into a treaty of peace with the republic. The drift of the vague and ulterior project was, to uproot the Austrian ascendancy, and to overawe the native governments, in Italy.

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In prosecuting the first design, the general was instructed to give an alternate direction to his blows; that is, he was first to beat the Sardinians that he might aim an unimpeded stroke at the Austrians; he was next to beat the Austrians that he might detach the court of Turin from the coalition; and was to detach the court of Turin from the coalition that

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he might follow up his assaults upon the Austrians with such active and undivided vigour, as should force the emperor, notwithstanding the mercenary and inveterate stimulants of England, (4) to postpone his abhorrence of amity with a popular government, to the prudence of accepting terms of peace.

In pursuing this vibratory course of operations, the general was recommended, with scrupulous emphasis, to limit his advance in the direction of Turin, in the first instance, to the taking of Ceva and the observation of Coni; then to operate exclusively by his right, and with such boldness, as to drive the Austrians beyond the Po and disquiet them by a serious demonstration against Milan. This movement, which is enjoined with earnest repetition, had it been executed, would have placed Bonaparte between the Austrian army under Beaulieu, at least equal to his own, and that of Colli reenforced by draughts from numerous and powerful garrisons, and by detachments from the army of the duke of Aoste, who, at the head of a superior force, was opposed to the army of the Alps under Kellerman. The perilous tendency of this attenuated scheme, makes its conception wonderful, and its folly plain. (5)

The inaccuracy of data, both political and military, upon which the directors proceeded in developing their plan, is not less remarkable, and shows how difficult it is for a secretary in his closet, and more especially for a cabinet of coordinate ministers, to prescribe the movements of an army in the face of the enemy. For example, the directory argued on the assumption that Ceva was a first rate fortress, whereas it was a secondary one, and that Tortona, a place of great strength, would, if attacked, offer but slight resistance. They assumed that the court of Turin was held in the coalition, not by inclination and interest, but by the force of Austrian predominance and English treasure, was disposed to prefer an alliance with France, and would be likely to embrace that connection, provided an equivalent for the succours of England, and protection against the power of Austria, were furnished by France. (6) Upon this conclusion they projected a negotiation with the king of Sardinia, in virtue of which, and in return for the promise of indemnity in the Milanese territory, they were not without hopes that he would unite his forces with the French

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army, and relinquish, by treaty, all title to the dutchy of Savoy and the county of Nice, which, in the previous campaigns had been wrested from him by conquest.

But nothing could be more fallacious than this speculation upon the policy of the king of Sardinia, who was prompted by feelings grounded in family connection, by the instincts of royalty and self-preservation, to resist the progress of the French arms, and to cut short the existence of the French republic.

With singular inconsistency, the general was directed to undertake sieges in the heart of Piedmont and Mont Ferrat, and in the presence of superior armies, without exposing to the chances incident to a reverse, his battering cannon; was to encourage the subjects of Sardinia to form a political fraternity with the French, and yet was to exact from them heavy contributions to support his army; and was to separate the court of Turin from the coalition, but was not to consent to a suspension of arms, without receiving special authority from the directory. These pragmatistical instructions, while they ostensibly sent forth the general to gain victories and conquer dominions, really with-

held from him the power of carrying on the war, or of bringing about a peace. (7) He was bound, therefore, to be guided by the great principles of military prudence and duty, and to conform to the current pressure of circumstances and the evident interests of his country, rather than to the confused and impracticable commands of the directory. He was, in short, to navigate the sea of danger, upon which, in defending the independence of his country, he boldly launched, not upon the track laid down in his chart, but upon a course adapted to the object of the voyage, and to the force and direction of the winds and tides.

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The state of his army was not more satisfactory than the nature of his instructions. His fighting force did not exceed thirty-five thousand men, while that of the enemy, well fed, supplied and appointed, with a full proportion of cavalry and a train of two hundred cannon, amounted to seventy thousand. (8) Rations of meat, had for some time ceased to be distributed in the French camp, and even the supply of bread was precarious. On the cold and snowy Alps, the republicans had wintered, half-

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clad, ill shod, and without tents. Hunger and frost, which thinned their ranks by disease and desertion, had forced the troops into habits of plunder and insubordination. They lived by a system of marauding, which leading them often into the enemy's country, was besides its other inconveniences, not unattended with danger and loss. Upon mountains of rock and ice, the horses of the army had sunk down and perished; so that the cavalry consisting of two thousand four hundred men, was for the greater part dismounted, and even many of the staff officers were afoot. The arsenals of Nice and Antibes contained abundant stores of ordnance; but five hundred mules which constituted the sole means of transport remaining to the army, admitted the employment of but thirty light pieces. The military chest was empty, and the financial efforts of the government had been able to supply the new general with no more than two thousand crowns in gold, and one million of francs in bills, half of which were protested. So low in short were his means, and so desperate the poverty of the army, that when soon after his arrival, he directed a payment, which distributed

according to rank gave each general of division three Louis d'or, (9) it was received as a gratification, while the proportionate fraction, paid on account to the privates, produced more surprise than satisfaction, and more satisfaction than comfort. This latter payment he was enabled to effect only by his personal influence with a zealous contractor. (10)

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His reception by general Scherer and his relief of that officer seem to have been marked by every circumstance of propriety on both sides. On the day after assuming the command, Bonaparte thus expressed himself in a letter to the directory. "I am particularly gratified with my reception by general Scherer; who by his honourable deportment and readiness to supply me with all useful information, has acquired a right to my gratitude. His health appears to be really somewhat impaired. To great facility in expressing himself he unites an extent of general and military knowledge, which may probably induce you to deem his services useful in some important station."

To most of the regiments their new general had been known either at the siege of

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Toulon, or in the campaign of Saorgio; and even to the division which upon the conclusion of the Spanish war, had been led by Augereau from the Pyrenees to the Alps, as they had fought under Dugommier in 1794, his name was familiar. He was received therefore as commander in chief with satisfaction by the army; although it appears that Augereau, and with better pretensions Massena, at first regarded his appointment as in some sort derogating from their own rank and reputation. (11) But this partial discontent was of momentary existence, was suppressed immediately by the superiority of his character, and speedily removed by the events of the campaign; while its temporary prevalence, by inducing these generals to elevate the standard of their own merit, may have had the effect of inciting them to extraordinary hardihood and prowess.

His personal appearance was at this period of his life, very different from what it subsequently became. His face was so fleshless, that the chiselled form and fine expression of his features, were overcast with a look saturnine and severe. According to the fashion

of the time, his hair which shaded his forehead, was tied behind, and fell in what were called *dog's ears* down his temples and cheeks. His figure was light and slender; and his rounded limbs terminated in feet and hands of such feminine proportion and delicacy, that it was evident his physical power of exertion and endurance, was supplied by the energy of his mind. On the other hand, his mental faculties were in a great measure independent of the influence which variations in the health or tension of robust and muscular frames, frequently exercise upon the intellect.

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Having been accustomed to command even when he was legally subordinate, it was easy for him to control, when he became chief in authority. The force of that ascendancy which even at this stage of his career he exerted over those who approached him, was exemplified as he passed through Toulon, in the person of Decrès, his future minister of marine. This naval officer, who had known him at Paris before his appointment, believed himself on a footing of perfect familiarity with the general of the army of Italy. Under this impression, upon hear-

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ing that Bonaparte was to pass through Toulon, he proposed to introduce several of his brother officers, with a view of obliging them, and of showing off the intimacy which he enjoyed with a commander in chief. Attended by his comrades, he hastened to present himself, and was advancing, with the utmost cordiality, to salute the general, when the attitude, the look, the voice of the latter, stopped him short. There was nothing repulsive, injurious, nor even stern; but there was a magical something that prescribed a limit, which Decrès confessed to a friend, he never afterwards dared to overstep.

Upon relieving general Scherer, Bonaparte's first care was to break the attachments of custom which held the head quarters of the army of Italy inveterately stationary at Nice. They were ordered to be transferred immediately to Albenga, a town on the coast, about seventy miles in the direction of Genoa, for which town the troops cantoned around Nice were directed to march. To such a degree was the discipline of the army on this frontier depraved by long suffering, fruitless combats, and frequent change of commanders, that certain companies of the twenty-

ninth refused to obey the order. With this insubordinate spirit, political malcontents and royalist intriguers, who, under the corresponding direction of Pichegru and the prince Condé, were then in full activity on the frontiers, had managed to infuse into that corps a tendency to Bourbonism so successfully, that one of the companies called itself *the company of the Dauphin*, and two of the officers had ventured to shout *long live the king!* At the same time, and as if in concert with these dangerous manifestations, a French emigrant presented himself at the advanced posts, in the character of a Sardinian officer, with a flag of truce and a communication from general Colli. From the coincidence of these events, Bonaparte, naturally and justly apprehended a correspondence between his mutineers and the agents of general Colli. He determined, therefore, to be prompt and stern, if not rigorous, in dealing with this threatening disorder. In spite of Colli's remonstrances, and the ostensible character of the Sardinian emissary, he was detained, (12) while both the disobedient and the royalist officers were arrested, the companies disbanded, the

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men sent into the rear, and distributed in another regiment. This energetic correction humbled the mutineers, and contributed to establish habits of obedience and the force of discipline. These, it was the great object of the general to restore, not by unjust severity, but by removing the causes of disorder; for, as he wrote to the directory, the sufferings of the men extenuated their misconduct; and, "without discipline, he could not hope for victory."

Looking closely and severely into the errors and abuses of the commissariat, he commenced at once a system of productive economy, active control, and inexorable correction in the departments of subsistence; and, seconded by the zeal of one of the contractors, he succeeded, in less than a week, by employing his limited means to the best advantage, in furnishing the troops with salt and fresh meat alternately every day. This addition to their diet had as good an effect upon the health as upon the temper of the army. (13)

On the march from Nice, along the rugged and precipitous shore of the Mediterranean, the head quarters, with the rear and baggage of the army, were exposed to the cannonade

of Nelson's squadron. Their fire, though incessant and not harmless, Bonaparte received with such bold contempt, that he would not allow the columns to halt, either for the purpose of avoiding or returning it. (14)

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Arrived at Albenga, he reviewed his troops, and, for the first time, addressed them in those accents, which whether grave or animated, never failed to awaken transports of enthusiasm in the soldier's breast. On this occasion his words were few, and not flattering. "Soldiers! you are naked and hungry; the government owes you much, but can pay you nothing. Your patience and valour in the midst of these rocks are admirable, but they cannot win for you martial fame. I propose to lead you into the most fertile plains on the globe. Rich provinces, great cities, will be in your power; there you will find honour, glory, and wealth. Soldiers of Italy! can you be wanting in courage and perseverance?"

There was boldness of promise in this address; but, at the same time, hard conditions, and plain truth. The soldiers were told that they were to serve their country

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without food, clothes, or pay, and were to procure these, as well as wealth and glory, only at the expense of hardship and peril. If they were to gain honourable rewards, they were to submit to unexampled privations, and to accomplish prodigious undertakings.

Had these propositions been balanced in the measured phrases, and veiled in the studied sophisms of a rhetorician, they would have produced discouragement and irritation, rather than the impulse of military ardour. But, in Bonaparte's direct and simple expressions, there was a tact more exquisite than art, which genius only could inspire, and the firmest valour could the best feel. Accordingly, this short and stern address, roused and elevated the gallantry of the army, as the freshening wind swells and directs the billows of the sea. Impelled by its energy and truth, their courage rose above the sense of suffering and injustice. The instinct of the soldiers more perspicacious than the judgment of statesmen, felt the glorious spirit of their leader: they answered his address with eager acclamations, and gave him at once their entire confidence.

Generous men! they complained no more of neglect, penury, or want; and sighed only for battle, victory, and fame. In the character and effect of this address, when they are attentively considered, may be discovered the germs of those wonders which the campaign unfolded. (15)

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The divisions were commanded by Massena, Augereau, Serrurier, and Laharpe; the cavalry, by generals Stengel and Kilmaine, and the artillery such as it was, by general Dujard. Among the generals of brigade some of whom had served at Toulon and in the campaign of Saorgio, were Victor, Joubert, and St. Hilaire, names soon to be famed in war. Berthier, an officer of peculiar qualifications for the post, was adjutant general of the army. Murat, Muiron, Junot, Marmont, Duroc, Le Marrais, and Louis Bonaparte, were aides-de-camp to the commander in chief. The regiments had been trained in the best school for military virtue, in penury and hardship, and had been steeled to danger in battles on the Pyrenees and the Alps. The moral feeling or military tone of the army, was therefore greatly superior to its numerical force or material condition. (16)

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The plan of Bonaparte's invasion of Italy differed from those of former conquerors, who in ancient or modern times carried their victorious arms beyond the mountain ramparts of that beautiful country. He determined to enter Piedmont, not by either of the passes of the Alps, which, owing to their immense altitude are blocked up with snow eight months in the year, and are besides guarded at their outlets by numerous and strong fortresses; but through the pass of Cadibone, where the chain of the Alps declines to its lowest point, and the Appennines rise from their least elevation. To use his own descriptive phrase, instead of forcing the Alps, he resolved to turn them. The western outlet of this pass, about thirty miles south of Albenga, terminated at the port of Savona, a place suitable for the depot of the army; while to the eastward, it issued from the mountains between Ceva and Acqui, two of the least formidable of the enemy's fortified places, and at a point threatening equally the Austrian and Sardinian camps. (17)

Adopting this line of invasion, it was necessary to assemble the army on its right. This delicate operation, as the passes of the

Alps were yet obstructed by snow, he counted on effecting without interruption from Colli; and as the positions of the Austrians were more distant, without interference from Beaulieu. To provide against the more probable annoyance of the former, he strengthened the connection between the left of Augereau and the right of Serrurier, by occupying with a detachment of Rusca's brigade, the position of La Sotta, which commanded one of the passes in that quarter, and the importance of which his previous acquaintance with that region of the Alps, enabled him at once to comprehend. His hope was to appear suddenly in the plains of Italy, to attack the Austrians or Sardinians separately, and with the mountains in his rear to manœuvre against Turin or Milan as he should judge more feasible.

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The left division under Serrurier was posted at Ormea and Garessio, on the eastern slope of the Alps, and the head waters of the Tanaro, in observation of Colli; who with the Sardinian army which constituted the right wing of the allied force, was encamped and intrenched around Ceva. The centre divisions under Massena and Augereau, were

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stationed at Loano, Finale, and Savona, towns on the sea coast. Laharpe with the right division, was advanced toward Genoa, having his vanguard under general Cervoni, pushed forward as far as Voltri. (18)

This disposition of Laharpe's corps had been made before Bonaparte's arrival, in concert with the proceedings of the French agent at Genoa; who in order to intimidate that feeble state, and extort from its fears a loan to the French treasury, had demanded a passage for troops through the Genoese territory, and announced that the French were to penetrate into Lombardy by the pass of the Bochetta. This inopportune step, which, though founded on the outrage permitted on the French flag and the frigate *La Modeste*, gave naturally offence and alarm to the Genoese government, being instantly communicated to the Austrian general, induced him to draw his troops from their winter quarters, and commence the campaign.

Beaulieu though old, does not appear to have been inactive or, on this occasion at least, hesitating. (19) Conjecturing from his information, that the French commander was determined to take possession of Genoa,

and to convert the resources of that neutral republic into means of carrying on the war, a design which he was aware the allies had previously entertained, he took his measures with promptness and vigour. Dividing his army into three corps, he directed Colli with the right to keep Serrurier in check, while himself with the left, and Argenteau with the centre were to push through the mountains, each by the pass in his front, and unite their forces on the left of the French, in the basin of Savona. Argenteau was to march by the road of lower and upper Montenotte, (20) and then to force his way by Montelicino, directly to Savona. Beaulieu, whose headquarters were at Novi, was to take the route of the Bochetta, interpose between the French army and Genoa, communicate with the British squadron on that coast, drive Cervoni back upon Laharpe, Laharpe upon Massena, and forming a junction with Argenteau in the basin or plain of Savona, was to fall with overwhelming force upon the front and left flank of the French army.

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Bonaparte on the 9th transferred his headquarters to Savona. Being apprised that

CHAP. VI. the Austrians were in motion, and perceiving that instead of issuing unexpectedly upon the plains of Piedmont, he should have to fight his way through the mountains, he observed vigilantly the bold and forward movements of his adversary. Aware that he could overcome his vast superiority of means and numbers, only by rapid marches, well directed attacks, and skilful choice of ground, he discovered with pleasure, that Beaulieu by advancing upon Voltri, while Argenteau was only at Montenotte, had interposed the broad ridge of the Appennines between his left and centre, and that consequently Argenteau was more within reach of attack than of support; while three of his own divisions being all on the same side of the mountains, and in connected positions, could be expeditiously collected for a single operation. Combining these perceptions promptly into a system of action, he resolved to detain Beaulieu by a detachment at Voltri, and to fall with his principal force upon Argenteau. Here at once may be seen the difference between a good general and a great commander. Upon the approach of Beaulieu's formidable columns, a good general would

have called in his detachments, concentrated his force in some strong position, and risked his life and reputation in its defence. Defeated, he would have been compelled to retire; victorious, he would have been unable to advance, against the still overwhelming numbers of the allies. But a great commander, facing danger with promptness and sagacity, disables the giant as he lifts his ponderous arm to strike. Acting upon this bold and skilful determination, Bonaparte sent orders to Cervoni to maintain himself obstinately at Voltri; while to encourage his resistance, as well as to protect his retreat, when it should become necessary, he posted two battalions in his rear on the heights of Voraggio. In the gorge of the pass through which Argenteau proposed to descend upon Savona, and at a point where several routes entering the mountains from Piedmont, unite, stands Monteligino, a rocky eminence which the French had slightly fortified. This post was confided to Colonel Rampon, with the thirty-second regiment, consisting of about one thousand men, which, for its defence of Monteligino, got the surname of *the brave*, and became as famous in the cam-

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paigns of Italy as the tenth legion was in the army of Cæsar. The occupation and defence of this position, while it afforded additional protection to the retreat of Cervoni, was intended to answer the more important purpose of holding Argenteau back, so that Bonaparte might execute his meditated attack on the centre of Beaulieu's army, while it was completely out of support from his left.

These dispositions were not completed before Bonaparte foresaw their success. Confident of victory, while his generals were uneasy and apprehensive, he wrote to the directory on the 8th of April in the following sanguine terms—"I have just caused the important position of La Sotta to be occupied. When you read this letter we shall be already engaged in battle. The treasury has not kept its word. Instead of five hundred thousand francs, it has only sent us three hundred thousand, and we have as yet no tidings of the six hundred thousand, which sum was announced. But in spite of all this we shall advance." On the same day, Massena in a letter to the commander in chief, thus expressed himself:—"I do not know what are your intentions in

leaving the troops (of Cervoni) longer at Voltri. I must not conceal from you that our line is too much extended to be defended with so small a force." In a letter of the 9th which general Mesnard addressed to Massena, informing him of the advance of the Austrian centre, he observes, "General Roc-cavina commands this force. His design is to cut off the retreat of our troops from Voltri, and to make them prisoners."

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On the 8th the advanced parties of Beaulieu attacked the corps of Cervoni, amounting to four thousand five hundred men, and were repulsed. On the 10th the Austrians renewed the attack with a force estimated at ten thousand; but Cervoni, although his right was cannonaded by the English squadron, and his left turned by a division of Austrians, held his ground manfully the whole day. On the 11th he retired to a strong position on the mountain of Le Fourche, and according to the orders of Bonaparte, fell back at night secretly and rapidly upon Laharpe, at Madona, situated about four miles in front of Savona, on the route to Montenotte.

While Beaulieu with the left wing of his

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army was thus engaged at Voltri, Argenteau with the centre which besides a division in the rear connecting it with the army of Colli, mustered fifteen thousand men, advanced from lower to upper Montenotte. (21) In the forenoon of the 11th his light column, two thousand five hundred strong, under general Roccavina, attacked the post of Monteligeno, but was vigourously met by Colonel Rampon and repelled with loss. In a few hours Argenteau came up with the division, when a heavier column of attack was formed and a fresh assault made upon Rampon. This also was repulsed. The Austrians prepared a still stronger force for a third assault, indignant at being worsted by a corps so inconsiderable. The intrepid Rampon at the same time, who was without water food or ammunition, proposed to his men a solemn oath, to die rather than yield their post—"Let us die first!" was their heroic answer. The Austrians advanced a third time, and reached the breast work of the redoubt, when Rampon with his self-devoted regiment rushed upon them with the bayonet, and with such determined courage, as to drive them with

slaughter down the mountain. Upon this reiterated defeat, Argenteau finding his men fatigued and disheartened, drew off and encamped on upper Montenotte, intending to turn the position of Rampon in the morning, and to reach Savona in spite of him. But Bonaparte had prepared for the ill fated Austrian very different employment.

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Laharpe, already at Madona de Savona, was pushed forward on the night of the 11th, to support and supply Rampon, with whom he was united by break of day. Augereau was ordered to cross the Alps from Loano, in the direction of Millesimo, so as to maintain his connection, be in readiness for ulterior operations, and intercept any aid from Colli to Argenteau; and Bonaparte in person, marched at midnight from Savona with Massena's division, to which the brigade of Joubert was united, and placed himself by the dawn of day near upper Montenotte, upon the right and rear of the unsuspecting victim of his celerity and skill.

On the morning of the 12th, while Beaulieu was victoriously establishing himself at Voltri, and opening a communication with

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commodore Nelson; while Colli was amused near Ceva, by false attacks which Serrurier was instructed to make; and Argenteau himself was preparing to deal with Rampon alone, he was at once assailed in front by Laharpe and Rampon united, and by Massena in flank and rear. Notwithstanding the suddenness and combination of the French onset, Argenteau seconded by Roccavina, received it with firmness. On this trying occasion, he exhibited intelligence and decision. His plan was to act on the defensive against Laharpe, and to extricate himself by attacking Massena with his principal force. But he was not allowed time nor opportunity; for Bonaparte had posted himself in the centre of Massena's division, and from a commanding height gave impulse and direction to his columns. (22) Laharpe was ordered to attack the Austrian front at Monteligino, Massena with the brigade Mesnard to dislodge their right from the heights of Montenotte, while Joubert was to penetrate into their rear. These movements nicely combined and vigorously executed, quickly decided the battle: the Austrians, their front overpowered by Laharpe and Rampon, their

right driven from Montenotte by Massena, and their rear at the same time attacked, were thrown into confusion, and in spite of the exertions of Argenteau and Roccavina, fled precipitately, with the loss of fifteen hundred men, killed and wounded, two thousand prisoners, five field pieces, and several stand of colours. The loss of the French was inconsiderable. Such, succinctly, was the battle of Montenotte, famous for being the first of a long series of victories, of which though not the least brilliant, it was in consequence of the want of cavalry among the least decisive. Owing to the skill of Bonaparte's manœuvres, and the rapidity of his onsets, the Austrians were so completely routed, that they must have suffered severely had there been a rapid pursuit. Of the fugitives, the greater part who were Austrians, retreated upon Dego in the direction of Acqui. The Sardinian detachments with difficulty made their way to Millesimo, on the road to Ceva. The former position while it defended the route towards Milan, was in the line of Beaulieu's countermarch from Voltri, and of the advance of reenforcements from Lombardy. The latter connected the Sardinian detach-

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ments with Colli's left wing, and commanded the road to Turin. (23)

Although on the morning of the 12th, Beaulieu, who was anxiously concerting with the English commodore, a plan of operations against Savona, heard the distant sound of battle upon his right, it was not until the morning of the 13th, that the overthrow of his centre was made known to him. This intelligence fell like a thunderbolt in his path, severed his connection with Nelson's squadron, and dashed to pieces their mutual hopes of victory, invasion, and conquest. He returned in haste to Acqui where he arrived that night; having directed Sebottendorf with the main body of his corps to retrace his march by Sestri and the Bochetta to Dego, and Wukassowich who had been pushed forward with a division of grenadiers on the left of Cervoni, to take the more direct route for the same point, by the way of Sassello. But the route in one case was difficult and rough, and in the other so circuitous, that Sebottendorf's leading battalions only were in time to participate in the next battle.

Bonaparte was not less keen in prosecu-

ting his success, than he had been bold and skilful in gaining it. On the day of the battle of Montenotte he advanced his head quarters to Carcare, a point at which the springs of the mountains turn their waters to the Po. Laharpe with the right division was ordered to pursue the Austrians on the route towards Sassello, with a view of driving them further upon their left, and of menacing an Austrian detachment of four battalions stationed at that place. He was then suddenly to wheel to his left and march in the direction of Dego, in order to cooperate with Massena in an attack on that fortified position. At the same time Massena was directed to advance by the main road to Dego, while Augereau's division, which, as Serrurier was yet stationary at Garessio, now formed the left of the line, moved upon Millesimo. At this point the Piedmontese had been joined by Colli, with as many battalions as he could venture to draw from his camp at Ceva and his main position in front of Serrurier; and at Dego, Argenteau was reenforced by Beaulieu with all the troops which had been able to come up from Voltri. Thus the Austrian general profiting by his numbers, notwith-

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standing the defeat of his centre, was able to oppose to his adversary more than an equal force, which though it occupied an extended line, rested on intrenchments on the heights of Dego, and was strongly posted on those of Cairo and Millesimo. Here, covering the two great roads leading into Piedmont and Lombardy, he hoped to maintain himself until the arrival of troops from Milan and the return of all his divisions from Voltri, should enable him to resume offensive operations, and retrieve the loss and discredit sustained by his lieutenant. But the battle of Millesimo, which again disconcerted his plans, gave Bonaparte his second victory.

The enemy had strengthened his right at Millesimo, by occupying a mountain called Cossaria, situated between the two branches of the Bormida, and commanding the valleys of both. They had also availed themselves judiciously of the nature of the ground in front of Millesimo, and had posted a strong detachment in a narrow defile, through which an approaching force must pass. At daybreak on the 13th, Bonaparte with his left division attacked the enemy in the defile before Millesimo. Augereau, who had not

yet been engaged, and was burning with emulation of the glories of Montenotte, led this attack, forced the pass with the impetuosity of a torrent, and supported by the brigades Joubert and Mesnard, cut off the corps of general Provera from Colli's main body, and swiftly surrounded it on the mount of Cossaria. The strength and value of his elevated position being felt by Provera, he intrenched himself with his two thousand men in the extensive ruins of an ancient chateau on its summit. Here, though he had little ammunition, and neither water nor food, he resolved to hold out to the last, as from his lofty strong hold he could see the Sardinian army preparing to come to his rescue.

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On the other hand, Bonaparte whose personal activity in these battles was incessant, had, in the night, before he joined the division of Augereau, sent orders to Massena and Laharpe to expedite their movement upon Dego, so as to attack in the morning. Consequently he was under the impression that his brave lieutenants were engaged in a struggle for victory, with which the division of Augereau ought to cooperate. He first there-

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fore summoned Provera, and that proving ineffectual, resolved to assault him, in the hope of clearing away all obstruction to an immediate attack on the force under Colli. But while the columns were forming for this perilous attempt, a brisk firing was heard in the direction of Cencio, which drew the commander in chief towards the centre of his line, which was held by the brigade Mesnard.

To Augereau's direction was consequently entrusted the assault upon Provera. (24) This officer was so confident in the prospect of relief, and the strength of his post, that he would consent to relinquish it only upon condition of a safe retreat to his friends, with his troops, their arms, and baggage. As the mountain, which was steep and rocky, presented three faces, Augereau formed three columns of attack. They were commanded by generals Banel, Joubert, and Quénin, and were supported by a proper reserve. Each column ascended a side of the mountain, with a view of distracting the fire of the enemy, and of meeting, in an attack, on the chateau. The assailants advancing, with determined spirit, in the face of a con-

stant discharge of musketry, the heads of the columns were more than half way up, when Joubert coming to a depression in the surface of the hill, which afforded a degree of shelter from Provera's fire, halted in order that his men might breathe, and make their attack with collected vigour. Banel and Quénin, it appears, being apprised of his halt, imitated his example, and likewise suspended their progress. This result of discretion or accident, the enemy conceiving to be the effect of fear, took fresh courage, and while they continued their fire, rolled down huge stones from the ruinous walls upon the French columns, into which bounding rocks and showering bullets carried overthrow and slaughter. Generals Banel and Quénin were among the first and bravest of the slain. The exertions and intrepidity of Joubert not only sustained the courage of his men, but led them to the foot of Provera's intrenchment, into which, with seven brave followers, he was forcing an entrance, when he was prostrated by a stone from the walls. (25) He rolled senseless down the precipice, and, though but momentarily disabled, was believed by his men to be dead.

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Before so many obstacles, the columns deprived of their leaders, recoiled, the men scattering, and sheltering themselves, as they could, behind the few trees, slender brushwood, and rocky projections of the mountain, until night, which was now approaching, favoured their retreat. The loss of the French in killed and wounded has been estimated at little short of a thousand, in which number they lamented two generals and other gallant officers slain. Thus severely foiled, Augereau became circumspect, and established posts close around the foot of the mountain. These, by order of Bonaparte, who returned to this point in the evening, and was apprehensive that Provera might attempt in the night to cut a passage to the Sardinian army, he fortified, as well as he could, with artillery, and prepared to maintain, by directing his men to sleep on their arms.

During the 13th, Massena finding his troops fatigued by a long march, and his numbers insufficient for an attack on Dego, had waited for the junction of the brigade Dommartin, and for the support of Laharpe, so that, on that day, the cooperation pro-

jected between the two wings of his army by Bonaparte could not have taken place, even had the assault on Provera proved successful. But, in the course of the morning of the 14th, these accessions reached Massena, and the two armies were in presence along the whole line; from Millesimo, where Augereau and Colli were confronted, to Dego, for the possession of which Bonaparte and Beaulieu were to contend. On the left the allies, on the right the French, were the assailants. The former confided in their numbers and position, the latter relied on their enthusiastic courage and their general's skill.

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Leaving Augereau to deal with Colli, and to reduce Provera, Bonaparte repaired, on the morning of the 14th, to the right of his line, with a view of superintending, in person, the storming of Dego. On his way, after witnessing the gallantry with which Mesnard defeated an attempt of the enemy by piercing the French centre, to turn their left and relieve Provera, he directed him to incline to his right, so as to support the attack of Massena and Laharpe. For this important operation the division of Laharpe

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was formed into three close columns, under the orders of generals Causse, Cervoni, and Boyer; that of Massena into two, under Lasalcette and Monnier, which last column, destined to turn the enemy's left, was attended by Massena in person. The Austrians were posted in a grand redoubt on the commanding height of Dego, and in intrenchments on a chain of contiguous but less elevated hills, extending to their right. These were to be carried by the division of Laharpe, who was then to unite with Massena in the attack on Dego. About one o'clock, the preparations were completed, and the general ordered the troops to advance. At this moment, Junot arrived with the capitulation of Provera, and with intelligence that Colli, after being repulsed by Augereau, in repeated efforts to rescue Provera, had been finally compelled to retreat. This information stimulated to a higher degree of fervour the courage of the troops. They crossed the rapid Bormida under a plunging fire of artillery; the columns of Laharpe fording the torrent, Massena passing on a rude mountain bridge. Moving with impetuosity and concert, they soon came into close action,

The Austrians resisted bravely, but were overpowered by the vigour of the French. So complete was their success, that on the right, Massena after taking the Austrian artillery, intercepted their retreat. The corps stationed in the great redoubt of Dego, had a prospect not unlike that of Provera, but a different fate. When attacked in front by the columns of Causse, Cervoni, and Lasalcette, they could see Argenteau hastening up in the rear of the village, with a reenforcement of four battalions to their relief. They therefore stood firm, when they might have retreated in comparative safety. But Massena continuing his active progress on their left, opened a fire on the flank of Argenteau, who felt himself endangered and instantly retired. At the same moment, Causse, Cervoni, and Lasalcette, assailed them in front, broke into their works, and fell upon them with the bayonet. The Austrians fought with a courage worthy of a better fate, but overwhelmed by their enemies, and unsupported by their friends, they were cut to pieces. Argenteau was censured for having too readily sacrificed these brave men to his own safety. Thus, from right

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to left, along the whole line from the heights of Cossaria to those of Dego, Beaulieu's defeat was complete. The action closed with the close of day. The vanquished fled to the camps they had left; the victors slept on the hills they had won.

The loss of the allied army in prisoners, amounted to six thousand, among whom were one lieutenant general, one brigadier, and twenty-four field officers. Thirty pieces of artillery, a quantity of ammunition, and fifteen colours fell into the hands of the conqueror. As the French had mounted four hundred cavalry, and pursued the imperialists hotly from Dego, where the resistance was obstinate, and the fighting severe, their loss in killed and wounded, which was computed by Bonaparte at two thousand five hundred, was doubtless considerable. The conduct of Provera, in surrendering without a determined effort to disengage himself, presents an obvious and inglorious contrast with the heroism of Rampon. In the hope of entailing upon the enemy the services of a general so inefficient, Bonaparte, in releasing Provera on parole, bestowed on him

words of commendation, which, it appears in the sequel, had the effect they were designed to produce.

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The victory of Millesimo, by driving Beaulieu back upon Acqui, and forcing Colli to withdraw to Ceva, completely disjoined the Austrian and Sardinian armies, and effectually divided the motives of the two commanders. Beaulieu became solicitous to protect Lombardy, and Colli anxious to cover Turin.

Not a moment was lost in following up these well-earned advantages, and in overpowering the enemy by incessant rapidity as well as daring enterprise. With a view of favouring the junction of Serrurier who had been directed to approach from his position at Garessio, Augereau was ordered to incline to his left, and to take possession of Montezemoto. Laharpe was to support Augereau, while Massena with his division, forming the right of the line, was to advance in a corresponding direction, and to coöperate, by turning their left, in dislodging the Sardinians from their fortified camp at Ceva.

Meanwhile, Wukassowich, after a painful and devious march across the mountains from Voltri, by way of Sassello, arrived at three

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o'clock in the morning of the 15th in the rear of the post at Dego, where, it will be remembered he had been directed by Beaulieu to form his junction with Argenteau. To his astonishment he found French instead of Austrian troops before him. Taking counsel from courage, he attacked them at day break, fatigued with the toil of the late battle, and oppressed with wine from the neighbouring village. In spite of the exertions of their officers, the French offered but a slight resistance, and Wukassowich with little difficulty took six hundred prisoners, and recovered the positions as well as the artillery which Argenteau had lost. Intelligence of his disaster created great alarm at the French head quarters; for the surprise was not only complete, but inexplicable, as the French generals it would seem could not conceive the possibility of an attack on Dego, while their parties on the roads to Acqui and Ceva, were undisturbed. Massena being first apprised of this rude assault upon the extreme right of his division, hastened to the spot, and putting himself at the head of the disordered battalions and such troops as were at hand, attempted to

drive the successful Austrians from their ground, before they could fairly establish themselves. But his men, who had not recovered from their consternation, attacked feebly, and were quickly repulsed. At this moment, Bonaparte galloped up, leading Laharpe's division, whose march upon Ceva he had promptly countermanded. Under his direction efficient preparations were instantly made for fighting over the battle of the day before, and regaining the heights and redoubts, which had been so gallantly won, and so suddenly lost. The grand redoubt of Dego was again to be carried by assault; a task which was confided to general Causse, with the 99th regiment. General Mesnard with his brigade was charged with dislodging the enemy from the surrounding heights, a service which Massena, whose privilege of rank was the post of danger, in person superintended. Causse finding his column dreadfully galled in climbing the hill, placed himself at the head of the grenadiers, and sprang forward in hopes by accelerating the issue, to diminish the expense of the conflict. A deadly discharge of musketry from the redoubt, deprived the assailants of their

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daring commander, and driving this party back upon the column, threw the regiment into disorder. At this critical moment the Austrians rushed down the hill; attacked, routed, and pursued the French. Bonaparte, however, displaying the 39th, which had just reached the ground under general Victor, received and broke the shock of the imperialists; and directing the officers of his escort to rally the 99th, with the united corps, forced them to retreat to their post on the hill. The conflict on this point was severe and doubtful. The adjutant general Lanusse took command of two battalions of light troops and determined to repeat the effort of Causse. The Hungarian grenadiers of Wukassowich, no less resolved to renew their successful charge, met and engaged him. Three times the French were forced to recede, as often the Hungarians were compelled to retire. The last time Lanusse placed his hat on his sword, and calling on his men who bravely followed, rushed up the hill and decided the action. In the meantime, Massena had cleared the inferior heights, and gained the front of the grand redoubt, while Cervoni was scaling

the precipice on its flank. Upon this Wukasowich, his grenadiers discomfited, and his post in danger of being surrounded, had no resource but flight. The pursuit, like the battle, was fierce and bloody. The Austrian division was nearly destroyed, and all the artillery retaken. The intrepid conduct of Lanusse, which passed under the eyes of the commander in chief, was like that of Rampon at Montelicino, rewarded by promotion to the rank of general of brigade. Lannes, the famous Duke of Montebello, who commenced the campaign as a chief of battalion, participated in this glorious struggle. On the same ground, the day before, his gallantry had so engaged the attention of Bonaparte, that he promoted him on the field to a full colonelcy; a promotion which was the measure of the first degree of that merit which afterwards became colossal. These were the first occasions on which Bonaparte as commander in chief, enjoyed the congenial pleasure of rewarding courage displayed on the field of battle. Owing to the closeness and desperation of the fighting, the French lost many officers, among them generals Causse and Bonnel. The former who fell

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mortally wounded, upon seeing the commander in chief advancing in the heat of the action, could only articulate, "Is Dego retaken?" the love of glory being the last emotion of his noble heart.

The surprise of the French at Dego although it was promptly and gallantly retrieved, discovers a want of that prudence for which their commander was subsequently distinguished. His plan of operations was founded on the advantage which the movement of Beaulieu upon Voltri, and the time necessary for that general's reunion of his divisions, would be likely to give him over the Austrian centre. From his report of the victory of Millesimo, it appears he was aware of an Austrian corps being stationed at Sassello, and that he overrated it at eight battalions. Yet, with these pressing reasons for vigilance in respect to the security of his rear and right, he allowed Wukassowich, who actually marched by the way of Sassello, and united the troops there with his own division, to reach his bivouacs unobstructed, and fall upon his men in their sleep.

The consequences of this imprudence might well have been fatal. For had Bo-

parte's attack on Dego, which formed the leading operation in the battle of Millesimo, been postponed from the afternoon of the 14th to the morning of the 15th, the failure of the French would have been inevitable, and their expulsion from Piedmont not improbable.

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If we censure the French general, because in the hurry of incessant fighting and pursuit, his judgment declined for a moment from its comprehensive elevation, we cannot fail to admire the active vigour, and easy celerity, with which its equipoise was recovered. The second capture of Dego was more glorious to the French than the first; and the personal prowess which Bonaparte combined with his military skill in conducting the operation, shows that, while he felt its critical importance, he perceived and employed the best means of ensuring its success.

But neither the genius of Bonaparte nor the spirit of his troops in the opening of this campaign, can be adequately admired, without bearing in mind that the first six days, from the combat of Voltri to the victory of Dego, with pauses of but a few hours, were

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filled up by one widely extended and continued battle, in which the French infantry were victorious, at all points and against fresh troops, over superiority of ground, numbers, and equipment.

While the shattered remains of Wukasowich's division pursued by the light troops of Massena and the cavalry of Stengel, fled to Acqui, increasing the consternation of their comrades, and the confusion of their general, Bonaparte, prompt, victorious, and persevering, renewed his interrupted movement against the Sardinians. Attentive to the great object rather than the special instructions of the directory, he determined to operate vigorously with his left and centre; and prudent from experience, to protect his rear from a repetition of surprise or annoyance. Accordingly while Victor with one brigade was posted at Cairo, Laharpe was thrown directly in front with instructions to take post on the river Belbo, at the late Austrian camp of St. Benidetto, to observe Beaulieu, to restrain his detachments, and hold him separated from Colli. General Cervoni also was despatched to Savona to ascertain whether the enemy had

completed the evacuation of Voltri. To Serrurier, orders were sent to come into connection with Augereau, who was advancing toward Ceva, and to cooperate in an attack on the Sardinian intrenchments at that place, which Massena, by a corresponding movement on the right was commanded to turn. These combined movements were speedily performed. Thus the action of the army was reversed. The right division which hitherto had been incessantly engaged in marches or combats, was now left stationary on the Belbo, while the left, which as yet had been inactive on the Tanaro, was placed in advance, and in close pursuit of the enemy. Serrurier descending the left bank of the Tanaro with the main body of his division, by means of detachments on the right bank, cooperated with general Rusca in dislodging a Sardinian corps from the heights of St. Murialto, and in establishing the desired connection. The divisions advanced upon Ceva; Serrurier, by the way of Batifolo, Bagnasco, and Nucetto; Augereau on the route of Montezemolo and Montezemoto. Serrurier's light troops driving in the outposts of Colli reached the town of Ceva, as

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From this proud and airy height the republican troops enjoyed the wide and sudden prospect spread out before them — the plains of Italy, so long regarded as the land of promise, glittering with the domes of distant cities, shining with the currents of wandering rivers, and waving with harvests of abundance and glory. This scene so sublime and delightful, they contrasted with the sterile rocks and wintry precipices over which they had burst with impetuous conquest; and looking round on the icy range of the Alps that had ceased as if by magic to forbid their invasion, their bosoms throbbed with a sense of irresistible valour and invigorated hope. The general himself was not unmoved. Gazing at the huge rampart of mountains he said to his officers, "Hannibal forced the Alps, but we, we have turned them;" a phrase which happily depicted the grandeur, skill, and success of his enterprise.

But the tide of invasion rolled swiftly along; the political sympathy of the inhabitants adding momentum to the progress of

the victors, as they penetrated into Piedmont, and entered like a broad wedge between the shattered allies. On Colli, in his camp at Ceva, Bonaparte now freed from the Austrians, directed his strength. Augereau descending from the heights, and Serrurier passing down the banks of the Tanaro, attacked on the 17th, the latter the right and the former the front of the Sardinian intrenchments. Massena on his side pushed forward with a view of crossing the river below Ceva, and getting into the enemy's rear. In the front where the brigades Beyrand and Joubert made and repeated vigorous assaults upon his exterior works, Colli, with his heavy artillery and a disposable division of eight thousand men, opposed a very resolute resistance. But on his right Serrurier, whose turn to court danger and distinction was now come, had pushed a brigade as far as Montbarsilico on the road to the bridges over the Corsaglio. The Sardinian general finding from this movement and the progress of Massena, his position no longer tenable, and fearing a catastrophe like that from which he had been unable to extricate Provera, was forced

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to retire, although he thereby increased his distance from Beaulieu. Availing himself of the night to repass the Tanaro, he gained the bridges over the Corsaglio, and selected a position on the left bank of that river, at its confluence with the Tanaro. Upon retreating from Ceva, he strengthened the garrison of that fortress, but was not able to bring off the artillery from his camp, his expulsion from which spread consternation among the provincial authorities, and alarmed the court of Turin. In this affair of Ceva the Sardinians, besides their killed and wounded, lost four hundred prisoners.

Serrurier, already on the left bank of the Tanaro and reenforced by the impatient cavalry of Stengel, pursued closely in the rear of Colli. Bonaparte placed himself with this division and established his head quarters at the castle of Lesogno, situated near the right bank of the Corsaglio and its point of junction with the Tanaro. Massena who had passed the Tanaro lower down, now formed the centre of the line, and leaving a rearguard at the bridge of Ceva in order to observe the garrison and to maintain a communication with Victor's brigade at Cairo,

directed his march for the general's head quarters. Augereau, on the right moved down the east bank of the Tanaro in the direction of Castellino; Beyrand's brigade forming his rear; Ruscas escorting the captured artillery; and Joubert's thrown upon the left, in order, by finding a bridge or effecting a passage below the mouth of the Corsaglio, to keep open a communication with the other divisions and to assist in the attack on Colli.

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In the angle formed by the two rivers there was sharp fighting between the French light troops and the rear of the Sardinians. On the 19th, Serrurier forced the passage of the Corsaglio, at the bridge of St. Michel, and, after taking several pieces of artillery, established the brigade Fiorella in that village. But his troops, who, in consequence of continual movements for several days, had received no rations, dispersed themselves in quest of food, and in this situation were suddenly attacked by Colli's rear guard, and driven, with loss and disorder, out of the village and over the bridge. On the same day, Augereau, with Joubert's brigade, reached the bank of the Tanaro, a deep and rapid stream, which here aug-

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mented by the Corsaglio, and cleaving its way through clustered hills, presented in alternate opposition steep and shelving banks, which admitted only a long and diagonal passage. Parties of the enemy, who were drawn up on the left bank, had destroyed the bridge. Nevertheless, in order to make a diversion in favour of Serrurier, an effort was made to gain the opposite shore. Joubert, although lately wounded, urged his horse into the river, and, taking an oblique direction, succeeded in landing with a small party. But the current was found too strong and deep for the grenadiers, and Augereau was therefore compelled to recall Joubert, and withdraw his brigade out of reach of the enemy's fire. The 21st, the rear of Massena's division having come up to Lesogno, preparations were made for forcing a passage of the Corsaglio at several points. Serurier forming the left, was directed to ascend the stream, and crossing at the bridge of Torre, to fall upon Colli's right flank, while Massena was to effect a passage at the bridge of St. Michel, in the face of the enemy's batteries. The general in chief, with part of Massena's division, and

with Joubert's brigade, was to cross by a ford above, and a hastily constructed bridge below, the confluence of the rivers. Colli, though hoping for support from Beaulieu, was intimidated by these preparations, and withdrew from his positions on the bank of the river, to more elevated and contracted ground immediately under Mondovi, where, if disappointed in receiving reinforcements, he might have time to fortify himself, and to remove the ample magazines of that important town. But, on the 22d, while he was thus employed, the French, whose passage of the river had been accelerated by being unopposed, came upon him. Serrurier who led the pursuit, first came into action, assailing the enemy's centre with the brigades Dommartin and Fiorella, while the brigade of Guyeux attacked his right. At the same time the columns of the commander in chief and Massena were gaining his left flank. Strengthened by several redoubts, Colli resisted manfully. In the centre Dommartin was at first repulsed by the exertions and gallantry of general Dichat, but being supported by Serrurier with Fiorella's brigade, the attack

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was renewed with vigour. In this conflict, in which general Dichat was mortally wounded, the struggle was severe, and the slaughter dreadful. Serrurier, however, succeeded in carrying the principal redoubt which covered the Sardinian centre. His success decided the action. General Colli finding his centre thus exposed, and that Guyeux who had driven in his right was on the point of entering Mondovi, ordered a retreat behind the Ellero, a movement which soon degenerated into flight. He lost three thousand men killed and wounded, fifteen hundred prisoners, among whom were three generals, eight pieces of cannon, and eleven stand of colours. In addition, the fortified town of Mondovi, with its artillery and magazines, was surrendered to the victor.

As the weight of this battle had been sustained by Serrurier, it resulted that all the divisions and each commander, had proved their courage and conduct in this short campaign, of ten days and incessant action; Massena and Laharpe at Montebotte and Dego; Augereau at Millesimo, and Serrurier at Mondovi. Notwithstanding

ing the roughness of the ground, it appears that the general's aide-de-camp Murat, made a successful charge with the 20th regiment of dragoons.

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General Stengel, a brave and accomplished officer, had omitted no opportunity of securing horses and mounting his troops, so that as the army between Montezemoto and the Corsaglio was reaching suitable ground, he had thrown his cavalry occasionally in front, and was eager to compete with the infantry in service and glory. On the retreat of the Sardinians from Mondovi he pursued them ardently beyond the Ellero, and attacked a superior body of Colli's horse. In the charge, which was not successful, the French were repulsed by the queen's regiment of dragoons, and Stengel surrounded and killed. The brave Murat, rallied the broken squadrons, and putting himself foremost in a desperate charge, routed the Sardinians and renewed the pursuit. Bonaparte deeply regretted the loss of Stengel, in whose character he said were united, besides various accomplishments, the fire of youth and the judgment of age. His death was owing probably to his defect of vision, his breast being

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The French general, neither stopped by resistance, nor delayed by success, advanced rapidly upon the traces of Colli, and directly towards the heart of Piedmont. Serrurier on the left pursued in the line of the enemy's retreat, by the road of Brealongo upon Fossano, from which town situated on the left bank of the Stura, after a sharp cannonade with Sardinian guns, he compelled Colli to retire. Bonaparte in the centre with Massena's division, marched down the left bank of the Tanaro, and took possession of Cherasco, a fortified place between the Stura and the Tanaro, and immediately at their confluence. Down the right bank of the latter river, Augereau led his division by the way of Dogliano and Novetta to Alba, an important town on the Tanaro, about fifteen miles below Cherasco. By keeping Augereau on the right bank, while the faculty of supporting Laharpe in case of an attempt on the part of Beaulieu to overwhelm him by numbers, was maintained, a larger space

for collecting provisions for the army was commanded, and the necessity avoided of conveying heavy artillery across a river without bridges. These movements were so expeditious and well regulated that Serurier entered Fossano, Massena's division took possession of Cherasco, and Augereau made himself master of Alba, all on the 25th of April.

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Thus in a fortnight after the commencement of active operations, the republican general, having defeated numbers doubling his own, reduced the Austrians to inaction and the Sardinians to despair, and left the exterior fortresses of Coni and Ceva far behind him, had established his army in three strong positions, embracing eight leagues of an important water course, in the centre of Piedmont and within thirty miles of its capital. (27)

Meanwhile Beaulieu, who had received from Colli and the Sardinian court, urgent solicitations for assistance, marched from Acqui with a part of his force to Nizza de la Paglia, in a direction tending to support Colli, who had fallen back behind the Po to Carignano, ten miles in front of Turin.

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Counteracting this movement, which was too late and indecisive to be useful, Laharpe left his position on the upper Belbo, and drew down to Niella with a view of keeping in front of Beaulieu, and in closer connection with the right of Augereau. At the same time, as intercourse between the rear of the army and Savona had ceased in consequence of the shorter line of communication, from Garessio and Oneille to Nice, being now in possession of the French, general Victor was directed to break up from Cairo and join Laharpe. Orders were likewise sent to generals Dallemagne and Macquart, who had remained in their positions on the extreme left, with a few skeletons of battalions, destined to guard the Col de Tende and maintain a connection with the army of the Alps, to advance into Piedmont and in conjunction with one of Serrurier's brigades, to invest Coni. To give further security to his position, as well as to increase his power of annihilating the resistance of Sardinia, and carrying on the campaign against Beaulieu, Bonaparte requested general Kellerman to send forward to his support the right wing

of the army of the Alps, which was now likely to be unemployed.

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Cherasco, where his head quarters were established, though a fortified town, being remote from the frontiers, was indifferently armed and provided. But its magazines contained a great quantity of artillery, and no time was lost in putting it in a state of defence. After this was effected, the main body of Massena's division was advanced in the direction of Turin as far as the little town of Bra, five miles in front of Cherasco, and but fifteen from general Colli's camp.

Thus posted, the French general seemed to be prepared to strike the last blow at the Sardinian monarchy, and with the aid of the disaffected population around him, to overwhelm the king himself in its ruins.

As early as the day after the battle of Mondovi, general Colli had proposed a cessation of hostilities, in the hope of suspending the tempest, which, powerless from defeat and unsheltered by Beaulieu, he felt unable to withstand. The court of Turin, alarmed at the loss of their intrenched camp at Ceva, had furnished the occasion, by send-

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ing plenipotentiaries to Genoa, to open negotiations with the French agents under the mediation of Spain; which court, since the treaty of Bâle in July, 1795, was the chosen intercessor for the worsted coalitionists. Colli proposed an armistice, to continue until the result of these negotiations should be known. Bonaparte, though inexperienced in diplomacy, was too sagacious not to discover in the nakedness of this proposition, an indirect appeal to his mercy; in other words, an application prompted by the helplessness and trepidation of the Sardinian monarch. These he determined to turn to account; not for the sake of wresting exorbitant concessions from Victor Amadeus, but for the purpose of weakening the power of Austria in Italy, which was the great object of the campaign. His answer to general Colli, considered as a piece of diplomacy is remarkable for being perfectly void of finesse or duplicity; and regarded in reference to his situation as a victorious commander, is commendable for delicacy and moderation. (28) He replied that the directory had reserved to itself the power of making peace; that consequently the commissioners of the

king of Sardinia would be under the necessity of proceeding to Paris, or of waiting at Genoa for the arrival of French plenipotentiaries; that considering the relative situation of the two armies, a simple and unconditional cessation of hostilities was out of the question; and that although as a private individual, he had reason to believe the French government would consent to peace on terms honourable to the king of Sardinia, he could not on the mere presumption, suspend the progress of his army. But he added, that if the king would surrender to him two of the three fortresses, Alexandria, Coni, and Tortona, he would agree to the desired suspension of arms. By this fair and direct proceeding he consulted the main object of the campaign, and the safety of his army, without humiliating the court of Turin, or appearing to remember either its characteristic duplicity, or its concern in the occupation of Toulon. With these conditions Victor Amadeus, in spite of the intrigues and instances of the Austrian and English envoys and partizans, complied without hesitation; and on the 28th of April, the armistice of which they formed the basis, and

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In conformity with the terms finally agreed upon, by virtue of which the king of Sardinia engaged to separate himself totally from the coalition, and to discontinue harbouring French emigrants of all ranks; Coni and Tortona, with the artillery and magazines appertaining to them, were surrendered to the French; a line of demarcation between the two armies, coinciding with the limits of their actual possessions, was defined; Ceva, situated greatly within that of the French, was evacuated by the Piedmontese garrison; military routes affording a direct communication with France were established; the Sardinian militia disbanded; and the Sardinian army disseminated among various and remote stations, so as to relieve the French, of old acquainted with the faithless character of the court of Turin, from apprehensions of annoyance in their rear. It was also stipulated, at the instance of Bonaparte, that Valenza, a fortified town on the Po, above the mouth of the Tanaro, and in the direct route from Cherasco towards

Milan, should be evacuated by Beaulieu's Neapolitan troops, and surrendered to the French general, to be held by him until he should have effected the passage of the former river. This article, though apparently of secondary importance, had great influence on the succeeding operations.

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Murat, colonel of cavalry and first aide de camp of the commander in chief, was despatched to Paris to deliver to the directory, with a copy of the armistice, twenty-one stand of colours, trophies of the victories which had led to it; a mode of announcement as novel as the exploits themselves were then unrivalled. The aide de camp Junot, had been sent from Mellisimo with a report of that important battle, but being obliged to pass by Savona, and along the route of the *Corniche*, Murat, who crossed the Alps at Mont Cenis and travelled post from Turin, reached Paris before him, and produced consequently greater sensation and rejoicing in the capital. The legislative bodies of the new government, which at its birth in the previous autumn, Bonaparte had protected from the fury of domestic factions, were now occupied in solemnizing

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his triumphs over foreign foes. Repeatedly during one week in April, they decreed that the army of Italy had deserved well of their country. It need scarcely be mentioned, that the victories thus celebrated bear the immortal names of Montenotte, Millesimo, Dego, Ceva, and Mondovi.

It is worthy of remark, that the despatch of Bonaparte, announcing the armistice of Cherasco, was dated precisely one month after his first report from the head quarters at Nice. (30)

The French general remained at Cherasco only three days after the signature of the armistice. During this time, besides attending to the execution of its conditions, he was employed in providing subsistence for his troops, and in repressing the habits of plunder into which they had relapsed. The rapidity of their movements since the 11th of April, the scarcity of money, the insufficient transport and mountainous country, had rendered it impracticable to furnish a regular supply of rations. The consequence was, that the men, after fighting all day for their country, had at night to plunder for food. This, of course, was attended always with

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waste, sometimes with license and cruelty. To the reproaches of their officers they answered, that their behaviour was better than their fare, and to threats they opposed indifference or defiance. This state of things was productive of numerous complaints from the field officers to the generals, and from these to the commander in chief. General Laharpe's correspondence teems with indignation at the conduct of the men, with rage at the failure of the contractors, and with an inconsistent anxiety to punish both. The letters of the generals exhibit a situation of affairs, which under any other commander of the age, would have led to mutiny sooner than to conquest. In a letter of the 7th of April, general Rusca says, "I have but few cartouches at Bardinetto. You must forward a supply of them, as well as rations of brandy, the troops being in bivouac without blankets or shoes, and the cold is severe." On the 14th Massena wrote, "My troops have received no bread, and I know not whether any can be found in the rear at Vado." Serrurier the same day, "There are no provisions in the magazines of Ormea and Garessio; we live from hand to mouth."

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And Laharpe also on the 14th, "In spite of your promises, general, the troops are still without bread. They sink from fatigue and inanition; send us, at least, a little bread and brandy, for I fear proving a prophet of ill; yet, if we are attacked to-morrow, the men will behave badly for the want of physical strength." On the morrow they had to fight the battle of Dego. The 17th Augereau wrote, "I learn, by an order of the day, that shoes are to be served out to the divisions of generals Massena and Laharpe. But no mention is made of my division, which is in great want. I beg you to send me as soon as possible, a supply of shoes, of which I stand in need. Provisions destined for my division are received with difficulty." On the 20th, Laharpe, after reiterating his complaints and declaring that the 69th had received but two rations and a half in a week, concludes, "bread, bread, and again bread." On the 22d, this brave officer, whose troops, left in the exhausted country on the Belbo, were exposed to the greatest suffering, thus expressed himself, "The soldiers are culpable, but those who expose them to the necessity of dying of hunger, or

of living by pillage, are much more so. In the name of humanity, in the name of that liberty which they are assassinating, come to our relief. Send us wherewithal to support our wretched existence, without committing crimes. Who would have believed that the brave troops of the army of Italy, would be rewarded with the cruel alternative of dying with famine, or living as brigands."

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These disorders, so grievous in themselves, and so dangerous in their consequences, Bonaparte saw might be alleviated by the laws of discipline, but could be corrected effectually only by the removal of their cause. While, therefore, he denounced punishment against those who should transgress the rules of subordination, or seize without authority the property of the inhabitants, he refused to sanction, except in one or two cases of excessive aggravation, the infliction of capital punishment; using at the same time, his utmost exertions to stimulate the activity of the contractors, and to expedite the conveyance and delivery of provisions. For this object, as well as for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Austrians had completed the evacuation of Vol-

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tri and might not repeat the surprise of Dego, general Cervoni was sent, after the battle of the 15th to Savona, with directions to see that the supplies for the army were forwarded, without unnecessary delay or consumption at that depot. This considerate tenderness of Bonaparte for his troops, whose irregularities were more than compensated by their sufferings and their services, was displeasing to some of his officers. Two field officers tendered their resignations, and the brave general Laharpe, in whose character there appears to have existed that sort of restlessness and inconsistency, which a keen susceptibility and an impatient temper are apt to beget, addressed to the general in chief the following letter: "The extravagant disorder to which the troops give themselves up, and to which no remedy can be applied, *since the authority to shoot a rogue is refused us*, hurries us to our ruin, covers us with disgrace, and prepares for us the most cruel reverses. The firmness of my character not permitting me to look on these outrages, much less to tolerate them, the only part left for me is to retire; and, therefore, I beg of you, general, to

accept my resignation, and to send an officer to take the command with which I am entrusted, preferring rather to cultivate the earth for bread, than to remain at the head of a rabble who are worse than the ancient Vandals."

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It is needless to observe that this letter neither altered the conduct of Bonaparte, nor the position of Laharpe, although it exemplifies the degree of embarrassment to which, from this source of suffering and disorder, the former was exposed. (31)

However, the halt made at Cherasco, the armistice concluded there, and the establishment of direct routes of transportation between France and Piedmont, soon enabled the general to apply an effectual remedy to these distressing inconveniences; that is, to remove their cause. The troops being furnished with abundant food, ceased to plunder, and returned under the influence of military rules and subordination, which afterwards, were strictly enforced. (32) Volunteers from the depots, and convalescents from the hospitals, attracted by news of victory and plenty, made their way to his camp and repaired the losses which hi

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victories had cost. Sixty pieces of artillery were put in order for service, and by adding to the horses taken from the enemy, those which with the consent of the government of Sardinia, were purchased in Piedmont, the greater part of the troopers were mounted; so that the condition of the army of Italy became worthy of its spirit and prowess.

At Cherasco Bonaparte was visited by the minister and the son of the king of Sardinia, who expressed, and probably felt great admiration for the young conqueror. The delicacy and good faith of his proceedings in relation to the execution of the terms of the armistice; and his forbearance to countenance the revolutionary projects of the inhabitants in the province within which his principal force was encamped, gave peculiar satisfaction to the court of Turin, and made their military misfortunes less painful. His moderation in this instance was the more remarkable, as it was in opposition to the counsels of some of his generals, and to the letter of his instructions. (33)

It will not escape the reader's observation that this was not the only point in regard to

which Bonaparte had deviated from the instructions of the directory. Instead of acting principally against the Austrians, he had directed his force chiefly against the Sardinians. Instead of penetrating to the right towards Tortona; he had advanced to the left upon Turin. And in place of refusing an armistice, he had granted one. This line of conduct, although it argued a fearlessness of responsibility, and a generous disdain like that of Alexander, *to steal a victory*, may at first view appear insubordinate and unwarrantable. To this conclusion however are opposed, the contradictory nature of the instructions themselves, the effectual manner in which had been accomplished the success of the French arms, and more than all, the consideration, that in every position in which Bonaparte had been previously employed, his ability to serve his country, had been proved to transcend the limits of his authority. At Toulon, though only a chief of battalion, with the sanction of Gasparin and the acquiescence of Dugommier, he commanded the siege. In the campaign of 1794, with the approbation of the deputies, though he was only a brigadier general, he directed the

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operations of general Dumerbion and his whole army. At Paris in 1795, in the presence and with the applause of the convention, he treated their commander in chief and their commissaries as mere nullities, while he defended themselves against the insurgents. So that if he exceeded his instructions in the campaign of Montenotte, he had usurped command in the insurrection of Vendemaire, in the campaign of Saorgio, and at the siege of Toulon. On each of these occasions he had overflowed the ordinary channels of duty with a flood of courage, patriotism, and talent; and on all of them, an exuberance of public good had sprung from his excess of authority. Hitherto this prodigality of service, had been accepted by the government as the bounty of genius; nor were the directory in the present instance, so unjust as to adopt a new rule of construction, and pronounce his conduct to be the encroachment of ambition. (34)


At this time, as neither the settled animosity of factions nor the organized enmity of governments, had breathed malignant slanders on Bonaparte's name, his character and exploits commanded the admiration of

all Europe. (35) And having as we have seen, in the short space of fifteen days, shaken and upheld one kingdom, humbled and spared one monarch, established the subsistence, renovated the discipline, equipped the cavalry, supplied the artillery, recruited the strength, and fortified the rear of his army, he resolved to carry the war into the heart of Lombardy; and single handed, (36) to brave the utmost might of that imperial house, whose hatred was destined to be an instrument of his elevation, and whose love, to be a cause of his downfall. (37)

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APPENDIX.



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CHAPTER I.

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(1) From the manner in which sir Walter Scott records this cardinal event in his story, one might infer that his hero was a foundling—for instead of establishing the date of his birth by positive affirmation or undeniable proof, he settles it by a vague circumstantial conjecture (v. iii, p. 6). “The subject of our narrative was born, according to the best accounts and his own belief, in the town of Ajaccio, upon the 15th day of August, 1769.” This hesitating, circuitous language, which might be proper to remove doubts concerning a remote or uncertain event, is evidently calculated to inspire them, when applied to a fact of recent occurrence, signal notoriety, and infinite attestation. How can the birth of any man, public or private, in the second half of the 18th century, be better determined, than Napoleon’s was, at the time the author of *Waverley* condescended to adjust it by a scale of loose probabilities; in the face of Napoleon’s own statement, and in reach of the testimony of his mother,

his uncle, and of the evidence afforded by the domestic chronology of a numerous family?

Polybius insists on the importance of fixing with clearness and precision the commencement of an historical narrative, a precept which common sense, and common practice confirms. As sir Walter Scott has left a name in literature, more illustrious than that of Polybius, the reader may be curious to learn his motive, for employing terms on this occasion, which have the singular property of suggesting doubts which the author himself did not entertain, and upon a subject, in regard to which, certainty was not only desirable, but in truth almost unavoidable. That he could entertain no doubt on the subject is evident, not only from its universal notoriety, but from the fact that he had before him and referred to Benson's *Sketches of Corsica*, in which (p. 3) the record of Napoleon's baptism, stating that he was born on the 15th of August, 1769, is given *for the declared purpose of clearing up all doubt*.

In the *Quarterly Review* for October, 1814, is an article headed, "*Memoirs of Buonaparte's deposition*," in which, among other points of invective and schemes of detraction, a violent, though not a vigorous, effort is made, to prove that Napoleon had falsified the date of his birth, his name, and the names of his family. This article was ascribed by the voice of literary rumour, to a distinguished and obsequious place-holder under the British government, a prolific if not a powerful contributor to the

review in question. Of its temper and language the following passage will give the reader a just idea.

“It is worth recording as characteristic of Buonaparte and consistent with his whole course of life, that he *falsified* the date of his birth, his own Christian and family names, and the names of his wife and of all his family.

“He chose to call himself *Napoléon Bonaparte*, and to fix his birth day on the *15th August, 1769*.

“His real names are *Napolioné Buonaparté*, and he was born on the *5th February, 1768*.

“The change of name was evidently for the purpose of making it somewhat *French*; and it was not till his appointment to the army of Italy, that he made this alteration. Barras, in his official account of the affair of the 13th Vendémiaire, 5th October, 1796, calls him, ‘le général Buonaporté,’ probably a misprint for Buonaparte; and in the contract of marriage between him and his first wife, still existing in the registry of the second arrondissement of Paris, dated also in 1796, he is called by the notary, Napolione Bonaparte; but his own signature at the foot of the contract, is written Napolione Buonaparte; and the preamble to this deed states that his baptismal register, then produced, attests that he was born on the 5th February, 1768.

“For the change of date three reasons may be assigned, 1st, that he piqued himself on being the youngest of heroes, and was not sorry to strike a year and a half from his real age; 2d, Corsica was not annexed to France till June, 1769, and

therefore to make himself a Frenchman, he was obliged to choose a date subsequent to this period; 3d, the 15th August was, in the French calendar, the day on which a vow of Louis XIII, putting his kingdom under the protection of the Virgin, was celebrated, and it therefore appeared a fit birth day for the saviour of France, as Buonaparte called himself, and a convenient niche for the new patron saint Napoleon.

“From the same contract of marriage it seems that Josephine’s real names were Marie – Joseph – Rose.

“The names of the rest of the family, as they appear in the act of guardianship made on their father’s death, and now remaining in the archives of the chambre des comptes, are as follows, Joseph, Napolione, Lucciano, Luigi, Girolamo, Mariana, Carletta, Annonciada; in the last three persons, our readers would have some difficulty in recognising their imperial highnesses the Princesses Elise and Pauline, and her majesty Queen Caroline of Naples; but even this change did not satisfy him, for latterly, his court calendar announced these ladies as Marie-Elise, Marie-Pauline, and Marie-Caroline; and even his old mother Letzia was new christened Marie Letitia.

“The story of Napoleon’s having been baptized *Nicholas* is therefore not true; though at the college of Brienne he may have substituted this familiar name for his foreign one of Napoleon.”

The folly and falsehood of this effusion, are too

obvious and contemptible for serious notice or exposure. The empress wrote her name *Josephine*, when she was madame de Beauharnais, as may be seen, in her 'Letters to her Daughter,' found in the collection published by F. Didot. In composition, *Josephine* was curtailed of its last syllable, as Marie Joseph-Rose. In regard to *Napolione* (Italian) and *Napoléon* (French) their difference is imputable clearly to the two languages, as *Las Casas* (Spanish) has become *Las Cases* (French), and *Henry* (English) is *Henri* (French). Every body but the Quarterly reviewer it seems, knew that *Buonaparte* and *Buonarotti*, and similar Italian names, were written with or without the *u*, at pleasure. This learned person seems also to have been ignorant, that *Lucciano*, *Luiggi*, *Girolamo*, etc., in Italian, are equivalent to *Lucien*, *Louis*, *Jerôme*, etc., in French. But the mother of Napoleon, a woman, who independently of the wonderful man she gave to the world, or of the eventful story of her life, is respected for all the virtues of her sex, venerable and venerated for her age, happened to have two names, Marie Letitia (as may be seen in the baptismal register of her son, published by Benson) a circumstance so offensive and outrageous to the Quarterly reviewer, that he asserts, "even his *old mother Letzia* was new christened Marie-Letitia." One might apprehend, that some caged hyena, hungry for human flesh, had been inspired with the art of writing!

The Quarterly Review was considered a vehicle

of demi-official wishes and opinions; and the author of this execrable diatribe, was of course less the dispenser of literary fame, than the organ of ministerial and royal sentiments. This last consideration it is well known, Sir Walter Scott was not the rude and rebellious person to disregard. In these circumstances may be discovered the influence to which the great Scotch Novelist was *booing*, and the associations to which he winked, upon setting out to escort the mighty name of Napoleon to posterity.

That this Caledonian courtesy was altogether different from mere French politeness, and exhibited a perfect consistency between the deportment and design of the author, is evident from a previous passage of his work. In his preliminary history of the French revolution, where he is describing the irruption of the populace, into the palace of Versailles on the night of the 5th and 6th October, and the narrow escape of the queen from their fury, he goes out of his way in order to sooth and gratify legitimate ears by imputing to the hero of his book a gross falsehood, before he has even announced his birth, name, or parentage. In a note (v. i, p. 201) referring to a remark made by Napoleon near thirty years subsequently to the period of which he was writing, Sir Walter Scott observes:—"One of the most accredited calumnies against the unfortunate Marie Antoinette pretends, that she was on this occasion surprised in the arms of a paramour. Buonaparte is said to have mentioned this as a fact, upon the authority of Madame Cam-

pan. We have now Madame Campan's own account, describing the conduct of the queen on this dreadful occasion as that of a heroine, and totally excluding the possibility of the pretended anecdote. But let it be farther considered, under what circumstances the queen was placed,—at two in the morning, retired to a privacy liable to be interrupted (as it was) not only by the irruption of the furious banditti who surrounded the palace, demanding her life, but by the entrance of the king, or of others, in whom circumstances might have rendered the intrusion duty ; and let it then be judged whether the danger of the moment and the risk of discovery, would not have prevented Messalina herself from choosing such a time for an assignation." The sex, the beauty, and the fate of Marie Antoinette, command for her memory the respectful indulgence of generous minds. But could these considerations justify the Author of Waverley, in endeavouring to forestall the equity of his readers, by creating an impression that the man, to the study of whose character he was professing to conduct them, had made a false assertion in order to propagate a cruel slander ? Unfortunately for the memory of Marie Antoinette and for the Author of Waverley, he sustains this imputation by a course of reasoning, which leads to a conclusion precisely opposed to the consequence he aims at. He argues, first, that considering the firmness of mind displayed by the queen on this occasion, it is absurd to suppose she would have permitted the caresses of a paramour

that night. The inference, however, is obviously the other way, inasmuch as had she been greatly oppressed with fear, an access of love would have been improbable. He next argues that from the circumstances of the moment, the liability to interruption from the populace, or from the king, or, in consequence of danger, from others, it is impossible to conceive that she would then have consented to an assignation. Now the circumstances of the moment, so far from bearing this terrific aspect, were according to Sir Walter's own account on the previous page, the most favourable that could be to the alleged interview, as they were of a character to exclude the apprehension of disturbance. La Fayette had arrived with the civic guard from Paris, and after addressing the mob, having an audience of the king, and "pledging himself to the national assembly, for the safety of the royal family, and the tranquillity of the night," had retired to rest under the sincere conviction, that there was not the least danger of an attack on the palace. Was there then any thing in the appearance of these circumstances, to deter the queen from an assignation? Her previous display of fortitude is not inconsistent with the anecdote, for the mind, after contending with stern emotions, is not unwilling to repose on those of a different description. With respect to the authority of Madame Campan, which is so vaguely and bravely referred to, she says (t. ii, p. 77) that the queen on going to bed, "directed her attendants to go to bed likewise, thinking there would be no

danger, that night at least." So that Marie Antoinette was not apprehensive of interruption from the populace, nor inclined to admit it from her ladies in waiting. As to the king, Madame Campan has commemorated too faithfully his unnatural coldness (t. i, pp. 60, 88) and his almost incurable torpor (p. 186), to render the anecdote repeated by Napoleon, improbable, or the circumstance it records, inexcusable. Besides, according to his version, the Count de Fersen, well known before as the queen's favourite, had arrived at Versailles only that evening (O'Meara, v. ii, p. 172), when, though she might not have been disposed to form a new connection, there was nothing to deter the renewal of an old one. It is to be observed farther, that Madame Campan might very well relate an anecdote of the kind verbally, which she would decline publishing in a book; while it is difficult to imagine a motive which would induce Napoleon to invent such a story: and it may be added that as the period of the restoration, under which Madame Campan's Memoirs as well as Sir Walter's work appeared, was not favourable to the development of truth in regard to this question, so the air of Versailles, the *genius loci*, at the time the queen was driven from her bed, was not propitious to royal chastity. The reader cannot fail to perceive that as Sir Walter is on this subject far from questioning the veracity of Madame Campan, or of O'Meara, his laboured imputation was intended to bear exclusively upon the memory of Napoleon. Had there been the least occasion for it

—had the digression into which it is shaped been pertinent in the remotest degree—had Sir Walter been writing the life of Marie Antoinette, this attempt to vindicate her memory, even at the risk of reviving the recollection of her frailties, might have been pardoned in spite of its injurious failure. But when it is obvious, that there was no occasion for it, that it is a violent deviation from his narrative, an excrescence from his subject, it exposes the intention with which his book was written too plainly to admit of doubt or to require demonstration. All that remains is to see how it is executed.

PAGE 3.

(2) It is remarkable that Sir Walter Scott, who is so devoutly respectful to long pedigrees and high birth, should express derision for the undisputed nobility and ancient distinction of the Bonaparte family. Hazlitt, a fierce republican, traces it with careful prolixity, (v. i, pp. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6); Norvins, (v. i, p. 1) with serious succinctness; Lockhart, (v. i, p. 1) with studied diminution; while Scott classes it among minute matters which might be justly regarded (v. i, p. 2) “as trivial and unworthy of notice.” The electors of Hanover, when transferred from a poor German principality to the throne of Great Britain, by accident not by merit, were proud of the former distinction of their family, though the honours of this kind which it could boast, were not higher than those of the sovereign princes of Treviso, or of the Christian emperors of

Constantinople. For the descent of the Bonaparte family see *Mémorial de St. Hélène* (t. i, p. 142 et sequente); *Memoires de la Duchess d'Abrantes* (t. i, ch. 3); *La famille Bonaparte*, par M. Foissy, Avocat; and Zoph's summary of universal history.

PAGE 4.

(3) The early traces of that disparagement which pervades Scott's *Life of Napoleon*, after he fairly reaches his subject, are, as might be expected from so practised and skilful a painter, slight and incidental; disposing the mind of the reader to receive false impressions, rather than attempting directly to convey them. Thus (v. iii, p. 4) it is gently intimated that Napoleon possessed, in common with his father, a sprightly mind and fluency of speech — "possessed a talent for eloquence and a vivacity of intellect which he transmitted to his son,"—an intimation which leaves room for assigning to extraordinary fortune, rather than to transcendent genius, the principal events of his career. In the same style of design, and on the same page, it is observed, that his brother Lucien, who never fought a battle, planned a campaign, prescribed a peace, dictated a law, nor administered a government, "was scarce inferior to Napoleon in talent." A traveller who should say that the gloomy and lumpish hills of Scotland "were scarce inferior" to the Andes, would convey a very inadequate idea of the altitude of Chimborazo. As this over-praise of

Lucien, can scarcely be attributed to Sir Walter's partiality for the Bonaparte family, it must be considered as a sly attempt, to extol one brother, at the expense of the other.

PAGE 5.

(4) That a lady in an advanced state of pregnancy, and surrounded by the calamities of war, to which her husband as a chief of the defeated party was peculiarly exposed, should need the support of prayer, or implore the protection of heaven, can hardly be supposed to proceed from "a good constitution and bold character of mind," as is coarsely affirmed by Sir Walter (v. iii, p. 6). It must have required "a forty-parson-power" of prejudice, or of something worse, to induce an author of his delicacy of feeling and unrivalled power of description — the creator of Rebecca — thus to caricature and debase this noble and touching incident.

"Interea ad templum non æquæ Palladis ibant
Crinibus Iliades passis, peplumque ferebant
Suppliciter tristes."

The benevolent and enlightened Addison recommends to a lady in affliction (Spectator, No. 163.) practices of devotion, as the most effectual and the most *natural* means of relief.

PAGE 6.

(5) This account of the birth of her son, was communicated to me, by the mother of Napoleon herself, at Rome, long before the preparation of this

work was thought of. She expressly contradicted the story about the tapestry of the apartment being ornamented with designs from the Iliad.

PAGE 9.

(6) Madame Mère. In the interview with which I was honoured by this venerable lady in the autumn of 1830, she conversed much about the birth and infancy of her great son; whose full length portrait in his imperial robes, was at the head of the bed on which she was reclining. The portrait of her husband representing a very handsome man was on the right of her bed. Among other particulars she mentioned the extreme fondness and indulgence of Napoleon's father; who often saved his favourite from her correction, and controlled him frequently by threatening to tell her of his disobedience, saying, "Very well, sir, I shall tell your mother, and she will teach you to behave better." She added, as well as I can remember her remark: "This threat usually checked Napoleon; but sometimes I had to switch him well."

PAGE 9.

(7) This fact mentioned to me by Madame Mère, is repeated on her authority in Montbel's notice of the Life of the Duc de Reichstadt (p. 357.)

PAGE 10.

(8) He delivered a speech in that convention, which contained the following noble passage:—

“If, in order to be free, it were only necessary to wish it, all the nations of the earth would be free. But we learn from history that few have enjoyed that blessing, because but few have had the energy, the courage, and the virtue necessary to gain it.” This speech was addressed to a people who had the will, but not the power to be free. The celebrated remark of Lafayette—“To be free it is only necessary to will it,” had reference to nations in different circumstances.

PAGE 11.

(9) Sir Walter Scott's statement of the circumstances under which Napoleon was entered at the school of Brienne, is not only inexact, but is unauthorised, except in so far as it coincides with the slanders prepared, during the war, by English hirelings at Paris; and repeated by historians of the same class in London. He says (v. iii, p. 9) “the Count de Marbeuf interested himself so much in the young Napoleon, as to obtain him an appointment to the Royal military school of Brienne,” and arranges his dates (v. iii, p. 5) so as to ante-date the Corsican deputation three years, and send it to Louis XV, whose life he prolongs to 1776! The narrative in the text is the substance of Napoleon's declaration to Las Cases (Memorial, t. i, pp. 154-5), is confirmed by his conversations with Antomarchi, which are adopted by Hazlitt, and is countenanced by the account of Norvins (v. i, p. 10), while Sir Walter Scott's statement is contradicted or rejected

by every author pretending to respectability, who has written on the subject, except Lockhart, who, defying this body of authority, adopts the distorted story of Sir Walter, even to the extravagance of asserting (v. i, p. 4) that Bonaparte entered the school of Brienne when but seven years of age. Why the patronage of Marbeuf should have been gratuitously interposed by both these authors, is a question, which can hardly be answered, without reference to the first note.

PAGE 15.

(10) The slander noticed in this paragraph, originated in the intercourse of kindness, which subsisted between the families of de Marbeuf and Bonaparte. Napoleon's own positive account of this intercourse, as it was not controverted by Sir Walter Scott, should have been adopted by him; for his neglect of it implies a persuasion, that the declarations of his hero deserved neither to be credited nor contested. But with a looseness which could hardly be admissible in the structure of a fictitious narrative, he destroys all the tendencies of probability, and the relations of cause and effect, composing the substance and aspect of this circumstance. He makes Charles Bonaparte owe his deputation to Versailles to the influence of Marbeuf in Corsica, and represents his judicial appointment as a consequence of this mission; deriving both steps of advancement from the favour of Marbeuf (v. iii, pp. 5 and 9); whereas, Charles Bonaparte received

the judicial appointment before he was deputed to Versailles, and was indebted for both these situations to facts attested by Sir Walter himself; his popularity as a patriot, his eloquence as an advocate, and his consequent consideration among the nobility of the island. This is his own account of Napoleon's father (v. iii, p. 3). "Charles Bonaparte was the principal descendant of this exiled family. He was regularly educated at Pisa, in the study of the law, and is stated to have possessed a very handsome person, a talent for eloquence, and a vivacity of intellect, which he transmitted to his son. He was a patriot also, and a soldier, and assisted in the gallant stand made by Paoli against the French." Had Paoli refrained from emigration, and become reconciled to the French government, it may be readily conceived, without assuming the instrumentality of Marbeuf's influence (admitting he possessed this influence) that Paoli would have been offered the place of deputy of the nobles. In his absence, Charles Bonaparte, his friend, his compatriot, his follower, may be said to have stood in his place. The truth is, that Charles Bonaparte, instead of being indebted to the influence of Marbeuf, actually supported Marbeuf by his influence, as is mentioned in the text, in conformity with the undisputed account of Napoleon himself, with the position of the persons and with the order and character of the events in question. It is remarkable, that the slander which this confusion of misstatements would seem intended to colour,

Sir Walter could not venture to confirm, nor Lockhart to repeat.

PAGE 14.

(11) Bourrienne (t. i, p. 35), an author, whose spirit of detraction and ingratitude, makes his testimony unexceptionable, when favourable to his benefactor.

PAGE 14.

(12) From a fear of multiplying notes unnecessarily, I beg to observe, that the account given in the text, of Napoleon's disposition, conduct, and standing, while at the military schools, is taken from his own consistent statements to Las Cases, O'Meara, and Antomarchi, the authenticated notes and sayings of the professors, and the admissions of Bourrienne, and Sir Walter Scott himself. This last author, however, at the expense of his consistency, takes care to represent Napoleon's reserve, superinduced by circumstances, as the effect of a character naturally cold and unsocial—omitting those causes of pain to his sensibility and offence to his pride, which, for a season, "chilled the genial current of his soul."

PAGE 20.

(13) Sir Walter Scott takes a different view of Napoleon's intellectual character, and seems to think it was fitted for scientific studies and military employments only (v. iii, p. 12); asserting that he never acquired the art "of writing or spelling French with accuracy or correctness"—that "though of Italian origin he had not a decided

taste for the fine arts"— that his "taste leaned to the grotesque and bombastic," and "that his bulletins seldom if ever present those touches of sublimity, which are founded on simplicity and dignity of expression."

The speeches, writings, and laws of Napoleon, prove, that he was as capable of excelling in legislation as in war, and of acquiring elegant attainments, as he was of gaining abstruse knowledge. The temerity of the assertion, that he never "acquired the art of writing or spelling French with correctness," may be estimated by reflecting, that he was educated from the age of ten to that of sixteen, by French instructors, with French companions, and in French society, alone; that he conversed in French only, and that all his compositions, even his letters to his parents, were in French, and were submitted, as Sir Walter Scott himself affirms, to the inspection and correction of a French professor of belles lettres. That at the age of twenty, he was the author of a French essay, which gained a prize of the Academy of Lyons in preference to other French essays; that he wrote a French historical tract which obtained the approbation of the Abbé Raynal, a French author of taste and distinction; that before he was twenty-four years of age, he had composed other popular and admired writings in French; that throughout this susceptible period of life, his constant associates and intimate friends, were French gentlemen and ladies; that he married a French lady; commanded French ar-

mies; negotiated French treaties; governed the French nation; patronised French literature; was a member of the French Institute; and for a series of years, corresponded with his generals and ministers, the agents of other governments or of his own, and the crowned heads of Europe; and read, wrote, and spoke, habitually, for about forty years, in the French language only. If with this education and life, he remained incapable "of writing or spelling the French language with correctness," the fact would constitute a peculiarity, as remarkable, as any circumstance connected with his character; and in that view, should have been carefully and conspicuously set forth by Sir Walter. Whereas, the unceremonious manner in which he introduces and dismisses the strange assertion, shews that he preferred its being believed, to its being examined. Briefly mentioned in the beginning of the third volume, its proof is not attempted until the close of the fifth (p. 426); and this attempt consists only in the production of the copy of an autograph note from Bonaparte to Talleyrand, written, when the former was first consul, and the latter (the public having forgotten as Sir Walter observes — (v. iv, p. 237) his "scandalous" attempt to extort a bribe from the American commissioners), was minister for foreign affairs. The errors of this note, though formally enumerated and emphatically marked, the reader will be surprised to learn, consist precisely of such mechanical lapses in orthography, as are committed every

day in the penmanship of careless or expeditious writers. In a confidential note to his minister, Napoleon it seems, did not take care to finish the words *faites* and *dites* — omitting the final and penultimate letters in each, so as to write, instead of *faites* and *dites*, *fait* and *dit*. This error, grave as it is, might perhaps have shocked the nerves of a pedagogue; but that it can support the great characteristical consequence attached to it, it is difficult to conceive. It was evidently more the fault of the quill, than of the mind, employed in writing the note; and if the author of *Waverley* was resolved to exalt it into matter of historical moment, he should have argued ignorance in the goose, rather than in the consul. If any thing can be more contemptible than his imputation, or ridiculous than his reasoning, it is the figure which he assigns to himself and his fellow labourers in this momentous affair (v. v, p. 425). “This very singular memorandum contains the instructions given by Napoleon to Talleyrand, concerning the manner in which he wished him to receive Lord Whitworth, then about to quit Paris under the immediate prospect of the war again breaking out. He did not trust, it seems, to that accomplished statesman the slightest circumstance of the conference; “although,” as Talleyrand himself observed, as he gave to the Duke of Wellington the interesting document, in Napoleon’s own handwriting, “if I could be trusted with any thing, it must have been the mode of receiving and negotiating with an ambassador.”

The prince of diplomatists, is so dexterous as to discover, that Napoleon failed on a certain occasion, to dot his *i* s and cross his *t* s, and amazes the hero of Waterloo by proof of the important fact. This, the confounded chieftain, divulges to the author of Waverley, who employs that genius, which had led captive the taste of nations, in reporting it to the world! These personages might have recollected that the letters of Napoleon's signature were often imperfect. Could it be thence inferred, that he had never "acquired the art of writing or spelling *his name* with accuracy or correctness?" They might also have referred to what he told O'Meara. "April 30, 1817. He observed that formerly he had sometimes been in the habit of writing only half or three quarters of each word, and running them into each other; that no person except one well acquainted with his manner of writing could read it." Or they might have remembered his observation to Las Cases (Memorial, t. vi, p. 387): "A public man, engaged in great affairs, a minister for instance, cannot and should not write with orthographical correctness. His thoughts outstrip his hand; he has time only to throw out signs; he must put a word in a letter and a phrase in a word. To decypher all this is the business of clerks." In the professed romances of Sir Walter Scott, errors of composition not unfrequently occur; yet who would undertake to assert that, born on the wrong side of the Tweed, "he had never acquired the art of writing English with accuracy or correctness?"

It is clear that in this business, Talleyrand was not the dupe. His diplomatic coolness in propounding the natural question *if he could be trusted with any thing*, is as remarkable as the officious simplicity of Sir Walter in recording it.

The next allegation on this subject imports, that Napoleon “though of Italian origin, had not a decided taste for the fine arts”—as if all persons of Italian extraction were expected to possess a decided taste for the fine arts; even those who happened to be born and bred, who lived and died out of Italy. Are all men of Scotch origin supposed to be gifted with second sight? Or, on the other hand, is it fair to reproach a man with not having that which he could not be expected to possess.

“A taste for the fine arts” may mean either the faculty of producing or of appreciating *chef d’œuvres* in architecture, sculpture, painting, poetry or music. In the first sense, the phrase is inapplicable, as Napoleon never professed nor practised the fine arts; in the second it is untrue, as no other prince of modern times patronized the fine arts with equal taste and munificence. Let him be compared in this respect with his contemporaries—with Francis of Austria, Alexander of Russia, the Louises of France, and the Georges of England; or let the treatment which Talma received be contrasted with that which Sheridan experienced.

After denominating the rich and metaphorical style of Napoleon in his youth, “exaggerated phrases,” Sir Walter complains, that “his bulletins

seldom if ever present those touches of sublimity which depend on dignity and simplicity of expression." This would appear to admit that his bulletins do present frequent examples of sublimity, though seldom if ever of a particular description. But is it common to find "touches of sublimity" of any sort, in the orders, proclamations, or reports of commanding generals—in those for examples of the Dukes of Marlborough, York, or Wellington? It is evident that this entire statement about grammar and taste, would have the merit of being true, if it were completely reversed, that is, if, instead of his actual story, Sir Walter had said—*Although Napoleon had no opportunity in his youth of cultivating a taste for the fine arts, and was engrossed, during the whole of his career, by the toils of war or the cares of government, he was so happily endowed by nature, that he was an excellent judge of the beauties of architecture, painting, poetry, sculpture and music, and patronized their professors with a noble liberality—He had, moreover, such a rich vein of eloquence, that even in his military reports, numerous examples of the sublime occur; some indeed, of those exquisite touches, which depend on dignity and simplicity of expression.* The pains taken to expose these awkward falsifications, will not be thought misapplied, when it is considered that absence of taste in the constitution of a strong character, is almost equivalent to the presence of ferocity. Besides *obsta principiis*, is as sound a maxim in criticism as in medicine.

(14.) Bourrienne (vol. i, p. 40) denies this anecdote, and attempts to discredit it by saying it is dated in 1783, and that Napoleon was then at Brienne, "where certainly he never was in company, especially in the company of ladies." Yet at page 37, he states that in the year 1783 the duke of Orleans and Madame Montesson came to Brienne—that for more than a month the magnificent château of the count de Brienne was "a little Versailles," that brilliant *fêtes* were given in honour of the visit of the prince and Madame Montesson, who, together presided at the examination of the pupils of the royal school—that Napoleon divided with Bourrienne himself the mathematical prizes, and that Madame de Montesson complimented Bourrienne's mother on the frequency of her son's academical triumphs.

Now here was a company of ladies to which Napoleon was admitted. The observation was doubtless made on this occasion, and probably by the Countess de Brienne, of whom Napoleon was a favourite, not the less, for having been recommended to her, as the reader will recollect, by a dignitary of the church and minister of the crown.

The Count de Las Cases also discredits this anecdote (though not on the emperor's authority) and for the same reason which Bourrienne advances; that is, that while at Brienne Napoleon could not have been in the company of ladies. Yet the Count repeats this conversation of Napoleon (t. vii, pp. 127-8). "He talked while in bed of his early years

at Brienne ; of the Duke of Orleans, of Madame de Montesson, whom he remembered to have seen there ; of the family of Nogent, of that of de Brienne, who were connected with the details of his boyhood, etc.” The reasons for denying it being thus ascertained to be unfounded, the anecdote which does not appear to have been the offspring of a malicious purpose, becomes from its existence highly probable, the more so as it is consistent with the energy of Napoleon’s character, the vigour of his judgment, the vivacity of his expressions, and his well known admiration of Turenne, as a commander, a sentiment which at fifteen must have been warmly associated with his professional pride. In his letter to the deputy Buttofaco, one of his first productions, he goes out of his way to speak of Turenne as the greatest of captains, so strong and insuppressible was the admiration he felt for him, and among the last of his dictations at St. Helena is a careful analysis of Turenne’s campaigns.

PAGE 22.

(15) The cause of Napoleon’s early designation for the school of Paris, as explained in the text, is taken from the account repeated by Las Cases (*Mémoires*, t. i, p. 173), in Napoleon’s own words. This account, adopted by Norvins (t. i, p. 14), and by Lockhart (v. i, p. 6), is rejected by Sir Walter Scott, who represents the selection of Napoleon as “a compliment paid to the precocity of

his extraordinary mathematical talent, and the steadiness of his application" (v. iii, p. 14). Admitting that "precocity of talent and steadiness of application" are likely to coexist, it is to be noted that genius and precocity are very different things, and that what is precocious is generally thought shortlived and worthless. Napoleon's talent for mathematical reasoning, and the profoundest logic, is known to have been as lasting as it was strong.

PAGE 22.

(16) With respect to the date of this examination, and consequently the age of Napoleon at the time he left Brienne, an error which seems to have prevailed, is corrected in the text. Las Cases, on his authority says (t. i, p. 174) the examination took place in 1783—and that he was designated by the Chevalier de Keralio for the school of Paris, "although *perhaps* he was not of the requisite age." Now the customary age was 15—and it is *certain* that he could only have been 14 in 1783. So that it is probable Napoleon made a mistake of one year in referring by memory in 1815, to this remote event. This inference is strengthened by two documents quoted at length by Bourrienne; one, the report of M. de Keralio to the king on the result of Napoleon's examination, which is dated in 1784 (v. i, p. 28) the other, the register of the principal of the school of Brienne, stating that Napoleon was born the 15th of August, 1769—"entered the school of Brienne the 23d of April, 1779, and left it the 14th of October, 1784."

Again, as the examination was annual, and as the Chevalier de Keralio rejected the proposal of the professors to detain him another year at Brienne; his examination could not have been a year earlier than his departure from the school. It would appear, therefore, that he was examined a little before he was fifteen, and that he entered the school of Paris shortly after the commencement of his sixteenth year, viz. in October, 1784.

Since writing the above I have conversed with the Count d'Hedouville, who was himself an *élève* of the military school of Paris, as well as a comrade of Napoleon in the regiment of Grenoble. The Count confirms this correction of the date, by the assertion that he left the school of Paris in 1784, and that Napoleon entered it at the time he, the Count, quitted it.

PAGE 25.

(17) "Stimulated by the enthusiasm of military genius to take part in the war in which Great Britain was then engaged, he had pressed so earnestly to enter into the navy, that, at the age of fifteen, a midshipman's warrant was obtained for him. The interference of a timid and affectionate mother deferred the commencement and changed the direction of his military career." (Marshal's Life of Washington, 2nd ed. ; v. i, p. 2.)

PAGE 24.

(18). The 24th February, 1785.

PAGE 30.

(19) It appears that he was examined in August, and commissioned in September. It may be proper to mention that the story referred to, but not adopted by Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 15), imputing to Napoleon, while a military student, the quixotic absurdity of attacking a balloon of Blanchard, the aeronaut, with his sword, was false as to Napoleon, but true as to one of his comrades, Dupont de Chambon.—See *Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoléon*, par Arnould (p. 3). This statement about Dupont is confirmed to me by the recollection of the count Las Cases.

CHAPTER II.

PAGE 54.

(1) After mentioning (v. iii, p. 16) that Napoleon was only in his seventeenth year when he entered into society at Valence, Sir Walter Scott adds, that "his manners could scarcely be called elegant, but made up in vivacity and variety of expression, and often in great spirit and energy, for what they wanted in grace and polish." Who, but the author of Waverley, could have ventured to notice, as *a deficiency*, the absence of polish in the manners of a lad of sixteen, fresh from a school of artillery, or could expect him to observe the rules of Chesterfield, and to exhibit that ease which presupposes long acquaintance with fashionable society? In the deportment of so gifted a youth, there was naturally a spirit and a charm which would have been lost in modish ease, and suppressed by formal propriety.

The gravity and emphasis with which Lockhart (vol. i, p. 8) follows up this absurd abnegation are amusing. In the mingled tones of a witness and a judge, this writer disposes of the manners of his hero by declaring definitively that "courtly grace and refinement of manners he never attained." Let us suppose this assertion to be true, would it follow that Napoleon did not attain a manner of

much higher elegance than courtly grace and refinement? The grace called *courtly*, means the grace of a courtier, and this implies a carriage of proud submission towards superiors, and of condescending arrogance towards inferiors, a smooth impertinence of exigence and concession. This mechanical and subordinate grace, which excludes manly independence and refined simplicity, would have been sadly out of place in the deportment of a man who never saw his equal, and whose manners, as the unstudied expression of feeling, intellect, and power, excited in the beholder a degree of pleasure and admiration which would have been apt to make him turn with disgust from an exhibition of "courtly grace and refinement."

Here is already an array of deficiencies, a list of formidable denials, aimed at the memory of Napoleon by his celebrated biographer. "Though of Italian origin, he had not a decided taste for the fine arts." His bulletins seldom contained touches of "simple sublimity of expression." "In his fifteenth year his taste had not become correct," and, in his seventeenth, "his manners could scarcely be called elegant and polished." Would it not have been as instructive and equitable in Sir Walter Scott to proclaim, that though of Greek descent, Napoleon could not recite the odes of Pindar and Archilochus—that all his battles were not as great as those of Austerlitz and Wagram—that in his fifteenth year he had not a long beard—and, in his seventeenth, was not married?

PAGE 53.

(2) The Count d'Hedouville takes pleasure in relating testimonies of the warm and effectual kindness which Napoleon, throughout his career, extended to him. Their political sentiments differed when young, one being in favour of a limited constitution, the other of the royal prerogative. D'Hedouville, following out his principles, emigrated. When Napoleon became first consul, he enquired for his former comrade, and learning that he was vegetating in Spain, sent for him. On their first interview he offered to make him one of his aides-de-camp, but observed that, perhaps, as his comrades of Valence were now all generals, he might not like to commence the career of arms so far below his former equals, and offered him a situation in the diplomatic corps. D'Hedouville preferring this latter profession, was immediately attached to the embassy at Rome, and subsequently appointed minister plenipotentiary at Frankfort.

PAGE 41.

(3) The author of *Waverley*, to give a mean and sordid colouring to the early life of his hero, speaking of his residence at Auxonne, says, (v. iii, p. 368), "M. Joly found the fugitive emperor in a naked barrack room." "His brother, Louis, whom he was teaching mathematics, lay on a wretched mattress in an adjoining closet." In answer to which, Louis Bonaparte observes (*Réponse*, p. 28): "This passage contains almost as

many falsehoods as lines. I recollect very well that, on my account, a larger and more commodious apartment was assigned to my brother than to the other officers of his rank. The furniture could not be either better or worse than that of his comrades, because they were all in barracks, and, of course lodged and furnished by the state; I remember that I had a very good chamber and an excellent bed. My brother directed my studies, but I had proper masters, even in literature."

With respect to the accident of Napoleon's being nearly drowned while bathing in the Saône at Auxonne, there is a difference, in regard to some slight particulars, between the relation of it in the text and the recital of the count de Las Cases (t. iii, p. 433). But inasmuch as the count's journal was seized by the governor of St. Helena, before he had written out his notes of various conversations, I have adopted the account of the same incident found in the journal of O'Meara (v. ii, p. 227) and confirmed by the recollection of Louis Bonaparte (Réponse p. 127). It happens to be in more decided contradiction to the story on the same subject introduced by Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 18), who with dramatic dexterity, transposes the accident to the city of Lyons and the river Rhone.

"Modo me Thebis, modo poscit Athenis."

PAGE 42.

(4) For this anecdote I am indebted to count d'Hedouville. In the Mémoires of Napoleon (Monthon t. ii, p. 207) it is said that he was made

captain in 1789. This is an error either of himself or his amanuensis, as the army list of the period shows that in 1789 he was a lieutenant. Count d'Hedouville says he joined the regiment of Grenoble as lieutenant. Las Cases (t. i, p. 224) dates his promotion to a captaincy in February 1792, as does Norvins (t. i, p. 22).

PAGE 46.

(5) The decided inclination of Napoleon to the popular side in the revolution, as mentioned in the text, an inclination natural to his youth, his independent and enterprising character, and his favourite studies, is attributed by Sir Walter Scott principally to the circumstance (v. iii, p. 17) of his being "a friendless stranger and adventurer," or in Lockhart's imitation (v. i, p. 6) "this poor solitary alien." It is not easy to conceive that a young French officer, who had been educated in a national military school of France; had there distinguished himself above all his comrades; had since been the object of applause, caresses and promotion; and who counted among his friends Paoli and Raynal, could have considered himself while on the French soil, and in the French army, "a friendless stranger and adventurer." If this was the case the French army must have been, for the most part, composed of strangers, adventurers, and "poor solitary aliens." But this is not the only absurdity, into which on this subject Sir Walter is drawn, by his eager spirit of misrepresentation and

disparagement; for in order to colour the insinuation that it was a selfish necessity, not a liberal choice, which made Napoleon a patriot in the revolution, a statement, which the latter made at St. Helena in reference to this period of his life, is thus distorted by Sir Walter both in its language and its date. "Were I a general officer," he is alleged to have said, "I would have adhered to the king, being a subaltern I joined the patriots." Now his real words, as they are recited in the text, and as they were uttered at St. Helena about thirty years subsequently to the time alluded to, are these, "had I been a general officer I might have adhered to the king; a young lieutenant, I sided with the revolution," not so much describing the motives under which he did act, as exemplifying, by a hypothetical reference to his own case, those which probably operated on others; and so far, extenuating the error of individuals, who pursued a line of conduct opposite to his own. His biographer, however, gives his language a direct and particular meaning instead of a conditional and general one, altering its terms and transposing its date, so as to convey the impression, that Napoleon, instead of acting from that principle and enthusiasm which became his character and suited his age, was by his own confession, influenced by personal interest and selfish calculations.

The interpretation here given to his expressions, is not only borne out by the terms themselves, but corresponds with the uniform tenor of his sentiments and conduct, in regard to emigration. His

elevation to the head of the government, opened the arms of France to her wandering children. In conversation with Las Cases on the voyage to St. Helena, he said (*Mémorial*, t. i, p. 294): "And for myself, can I affirm, notwithstanding my natural opinions, that there might not have been a train of circumstances which would have induced me to emigrate—the vicinity of the frontier, the ties of friendship, the influence of a commander, etc. In a revolution, one can only be positive as to what one has already done; but it would not be wise to affirm that one might not have pursued very different conduct. And on this subject," adds Las Cases, "he cited a singular instance of the influence of chance on the destinies of men. Serrurier and the younger d'Hedouville set off together to emigrate into Spain. A patrol fell in with them. D'Hedouville, younger and more active than his companion, passed the frontier, thinking himself very fortunate, and pursued his way to vegetate in Spain. Serrurier, obliged to retrace his steps into France, and quite in despair, became a marshal."

PAGE 48.

(6) This interesting anecdote, which shows the unbounded confidence which the young Napoleon inspired in his own family, Sir Walter Scott disregards, though he took the trouble to pervert the saying which is noticed above. Louis Bonaparte in his reply to Sir Walter (p. 9) in alluding to the ascendancy of Napoleon in his family, says, "I feel

myself obliged to declare here, as the brother of the emperor Napoleon, that it was in his own family that he began to exhibit that great superiority; not after glory and power had elevated him, but in his early youth."

PAGE 49.

(7) This fact is stated in a memorial addressed by Charles Bonaparte to marshal Ségur, minister of war, applying for a place for a younger son, in one of the royal military schools. The memorial is recited in Bourrienne (t. i, p. 20).

PAGE 51.

(8) This plain interpretation of Napoleon's sentiments, founded on his general disposition and his situation at the time, did not occur, it would seem, to Sir Walter Scott, who resolves the language he alleges him to have used, into a sort of innate contempt of the people — a feeling, perfectly at variance with the well known character of Napoleon, and with all the great events of his life. But this contempt, though eminently aristocratical, and therefore entitled to the respect of that order, and to the homage of its idolater himself, he proceeds to represent as not very earnest, exclaiming (v. iii, p. 19) "how different would his feelings have been had a seer whispered to him, that on the ruins of the throne which the people were demolishing, his own imperial seat was to be erected." This is certainly more like "demonology and witchcraft"

than history. It is at least the first time a man's character has been arraigned, for what he might have done in a case, which, without supernatural means, could not occur. But Sir Walter, as anxious to avert praise as to apply censure, employs in his service, when facts cannot be found, misstatement or hypothesis, following the ancient rule of malice—

“Flectere si nequeo Superos, Acheronta movebo.”

PAGE 36.

(9) This statement is derived from Bourrienne, who with a modesty truly heroic, intimates that by rights, he ought to have been the great man, instead of his friend (v. i, p. 36). He further represents (p. 49) Napoleon in such destitution, while he was at Paris in 1792, that he himself though not rich, had frequently to pay for his dinners. Even if this were the case, the account was so soon balanced, that these items might have been forgotten. But there is every probability against the assertion of Bourrienne, exclusively of his notorious bad faith. Bonaparte was a captain of artillery, and was in the receipt of full pay. He was the head of his mother's family, and could have got money from home, had he needed it. He was by all accounts, destitute neither of prudence nor of pride. The subject is noticed, not on account of any peculiar importance attached to it, but for the sake of truth only. For the same reason, I advert to the interesting Memoirs of the Dutchess d'Abrantes, in which Napoleon is described, while

at the military school of Paris, as suffering under a sense of dependence, and impatient of the civilities offered him by madame de Permon, the friend of his mother, because the family of that lady was more prosperous than his own. It is also intimated in the same entertaining work, that being himself an *élève* of the royal military school of Paris, he looked with chagrin and envy at the superior advantages of young Permon, who lived in the society of his parents, and the comforts of home.

It is universally admitted that Napoleon had a decided taste for the profession of arms; it is known that he was transferred from Brienne to Paris under flattering circumstances; and that he was so much distinguished for genius and attainments, as to have attracted the notice of the Abbé Raynal. His uncle, the archdeacon, was living at the time referred to by the dutchess, and the fortune of his family, though impaired, was independent. It is not likely that in this state of things, his self-love would have suggested a painful comparison, between the subordinate luxury of a family in the capital, with the modest circumstances of his mother in a distant province; or that the most distinguished military student of the chief school of the kingdom, would envy the lot of a young gentleman, who was himself unknown, and whose family was confessedly neither opulent nor powerful.

The statements here noticed, are the substance

of a dialogue of full three pages (*Mémoires de la Duchesse d'Abrantes* (t. i, pp. 78, 79, 80, 81), between M. and Madame de Permon, and their son, a dialogue which would appear to be repeated *verbatim*. The dutchess says (p. 29) she was born the 6th of November, 1784, at Montpellier, and came to Paris, or to use her own words (p. 69), "*We* came to Paris in 1785," and that her mother made immediate enquiries about Napoleon Bonaparte who was (p. 76.) "then at the military school of Paris." Now as Napoleon, left the military school of Paris to join his regiment, in September or October, 1785, the dutchess could not have been quite twelve months old, when these conversations are said to have been held. If they were intrinsically probable therefore, if they were not, from various particulars which they contain, incompatible with the well known regulations of the military school, they could not be received as authentic, especially as they are not of a nature to authorize the supposition, that such remarks as they consist of, would have been recorded at the time by the interlocutors.

PAGE 38.

(10) The sketch here given of Paoli's Anglo-insurrectionary proceedings, is a summary of statements found in Benson's *Sketches of Corsica* (section 2), and in the *Mémoires de Napoléon* (t. IV. ch. 16.)

PAGE 60.

(11) This saying of Paoli is recorded variously, as addressed directly to Napoleon himself, and as addressed to others respecting him. It was no doubt used both ways. I have adopted that version of it which seems most emphatic, and from the circumstances under which it occurred, most memorable. It is found in Antomarchi (t. i, p. 197) repeated from the dictation of Napoleon, precisely as I have given it. Las Cases, Montholon, Norvins, Hazlitt, and even Lockhart, concur in one thing respecting it, in representing Paoli as impressed upon personal acquaintance, with the great and heroic qualities of Napoleon, the firmness of his principles, and the energy of his character. But the manner in which the great novelist contrives to *nullify* this dangerous praise of a personage, who, according to his account, was in his youth chiefly remarkable for “precocity of mathematical talent and steadiness of application,” is worthy of especial notice (v. iii, p. 15). “Plutarch was his favourite author, upon the study of whom he had so modelled his opinions and habits, of thought, that Paoli afterwards pronounced him a young man of an antique cast, and resembling one of the classical heroes.” Thus, it appears, that a young man of precocious mathematical talent and steady application, may by closely studying Plutarch, cause himself to be esteemed, by eminent and experienced persons, equal in excellence to a classi-

cal hero; and that the statesman and warrior Paoli was entrapped by this sort of imitation, into the admiration of a were bookworm. Yet this absurdity is hazarded, for the purpose of emasculating the anecdote referred to, a device, the success of which, while it would deprive the character of Napoleon of all essential force, and intrinsic dignity, would take from that of Paoli, the faculty of common penetration.

PAGE 63.

(12) The conduct of Paoli in the French revolution cannot be justified. After resisting the forced incorporation of Corsica with France, he had a perfect right to acquiesce in it as Charles Bonaparte did, or to abjure it, as he himself for a time did. But he had no right, after accepting the amnesty held out by the law of the national assembly, and accepting also at the hands of the French government, an appointment of high trust and honour, to renounce his allegiance to France, and to dismember the republic, by delivering up the province committed to his superintendence, to a rival and hostile nation. He had sanctioned the annexation of Corsica with France, in the most solemn and binding manner; and if he was justifiable in transferring Corsica to England, the authorities of any other province of France, would have been blameless, had they committed the same act. Yet more flagrant treason than they would have committed, can hardly be conceived. From respect for Paoli's general character, his

conduct has been treated with indulgence even by French authors, and in that spirit, is noticed in the text. Sir Walter Scott extols it as nobly contrasted with the conduct of that portion of the Corsicans, who continued faithful to their allegiance, and really appears to esteem perjury and treason in favour of England, the first and highest duties of a French citizen. Alluding to this part of Paoli's history, he holds the following language (v. iii, p. 19). "He was desirous of establishing that freedom which is the protector not the destroyer of property, and which confers practical happiness instead of theoretical perfection." "In a word he endeavoured to keep Corsica from the prevailing infection of jacobinism, and in reward he was denounced in the assembly." "The infection of jacobinism," in Corsica consisted simply in the ascendancy of the revolutionary government, and this it was the object of Paoli to prevent. Now we learn from Sir Walter himself (v. i, p. 68), that one of the main grievances that occasioned the revolution, was the fact that the people had no security whatever for their persons or their property. "They had no national representation of any kind, and but for the slender barrier offered by the courts of justice or parliaments as they were called, were subject to unlimited exactions on the sole authority of the sovereign. *The property of the nation therefore was at the disposal of the crown*, which might increase the taxes to any amount, and cause them to be paid by force, if force was necessary. *The personal freedom of*

the citizen was equally exposed to aggressions by 'lettres de cachet.' The French people, in short, *had neither in the strict sense, liberty nor property.*" So that Paoli in order to "preserve the property and practical happiness" of his countrymen, endeavoured to prevent the success of measures, taken for the overthrow of a government, which deprived them of both liberty and property. And, by way of convincing the world of his sincere and tender regard for these blessings, seized on the person of a confiding friend, and confiscated the property of an amiable widow and eight children, the relict and offspring of his departed fellow soldier. This was his exemplification of the rights of property and security of person, as opposed to "the infection of jacobinism, and theoretical perfection."

But "the infection of jacobinism," may be limited, to mean the excesses of the French revolution. Yet Paoli had deliberately and solemnly made himself a French citizen. Had he a right to dismember his country, and throw himself and the province under his charge, into the grasp of its most powerful and inveterate foe, on account of certain excesses or errors, not affecting himself or his friends, in the existing parties or actual ministry? If he had, it is plain that Pichegru and Arnold, instead of being foul and blotted traitors, were spotless and uncorrupted patriots; and O'Connell would be justified on account of long misrule, and of a late and acknowledged act of oppression on the part of the British government, in

separating Ireland from Great Britain, and in placing that island under the dominion of France, in case of war between the two nations. Further, upon Sir Walter Scott's principles, when Louis XIV was endeavouring to force the Pretender upon the people of England, the officers employed by the British government, ought not only to have betrayed their country to France, but counted on receiving reward and applause for so doing. The spirit disclosed by Sir Walter in the passage here considered, will be found to pervade his entire work. It should be kept in mind that the aim of Paoli was not to establish the independence of his country, but to transfer its dependence from France to England, from a catholic to a protestant government.

In the Appendix to the third volume of Scott's Life of Napoleon (p. 364), it is mentioned that Pozzo di Borgo, who joined the English, was instrumental in procuring Paoli's mock decree of banishment against Napoleon, and that owing to the vindictive temper of the latter, Pozzo di Borgo was chased from country to country, as the arms and influence of France overspread the continent. The truth appears to be, that Pozzo di Borgo, in the cases comprehended in this statement, stood in the predicament of a French citizen, serving or abetting a foreign power at war with France, and felt himself, as such, liable to be punished for treason, if he fell into the power of France, whether she was governed by the convention, the directory, the consul, or the emperor; a liability from which,

his only chance of escape, would have been found in the clemency of Napoleon. He very naturally kept out of the way of his own countrymen, as Dumouriez and Pichegru did likewise. Can it be supposed that had Arnold been observed to retire modestly, at the approach of general Washington and his army, his retreat would have been referred to by an impartial historian as proof, not of his consciousness of guilt, but of the "strong love of revenge," the unforgiving and vindictive temper of the American commander, supposing general Washington to have thought himself personally wronged by Arnold?

In a strain quite exulting and equally rational, Sir Walter proceeds—"But the fate of these two early acquaintances seemed strongly contrasted and interwoven. As Napoleon began to lose ground, the fortunes of his relative appeared to advance, and honours and emoluments dropped upon him, in proportion to Napoleon's descent from eminence." The true ground of contrast between them and their honours, consists, it must be allowed, in the difference between the friend and the enemy of his country. In proportion as France was agonized and humbled under the blows of the holy alliance, the fortune of Napoleon declined, and that of Pozzo di Borgo advanced, his "honours and emoluments" being unhappily derived from the calamities of the land which gave him birth, and the people who gave him honours. For Pozzo di Borgo was a member of the French

legislature. As to his alleged relationship to Napoleon, the following account of its foundation and character, is found in O'Meara's *Voice from St. Helena*. "January, 6th. 1817. Cipriani informed me that Pozzo di Borgo was the son of a shepherd in Corsica, who used to bring eggs, milk, and butter to the Bonaparte family. Being a smart boy, he was noticed by Madame Mère, who paid for his schooling. Afterwards, through the interest of the family, he was chosen deputy to the legislative body, as their sons were too young to be elected. He returned to Corsica as *procuratore generale*, (or public prosecutor) where he united himself with Peraldi, an implacable enemy of the Bonapartes, and consequently became one himself." We have here the exemplification of Æop's fable, of the serpent warmed on the husbandman's hearth. Cipriani was a Corsican, and maître d'hôtel of the emperor, a situation of confidence and respectability. He died at St. Helena, and he is described by O'Meara as a man of talent and merit. His account of the Russian ambassador has not been contradicted as far as I know. Louis Bonaparte confirms his denial of the relationship of Pozzo di Borgo with the Bonaparte family (*Réponse*, p. 26). He says also, that there was no decree of banishment, and that Joseph, not Lucien was with his brother in Corsica, Lucien being at Marseilles with Semonville, who had been appointed ambassador to Constantinople. The decree of banishment, could have been nothing more than an

order or threat of Paoli. But such as it was, it is mentioned, emphatically by Norvins (t. i, p. 26); and as Louis Bonaparte was very young at the time, I have thought his denial not equivalent to Norvin's assertion and the probability of the fact.

PAGE 64.

(13) Benson's sketches of Corsica (p. 5). The account here given is adopted by Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 21), though he omits the material incident of Bonaparte's eloquent and successful appeal to the Corsicans, probably, because it would not have squared with the bad taste, bombastic and exaggerated phrases, which he before (p. 13) declares, characterized his effusions.

PAGE 65.

(14) This statement is in direct contradiction with the following assertion of Sir Walter Scott (p. 22). "Napoleon does not appear to have regarded Corsica with any feeling of affection."

All readers of English poetry will remember and few be unwilling to repeat, the stanza in the "Lay of the Last Minstrel," beginning—

"Breathes there the man with soul so dead,
"Who never to himself hath said,
"This is my own my native land?"—

And ending—

"If such there breathe, go, mark him well,
"For him no minstrel raptures swell,
"High though his titles, proud his name,
"Boundless his wealth as wish can claim;

“ Despite his titles, power and pelf,
“ The *wretch* concentrated all in self:
“ Living, shall forfeit fair renown,
“ And, doubly dying, shall go down
“ To the vile earth from whence he sprung,
“ Unwept, unhonoured, and unsung.”

This *wretch* thus devoted to abhorrence and oblivion, Sir Walter Scott affirms his hero to have been, in a work professing to preserve, for distant posterity, a record of his actions and a portrait of his character. And this he does not only against all probability, but in defiance of evidence of the strongest description, and staring him in the face. He has himself stated that a few months before the birth of Napoleon, Corsica was by conquest incorporated (v. iii, p. 23) with the kingdom of France. He has also stated (p. 367) that when Napoleon was in his twenty-third year and only a lieutenant of artillery, he composed a work “ which might form two volumes, on the civil, political and military history of Corsica.” Putting these two facts together, let us enquire what motive other than affection for Corsica, and respect for the heroic struggles of her sons for independence, can be supposed to have prompted Napoleon’s undertaking, or to have directed the choice of his subject. In addition we learn from Sir Walter (v. iii, ch. 7) that Napoleon while engaged in the heat and pressure of his Italian campaign *contributed* (as Sir Walter has it) to wresting his native island from the possession of England, and reannexing it to France; that

notwithstanding the great events which engaged his attention, the short continuance, contested tenure, and sudden termination of his power; notwithstanding all this, we learn from Sir Walter Scott, that he had a marble fountain constructed at Ajaccio, more for the comfort of the inhabitants, than the embellishment of the town. Besides, as was known to Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 224), among the latest efforts of his mind when oppressed by disease, insult, exile, and restraint, is an admirable geographical and historical notice of Corsica; and his conversations with Antomarchi, also known to Sir Walter, are replete with expressions of affection for his birth place. How then, can it be said with the least possible regard for truth, that Napoleon was destitute of affection for the place of his birth, a sentiment by the way, common to men, strongest in those of the strongest character, and claimed by Sir Walter, truly no doubt, for himself?

George the third was his contemporary. This "gracious king" "was in fact very near being born an alien," both his parents being native Germans. He placed "his affection for his birth place" above all question, not by writing its history, nor by rescuing it from foreign domination, nor by designs nor monuments of utility or munificence; but by declaring a fact which every body knew, and effecting a repetition which would have been as meritorious in a parrot as a prince. The mi-

nisters of England advised him to say to his subjects that he was "born a Briton," and the whole British nation was thrown into transports of loyal gratitude and delight! Yet Napoleon, had he condescended to repeat the assertion of a mere physical fact; or to catch at vulgar applause by reflecting on his fathers before him, might have proclaimed to France — "Born a Frenchman, I glory in the name."

But Sir Walter asserts not only that Napoleon was regardless of Corsica, but that Corsica was regardless of him; and this double edged imputation he attempts to reconcile with verisimilitude, by affirming it to be natural. His language on this occasion, exemplifies so clearly the ease, with which, under the sanction of his great name, absurd conjectures and ridiculous contradictions, could be circulated in place of attested facts and consistent inferences, that it deserves attentive examination (v. iii, p. 22). "Napoleon never again revisited Corsica, nor does he appear to have regarded it with any feelings of affection." This sentence is composed of two affirmations; the first positive, the second conjectural, and both unfounded. As to the first, we learn from Bourrienne (t. iii, ch. 2) that on his return from Egypt Napoleon landed at Ajaccio, and was received by the inhabitants with the warmest attachment and admiration; that he remained there eight days in consequence of unfavourable winds, and manifested for his birth

place a remarkable degree of affection. Bourrienne's words are, "He was overwhelmed with incessant visits, compliments and solicitations; the whole town was in motion; every body insisted on being his cousin, and from the prodigious number of god-children who came to pay their respects to their god-father, one might have supposed that Bonaparte had held one-fourth of the children of Ajaccio at the baptismal font. He walked out with us very often in the environs of Ajaccio, and took as much pleasure in pointing out to us the small domains of his ancestors, as he ever afterwards felt while in the zenith of his power, in numbering his crowns."

Lavalette, another eye witness of this visit, says (*Mémoires du comte Lavalette*, t. i, p. 336): "We arrived at Ajaccio. This little town was the birth place of the general in chief. He had left it eight (six) years before when only a captain of artillery. At the sight of his native town his breast was fondly affected. As we were direct from Egypt where the plague prevailed, we had not clean bills of health; and of course could not be allowed to land. The inhabitants surprised at seeing the admiral's flag at our main, hurried down in crowds to the shore. But when they learned the presence of their illustrious countryman, his relations and friends sprang into the boats, threw themselves aboard the ship, and soon broke the quarantine. In this, however, there was little actual inconvenience,

since after a passage of forty days, we had not a single man on the sick list. In one of the boats which crowded under the poop of the vessel, an old woman dressed in black stood up and stretched out her hands towards the general, crying out 'my dear son!' for some time, without being able to catch his attention. At length he discovered her, and instantly called out in return, 'Mother!' It was his nurse."

So much for the assertion of mutual indifference between Napoleon and the people of Corsica, as well as for the repeated declaration (v. iv, p. 133) of his never having visited that island subsequently to his expulsion from it by Paoli and the English in the spring of 1793. But perhaps as neither the *Memoirs of Bourrienne* nor those of *Lavallette* had been published, at the time Sir Walter Scott's work appeared, the references just made may be thought not to render these statements of his inexcusable but only to make them incredible and absurd. Yet Dr. Antomarchi's account of the last moments of Napoleon was not only known to Sir Walter but consulted by him, as appears from his own words, (v. 9, pp. 295-7). "Dr. Antomarchi's account of his last moments, a work in two volumes, though less interesting and showing far less acuteness than that of Las Cases, or of O'Meara, is yet useful and entertaining" and "we beg to refer to Dr. Antomarchi's work, etc." In this work Napoleon himself says (t. i, pp. 221-2): "We arrived

at Ajaccio and anchored in the harbour. The companies of the town, the population, hastened immediately to the landing; all wished to see me. They invited me to land. It was nothing but acclamations. The troops were under arms, but poor fellows, they had neither clothes nor shoes. I asked what was become of their military chest; but they had received not a sous for seven months. The paymaster was in advance to the government, having had to borrow forty thousand francs, which he distributed among them proportionably, in order to procure them subsistence, and to satisfy the tavern keepers who had refused their tables to the officers. I was indignant at this neglect. Collecting all my disposable cash I had their accounts stated and paid; I did not wish their uniform to excite compassion. In the evening there was a ball and illumination. In these demonstrations the poor vied with the rich. Brave people of Ajaccio, never shall I forget their reception of me." In addition to this we have the admission of Sir Walter himself (v. ix, p. 295): "Dr. Antomarchi seems to have been acceptable to Napoleon, and the rather that he was a native of Corsica."

Sir Walter Scott has left behind him the reputation of an amiable man, a pleasing poet, and a great novelist, but does this reputation justify or even excuse this wanton misrepresentation of his hero's affections, or this barefaced attempt to palm upon his readers a story, which he must have known to be untrue?

Thus far his narrative. Let us now examine the conjectures and inferences by which he endeavours less to substantiate than to colour it. "One small fountain at Ajaccio is pointed out as the only ornament which his bounty bestowed on his birth place." Here we recognize that "canny Scot," Andrew Fairservice himself. Because Napoleon did evince his affection for his birth place in a natural and expressive manner, and the fact could not be denied, it is masked by the reproach that this was the only mark, not of his *affection*, which is the matter in controversy, but of his *bounty*. But this is not all. The allusion to the "small fountain," is made by Sir Walter (v. iii, pp. 22-3) on the authority of Benson, to whose *Sketches of Corsica* a very defective reference has been already noticed. On this occasion the mutilation of Benson is still more hazardous. Instead of saying that "one small fountain was the only *ornament* bestowed by Napoleon's *bounty* on Ajaccio," Benson observes (pp. 10-11) "As you quit the town, the first object that presents itself is a little fountain on the left, which *except the pavement of the quay*, is the only *public work* of Bonaparte for the place of his birth." So that the fountain was not pointed put as an *ornament* but as what it was no doubt designed to be, a work of public utility, and never was mentioned as the *only* work of that description, except by Sir Walter Scott himself, who held before his eyes proof that his assertion was false, and his reproach unfounded.

As Ajaccio is a small town, it required, one would think, a small fountain, upon those principles of proportion and good taste in the perception of which Napoleon is affirmed repeatedly, by Sir Walter, to have been deficient. Had he constructed a large fountain, at great cost, for ornament rather than utility, he might have been justly accused of indulging his own vanity at the public expense. But Sir Walter seems to argue that the larger the fountain, the greater the affection. Yet this mode of reasoning would justify the belief, that the larger the book, the greater the truth, an inference which Sir Walter Scott's readers will, no doubt, earnestly protest against. He proceeds, "he might, perhaps, think it impolitic to do anything which might remind the country he ruled that he was not a child of her soil; nay, was, in fact, very near having been born an alien, for Corsica was not united to, or made an integral part of France until June, 1769, a few weeks only before Napoleon's birth." If it be within the limited license of history to substitute conjectures and suppositions for events and reasoning, common sense and common decency undoubtedly require, that these conjectures and suppositions should be natural and consistent. Yet here Napoleon is represented as fearing to bring to recollection a fact which both he and Sir Walter knew never existed, and is supposed to have concealed a sentiment, which, it is just before asserted, he never entertained. With equal boldness of language, and

confusion of thought, it is inferred, that, inasmuch as he was born *after* Corsica became an integral part of France, he felt and acted precisely as if he had been born *before* that event, and knowing himself to be a native of France, must have thought himself an alien ! Again, a reproach on this last point, however idle or ridiculous, he is represented (p. 23) to have felt as a “stigma,” to avoid which, as well as to make the people of France forget the notorious fact of his having been born in Corsica, we are to believe he fell on the expedient of affecting indifference to that island and its inhabitants. The mode in which this “oblivious antidote” was to operate on the memory of the French nation is not stated. Nor is it easy to conceive in what manner such a thought suggested itself to the author of *Waverley*, who knew how tenaciously the people of Great Britain adhered to George I and II, although they “actually were not children of her soil,” and also knew how many of his gibbeted countrymen fed the vultures and tainted the air, for having dared to contest the rights, and resist the rule of those “*aliens*.” The last material in this fabrication is an exact quotation from Benson, the traveller, whose light work has been already referred to. This, it will be observed, as Sir Walter positively and repeatedly asserts that Napoleon never revisited Corsica after he was driven out in 1793, is proceeding upon the plan of finding out a man’s feelings by frequenting a place which he studiously kept aloof from. The

quotation is as follows:—"The Corsicans are still highly patriotic, and possess strong local attachments. In their opinion, contempt for the country of one's birth is never to be redeemed by any other qualities. Napoleon, therefore, certainly was not popular in Corsica, nor is his memory cherished there."

This is a mixture of assertion and inference which the author of "the Lay of the Last Minstrel" should have been careful to disentangle and examine, if he condescended to notice it at all. He might have told his readers that Benson's is a light, hasty, and unpretending work—that he sojourned in the island but six weeks—that his work was at first "intended only as a private memorial of six weeks agreeably passed,"—and that it was swelled into the shape of a book by the English after-thoughts of the author. Besides, in the previous sentence, carefully omitted by Sir Walter, Benson says, that, on Napoleon's "elevation, the Corsicans looked for marks of especial favour, but such hopes were disappointed;" showing that the feelings he observed among them, or supposed he observed, were the effect of this disappointment, and not proofs that the Corsicans reproached Napoleon with want of affection for the place of his birth. Moreover, Benson visited Corsica as a sort of administrator of Paoli's estate in that island, and in the dogstar rage of the Bourbon ascendancy in France. His intercourse was therefore principally maintained with the agents of government, or the partizans of the old English faction in the island,

with the disciples of Pozzo di Borgo or Talleyrand. But, it may be asked, was there no other way for Napoleon to manifest feelings of affection for his native island than that afforded by the erection of large and costly monuments? Were not his benefactions and patronage to individuals demonstrations of attachment equally useful and expressive?

One thing which could neither be denied nor misapprehended, one would think, might have saved Sir Walter from plunging into this confusion of folly and injustice about the Corsicans. It is this broad and substantial fact, that France, instead of being, as he calls it, (p. 24) "the land of Napoleon's adoption," was the country of his birth, education, settlement, and residence; and that Corsica, as a fractional part of it, was benefitted by whatever favours he conferred upon France, while bounties distributed and ornaments erected in Corsica, instead of being marks of affection for the land of his birth, were memorials of regard for the place of his nativity.

The compliment which Sir Walter vouchsafes to "the high-spirited islanders" for resenting Napoleon's alleged indifference, by retaliating it, must appear even more ridiculous than the main body of the fabrication with which it is connected, when the reader recurs to the citations already made from Bourrienne, Lavalette, and Antomarchi, and adverts to the fact, that, at this very moment, the "high-spirited islanders" are strenuously engaged in erecting a monument to his memory.

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(15) "The great and well-earned influence possessed by Paoli over his countrymen became the ground of jealousies." "Towards the end of the year 1795, Paoli was informed that it was his Majesty's pleasure that he should immediately leave the island, and go to England. He did so, and arrived in London towards the end of December." —(Benson's Sketches. p. 118). So that Paoli was banished by the English government, after having banished his friends for their advantage; a retribution at once atrocious and just.

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(16.) Paoli died in England, on the 5th of February, 1807, of course, after the campaigns of Italy, Egypt, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, the close of the consulate, and the commencement of the empire. His manifestations of melancholy delight at the prodigies of his filial friend were not approved, it has been said, by the British government.—(Vide Antomarchi, t. i, p. 197).

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(17) The description of this essay of Napoleon, and the notice taken of the previous productions of his pen in the text, are at variance with the observations respecting them, of Sir Walter Scott, who, adding to the weight of his authority, the force of his contempt, gives but a sad account of the literary efforts of his hero. Of one he intimates,

(v. iii, p. 17) though he had never seen it, that its principles were probably felt as a reproach to its author's practices; thus projecting a shade of undefined and unfounded censure over the tract of his succeeding narration; of another, that it was fortunately not executed; thus pronouncing sentence on it though unborn, and affirming, by gratuitous implication, Napoleon's incompetency; and of a third, (the supper of Beaucaire) after an erroneous and unvouched summary of it, alleging that it excited its author's shame so painfully (v. iii, p. 30) that he caused the copies to be collected and destroyed with the utmost rigour. Before these bold and empty assertions issued from the press, it appears that this production, thus rigorously destroyed, rose like a phoenix from its ashes, and satisfied Sir Walter Scott that his account of it required correction; (appendix, v. iii, pp. 364-7) that, instead of being what he had declared it to be "a jacobin pamphlet," it was an essay inculcating submission to the acts and officers of government; that Marat was not, as he had asserted, one of the interlocutors, and that the essay contained no sentiment which could affect an honest man or a good citizen with self-reproach. Disappointed, but not disheartened, the author of *Waverley*, on this admitted alteration of his facts, finds an equivalent, if not identical imputation; as if the confusion arising from a blunder was to be relieved by perpetrating an injustice. This imputation imports, that although not stung by self-re-

proach on looking over his pamphlet, Napoleon was so disgusted with "the colour of his vizard," which he had assumed for the purpose of allaying the violence of a civil war while a foreign war was raging, that he called in and destroyed every copy that could be found, one only escaping, from which, unfortunately for the congruity of the body and appendix of Sir Walter Scott's work, though not for its bulk, the essay was reprinted. "The colour of his vizard," we learn, (v. iii, p. 367) "was the assumed character of a jacobin, with the friendly intention of convincing the girondists that they were choosing an unfit time for insurrection." This, be it observed, is imputing to Napoleon the scheme of recommending himself as a friend to the girondists, by assuming the character of their terrible and mortal foe; a device in the art of persuasion which was not practised by Demosthenes, nor inculcated by Quintilian. We also learn from Sir Walter, that the soldier in the dialogue is Bonaparte himself, that his essay was "free from all the exaggerated and cant language of the day, no mention of liberty, equality, or fraternity of the rights of man, no abstract discussion of political principles." He then goes on with a degree of hardihood that Rob Roy himself never equalled: "Notwithstanding, therefore, what is said in the text, from erroneous information of the nature of this publication, there is nothing in it (that is, nothing in what is said about the work in the text) inconsistent with Napoleon's own account of the origin

of the work, that it was written under the assumed character of a jacobin, with the friendly intention of convincing the girondists that they were choosing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner." Now, let us see what is said in the text about this work (v. iii, p. 30): "Napoleon had shewn that his own opinions were formed on the model of the times by a small jacobin publication called "Le Souper de Beaucaire," a political dialogue between Marat and a federalist, in which the latter is overwhelmed and silenced by the arguments and eloquence of the friend of the people." "It is whimsical to observe, that, in the manuscripts of St. Helena, he mentions this publication as one in which he assumed the mask of jacobin principles, merely to convince the girondists and royalists that they were chusing an unfit time for insurrection, and attempting it in a hopeless manner." Now, between these statements, he alleges in the appendix, there is no inconsistency, the first asserting that the jacobin opinions of Marat were those which Napoleon really entertained, and the second that he had merely assumed the language of a jacobin, the better to convince the insurgents that they were chusing an unfit time for their attempt. Would it not be as rational to say, *Notwithstanding that I told you yesterday that two and two make four, there is no inconsistency between what I then said, and what I now say, that two and two make five!* So far was Sir Walter from thinking there was no inconsistency between

these two statements, when he placed them in his text, that he introduced the latter as contrasted with the former, and as justifying an insinuation that it was on that account false. “It is whimsical to observe, etc.,” that is, *it is odd that Napoleon, after having written the ‘Souper de Beaucaire,’ in the genuine spirit of a jacobin, and with such sincere extravagance, that he assumed the vizard of Marat’s name; should have pretended, in the manuscripts of St. Helena, that he never entertained the exaggerated political sentiments of the jacobins, but merely assumed the mask of them for a moment, with the intention of pacifying an insurrection. The pretence is so whimsically false, that it is quite amusing to observe it.* But this is not the only inconsistency between the text and the appendix. In the first Napoleon is ashamed of his work, because it was “a jacobin publication.” In the second it is not a jacobin publication, “nothing can be more inaccurate than to say so” (p. 366): still he is ashamed of his work!

However, at last Sir Walter endeavours to reconcile this inconsistency, by saying that Napoleon himself admits in the St. Helena manuscripts, that he did assume the mask of a jacobin; that he was disgusted at the “colour of his vizard” afterwards, and therefore as Sir Walter asserts, destroyed his work. For this alleged admission of Napoleon, it is to be regretted that he does not make a less vague reference to his authority. In the third volume of

these manuscripts, (Montholon p. xii) this is the account which Napoleon dictated of the origin of his *Souper de Beaucaire*. "During Napoleon's stay at Marseilles near the insurgents, having had an opportunity of observing the feebleness and incoherence of their measures and means, he wrote a small pamphlet, which he published before he left that city. He endeavoured to open the eyes of these madmen, and predicted that their revolt would have no other result, than to give occasion for the men of blood, to sacrifice their leading citizens on the scaffold." Now this so far from being an admission that he had assumed the mask of a jacobin or that he assumed any mask whatever, at any time, shows the reverse, for the jacobins were the men of blood, from whose power and cruelty he was endeavouring to screen the people of Marseilles. This "vizard," therefore, whose colour was so disgusting, never existed, and of course could not have occasioned the rigorous destruction of the pamphlet.

It is easy to conceive that when he had become the ruler of France and the dictator of Europe, he might have desired, from motives founded in the prudence of a statesman and patriot, but not from shame or disgust, to suppress the circulation of this early essay. It contained the affirmation of a military maxim, the soundness of which he had afterwards reason to deny (see *Mémoires de Napoleon*—Montholon—t. v, ch. 9). In the "Supper of Beaucaire" the military speaker says: "It is an

axiom in the military art that an army which remains in its intrenchments is beaten. Theory and experience agree on this point." This dictum, of Fouquet, the emperor would have been unwilling to recommend to his generals; a consideration which alone may be assumed as sufficient to provoke the destruction of the pamphlet. It might have had a tendency to obstruct the fusion of parties upon accomplishing which he was so intent, to awaken painful recollections which had long since subsided, or to cast censure on the memory of men, with whom those around him were connected, and who although they had erred in judgment, were many of them bright examples of virtue and talents. That it contained nothing to be ashamed of, or disgusted with, the pamphlet itself incontestably proves.

It is also easy to conceive, without reference to military opinions or political considerations, that a man of Napoleon's fine taste and matchless genius, after he had performed unrivalled achievements in war, politics, and legislation, was actuated by a feeling very different from shame or self reproach, when he destroyed one of his early fugitive productions, by a discretion or fastidiousness, of which the greatest minds are not *always* destitute. Virgil directed by his will, that the last six books of the Eneid should be burned, because he had not sufficiently revised and polished them. None of his commentators have attributed that sensitiveness to

shame or self reproach, on account of political sentiments in that immortal poem, although it does contain some which deserve reprobation. Johnson says of Pope — “Most of his juvenile productions, were by his maturer judgment afterwards destroyed.” As to Sir Walter himself, his admirers cannot fail to regret, that he was inattentive to these great examples of delicacy and judgment. Had it been otherwise, although his gains might have been less, his fame would have been disembarassed of some of his earlier as well as later productions, and untarnished by the one which we are now considering.

The letter to Buttafoco is given at length in the appendix to the 3d volume of Sir Walter Scott's *Life of Napoleon* with this preface (v. iii, p. 368) “We have preserved the composition entire, because, though the matter be uninteresting, the rough and vivid style of invective is singularly characteristic of the fiery youth, whose bosom one of his teachers compared to a volcano surcharged with molten granite; which it poured forth in torrents, whenever his passions were excited.” The reader will recognize in this sentence a distortion of the fact stated in the first chapter of this work, that the professor of belles lettres at the military school of Paris compared Napoleon's original amplifications to “blocks of granite issuing hot from a volcano.” The anecdote is derived from the Count de Las Cases, who thus relates it (*Memorial*, t. i, pp. 175-6 et 7) “Being myself an *élève* of the military school

of Paris, but a year earlier than Napoleon, I had opportunities of talking about him frequently after my return from emigration, with the masters who had been our common instructors. M. Domairon, our professor of belles lettres, told me that he had always been struck with the originality of Napoleon's amplifications; he had called them from the time Napoleon was at school, *granite heated in a volcano*." Is there the slightest reference here to the "passions" or "bosom" of Napoleon; the least intimation that the former were so fiery as to convert the breast they inhabited into a moral volcano overboiling with ire and fury? Rhetorical amplifications in the theme of a student may indicate the turn of his imagination or the tendency of his taste, but never have yet been supposed to proceed from the rage of his passions. Setting aside the memory of Napoleon, and the obligation of an historian to his readers, it might be supposed that feelings of delicacy and honour would have deterred Sir Walter from putting a calumny, invented by himself, into the mouths of two gentlemen whose hearts he knew must have abhorred it; one being the admiring instructor, the other the faithful friend of Napoleon. From the violence of this departure from truth, the supracumbent *weight* and ever-acting *pressure* of those motives by which the author of Waverley was influenced, may with some degree of accuracy be inferred. To this letter he affixes the date of January in the year 2, which answers to January, 1793, when Napoleon was in Corsica, and

joined Truguet's expedition against Sardinia. The letter itself proves it must have been written before that time, for this among other reasons, that it appeals to Mirabeau as one of the great patriots sitting in the assembly with Buttafoco, and Mirabeau died the 2nd of April 1791. As Lockhart's assertion is the mere echo of Sir Walter Scott's, it may be dismissed as an exploded falsehood. The contradiction between Norvins and Hazlitt, shows that one or the other must be wrong; while an examination of the work itself will prove that neither was right. They consider the pamphlet as a theory of government, written by a politician, whereas it was an argument addressed by an officer of the army engaged in the execution of a special and important duty, to a body of disaffected citizens, for the purpose of dissuading them from impeding the operations of the army to which he was attached, and from resisting the authority of a government, which directed that army against a foreign enemy. That it was no apology for the reign of terror, but an exhortation to a union of arms and councils, for the purpose of reconciling the army and the citizens, and resisting the common foe, a perusal of the dialogue will convince the most sceptical reader. It is wonderful that any one could misapprehend its object, or perceiving it, fail to render the essay unqualified applause.

That Napoleon had this pamphlet destroyed is repeated in the text on the authority of Sir Walter Scott and of Bourrienne, and therefore not posi-

tively. Neither Hazlitt nor Norvins mentions this fact.

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(18) The accounts given by other authors, of the appearance and object of this little work, are various. That dictated by Napoleon himself, as cited in the preceding note, states expressly that he wrote the pamphlet while he was staying at Marseilles, and published it *before he left that town*. Norvins, (t. i, p. 29) asserts that it was *printed* at Avignon by *Sabin Tournal*. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 44) affirms that it was after leaving Marseilles, and on his return to Avignon, that he wrote this pamphlet. The probability is, that it was written and published at Marseilles, and that it was published at Avignon also. In respect to its political character, the opinions of historians are still more discordant. The absurdities and contradictions of Scott have been sufficiently exposed. Lockhart (v. i, p. 15) says it was a pamphlet "in which the politics of the jacobin party were spiritedly supported, and of which he was afterwards so ashamed that he took great pains to suppress it." Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 44-45) represents it as an effort to prevent civil war and bloodshed, and as the beginning of a system of prudence on that subject, which he carried to an extreme that made him as a statesman "hesitating, cautious, and almost pusillanimous." Norvins, on the contrary, regards it as "an apology for the system of terror which then governed France" (t. i, p. 29.)

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(19) It has been alleged that Napoleon proposed after the wedding of his brother, marrying mademoiselle Desirée Clary, but that her father refused his consent saying that "one Bonaparte was enough in the same family." This is doubtless an *invention subsequent*, for at St. Helena, Napoleon denied ever having thought of this marriage (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 181 2). Hazlitt reasserts this story, and imputes to this attachment, his favour to Bernadotte, which proceeded, no doubt, from the well known arts of Bernadotte as a courtier and intriguer, from his connection with Napoleon's family, and from the interest of Joseph, the link of that connection. The vanity which could persuade a lady to imagine that she had once captivated the great conqueror, cannot provoke censure nor excite surprise.

CHAPTER III.

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(1) Thiers, in his history of the French revolution, observes, (t. v, p. 239) that admiral Trogoff who commanded at Toulon, and delivered the place to lord Hood, was a “foreigner whom France had loaded with favours.”

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(2) Extract from “the preliminary Declaration” of lord Hood to the inhabitants of Toulon: “and whenever peace takes place, which I hope and trust will be soon, the port with all the ships in the harbour, and forts of Toulon, shall be restored to France, with the stores of every kind, agreeable to the schedule that may be delivered.”

Extract from the proclamation of lord Hood to the inhabitants in the towns and provinces in the south of France—“Trust your hopes to *the generosity of a loyal and free nation.*”

Extract from the declaration made to lord Hood by the general committee of the sections of Toulon — who “having read the proclamation of admiral lord Hood, commander in chief of his B. M. squadron, together with his preliminary Declaration” — “would have recourse to the generosity of a loyal people, who

have manifested a desire of protecting all true Frenchmen, against the anarchists who wish to ruin them, declare to Lord Hood" — Here follow various conditions upon which the people of Toulon consent to deliver up the place. Of these, the 5th states that "the people of Toulon (are) full of confidence in the generous offers of lord Hood"—and the 8th, "that when peace shall have been reestablished in France, the ships and forts which will be put into the hands of the English, shall be restored to the French nation, in the same state they were in when the inventory was delivered."

Extract from the proclamation of lord Hood on taking possession of Toulon. "I do hereby repeat, what I have already declared to the people of the south of France, that I take possession of Toulon and hold it, in trust only, for Louis XVII, until peace shall be reestablished in France, which I hope and trust will be soon. Given on board H. B. M. ship Victory, off Toulon, the 28th of August 1793."

(Signed.)

"HOOD."

"By command of the admiral."

(Signed.)

"J. MC ARTHUR."

See Annual Register for 1793—State Papers—pp. 171, 2, 5. See also the declaration sent "by H. B. Majesty's command to the commanders of his fleets and armies," dated the 19th of October, 1793, recognising and confirming the agree-

ment which had been entered into with the inhabitants of Toulon. Annual Register for 1793, State papers, p. 199.

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(3) This is the general estimate of La Poype's force. Gourgaud in the *Mémoires de Napoléon* (t. 1, p. 9) states it, I presume by mistake, at four thousand.

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(4) In the Annual Register for 1793 (History of Europe, p. 284), the allied force is estimated at 12,000 men "bearing firelocks." This excludes the cannoneers who must have been employed in great numbers. Thiers (t. 6, p. 49) rates the land troops of the allies at 14 or 15,000. These antagonist accounts appear to confirm the computation of the emperor: viz.—5,000 Spaniards, 4,000 Neapolitans, 3,000 English, and 2,000 Sardinians—in all, 14,000. See *Mémoires de Napoléon*, Montholon (t. 3, p. 8). Sir Walter Scott, as he knew his countrymen were worsted, does not state their numbers.

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(5) Norvins says (t. 1, p. 32), that these ships conveyed 5,000 seamen of Brittany, and that their presence at Toulon was feared by lord Hood. The Annual Register for 1793 mentions that the ships were sent round to Brest, "with the hope of effecting a similar revolt in that quarter."—History of Europe, p. 284.

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(6) Various dates have been assigned for this promotion. Las Cases (t. 1, p. 224) makes it the 19th October, 1793. But in the same volume (p. 194.), he says on the authority of Napoleon, that in September, 1793, he was already a chief of battalion. In Montholon (t. 3, p. 11) Napoleon states that he was chief of battalion before he was appointed for the siege of Toulon. The same statement he repeated to Gourgaud (t. 1, p. 11) which is adopted or confirmed by Norvins (t. 1, p. 33). Scott, with his usual indifference to facts, and contempt of accuracy, asserts (v. 3, p. 30) that on occasion of Napoleon's being ordered to Toulon, he was promoted to the rank of *brigadier general*. Yet, at page 44, after calling him "the young general of artillery," he declares that in conformity with the recommendation of Dugommier, upon the conclusion of the siege, "he was confirmed in his provisional situation of chief of battalion, and appointed to hold that rank in the army of Italy." This is rewarding by injury, and promoting by degradation. Hazlitt on this point is vague and defective.

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(7) This is the object which most writers (and Napoleon himself in his dictation to Gourgaud t. 1, p. 16. among them), assign for concealing the erection and retarding the fire of this bat-

tery. In the dictation to Montholon, however (t. 3, pp. 28, 29), it is said that the fire was not to be opened until the day after Little Gibraltar should be taken, in order by the surprize to increase the confusion of the allies, who according to Napoleon's hypothesis, would be in the act of deliberating on the measures to be taken in consequence of the loss of Little Gibraltar.

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(8) Sir Walter Scott says, this party consisted but of three thousand men (v. 3, p. 37). Norvins (t. 1, p. 40) raises the number to seven thousand. Napoleon in the dictation to Montholon and Gourgaud makes it from six to seven thousand (t. 1, p. 16, and t. 3, p. 29), an estimate the lower number of which is adopted by Hazlitt (v. 1, p. 359), and by Thiers (t. vi, p. 53), authorities which I have followed. The military career of General O'Hara would have been as obscure as his talents were moderate, but for the remarkable fact of his having surrendered to Washington and to Napoleon. The anecdote respecting his sullen dignity in misfortune, is related by Napoleon himself in a letter to Kleber, of the 10th September, 1798. In a letter to the same commander, Napoleon incidentally refers to his first efforts against the allied squadron at Toulon, in terms which shew the remarkable accuracy of the account of the same affair dictated at St. Helena; from which account

that in the text is derived. Encouraging his lieutenant to defend the harbour of Alexandria against an apprehended attack from the victorious Nelson, he says—"With six twenty-four pounders, two furnaces for heating balls, and forty cannoneers, I contended for four days against the English and Spanish squadron, and after burning a frigate and several bomb-ketches, forced them to draw off." (Letter of the 21st August, 1798.)

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(9) In this picturesque language Napoleon himself describes the general under whom he gained his first laurels. Yet, Sir Walter Scott, after denouncing as we have seen, the bad taste and worse French of Napoleon, retails it without ceremony and without acknowledgment, as his own (v. iii, p. 34), although by so doing he deflowers the compliment to Dugommier's memory, of all its grace and spirit.

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(10) This fact rests on the assertion of Napoleon at St.-Helena (Las Cases, t. i, p. 206), evidence, which if it were not convincing, the invidious suppression of his name by these deputies in their despatches, would confirm. They were unjust to him because he would not be ungenerous to Dugommier.

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(11) It is in these terms that Napoleon repre-

sents the conduct of the deputies in his dictation to Gourgaud (t. i, p. 23), and that he repeats it to Montholon (t. iii, p. 35), emphatically and expressly contradicting the statements written at the time of the siege, which described these gentlemen as marching to the assault, at the head of the columns. Sir Walter Scott gives the substance of these opposite accounts to his readers, without adopting either, not unwilling, under the appearance of impartiality, to fix the suspicion of falsehood on Napoleon, and leave the disgrace of poltroonery on the deputies. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 365) and even Lockhart (v. i, p. 20) are more just. Norvins is silent on this point; but what renders its examination proper, is, that Thiers, without referring to authority, and with the air of a person who considered his narration incontestable, ventures to sanction in the most positive language, the statement which Napoleon positively contradicts. These are his words, after describing the assault (t. vi, p. 55): “In this action, general Dugommier, the representatives Salicetti and Robespierre the younger, and the commandant of the artillery, Bonaparte, had been present in the fire, and had inspired the troops with the greatest courage.” This is asserting that Salicetti and Robespierre the younger bore an equal part in the assault with Bonaparte and general Dugommier; an assertion, which, if not intended to destroy the deliberate statement of Napoleon altogether, might imply,

that he and Dugommier came swaggering up, sword in hand to the fort, three hours after it had been been wrested from the enemy. To avoid this absurdity it must be inferred that the historian, designed to convey to the world a downright contradiction of a statement, made by Napoleon respecting a matter of fact, of which the latter was an eye witness, and in regard to which, he could hardly have committed the error thus imputed to him, without falsehood. The only sources of authority to which a writer rejecting the statement of Napoleon would be likely to resort, are first, the despatch of the deputies, Ricord, Fréron, and Robespierre the younger, dated the 28 Frimaire (18 December) 1793; second, the speech of Barrère, delivered in the sitting of the 24 December (14 Nivose) on the occasion of reporting this despatch, in the name of the committee of public safety, to the convention; third, the official report of general Dugommier, dated the 29 Frimaire (19 December); fourth, the relation of the capture of Toulon drawn up by general Marescot, who commanded the engineers of the siege, dated the 9th January, 1794, and published in his compilation by Musset-Pathay in 1806; and fifth, the history of the siege of Toulon found in the voluminous work entitled: "*Victoires et Conquêtes des Français.*" In the first of these documents these three deputies say — "Distributed among the columns, we rallied such of

the troops as were for a moment daunted." They speak of their colleague Barras, as being employed on the other side of the harbour with Lapoype, but make no mention whatever of Salicetti; so that if their own vague and interested account were to be received without abatement, it would not exactly sustain the narrative of Thiers.

Passing from the first to the second document, from the deputies to their colleague the orator; it appears, that in the fervour of rhetoric and exultation, he thus discoursed to the convention. "The representatives of the people marched at the head of the republican columns. Salicetti and Robespierre the younger, with their drawn swords, marshalled the first troops of the republic the road to victory, and mounted to the assault. They set an example of intrepidity. Ricord was also at the head of a column." This besides being a second-hand assertion, is in a style of description too frothy and effervescing for the sobriety of historical truth. Moreover, these deputies were colleagues of the orator as well as of his auditory, and one of them the brother of Robespierre, who then presided in the reign of terror. The *esprit du corps*, the nature of the occasion, and the interest of the orator, all tended to produce exaggeration and praise. Barrère includes the name of Ricord, which Thiers omits, while they both omit that of Fréron, one of the signers of the des-

patch which declares—"distributed among the columns, *we* rallied such of the troops as were for a moment daunted."

In the third document general Dugommier says—"so that, in spite of the obstructions of the weather, our brothers in arms sprang forward in the path of glory, as soon as the order was given. The representatives of the people, Robespierre, Salicetti, Ricord and Fréron were with us; they set an example to our brethren of the most signal devotion." This account it will be observed places Ricord and Fréron on the same ground which Thiers assigns expressly to Robespierre and Salicetti; and from which Barrère excludes Fréron. It makes no mention of Bonaparte whatever; and does not describe the deputies as mounting to the assault; but rather as being with the columns, when the order for the attack was pronounced, and the troops rushed forward to execute it. Considering that the deputies were not expected to lead columns, or share in the danger of storming forts, that something was due from courtesy to their station, that much was conceded from interest to their power, and that there is obvious inconsistency between the affirmation of Thiers and the report of Dugommier, it must be confessed, that the narrative of the historian is not corroborated by the report of the general. Marescot says—"The representatives of the people, the citizens Salicetti, Ricord, Robespierre the

younger, and Fréron were present." But he omits the names of Dugommier and Bonaparte, although he mentions those of Laborde and Victor. His account is therefore far from supporting that of Thiers. Nor does it remove the impression that the presence of the deputies was confined to the moment, when the troops were put in motion. The probability of this having been the fact is increased, when we reflect, that of the five military gentlemen who are mentioned as participating in this arduous conflict—viz, Dugommier, Bonaparte, Muiron, Victor, and Laborde, four were wounded, that is Bonaparte slightly, and Muiron, Victor, and Laborde, severely—whereas of the four citizen soldiers, all escaped untouched. Again, men who would invidiously refuse praise to another, would not scruple to take credit unduly to themselves. Thiers admits (v. 6, p. 51) that the reduction of Toulon was due to "a young officer who commanded the artillery." This young officer is not even mentioned in the despatch of the deputies, and there can be little doubt that the puff of Barrère about the *drawn sword of Salicetti and Robespierre*, was prompted by those deputies themselves. In addition to this we should remember the analogous fact that Fréron and Barras, disavowed their letter, advising the government to raise the siege. (See the *Moniteur* of the 28th December, 1793.)

Nor does the account of this siege in the *Vic-*

toires et Conquêtes, etc. of the French armies, (t. 2, p. 155) justify the narrative of the historian. It is there observed (p. 161) that the commissaires of the convention, Salicetti, Ricord, Robespierre the younger, and Fréron passed through the ranks and animated the soldiers to the attack, making no mention of Bonaparte, no distinction in favour of Salicetti and Robespierre, and leaving untouched the impression that the deputies confined their warlike exertions to words and gestures, and to the moment when the troops were moving to the assault.

Upon the whole, therefore, it appears that this account of Thiers, resting on such unsound and incoherent vouchers, would be liable to suspicion, even if it were uncontested. When opposed to the deliberate and emphatic declaration of Napoleon, as to a matter of fact of which he was an eye witness, it ceases to possess the smallest authority. It may be observed of this author, that his work, admirable as it is, betrays a general disposition to extol or excuse the civil personages of the Revolution.

In justice to Gasparin, it ought to be mentioned, that he had left the army of Toulon before the assault of Little Gibraltar, and was not a party to the injustice, or the boasting of his colleagues.

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(12) Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 39) as-

cribes this bold counsel to lord Hood—and as his statement is substantially confirmed by Napoleon (t. iii. p. 37, Montholon), I have adopted it. It is perfectly inconsistent, however, with the relation of the same affair, in the Annual Register for 1793 (p. 284, History of Europe).

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(13) There are few passages of Sir Walter's work which reveal the spirit in which it was written, more clearly than the following puerile flourish. After describing, much in the style of scenes to be found in Rokeby and Ivanhoe (as if the tawdry costume which suits the stage, might be worn with grace or propriety in private circles), the awful but incomplete conflagration perpetrated at Toulon, and the retreat of the British armament from its calamitous intercourse with French traitors, he adds—"It was upon this night of terror, conflagration, tears and blood, that the star of Napoleon first ascended the horizon; and though it gleamed over many a scene of horror ere it set, it may be doubted whether its light was ever blended with those of one more dreadful." Now so far from this figurative representation being true, the "terror, conflagration and tears," were all on the side of the English and their motly allies; while the star of Napoleon blended its light with success, joy, security, and triumph. Sir Walter Scott had before him the

Memoirs of Napoleon, in which (t. iii, p. 46) it is stated that the French government celebrated the taking of Toulon by a national festival, the first ceremony of the kind which the republic had ordained. He refers also to the files of the *Moniteur* in which the details of this celebration are preserved, and yet he describes this leading triumph of the republic, as a "scene of horror over which the star of Napoleon gleamed."

When Cæsar had exterminated the Nervians in a great battle, pacified Gaul, and intimidated the barbarians beyond the Rhine, the Roman senate were so far from regarding his successes as "scenes of horror," that they decreed a public thanksgiving to the gods, of fifteen days. And the great captain of antiquity, whose "star was then ascending the horizon," so esteemed this national compliment, that he not only recorded it in his memoirs, but carefully mentioned it, as an honor which had never been paid to any other commander. "Ob easque res, ex litteris Cæsaris, dies XV, supplicatio decreta est, quod ante id tempus accidit nulli."

The battle of the Nile was the first of Nelson's great victories. To his enemy it was no doubt a night of "terror, conflagration, tears, and blood." To him it secured the gratitude of his country, and immortal fame. What would the people of England have said, if this fair *conquest* of their hero, had been distorted by metaphorical detraction into "a scene of horror," and de-

precated with sinister regret as a night of "tears and blood."

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(14) Lockhart (v. i, p. 21) says: "Junot became marshal of France." Even he ought to have known better. Junot might have gained a *baton* in 1812 at Valentino.

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(15) That this was the course of public feeling, no one who considers the enormity of the crime committed by the Toulonese, and the advantage taken of it by the English admiral, can doubt, especially after examining the terms of his proclamations, cited in a former note; his attempt, confessed in the Annual Register, to seduce from their allegiance the people of Brest and Rochefort: and the declaration of the king of Great Britain of the 19th October 1793, encouraging other towns of France to follow the example of Toulon. Yet in defiance of this mass of evidence, attesting the insincere and calamitous conduct of the English government in this treason of Toulon, British writers exhaust all their terms of reproach upon the cruelty of the French convention! Sir Walter Scott calls it (v. iii, p. 43) "republican vengeance;" but says nothing about its exciting cause; although he seems to admit, that adequate exertions were not made to retain possession of Toulon, and of course, the power of protecting its guilty inhab

tants. Lockhart (v. i, pp. 19, 20) is more unjust and extravagant; and the Bourbon ascendancy in France, operating as an equivalent to alien feeling, Norvins, who wrote his history under the dominion of the Restoration, talks with as much horror of the reprisals executed by the agents of the convention, as of the dangerous treason which provoked it (t. i, p. 45). And even Hazlitt, after properly observing (v. i, p. 352) that "the excesses of the French revolution, were to be considered, in the circumstances of the time, and from the character of the people, as the natural but deplorable result, of the general and almost frantic spirit of resistance to the threat of subjugation and oppression from without," is so far misled by this clamour, as to denounce more strenuously the stratagem by which the revolutionary tribunals entrapped their victims, than he does either the manner in which the people of Toulon betrayed their country, or that in which they were themselves betrayed (v. i, ch. 7). Yet what bounds would have been set to the indignation of British historians, had a French admiral in the time of Louis XIV, after persuading the people of Portsmouth to deliver into his hands that important station with all its fleets, arsenals and forts, upon the promise of receiving them "in trust only for the Pretender," and restoring them to England at the conclusion of peace between her domestic factions, upon finding himself likely to be driven

out of the place, blown up the forts, burnt down the arsenals, carried off as prizes all the ships he could get away with, and set on fire the rest?

Notwithstanding the reproaches of French writers, it is not to be denied that England and France being at war, the British admiral was justified in availing himself of the offer of the Toulonese to deliver up to him their town, their harbour, and its contents. But it is equally undeniable that he was bound upon every principle of good faith to adhere strictly to the conditions, without consenting to which, he would never have got possession of Toulon. These, as they were understood by the Toulonese, and solemnly repeated by lord Hood himself, imported, that he took possession of Toulon, and “held it *in trust only for Louis XVII*, and that the place and every thing in it were to be restored to the French nation when peace should be reestablished in France.” The object of the trust which he accepted being the interest of Louis XVII, lord Hood should have made the promotion of that interest the main purpose of his conduct, while in the possession of Toulon, and should have acted as if he had been appointed to act by the King of France, and confined his agency strictly within the limits of his trust. It cannot be supposed that Louis XVII, either as claimant or possessor of the French throne, was likely to be benefitted by the destruction of the naval power of France. His comparatively

venial connection with the foreign enemies of France had hurried Louis XVI to the scaffold. It was not probable that delivering up the fleets, forts, and arsenals of France to English possession or English flames, would place his son, who was in the power of the French people, upon the French throne! Yet lord Hood, the trustee of Louis XVII, so disposed of them to lord Hood, the commander of a British squadron. Holding this double character, he assumed one aspect to get possession of the fleet, and acted under the other to destroy or make prize of it. Supposing it be to his intention, and in his power, England and France being still at war, to replace the ships and other public property, at the re-establishment of peace in France, the injury to Louis XVII, in the increased irritation and dislike of the French people was irreparable. But it is alleged by Thiers, that lord Hood, so far from consulting the interest of Louis XVII, or any other interest than that of the British government and his own, prevented the departure of a deputation which the Toulonese proposed sending to the count of Provence, inviting him to repair to Toulon, and there to establish himself as regent of the kingdom; a step which might have been of infinite service to the cause of Louis XVII. If the minutes of the council of war, which fell into the hands of Dugommier are authentic, it would appear that the interest of Louis XVII was not thought of when the destruction of the pub-

lic property of Toulon was determined on. The Spanish government did not conceive that the interest of Spain, any more than that of Louis XVII was likely to be promoted by the conduct of lord Hood. In October, 1795, the king of Spain issued a declaration of war against Great Britain, in which, among other grievances complained of, is a breach of faith at Toulon, on the part of the English commanders, "in destroying all they could not carry off," and thus leaving the naval power of Great Britain in the Mediterranean, unrivalled. In the manifesto of the English government, this reproach is answered by evasion and sophistry, which prove it to be irrefutable. "It is perhaps the first time that it has been imputed as a crime to one of the commanding officers of two powers, acting in alliance, and making a common cause in war, that he did more than his proportion of mischief to the common enemy." This, besides evading the allegation of Spain, is avowing the doctrine that the end justifies the means, that a commander in time of war, is to pay no respect to the laws of humanity, justice, or honour, but is to look only to the utmost degree of mischief to be inflicted on the enemy; and that bad faith or cruelty in one belligerent in a combined armament, casts no disgrace nor responsibility on the other. Upon this principle, the savage tribes of North America, when in alliance with the King of Great Britain, are exempted by him from the restraints

of humanity in war, and the denunciations of that connection, by the great lord Chatham, were misapplied. Lord Hood was a gallant officer, and had many titles to respect, but his conduct at Toulon was far below the dignity of his character and station, greatly unbecoming the second of Rodney, and the captor of De Grasse. *He made a promise, upon the faith of which great advantages were yielded to him, and performed it in a sense in which the party who confided in him, could not have understood it at the time it was given, nor have been supposed to understand it.*

With respect to the punishment of those citizens of Toulon, who confessed they had assisted the English in defending the place, its severe and indiscriminate infliction cannot be justified. But let the treason of Toulon be compared with the mutiny of the Nore. In the first case, French citizens delivered up to the enemy the largest naval squadron, and the chief naval station of their country. In the second, the English seamen rose in mutiny against their officers in time of war, but refused to join the public enemy. The British government could not shoot all their seamen—yet not a single ringleader was spared.

Thiers thus describes the conduct of the English admiral (t. v, p. 240): “Admiral Hood, who had hesitated a long time, at last made his appearance, and under the pretext of taking

possession of the port of Toulon in trust for Louis XVII, received it for the purpose of burning and destroying it." And (t. vi, p. 50) "The Spaniards were offended at the superiority affected by the English, and began to distrust their intentions. Admiral Hood taking advantage of this disunion declared, that since they could not agree together, it was necessary that for the moment no supreme authority should be appointed. He even prevented the departure of a deputation, which the Toulonese wished to despatch to the count of Provence, to invite that prince to repair to Toulon in the character of regent. From this moment it was easy to fathom the intentions of the English, and to perceive how blind and guilty had those French citizens been, who had delivered Toulon into the hands of the most inveterate enemies of the French navy."

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(16) This fact which is stated by Norvins, (t. i, p. 45) is countenanced by the positive and indignant terms in which Napoleon denied to Las Cases (t. i, p. 210) all participation in the execution of these men, a denial which he repeated to Montholon (t. iii, p. 45). Sir Walter Scott, after reproducing the slanders thus denounced, proceeds to assign most convincing proofs of their falsehood, (and consequently of the impropriety of admitting them into his work) but for fear they should make no impression on

the mind of the reader, he adopts a device of which he is no doubt the inventor. This contrivance consists in stating the charge hypothetically as true, and then assigning excuses for it which if admitted to be just, prove the imputation in question to be actually true. (v. iii, p. 43) "If he actually commanded at this execution, he had the poor apology that he must do so or himself perish." Now as he did not perish, the inference arises that he actually superintended the execution.

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(17) Had the designs of the English government, as manifested by the professions and conduct of Lord Hood, and the declaration of the king of Great Britain, succeeded, it is evident that the whole French navy might have been destroyed by the cooperation of French malcontents, and the commanders of the British blockading squadrons. What was done at Toulon, was attempted to be done at Brest and Rochefort. It was necessary to repress this dangerous correspondence with the public enemy, and the severity of the example which was set at Toulon, was doubtless increased by the evidences of national disaster and disgrace which there presented themselves. The less faith the English observed towards the Toulonese, the less mercy did the French extend to them. Yet the safety of these people seems to have been a se-

condary consideration with the "protectors of all true Frenchmen," "the trustees of Louis XVII," "the generous agents of a loyal and free nation." According to Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 39). "The safety of the unfortunate citizens who had invoked their protection, was not neglected even amid the confusion of the retreat. The numerous merchant vessels and other craft, *offered means of transportation* to all who having to fear the resentment of the republicans, *might be desirous of quitting Toulon.*" He goes on (p. 40) "*It had been resolved* that the arsenal and naval stores, with such of the French ships as were not ready for sea, should be destroyed, and they were set on fire accordingly:" shewing that the destruction of French property was the first object, and the "safety of the unfortunate citizens" the second. Moreover the minutes of the council of war held by the allied officers, at which the evacuation was resolved on, as cited by Montholon (t. iii, p. 39), confirms this conclusion.—"Third question. Is it not the interest of the allies to abandon the town at once, after setting fire to every thing which cannot be carried off? Answer: The council decides unanimously for the evacuation; the garrison which might be left in Toulon, would be without retreat, could receive no succour, and would soon be in want of indispensable supplies. Besides a fortnight sooner or later it would be obliged to surrender, and forced to deliver up the arsenal,

the fleet and the establishments entire." Here no provision is hinted at or concern expressed for "the safety of the unfortunate citizens." This is the account which Thiers gives of the part the English took in their behalf. (t. vi, p. 56). "Twenty ships of the line or frigates appeared suddenly in flames in the middle of the road, exciting despair among the wretched inhabitants, and indignation in the republicans, who beheld their fleet burning to ashes without being able to save it. Immediately twenty thousand individuals, men and women, the aged and infants, carrying with them whatever they most valued, hurried to the shores, and extending their hands towards the allied squadrons, implored an asylum which might shelter them from the victorious army. They consisted of all the families of Provence, who at Aix, Marseilles, and Toulon had committed themselves in this insurrectionary movement. Not a single shallop put off to the assistance of these imprudent citizens, who had put their trust in foreigners, and had delivered up to them the principal naval station of their country. At length admiral Langara, the Spanish admiral, more humane, ordered his boats to put off and to convey aboard the Spanish squadron, as many of the refugees as his ships could accommodate. Admiral Hood dared not resist this example, or the imprecations which were showered on his name. He gave orders at a late period, to receive the Toulonese

on board. These unhappy fugitives rushed desperately into the boats. In their confusion some fell into the sea, others were separated from their families. Mothers were seen in search of their infants ; wives and daughters seeking their fathers or husbands, wandered about the quays in the glare of the conflagration." General Marescot mentions the flight of "the wretched French citizens who remembered too late how faithless are the promises of an enemy, and how horrible is the fate of those whom a blind rage arms against their country. Confusion, hurry, and alarm, prevailed to such a degree in this embarkation, that numbers of the fugitives were drowned. Several of the boats were sunk by the republican artillery, which began to fire from the opposite shores."

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(18) This fact is reported upon Napoleon's authority by Las Cases (t. i, p. 23). Bourrienne affects to contradict it (t. i, p. 67) by affirming that it was not at Toulon that Napoleon selected Duroc *as his aide de camp*; but afterwards in Italy. This might be true without bringing into question the assertion that he knew Duroc at Toulon for the first time, there divined his merit and extended to him his favour. On this point there is still farther controversy. The Dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i, ch. 13) says that Junot was the first officer who was attached to Napo-

leon as aide de camp. Norvins on the contrary (t. i, p. 48) mentions that Muiron and Duroc were his first aides de camp. The probability is that Muiron was his first aide de camp and Junot his second, in relation both to rank and time, for they were both attached to his person, Muiron as adjutant, and Junot as sergeant and secretary, at Toulon. In the campaign of the next spring and at Paris in 1795, Junot was undoubtedly one of his aides de camp, while there is no evidence other than the assertion of Norvins that Duroc was. In 1796 when he took command of the army of Italy, his list of aides de camp was of course increased, and in point of rank, Murat who had been attached to him during his command at Paris, was first. Lavallette relates (*Mémoires*, t. i, p. 188) that when he joined Bonaparte as aide de camp in Italy shortly after the battle of Arcole, Murat having been promoted and Muiron killed, Junot was the first aide de camp, Marmont second, and Duroc third.

CHAPTER IV.

PAGE 122.

(1) "Happily he allowed himself to be directed entirely by the young Bonaparte" (Thiers, t. vi, p. 288).

PAGE 123.

(2) The words of Thiers in his concise sketch of this campaign are (p. 288): "He was struck with an idea as fortunate as that which restored Toulon to the republic."

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(3) This analysis of the plan is derived chiefly from the narrative of Napoleon himself (Monthon, t. iii, chap. II). A reference to the Annual Register for the year 1794, as well as the sketch of Thiers, has been found useful.

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(4) The most remarkable and successful exhibition of talent, in this sort of warfare, of which military annals preserve the record, was furnished by Cæsar, in his campaign against Afranius and Petreius, the lieutenants of Pompey, in the mountains of Catalonia. Without fighting, he compelled these resolute and experienced generals, by skilful choice of ground alone, to surrender at discretion an army equal in numbers to his own, which besides a large body of auxiliaries, contained *five Roman legions*; this before the battle of Pharsalia, and while

Pompey was in the pride of his strength. The great Condé deemed this exploit such a masterpiece of military skill, that he visited and studied the ground. *Cæsar de Bello civili*, lib. i, chap. 68, 71, 84.—(*Bossuet, Oraison funèbre de Louis de Bourbon*).

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(5) For these two facts, besides the *Annals* of the period see Thiers (t. vi, p. 289).

PAGE 129.

(6) Thiers observes (*ibid.*): “They could not hesitate to adopt the plan of Bonaparte.”

PAGE 129.

(7) Massena was a native of the county of Nice, and though already respected as a brave and promising officer, had not acquired *fame*.

PAGE 150.

(8) *Mémoires de Napoléon*—Montholon, t. iii, p. 68—confirmed by the *Annual Register* for 1794—chap. 4, *History of Europe*.

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(9) It would be difficult, were it required, to determine, whether from carelessness the French, or prejudice the English, biographers of Napoleon, have given the more defective accounts of these active, daring, and successful operations of their hero, in this his novitiate as a general officer. These operations evince a higher degree of military talent, than can be discovered in the entire

career of Bernadotte, Joubert, or even Moreau; or of any English general from the death of Marlborough to the appearance of Wellington. They are introductory, too, to a brilliant series of Napoleon's subsequent exploits, and their importance unquestionably contributed to save him from the axe of the revolution. Yet Norvins (t. i, p. 49) assures his readers that Massena took Onielle, traversed the territory of Genoa, beat the Austrians at Ponte-di-Nave, and made himself master of Ormea and Garesio. Whereas it appears Massena did not cross the Taggia, or go near the territory of Genoa, but wheeled to his left in the neighbourhood of Vingtimilia, and penetrated into the rear of the Sardinian camp at Saorgio. Norvins, who professes (see his preface) to have studied the actions and meditated the biography of Napoleon for many years, merely gives him credit for the plan of this campaign, and from the moment of its adoption, makes him a cypher. Respect for the superiority of Massena's rank could not justify this depression of Napoleon, for on that principle general Dumerbion should have been the officer commemorated; as he was in fact at the time the events took place (See Annual Register 1794, History of Europe, chap. iv). When we reflect that the great captain himself, in his last days, recollected these early efforts of his martial genius, with interest enough to dictate a clear though brief account of them, in his Me-

moirs of the war of Italy (Montholon, t. iii, chap. 2) it would appear that his countryman and admirer could scarcely think them unworthy of recital, without regarding them as fabulous. Yet had this been his opinion, respect for his readers demanded its avowal. So that in reference to this part of Napoleon's life, there is in the work of Norvins, an unjustifiable omission. It is true that Jomini in his account of these operations (t. v, chap. 33) mentions Napoleon only as the adviser of the measure, confining his details to the officers commanding regularly the division, its columns, brigades, etc. But he was writing a general history, not the life of Napoleon, and prepared his work, before the Memoirs of Napoleon appeared.

Hazlitt, whose book is written with more impartiality than judgment, furnishes but a meagre account of these important successes of the column conducted by Napoleon; adopting the slight allusion to them, which concludes a chapter on a different subject, in the dictation to Gourgaud (t. i, — chapter on the siege of Toulon) in preference to the connected narrative found in Montholon. Yet both these authors describe the plan clearly as Napoleon's, and as being bold, ingenious, and original. But Sir Walter Scott (v. i, p. 46) completes his account of this successful series of marches and actions (which threw the court of Turin into such alarm, that a levy *en masse* of the inhabi-

tants of Piedmont was ordered) in two sentences and one short note. "Bonaparte had influence enough to recommend with success to the general, Dumerbion, and the representatives of the people, Ricord and Robespierre, a plan for driving the enemy out of this position, forcing them to retreat beyond the Higher Alps, and taking Saorgio; all which measures succeeded as he predicted. Saorgio surrendered, with much stores and baggage, and the French army obtained possession of the Higher Alps, which being tenable by defending few and difficult passes, placed a great part of the army of Italy, at disposal for actual service." The important note is in these words—"The Sardinians were dislodged from the Col de Tende, 7th May 1794." Here the reader will observe Napoleon's influence, not his talent nor enterprise, is mentioned. Sir Walter in the *advertisement* of his work (v. i, p. 3) "claims credit for having brought to the undertaking a mind disposed to do his subject justice." Now suppose the duke of Marlborough, in his twenty-fifth year, had planned and conducted such brilliant and decisive manœuvres and combats; would his biographer be excusable for contracting them into the compass of a quarter of a small page? Sir Walter devotes about twenty times the space to Sir John Stuart's descent upon Calabria, in which he defeated an indifferent French general, and returned to the point from which he set out,

without altering the general state of the war (v. vi, p. 2), than he does to military events in the life and character of his hero, which the Annual Register of the time, considered likely to change the face of Europe (See Ann. Reg. for 1794—History of Europe, chap. 4). As to Lockhart, it is sufficient to observe that his account is more slight and imperfect than Scott's. Thiers in his general narration (t. vi, chap. 5), has done more justice to these events, than either of the professed biographers, and has noticed them as fully as, from the nature and style of his work, which is more a civil than a military history, he could be expected to do. It may be observed that he confirms generally the account left by Napoleon, a fact which has been thought to occasion a special reference to both, where they coincide, unnecessary.

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(10) This incident in the campaign, omitted altogether by the four biographers above mentioned, is not unworthy of notice as it contributes to demonstrate Napoleon's ascendancy in the army; and as its misrepresentation by Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, was made one of the pretexts for placing the general of artillery under arrest.

PAGE 157.

(11) Thiers, (t. vi, p. 271).

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(12) A slight allusion to this project and the successful movements which grew out of its adoption, may be found in Norvins (t. i, pp. 52, 3), a more imperfect one in Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 375, 77), none at all in Scott, and none in Lockhart. The particulars in the text are derived from Napoleon's own account, dictated to Montholon succinctly (t. ii, p. 211), repeated in detail to the same amanuensis (t. iii, ch. 2), from the *Moniteur* and Annual Register of the period, that very useful work, *Bourrienne et ses Erreurs* (t. i, ch. 3), and from the well designed sketch of Thiers (t. vii, p. 77).

PAGE 140.

(13) Thiers (*ibid.*) says Colloredo "retired shamefully, accusing the English, who accused him in turn."

PAGE 142.

(14) In the first volume of the *Mémorial de St. Hélène*, the reader will find this circumstance of military folly, and amorous infatuation, related in the words of Napoleon himself (pp. 217, 18), with an ingenuousness and a self reproach, which alone would carry conviction of their truth. He says "the idea came suddenly into his head," of entertaining his fair companion with a spectacle of war, and that the remembrance of his folly was ever after accompanied with regret; shewing that he acted from a

momentary impulse, which had there been time for reflexion, his good sense and good feeling would have repressed. The existence of this lady, her name, connection with Napoleon, and the effects of it on his conduct and fortune, are all unnoticed it would appear by Norvins, Hazlitt, Scott, and Lockhart.

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(15) Napoleon himself (Las Cases, t. i, pp. 215, 451); the dutchess d'Abrantès (Mémoires, t. i, p. 237); and Thiers (t. vi, pp. 452, 54). The last describes his conduct towards his brother as affectionate and even noble. The language of the first does not imply that his acquaintance with this unfortunate man, ever ripened into friendship, but that Robespierre conceived as was natural, an enthusiastic admiration for Napoleon.

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(16) Norvins (t. i, p. 57).

PAGE 146.

(17) The dutchess d'Abrantes (t. i, p. 241) publishes his note to Junot.

PAGE 147.

(18) The variety of misrepresentation to which this distinct and remarkable fact of Napoleon's being placed under arrest, has been subjected, is truly astonishing. Norvins (t. i, pp. 56, 7) makes it happen in the winter of 1794, 95—and describes it as the consequence of the plan which Napoleon furnished during

that winter to the deputy Maignier for fortifying the magazines of Marseilles. Hazlitt (v. i, pp. 375, 76) describes Napoleon as having been in great danger of being summoned to the bar of the convention, and placed under temporary arrest, in the month of September, in consequence of this same plan furnished to the deputy Maignier, which plan was not applied for until some months subsequent to September; thus confounding two unconnected events, and approximating as many remote dates. Scott's account is almost as defective and much more confused. He (v. iii, pp. 46, 47) avers that while Napoleon was employed in directing those operations, which forced the Sardinians from Saorgio, and in making himself acquainted with that region of the Alps, he was involved in the accusation before the convention which grew out the plan he furnished for fortifying the magazines of Marseilles. This is putting together events which were separated by several months, and making the last in succession the cause of the first. He then proceeds—"In the remainder of the year 1794, there was little service of consequence in the army of Italy," "and the 9th and 10th Thermidor of that year brought the downfall of Robespierre and threatened unfavorable consequences to Bonaparte,"—thus not only annihilating a number of important military events, but while apparently carrying forward his narration from the end of 1794, returning without notice to

midsummer of that year. He then affirms that Bonaparte was in consequence of his friendship for the younger Robespierre, and his suspected connection with the party of his brother, superseded and put under arrest; and that being liberated by the influence of Salicetti he repaired to Marseilles, "in a condition to give or to receive little consolation from his family," and that he remained with them until May, 1795, when he came to Paris. Here, not to notice the incoherency of the language, the arrest in August, 1794, and the reorganisation of the armies of Italy and the Alps which took place in the spring of 1795, and by which Napoleon's service as general of artillery in the army of Italy ceased, are arbitrarily brought together; and his military life from the beginning of September until May, totally extinguished by the dash of a romantic pen. As to his incapacity to console, or be consoled by his family, there appears to have been little room for consolation on either side. Joseph had married a rich and most amiable lady, the daughter of a banker of great wealth and credit at Marseilles, and Napoleon himself, after acquiring increase of fame and consideration, was returned safe from the dangers of war and proscription. It may be supposed, therefore, that while he himself was far from being dejected, his family was at this particular time one of the happiest in France.

In reference to the acquaintance of Napoleon

with the younger Robespierre, Sir Walter proceeds still farther in injustice and error. After wandering back from the end of 1794 to the downfall of Robespierre and his party in the middle of that year, he says without authority, Napoleon "had been the friend of the tyrant's brother, and was understood to have participated in the tone of exaggerated patriotism affected by his party"—and then adds—(v. iii, p.p. 47, 8): "He endeavoured to shelter himself under his ignorance of the real tendency of the proceedings of those who had fallen; an apology which resolves itself into the ordinary excuse, that he found his late friends had not been the persons he took them for. According to this line of defence, he made all haste to disclaim accession to the political schemes of which they were accused. 'I am somewhat affected,' he wrote to a correspondent, 'at the fate of the younger Robespierre, but had he been my brother, I would have poniarded him with my own hand, had I been aware that he was forming schemes of tyranny.'" Now here is a charge of the blackest complexion, brought forward without examination or proof, by an author professing special intentions to do justice. It amounts to this—that *as long as the Robespierres were prosperous and powerful, Bonaparte was their friend and abettor—that the moment they were overthrown, executed, and decried, he, with an eager and treacherous pusillanimity, disowned all knowledge of*

or participation in their schemes ; of which he professed such abhorrence, that he declared he could have willingly assassinated that one of the brothers, of whom he had been the personal friend ! For this diabolical charge, the only authority produced, is the extract of a pretended letter from Napoleon to a correspondent ; which as no reference is made to its date, the person to whom it was written, or the book or collection in which it was found, it may be safely affirmed, not only never was written by Napoleon, but was extracted from a source so polluted, that the author of *Waverley* was ashamed to own his clandestine reliance upon it.

But, let us suppose, for a moment, that the letter in question, in spite of the incongruity of its sentiments with Napoleon's character, was genuine, would it authorize the inferences which Sir Walter affects to draw from it as a matter of fair and obvious deduction ? He has himself stated (p. 46), that Ricord and Robespierre the younger, were the representatives attached to the army of Italy, to whom Napoleon's plan for dislodging the enemy from Saorgio was submitted, and by whom it was approved. He has also satisfied his readers that Napoleon had not been in Paris from about the 1st September, 1793 ; that is, for more than ten months previous to the downfall of Robespierre, and that during this period of ten months, his occupations had been intensely important, and exclu-

sively military. These two facts shew that he had occasion to cultivate the acquaintance of the younger Robespierre, and that he had no occasion nor opportunity to become a partizan of his brother, or to obtain any particular knowledge of the atrocious schemes imputed to him. Napoleon might, therefore, very fairly have answered, if reproached with being an accomplice of the tyrant, that he knew nothing of his designs, and if these had been attributed by a correspondent to the younger Robespierre, and had been described as particularly enormous and execrable, he might have replied, that if such horrible treason was really meditated by the younger Robespierre, he would have killed him himself, sooner than see it successfully perpetrated. It is evident, that the signification of this part of the pretended letter would depend altogether upon the nature of the alleged schemes. But not only is there every reason to believe that the letter was not genuine, and that Sir Walter did not deem it to be genuine, but that he did not believe himself in the inferences he deduced from it. At page 50, he says, when colouring another misrepresentation, "Bonaparte forgot neither benefits nor injuries." Now, friendship, which he will have it, existed between Napoleon and the younger Robespierre is the offspring of reciprocal kindness and mutual benefits, which, in the case of Robespierre, the younger, Napoleon must have forgotten.

Again, in his conclusion (t. ix, p. 319), he says, "Napoleon's personal character was decidedly amiable, excepting in one particular. His temper, when he received, or thought that he received, provocation, especially if of a personal character, was warm and vindictive." It is not pretended that he was actuated by revenge, when "he made all haste to disclaim adhesion to the political schemes of which the Robespierres were accused;" so that, unless denying an unfortunate friend at the expense of truth, was considered by the great Scotch novelist, "decidedly amiable;" he could not possibly have believed that the insinuations against the character of his hero, which are here examined, were less false than they are foul.

Lockhart (v. i, p. 23) mentions the facts of the arrest and release in their proper places; but adds, with admirable ignorance and effrontery, that, owing to the general ill-will of the deputies, Napoleon was never afterwards employed in the army of Italy. Whereas, from the letter of the deputies who arrested him, (*Bourrienne et ses Erreurs*, t. i, p. 27) it appears, that the necessity of employing him in the army of Italy was one of the causes assigned by them for restoring him to duty; and it is clear, from his own account of his life, from the history of Thiers, and from other less important works, that he conducted the army of Italy after his arrest and liberation, in the operations against Vado, Sa-

vona, Cairo, and Dego. The license of Lockhart is carried to the extent of adding, that, from the time of his liberation from arrest to his coming to Paris, he remained inactive with his mother at Marseilles, and, in this period of idleness and depression, fell in love with Mademoiselle Clary; thus suspending for an interval of nine months a career which was incessantly active and progressive; and reasserting, without the slightest proof, a story which Napoleon himself had contradicted (*Las Cases*, t. i, p. 182). In the same strain of heedless error, he intimates that Napoleon was too poor to marry; forgetting, that as Mademoiselle Clary was rich, his poverty would have formed an incentive; and that his brother Joseph, who was not a general officer, and was at least as poor as Napoleon himself, had already married the sister of Mademoiselle Clary.

Bourrienne, though he mentions the fact and the date of the arrest with sufficient accuracy, is, although diametrically opposed to Sir Walter Scott, woefully inexact as to its cause; affirming, that this had no reference whatever to a supposed complicity of Napoleon with Robespierre the younger, and Ricord; and, alleging, that had it not been for the downfall of Robespierre, the consequences might have been fatal to Napoleon. In the letter of the deputies, Albite, Salicetti, and Laporte, dated the 6th August, 1794, informing the committee of pub-

lic safety of their having ordered the arrest, this alleged connection with Robespierre and Ricord is expressly enumerated among the reasons of that measure (See Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, t. i, p. 20; also Jomini, Histoires des Guerres de la Revolution, t, vi. p. 113). Nor is Bourrienne less unfortunate in accounting for his release. He asserts, that it proceeded, in no degree whatever, from the belief of the deputies that his services were indispensable to the success of the army. These deputies themselves, however, give quite a different account, in their letter of the 24th of August, to the committee of public safety, in which they declare, that "the talents of this officer are, in the highest degree, useful; that his innocence is evident; and that, *therefore*, they have suspended the arrest until the orders of the committee shall be received, and restored him to liberty" (Bourrienne, et ses Erreurs, t. i, p. 27, and Jomini, t. vi, p. 114).

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(19) Norvins (t. i, p. 5); Montholon, t. iii, p. 76).

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(20) He himself mentioned (Las Cases, t. i, p. 215) that he was outlawed by the order of one of the deputies with the army, because he would not allow him to employ the artillery horses in posting; but neither the name of the deputy nor the date of the order is given; nor

does the fact appear to have led to any serious consequence.

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(21) This circumstance in the life of Napoleon, which is so particularly mentioned by himself (Mentholon, t. iii, p. 80) is not noticed by Norvins, Hazlitt, or Lockhart. The ludicrous distortion to which it is subjected by Scott (v. iii, p. 99), will be pointed out hereafter. Yet the selection of Napoleon for such critical service, so soon after the accusation to which he was exposed, and his influence in counteracting so injudicious an enterprise, were facts honorable to his character as a patriot and an officer. His presence at Toulon on the occasion too, led to an act of the most intrepid humanity. Thiers, who thought the event of importance enough to form a part of his great work, thus records it (t. vii, p. 458): "The government had projected a ridiculous *coup de main* against Rome. Anxious to revenge the assassination of Basseville, they had embarked ten thousand men on board the squadron at Toulon, which had been entirely refitted by the care of the committee of public safety. It was designed to send them to the mouth of the Tiber in order to lay a contribution on the papal city, and then to retire promptly to the ships. Fortunately a naval action with admiral Hotham, from which both squadrons retired equal sufferers, prevented the execution of this project."

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(22) There are few indisputable events in the life of Napoleon, which have suffered more diversified and wanton mutilation, than this rescue of two representatives of the people and a family of unfortunate emigrants from a mob. It is related by himself (Montholon, t. iii, p. 86) in a narrative as distinct and graphical as any part Cæsar's Commentaries, and is mentioned to have taken place in March, 1795, when he had been called to Toulon by this projected expedition against Rome. On another occasion he introduced it by way of illustration in a conversation with the faithful Las Cases (t. i, p. 210), mentioning the gratitude of the persons whom he saved, and though not proposing to fix its date, referring it incidentally to a period considerably posterior to the siege of Toulon. Las Cases adds of his own accord (p. 211) that after Napoleon's death the Chabillant family, who had preserved as a precious relic the order for their embarkation, bore grateful testimony in an interview he had with them, to this noble act of humanity; adding a number of touching details of Napoleon's generosity on the occasion, which he himself had forgotten, or neglected to relate. Yet in spite of the interesting nature of the fact itself, and of the incontestable evidence of its date and reality, Sir Walter Scott thus transposes, transforms, and degrades it, in the close of his account of the

siege of Toulon (v. iii, p. 44): "Bonaparte has besides affirmed, that, far from desiring to sharpen the vengeance of the jacobins, or act as their agent, he hazarded the displeasure of those whose frown was death, by interposing his protection to save the unfortunate family of Chabillant, emigrants and aristocrats, who being thrown by a storm on the coast of France, shortly after the siege of Toulon, became liable to punishment by the guillotine, but whom he saved by procuring them the means of escape by sea." Now here the fact is deformed and diminished in all its ingredients. The Chabillants were not saved from the guillotine of the convention, but from the murderous fury of a bloodthirsty mob—their rescue did not take place soon after the siege of Toulon, but more than a year after. Nor was his interposition likely to irritate the government, "whose frown was death," but the mob whose rage was destruction. So far from it, he was likely to gain credit with the convention, as he saved at the same time two of its members. Again, its authority does not rest on the affirmation of Napoleon alone, but concurrently on the acknowledgment of the emigrants themselves, to count Las Cases. Norvins (t. i, p. 58) mixes this fact up with the charge which had been previously made, against Napoleon, for furnishing a plan of defence for the magazines of Marseilles, and makes it one of the causes which moved the con-

vention to summon him to its bar. Whereas, putting the difference of time out of the question, his saving the deputies on the same occasion, shows that the events were in character perfectly incongruous.

The inaccuracy of Hazlitt is still more remarkable (v. i, p. 369). In reference to the executions which were committed immediately after the capture of Toulon, he says—"It was during his stay at Toulon at this period that Bonaparte saved the Chabrillant family, who were brought into the harbour on board a Spanish prize, from the fury of the mob. It was just after the fall of Robespierre."—Now Toulon was taken in December 1793; and Robespierre's downfall happened in July 1794; so that according to this account, Napoleon who, from his entrance at the school of Brienne until his first abdication, appears never to have passed an idle week, must have lingered at Toulon in perfect inactivity about seven months. But Hazlitt himself records (p. 327) that he joined the army of Italy in March 1794, and was immediately after engaged in the campaign of general Dumerbion. This confusion of dates is not the only defect of his account. By placing the rescue of the Chabrillements in connection with the siege of Toulon, he diminishes the danger which, in the cause of humanity, Napoleon so successfully braved. Immediately after the siege of Toulon when the troops who had taken it were present, he could with very little

difficulty have dispersed a mob, and would have incurred no other danger, than that of incensing the government, from which at the worst, he might have escaped by emigration. But when the rescue was actually effected, it was not the frown of a distant government, but the fury of an encompassing mob, which he had to defy, and at the risk of being torn limb from limb on the spot. Lockhart's account of the affair (v. i, p. 20) being a bold and careless compendium of most of the errors of his predecessors, may be silently despised.

From the despatch of the deputies Mariette and Cambon, dated the 27th Ventose (17th March), it appears there had been a succession of tumults for several days, which reached their utmost violence on the 22nd Ventose (12th March). It also appears that several emigrants had been murdered in the course of the first outrages; and that the twenty emigrants who were rescued by Napoleon, had been lying in prison under an order of the deputy Jean Bon St.-André, about a month. They do not mention the name of Napoleon, though they do mention that of general Bazanet, who commanded the garrison of Toulon. They state however that they proceeded to the arsenal and addressed the crowd "surrounded by a feeble escort composed of the generals of the expedition and some citizens"—and that when they withdrew from the arsenal, they walked arm in arm with general Bazanet, who

was more than once struck by a stone while thus escorting them; a fact which shews they were far from being protected by his influence. They also mention that the emigrants in the prison were saved from immediate massacre by the courageous resistance which a soldier, whose name they could not learn, offered to the mob. This soldier was, no doubt, one of Napoleon's cannoneers. They describe themselves to have been in the utmost danger, and their letter evinces that they felt it in its full force.

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(23) This is the progress, and this the date, which Napoleon himself assigns to his journey to Paris, making his arrival at the capital very distinctly subsequent to the insurrection of the first of Prairial (Montholon, t. iii, p. 88). Neither Scott nor Hazlitt mention whether he reached Paris before or after that event, both saying (v. iii, p. 49, and v. i, p. 379) that he arrived there in May 1795. Norvins, however, dates his arrival before the 1st Prairial (t. i, p. 61); while Lockhart with his usual confidence in error, asserts positively (v. i, p. 23) that "before the end of the year (1794) he came to Paris to solicit employment."

Bourrienne (t. i, p. 71) not only places him in Paris before the 1st Prairial, but implicates him remotely in the defeated conspiracy of that day, for the sake of which calumny, he probably ventured on the anachronism. That it is one,

additional evidence is found in the despatch of the deputies Mariette and Cambon, of the 17th March, which has been already referred to. In a postscript they mention that they had just seen the English prize ship (the *Berwick*) come into the harbour, and that they forward to the convention the despatches of their colleague Letourneur. Now Letourneur accompanied admiral Martin in his cruise, and the *Berwick* was taken off Corsica by the squadron soon after it sailed from Toulon. The fleets came in sight several days subsequently; the chase, the action, which took place the 14th of March, the return into port, and the abandonment of the expedition against Rome, all happening successively after the capture of the *Berwick*. So that Bonaparte could not have returned from Toulon to the army of Italy, sooner than the last of March. While there, Aubry's offensive and unjust measures were adopted (Thiers, t. vii, p. 457), upon learning and feeling which, he set off for Paris early in May, where he arrived purposely after the 1st Prairial. Kellerman, whom Napoleon met at Marseilles, as the former was on his way to take command of the army of Italy, was not appointed until the last of April, and did not reach Nice until the 9th May (Jomini, t. vii, pp. 81, 82). All these facts taken together shew that as late as least, as the first week of May, Napoleon could not have been nearer to Paris than Marseilles, and he asserts positively that on

the 20th of May and some days afterwards he was not nearer than Chatillon-sur-Seine. The Dutchess d'Abrantès (t. i, chap. 13, 14, 15, et 16) falls into yet greater errors in regard to this fact, which, considering her tender years at the epoch of which she treats, is not surprising. She dates the arrival of Napoleon at Paris, not only before the 1st Prairial (20th May) 1795, but before the 1st Germinal (21st March) of that year (t. i, pp. 246, 57). She says too that he had but one aide de camp (Junot) with him, whereas he himself mentions expressly Marmont, and Marmont only, who would hardly have remained so near the capital as Chatillon-sur-Seine. Madame Bourrienne mentions Louis Bonaparte (t. i, p. 80). This account Louis Bonaparte incidentally confirms in his reply to Sir Walter Scott, in which he says, his brother was accompanied on his arrival at Paris by three aides de camp—"Junot, Marmont and myself" (Réponse de Louis Bonaparte à Sir Walter Scott—p. 16). Unless the reader should prefer on a subject of this kind, the recollection of a "Miss *not* in her teens" (the Dutchess was not then 11 years of age) to the grave assertion of Napoleon, in making which he could not have been actuated by vanity nor heated by controversy, fortified by the circumstantial mention of his delay at Chatillon and the object of that delay; confirmed by the collateral statement of Louis Bonaparte in an effort to establish another point, and by the

letter of the deputies Mariette and Cambon to the convention, the picturesque details furnished by the Dutchess, respecting Napoleon's constant visits to the house of Madame Permon, and frequent conversations with that lady, her son, and her various guests, before the 1st Prairial, as they are made to spring out of the current events of the day, must be received as the errors of a memory too severely tasked. The Dutchess appears to have misconceived other particulars respecting this memorable 1st of Prairial. She makes Salicetti take refuge in her mother's house, as an outlaw, on the evening of the 2d Prairial, and while Napoleon was there (t. 1, pp. 302-3). Whereas Salicetti was not accused, or proceeded against by the convention until the 8th of Prairial (Thiers, t. 7, p. 433); and then in consequence of intelligence which was that day received from Toulon. The historian, when speaking of this intelligence, says, "It could not fail to provoke new violence against the partizans of the mountain and the patriots. It was alleged, that the events at Paris and Toulon were concerted; they accused the members of the mountain of having secretly organized these proceedings, and attacked them with fresh exasperation. They instantly decreed the arrest of Charbonnier, Escudier, Ricord, and Salicetti, charging all four with having agitated the south." This shews that Salicetti, instead of being outlawed on the 2d Prairial, was not even accused until

the 8th of that month, and then on a charge not thought of before, and but remotely connected with the insurrection at Paris. In the *Moniteur* of the 9th Prairial, the account given by Thiers is confirmed. It is there officially stated, that the letters of the representatives of the people at Marseilles had confirmed the rumour of the terrorists having got possession of the arsenal of Toulon in the course of a revolt, in which their colleague, Brunel, lost his life; that the convention had decreed that the members who were arrested on the night of the 1st Prairial should be brought back to Paris, and tried by a military commission (that is, Romme, Goujon, etc., who killed themselves), and that the convention had, on the same day, ordered the arrest of Ricord, Salicetti, etc. It is not easy to conceive, that a man would be first outlawed, and next accused.

With regard to this journey of Napoleon, and the time of his arrival at Paris, there exists yet another error, which, from the high authority of the work that contains it, would be likely, if uncorrected, to deprive my own narrative of the reader's confidence, and to leave this particular subject involved in confusion. In the *Mémorial de St. Hélène* (t. vii, pp. 382, 83), it is mentioned, on the authority of Napoleon, that in returning from Nice to Paris in 1794, he stopped at the château of Marmont's father, and that it was in the month of July or August. This is a mistake, as to the year and the month, either of

the emperor's memory, or of the record of his friend, and probably of the latter. For, on all other occasions, Napoleon refers this visit to Paris and sojourn at the house of Marmont the elder, to the month of May, 1795 (Montholon, t. ii, p. 212, and t. iii, p. 88), a date which all authorities of weight, except the one in question, and circumstances of application, confirm. Throughout the year 1794, as the reader must be aware, Napoleon was employed either in fortifying the coast of Provence, or in conducting the campaign of Dumerbion in the maritime Alps, except a part of the month of August (see note 18 of this appendix), when he was arrested upon returning from a mission to Genoa, which he had performed under instructions from Ricord, the deputy, dated the 13th July, 1794 (See the instructions copied in Bourrienne, t. i, p. 56). It is, therefore, as impossible to conceive that he could have been at Châtillon-sur-Seine in July or August, 1794, as it is difficult to doubt that he was there in May, 1795. This, and similar errors, in the work of count de las Cases, although they may mislead inattentive readers, and colour the misrepresentations of unfaithful writers, are invaluable as guarantees of the fidelity of his journal. Had it been *composed*, prepared to bolster up a reputation, to support a party, or to sustain a cause, it is certain that such mistakes would not have existed. Actual error in this case, is the highest evidence of intentional truth.

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(24). Hazlitt (v. i, p. 879) affirms, that Aubry was a secret friend to the Bourbons. He was implicated as one of the chief conspirators in the counter-revolutionary attempt of the 18th Fructidor, and banished with Pichegru and others to French Guiana; but, according to Thiers (t. ix, p. 316), as a promoter of political reaction, not as a royalist.

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(25) This fact is asserted by himself (Monthonlon, t. iii, p. 89) very emphatically, and is made the cause of his tendering his resignation. In that excellent work (*Bourrienne et ses Erreurs*) the author of a most conclusive refutation of Bourrienne's misstatements on this part of Napoleon's life, after proving that he was never cashiered, says, he was not ordered to the army of the west as general of *infantry* (t. i, p. 30), but as "commander in chief of the artillery of the army of the west." This last assertion is proved to be accurate by an order of general Hoche mentioning the fact, but it does not disprove the positive assertion of Napoleon himself, that he previously received an order to join the army of the west, and take the command of a brigade of infantry. If this assertion could leave any doubt on the mind, it would be removed by referring to a speech of Fréron in the conven-

tion on the 18th Vendémiaire, when, remonstrating against the proceedings of Aubry, he said, that "general Bonaparte had been withdrawn from his appropriate line of service, in order to be put into the infantry." Louis Bonaparte misapprehends, in some degree, this affair. (*Réponse*, p. 15). He represents his brother as having received his appointment to the army of the west, as general of artillery, while he was attached to the army of Italy, and as having visited Paris purposely to get that destination changed. But Napoleon himself expressly says (*Montholon*, t. iii, pp. 88, 9), that he was placed on the list of generals of infantry to be employed in the artillery when a vacancy should occur: and that after this interview with Aubry, he was positively ordered to join the army of the west as a general of infantry: assertions which the speech of Fréron confirms.

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(26) Thiers states (t. vii, p. 459), that Kellerman, although the corps of ten thousand men which had been destined to embark at Toulon for Rome was restored to his army, was so weakened by detachments employed in suppressing the renewed insurrections of Toulon and Lyons, that he could not resist the attack of the Austrians and Sardinians. But, it is evident, from the instructions drawn up by Napoleon, and despatched to Kellerman by the committee of

public safety, that he did not comprehend the nature and advantages of his position, which was taken for offensive, not defensive purposes; for falling upon the enemy the moment he placed his foot on the narrow tract of Geneose territory between the Alps and the sea; and not with a view of waiting the maturity of his preparations, and receiving his attack. It is fair to observe, that Jomini's account is totally at variance with this view of the subject. He alleges that the defensive was not only judicious on the part of Kellerman, but sanctioned by the committee of public safety (t. vii, pp. 81, 82). The operations he relates are rather inconsistent with this allegation, which is in direct contradiction to the statement of Napoleon, and the extract which he produces of the despatch written by himself, and after being signed by the committee, forwarded to Kellerman (Montholon, t. iii, p. 93). In this despatch the absurdity of acting on the defensive is thus forcibly demonstrated. "The committee observed to Kellerman, that the army was not extended in 1794 beyond the heights of the Tanaro, and had not prolonged its right by Bardinetto, Melogno, and St. Jacques, except for the purpose of preventing the Austrian army connecting itself with the English squadron, and of being in a situation to advance to the succour of Genoa, if the enemy should attack that city, either by sea or by the pass of the Bochetta. That the army did not

occupy Vado as a defensive position, but an offensive one, and to be able to fall upon the enemy if he should shew himself on the narrow tract between the Alps and the sea (*la riviere*). That the moment the Austrians had set foot at Savona, he ought to have attacked them, in order to prevent their getting possession of that place, and thereby cutting off his communication with Genoa; but since he had failed to do these things, nothing was left but to evacuate Vado, etc." It is true, that Kellerman was weakened, for a moment, by the necessity of suppressing the revolts at Lyons and Toulon; but at the end of his campaign, after all his losses by war, desertion, and disease, his force in the field amounted to 36,950 men, exclusive of 4,000 at and near Nice, 6,000 at Toulon and the neighbouring towns, and 10,000 marching to join him under Augereau—(See the table in Jomini, t. vii, p. 298). So that his army was not weaker than Dumerbion's, with which, in 1794, Bonaparte, as we have seen, had dislodged the Sardinians, beaten the Austrians, driven away the English, seized the coast, and occupied the whole chain of the maritime Alps, in the course of a few days. Thiers, after representing, on this occasion, Kellerman's occupation of the line of the Borghetto as a decision of his own judgment, in his succeeding volume (t. viii. 133), admits, that it had been traced out for him by Napoleon. He is right in saying it had been traced out in 1794,

but he omits remarking, that it was retraced in the instructions of the committee in the last of June or first of July, 1795. Napoleon's character of general Kellerman is, no doubt, perfectly fair (Montholon, t. iii, p. 92): "Kellerman was brave, extremely active, and endowed with many excellent qualities; but he was perfectly destitute of those talents which qualify a man for the chief command of an army. In conducting this war in the Alps, he committed nothing but faults."

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(27). This fact is substantiated by the following order of general Hoche, commander of the army of the west, dated the first complimentary day of 1795 (18th September). "The committee of public safety having called to its bureau (*"prés de lui,"*) the general of brigade, Bonaparte, I hereby cause him to be replaced by the chief of brigade Dutol, whom I have directed to take command of the artillery, which had been confided to that general" (See Bourrienne et ses Erreurs, t. i, p. 30).

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(28) As the word of Bourrienne was much less faithful than the memory of Napoleon, the assertion of the former that Napoleon applied for leave to be employed in the Turkish service (t. i, p. 74) is less to be relied on than the denial repeated as coming from Napoleon by O'Meara (v. i, p. 230).

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(29) Of this annoyance the degree may be ascertained by reference to these well attested facts: 1, that at this very time Napoleon received three thousand francs for a coach he sold to Salicetti (*Bourrienne*, t. i, p. 71); 2, that he sold a valuable collection of books (*Norvins*, t. i, p. 60); 3, that he was in the receipt of his pay as a general officer (*Montholon*, t. ii, p. 211, et *Bourrienne et ses Erreurs*, t. i, pp. 31, 32); and 4, that at the period in question he fixed his brother Louis at the artillery school of Chalons at his own expense (*Réponse par Louis Bonaparte, à Sir Walter Scott*, p. 16). These facts are well attested, because the first is asserted by *Bourrienne* in support of a calumny distinct from this alleged indigence—and he does resort to the truth in endeavouring to propagate falsehood; because the second is positively stated by *Norvins* a respectable writer, though a false inference is drawn from it; because the third is vouched by the declaration of Napoleon, and demonstrated by the essay referred to in *Bourrienne et ses Erreurs*; and because the fourth is proved by the undisputed acknowledgment of Louis Bonaparte himself, who for a reason to be found in Napoleon's will, cannot be suspected of undue affection for his brother's memory.

In misrepresenting this momentary halt in the forward march of Napoleon's career, the princi-

pal English and French authors whose works I have consulted, seem to have written from motives originating in different feelings, coinciding as to one object, and diverging with respect to others. Thus Sir Walter Scott, and his disciple, Lockhart, unobservant of that Roman dignity of mind which makes well supported poverty sublime, appear to be of opinion that by representing Napoleon as poor, they detract from his greatness. In this liberal spirit the first absolutely affirms (v. iii, p. 49): "He found himself unfriended and indigent in the city of which he was at no distant period to be the ruler. Some individuals however assisted him, and among others the celebrated performer Talma, who had known him while at the military school, and even then entertained high expectations of the part in life which was to be played by "*le petit Bonaparte*" (In a note to this French phrase he adds): "On the authority of the late John Philip Kemble." Sir Walter Scott it is known visited Paris ostensibly in search of materials for his work, when Talma was a living actor, and he made this assertion when Kemble was a dead one (Talma died at Paris 19th October, 1826). The former could have given him original and direct testimony on this point; the latter could at best have furnished only second hand information in regard to it. Yet he preferred as a witness the dead Englishman to the living Frenchman, and a hearsay story to direct testimony, as authority for reaffirming an assertion which the hero of

his book had positively contradicted, in Talma's lifetime, and to all appearance, with Talma's acquiescence (O'Meara, v. ii, p. 295). This proceeding it must be confessed shews as little tenderness for truth, as consideration for the character of the man whose memory the great novelist was pretending to embalm. Leaving "the late John Philip Kemble" in his grave, let us suppose Talma had really asserted that in the summer of 1795, he found Napoleon in Paris "unfriended" and so "indigent" that he himself afforded him pecuniary assistance; could any general in the French or in the British service believe him, even if the story had not been contradicted by Napoleon himself, seeing that he was a general officer at the time and in receipt of his pay as such? In regard to this appearance of Talma on the stage, Sir Walter thus proceeds in error and defamation (v. iii, p. 50). "Bonaparte had something of his native country in his disposition, he forgot neither benefits nor injuries. He was always during the height of his grandeur particularly kind to Talma, and even honoured him with a degree of his intimacy. As for Aubry being amongst those belonging to Pichegru's party who were banished to Cayenne, he caused him to be excepted from the decree which permitted the return of those unfortunate exiles, and Aubry died at Demarara." In the first place, as Napoleon neither needed nor received the benefits in question from Talma, the

counterbalancing fabrication constructed on "the disposition of his native country," falls to the ground. If his contradiction of the story needed support it would be found in the fact that neither Bourrienne, his wife, nor the dutchess d'Abrantès, who all undertake to furnish such minute details about Napoleon's intimates at this time of his life, mentions Talma among them. So that this fact only remains out of Sir Walter's story, that Napoleon was particularly kind and munificent to the French Roscius, not from gratitude, but from taste and generosity. Again, if an indigent man is unfriended, he will be apt to steal or starve. If a man in want meets with an old acquaintance who relieves him, it would be both false and ungrateful in him to say that he had been unfriended, for, a "friend in need is a friend indeed." Yet Sir Walter says Napoleon came to Paris in 1795 in perfect indigence, met with an old acquaintance who assisted him, and was yet unfriended, and that although he was thus unfriended, he was ever after grateful to this acquaintance. Thus it appears that without reference to other accounts or circumstances, Sir Walter's romance of Talma is one of those ingenious inventions, of which the parts will not hold together. As to the never to be forgotten "injuries" of Aubry, they happen to be scarcely more real and not more important than the remembered "benefits" of Talma. Aubry had included Napoleon in an arrangement of officers, favourable to the class of which he himself was

an individual, and unfavourable to the class to which Napoleon belonged. In their conference on this subject, Aubry's injustice had been protested against, and his impertinence severely retorted and rebuked. The indignant, but unaccepted tender of Napoleon's resignation followed; of which, the correction of Aubry's procedure, the restoration of Napoleon to his appropriate line of service, and his elevation to a situation of higher trust and greater consequence than he had as yet held, were the speedy consequences. In all likelihood therefore, he regarded Aubry as the involuntary promoter of his fortune, and so far from remembering, after a lapse of great events and much time, the poor exile of Cayenne with vindictiveness, the probability is, he forgot him altogether. His correspondence at the time, and his *Memoirs* (Montholon, t. iv, p. 236), shew, that he was far from approving the measure of punishment inflicted by the directory, and spoke of the banishment of citizens, who were not convicted of treason, in the strongest terms of reprobation. Besides the decree which permitted the return of certain exiles from Cayenne, was not a repeal of the decree of banishment, but an act of exception to it. So that Napoleon, instead of causing Aubry, as Sir Walter asserts, to be excepted from this act, at the utmost, only failed to except him from the operation of the former decree. In this there was no favour, but does it follow there was revenge or even injus-

tice. Was any plea of palliation or innocence urged in favour of Aubry, as there was in favour of others? According to Sir Walter Scott, it would appear, there was none. While the undisputed fact remained against Aubry, that he conspired with Pichegru, to betray his country. Further, the restoration of banished persons — even of honorable and conscientious emigrants — was a gradual process, which was of necessity regulated very much by the state of public feeling. If Aubry died before his guilt was forgotten, or could be excused, it was neither the effect nor proof of vindictiveness in the character of Napoleon. After this, to quote the following passage, is to expose its contradiction and refute its leading assertion (v. iii, p. 51). “Meantime his situation becoming daily more unpleasant, Bonaparte solicited Barras and Fréron, who as thermidoriens had preserved their credit, for occupation *in almost any line of his profession*” — “He was offered a command in La Vendée which *he declined to accept.*”

Lockhart’s misrepresentations on this point, are principally the repetition of Sir Walter’s, and require no notice. But he had access to a reservoir of slander, which happily for the admirers of Sir Walter’s invention, had not been prepared when he compounded his life of Napoleon. Bourrienne in his *Mémoires* says (t. i, p. 71) that Napoleon when thus oppressed by poverty and neglect “envied” his brother Joseph’s good for-

tune in marrying the rich Mademoiselle Clary, and would exclaim, "How fortunate is that *rogue* Joseph." Admitting that the exclamation was really made and was fairly repeated, the word *coquin* (rogue), was evidently used in a favourable and even a fond sense, as a man says of his child "you dear little rogue," or of his friend, "what a lucky dog." Yet Bourrienne, who was engaged in a very laborious and incongruous chapter of calumny, headed it, in reference to this anecdote awkwardly enough (ch. vi), "*Bonaparte is jealous of his brother.*" Out of these clumsy materials Lockhart, with less felicity than assurance, contrives an original slander of his own, which has the advantage of belying both brothers at once. Referring indefinitely to Bourrienne, this faithful translator says (v. i, p. 24) "How fortunate," Napoleon would exclaim "How fortunate is that *fool* Joseph!" As this author's volumes were prepared for the voluminous English work entitled: "The Family Library;" from the references already made to them, the reader will perceive that their principal use consists in shewing, with what perilous care, he thought historical truth ought to be excluded, from the intellectual nourishment of English families.

Hazlitt (v. i, p. 381-2) describes Napoleon as retired and studious, but says nothing of his poverty, farther than relating one version of

the Talma story, and also Napoleon's contradiction of it.

Coming to the French authors who profess to afford particular instruction on the subjects now under examination, it will be found that, while they agree with the author of *Waverley* in regard to the "indigence," they disagree with him altogether as to the "unfriended" state of his hero. Both classes sink him into abject poverty; but while the first desire to have him rescued by the pitiful machinery of accidental assistance, the second insist on relieving him by their own or their friends' sagacious liberality. According to these authorities, few men ever had so many or such generous friends. Bourrienne, his wife, and brother, were especially kind to him, and entertained him at dinner and in the evening "very often." Bourrienne visited him every morning, and found in his apartment many distinguished persons (t. i, pp. 70, 71). Although the husband says he was in great want of money, the wife avers he accompanied them very often to the theatres (p. 80). The Dutchess d'Abrantes declares (t. i, p. 275), that "he came regularly every day to her mother's house," and often dined there; that he was miserably poor, but had Junot for a banker, who not only gave him three-fourths of the money sent him by his parents, but more than half of what he won with the remaining fourth (p. 277). Taking into consideration that the account fur-

nished by the dutchess embraces a period of time anterior to the 12th Germinal, when Napoleon was at Toulon, or somewhere in the maritime Alps; it is appropriate to the present subject only, so far as it shews, that *had he been in Paris*, he would have found friends and a welcome, if nowhere else, in the house of Madame Permon. Norvins, though free from the malice of Bourrienne, and less entertaining than the Dutchess d'Abrantes, is not less inexact than either. He represents Napoleon (t. i, p. 62) as deprived of his pay, and in the greatest distress, and likely to starve, but for the timely recollection of the deputy, Doulcet de Ponté-Coulant, that there was such an officer in Paris as general Bonaparte. He has it, that this benevolent person having succeeded Aubry in the war department, called Napoleon to a situation near him before the defeat of Kellerman was heard of. This is contradicted not only by the repeated declaration of Napoleon himself, but by the essay which has already been referred to in *Bourrienne et ses Erreurs* (t. i, pp. 30, 31), demonstrating that he never was without his pay, and that it was in consequence of the disaster of Kellerman that he was consulted and employed by the committee of public safety (Gourgaud t. i, p. 48 et Montholon t. ii p. 211, et t. iii, p. 90). In regard to the gratitude which this respectable author, and Hazlitt after him (v. i, pp. 379, 80) allege that Napoleon felt

for the kindness of Ponté-Coulant, both the sentiment and its cause appear to be imaginary. The proceeding of the committee of which Ponté-Coulant was a member was this—Upon being alarmed by the disaster of Kellerman, they convened and consulted those members of the convention who had been on mission to the army of Italy, who, to a man, told them that the best thing they could do was to take the advice of Napoleon. He gave them advice; extricated their army from the peril in which it was placed; and then Ponté Coulant, in order to secure his future assistance, got a decree passed, attaching Napoleon to the bureau of which he himself was the chief. Now, in this affair, according to the ordinary course of human feelings, the gratitude, if such a sentiment was excited, could not have been on the side of Napoleon. But, supposing he could have felt gratitude on the occasion, he would have been grateful to the deputies who pointed him out to the committee, rather than to the committee who obtained his aid, or to Ponté Coulant, who, after making trial of it, profited by his sagacity.

The reader will observe, that almost exclusive possession of him is claimed by the different parties, the Bourriennes and Permons; and that all these writers appear to have known where he was in the months of April and May, 1795, better than he did himself.

It is surprising that Thiers, whose narrative

is generally so clear and philosophical, should have countenanced these errors of fancy, memory, and malice. In his account of the insurrection of the sections, 4th October, 1795, and of the agency of Napoleon in quelling it, it is observed retrospectively (t. viii, p. 41): "Barras had near him an officer very capable of commanding the troops. All the deputies who had been sent on mission to the army of Italy knew the young officer of artillery who had decided the capture of Toulon, caused the fall of Saorgio, and of the lines of the Roya. This young officer, become general of brigade, had been deprived of his commission (*destitué*) by Aubry, and now found himself in Paris out of employment, and almost reduced to indigence. He had been introduced to Madame Tallien, who received him with her accustomed benignity, and who even solicited in his behalf." The most that can be said in favour of this passage, is, that it does not contain as many errors as words. It is now needless to repeat either on the authority of Napoleon himself, his brother Louis, or the order of general Hoche attesting his appointment to the command of the artillery in the army of the west, that Napoleon never was deprived of his commission, nor in a state approaching to indigence. The assertion that he was in a connection of particular intimacy or favour with Barras ("*Barras avait auprès de lui*") at the time here spoken of is altogether erroneous. They had

met at the siege of Toulon in 1793, but being employed on different sides of the harbour, had not formed an acquaintance. Napoleon's first particular connection with Barras, which was not at the instance of that deputy, took place on the evening of the 12th Vendémiaire, when the nominal command of the troops of the convention was conferred on Barras, and the real command entrusted to Napoleon (O'Meara v. ii, p. 225; Montholon t. ii, p. 211). As to the benignant reception and patronizing smiles of Madame Tallien, it is probable that, previously to the 13th Vendémiaire, they had not been bestowed on Napoleon. That interesting lady and Madame Beauharnais were on the most intimate terms; and if Napoleon frequented the salons of Madame Tallien, before the 13th Vendémiaire, he must have formed the acquaintance of her bosom friend and constant visitor, Madame Beauharnais, also before that event. But his own and other accounts agree in representing his first acquaintance with Madame Beauharnais as occurring subsequently to the 13th Vendémiaire, and while he commanded the army of the interior. The occasion of that acquaintance—the application of Eugene for the sword of his father—his emotion on receiving it—the impression he made on the general, and the visit of his grateful and graceful mother to acknowledge the kindness which had been extended to her son, are facts too well ascertained to be denied or insisted

upon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 119. Las Cases, t. i, p. 222—O'Meara, v. i, p. 179—Constant, t. i, p. 15). So that Madame Tallien cannot be added to the number of persons—Talma, Junot, the Bourriennes, the Permons, etc., who befriended this “unfriended” and indigent officer, before the 13th Vendémiaire. But the fanciful texture of the historian’s language becomes apparent, when it is connected with his previous and subsequent expressions in relation to Napoleon. He first mentions the name of Bonaparte at the siege of Toulon (t. vi, p. 51), and thus introduces him. “In the council of war, there was a *young* officer, who commanded the artillery in the absence of the chief of that corps. His name was Bonaparte, and he was a native of Corsica.” This was in the autumn of 1793. He next notices him in the spring of 1794, in the camp before Saorgio (t. vi, p. 288). “Happily general Dumerbion allowed himself to be directed entirely by the *young* Bonaparte.” The third time he accords this distinction to the hero of Toulon and Saorgio, is in the summer of 1794, when in accounting for the inactivity of the armies of Italy and the Alps, he observes (t. vii, p. 96): “The *young* Bonaparte was even accused of being an accomplice of Robespierre, by reason of the confidence with which his talents and his plans had inspired the younger of these brothers.” The fourth time, in the autumn of 1795, when it appears he is again commemorated as the “*young* officer of artillery

who was known to all the deputies who had been on mission to the army of Italy, and who had decided the taking of Toulon, caused the fall of Saorgio, and the lines of the Roya." Afterwards when the directorial government had got into operation, he is called (t. viii, p. 124): "The *young* Bonaparte who had figured on the 13th Vendémiaire." And in March, 1796, after his marriage and appointment to the command of the army of Italy, it is solemnly recorded that (t. viii, p. 224): "Thirty thousand famished soldiers were confided to a *young* man, *unknown* but daring." So that according to Thiers, Napoleon was not only in the enjoyment of perpetual youth, but as epithets acquire force by regular repetition, was actually younger in the spring of 1796, than he had been in the autumn of 1793. Again—on the 13th Vendémiaire, that is the 4th October 1795, he is the young general *well known* to the convention, as the captor of Toulon, of Saorgio, and of the lines of the Roya; in March 1796, after having added to these distinctions, the victory of Vendémiaire under the eyes of the government itself, and the successful command during a critical season of the army of the interior, he is reduced to "a young man *unknown*." Now the fact is that Napoleon was not only two years and a half older as a man in March 1796, than he was at the siege of Toulon, but as an officer, as he intimated to Aubry, was growing old in the field of battle—was a general of distinction and experience,

versed in the arts of love and war; and at the time of which we are now treating, was more likely and more disposed to confer than to receive benefactions; as may be gathered from his interference to save Menou from condemnation, and to liberate Bourrienne from arrest (Bourrienne, t. i, p. 84). It is true that Napoleon speaks of himself in the spring of 1796 (Montholon, t. iii, p. 120) as "a young man." But it is in reference to the situation he held as a commander in the centre of the republic, when the government was safe and powerful, while the Italian frontier was menaced with invasion; and in contrast with general Hatry, a veteran from the army of the Sambre and the Meuse, who was ordered to Paris to succeed him. In the same relative manner he described himself in September 1793, as "an ancient officer of artillery;" (Montholon, t. iii, p. 11); but this had allusion to his regular education and length of service in the artillery; and was in opposition to officers who without a military education, had entered that corps since the commencement of the revolution, such as those whom he found attached to Cartaux. In this language, there is the simplicity of truth; in that of Thiers, the romance of history. The desire of effect, of displaying vivid and theatrical contrasts, of raising Napoleon by the sudden magic of a fantastic phrase, from perfect obscurity to glittering distinction, probably betrayed this elegant historian into these mawkish misrepresentations;

which besides being in very bad taste, discover a forgetfulness of the claims of common sense, the dignity of history, and the sacredness of truth. In short, Thiers seems not to perceive that an attempt to patronize the fame of Napoleon, is an attempt to degrade it.

It is ridiculous to pretend that Napoleon is remarkable among great generals for his youth. Alexander had overturned the Persian empire before he was twenty-six. At that age Hannibal had conquered Spain, traversed Gaul, passed the Alps, and invaded Italy. Scipio commanded in Spain, and took New Carthage, before he was twenty-four. At the age of twenty-three, Pompey had acquired the title of *imperator* and that of *the great* at twenty-five. Yet we do not find Plutarch perpetually repeating *the young Pompey, the young Alexander*, nor Polybius and Livy, declaring that when Hannibal prepared to scale the Alps, he was *a young man unknown but daring*. The great Condé was not twenty-two when he gained the battle of Rocroy; and before he was twenty-four, had added to that exploit the capture of Thionville, the taking of Philipsburg, and the victory of Nordlingen. Turenne was a major-general at twenty-three years of age. Charles XII fought the battle of Narva, and raised the siege of that place and of Riga in his nineteenth year. Hoche had distinguished himself, and commanded the united armies of the Rhine and the Moselle,

when he was but twenty-five. Napoleon's excellence above other great men, was not in the prematurity of his genius, but in its force.

Out of the contradictory tales of error, vanity, detraction, or malice, which have here been noticed the strong, and simple fact arises, that Napoleon was indebted, for fortune and for fame, up to this period of his life at least, to his own character and services alone.

CHAPTER V.

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(1) This is evident not only from the state of public sentiment disclosed by the votes on this occasion; but from the fact, that after the 18th Brumaire, when the nation had become disgusted with the directory, it was thought necessary to appoint three consuls. Sir Walter Scott (v. iii, pp. 51, 61) expends a profusion of loose and rambling sophistry, to prove, that there existed at this time in the body of the French nation, a "general tendency" in favour of the restoration of the Bourbons, and a strong though reluctant admiration of the British constitution; with all the abuses by which it was then infected. Arguing, however, with that freedom from the restraints of reason and consistency, which is natural and becoming in a writer of romances, he demonstrates the very reverse of what he undertakes to prove; showing conclusively (pp. 60-61) that the nation generally abhorred both the persons and the power of the Bourbons, and that monarchy itself was so odious, that although princes who were not personally detested, such as the dukes of Orleans and York

were mentioned, their names received not the slightest support. It is scarcely worth while to observe, that Lockhart adopts with implicit deference the absurdities of Scott, infringing with constancy and courage the moral of the old saying — *amicus Plato, sed magis amicus veritas*. For a just representation of the state of public feeling in France at this period, the reader who may have forgotten the fate of the expedition to Quiberon in the summer of 1795, is referred to the 1st Chapter of the 8th volume of Thiers. This is the account he gives of the friends of the Bourbons (p. 3). “The royalists concealed themselves behind this mass of malcontents. They consisted of a few emigrants, and returned priests, some creatures of the ancient court who had lost their places, and many indifferent and dastardly persons who dreaded a stormy freedom.”

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(2) Norvins (t. i, p. 10) observes “a third decree submitted these two dispositions to the acceptance of the people, as inseparable from the new constitution.”

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(3) In the exposition of this supplementary provision of the constitution of the year 3, there appears to have prevailed a remarkable indistinctness of expression. Thiers states (t. viii, p. 17) “that the new legislative body was to be

composed of two-thirds of the convention." Scott expounds them in the same manner (v. iii, p. 67) "the first (decree) ordaining the electoral bodies of France to choose as representatives to the two councils under the new constitution at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in convention ;" language which is adopted by Lockhart (v. i, p. 27). Napoleon (Montholon, t. iii, p. 103) explains the provision more accurately—"The convention attached to the constitution two additional laws, by which they prescribed that *two-thirds of the new legislature should be composed of members of the convention.*" Norvins (t. i, p. 70) gives a third interpretation : "By one of these additional laws, the convention formed two-thirds of the legislature;" phraseology which leaves it uncertain whether they were to be composed of the members of the convention, or of persons chosen by the convention. Even if the numbers of the convention and of the new legislature were equal, the statement of Napoleon is the more clear, and is therefore followed in the text.

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(4) On this subject Thiers expresses himself as follows (t. viii, pp. 16-17): "Such was the constitution by which it was hoped to maintain a republic in France. It presented one important question ; the constituent assembly, by an ostentation of disinterestedness, had excluded itself from the legislative assembly by which it was to be replaced ; should the convention do the same? It

must be confessed that such a determination would have been a great imprudence. Among an inconstant people, who, after having lived fourteen centuries under a monarchy, had in a moment of enthusiasm overthrown it, the republic was not so fixed in their manners, that its establishment could be trusted to the course of things. The revolution could only be effectually defended by its founders. The convention was composed for the greater part, of members of the constituent and legislative assemblies; it united in itself the men, who on the 14th of July and the 4th of August, 1789, had abolished the ancient feudal government, had overturned the throne on the 10th of August, had on the 21st of January immolated the chief of the Bourbon dynasty; and who for the space of three years, had made unheard-of efforts to sustain their work against all Europe. These men alone were capable of defending the revolution which was consecrated in the directorial constitution. Therefore, not pluming themselves upon a vain disinterestedness, they decreed on the 22d of August that the new legislative body should be composed of two-thirds of the convention, and that but one-third should be chosen by general election. Norvins says (t. i, p. 69), "The failure of the constitution of 1791, had been justly attributed to the decree of the constituent assembly which excluded all its members from the succeeding legislature." — "At a moment of equal danger, the convention reflected on the fault of its predecessors, and added two additional

laws to the social compact." Napoleon, too, observes (Montholon, t. iii, p. 103): "It was the general opinion that the short duration of the constitution of 1791, was to be attributed to the law of the constituent assembly excluding its members from the legislature." Even Jomini, aide-de-camp of the emperor of Russia, admits (t. vii, p. 213): "That in truth, these dispositions (the additional acts) which caused so much alarm, were, although contrary to the principles of the new constitution, really founded in the interest of the republican party." And Hazlitt (v. i, p. 399) declares, in speaking of these decrees, that "this prompt and seasonable step had for its object to save the country from the return of anarchy, or a counter revolution." These authors of different nations and various opinions, will be found to concur in regard to the prudence of the convention in passing the additional acts; and therefore to justify the expressions on this subject in the text. Sir Walter Scott's exposition of these enactments, however, is altogether opposed to that of the authors above cited, and is too characteristic of the political sentiments pervading the body of his work, and too much at variance with justice, to be passed without examination. It is in these words (v. iii, p. 66): "But the constitution of the year 3, with all its defects, would have been willingly received by the nation in general, as affording some security from the revolutionary storm, had it not been for a selfish and usurping decree of the thermidoriens to mutilate and render it nugatory at the very

outset, by engrafting on it the means of continuing the exercise of their own arbitrary authority. It must never be forgotten, that these conquerors of Robespierre had shared all the excesses of his party, before they became his personal enemies; and that when deprived of their official situations and influence, which they were likely to be by a representative body freely and fairly elected, they were certain to be exposed to great individual danger. Determined, therefore, to retain the power in their own hands, the thermidoriens suffered with an indifference amounting almost to contempt, the constitution to pass through, and to be approved of by, the convention. But under pretence that it would be highly impolitic to deprive the nation of the services of men accustomed to public business, they procured two decrees to be passed; the first ordaining the electoral bodies of France to choose as representatives to the two councils under the new constitution, at least two-thirds of the members presently sitting in convention; and the second declaring, that in default of a return of two-thirds of the present deputies, as prescribed, the convention themselves should fill up the vacancies out of their own body; in other words, should name a large proportion of themselves their own successors in legislative power. These decrees were sent down to the primary assemblies and every art was used to render them acceptable.

“But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this stretch of arbitrary authority. They recollected that all the members who

had sat in the first national assembly, so remarkable for talent, had been declared ineligible, on that single account, for the second legislative body; and now, men so infinitely the inferiors of those who were the colleagues of Mirabeau, Mounier, and other great names, presumed not only to declare themselves eligible by reelection, but dared to establish two-thirds of their number as indispensable ingredients of the legislative assemblies, which, according to the words alike and the spirit of the constitution, ought to be chosen by the free voice of the people. The electors, and particularly those of the sections of Paris, angrily demanded to know, upon what services the deputies of the convention founded their title to a privilege so unjust and anomalous. Among the more active part of them, to whom the measure was chiefly to be ascribed, they saw but a few reformed terrorists, who wished to retain the power of tyranny, though disposed to exercise it with some degree of moderation, and the loss of whose places might be possibly followed by that of their heads; in the other they only beheld a flock of timid and discountenanced helots, willing to purchase personal security at the sacrifice of personal honour and duty to the public; while, in the convention, as a body, who pronounced so large a proportion of their number as indispensable to the service of the state, judging, from their conduct hitherto, they could but discover an image composed partly of iron, partly of clay, deluged with the blood of many thousand victims—a pageant without a will of its own, and which had

been capable of giving its countenance to the worst of actions, at the instigation of the worst of men ;— a sort of Moloch, whose name had been used by its priests, to compel the most barbarous sacrifices. To sum up the whole, these experienced men of public business, without whose intermediation, it was pretended, the national affairs could not be carried on, could only shelter themselves from the charge of unbounded wickedness, by pleading their unlimited cowardice, and by poorly alleging that, for two years, they had sat, voted, and deliberated under a system of compulsion and terror. So much meanness rendered those who were degraded by it unfit, not merely to rule, but to live ; and yet two-thirds of their number were, according to their own decrees, to be intruded on the nation as an indispensable portion of its representatives. Such was the language held in the assemblies of the sections of Paris, who were the more irritated against the domineering and engrossing spirit exhibited in these usurping enactments, because it was impossible to forget that it was their interference, and the protection afforded by the national guard, which had saved the convention from massacre on more occasions than one.”

Looking at the mere exterior of this disquisition of the great novelist, it will be observed, that with a view either of dividing the responsibility of its misrepresentation, or of adding some degree of sanction to its folly, after exhibiting it, in the first instance, as the effusion of his own opinions, he

ascribes it at last to the people of Paris.—“Such was the language held in the assemblies of the people of Paris.” But this expedient, for whichsoever of these purposes it may have been used, is, independently of its insincerity and confusion, signally abortive. For, even if it were true, that these hackneyed metaphors and obvious contradictions had ever been hazarded by any one but the author of *Waverley* himself, the fact which on that hypothesis would arise, viz. that he had adopted the heated extravagance of sentiment and language proper to a paroxysm of party violence—would shew a temper of mind incompatible with the equity of an historian. To admit therefore the assertion which he employs to enforce his reprobation of this measure and its authors, is an effectual way of exposing his injustice. Another remark obviously suggested by this passage, is, that, throughout, Sir Walter suppresses the important fact, that the operation of these additional acts was expressly limited, at the utmost, to two years, after which the right of election, as defined by the constitution, was to revert fully to the people. When this fact is attended to, in connection with the delicacy and danger of effecting a transition from one set of fundamental institutions to another, in time of unextinguished civil faction, and of uncompromising foreign war, the unfairness of Sir Walter Scott (who knew that at Quiberon immediately before, and at the *Ile Dieu* during this period, his own government, at an immense expense of gold and honour, had

kindled civil war in France) in imputing to selfishness a proceeding which was clearly attributable to patriotic discretion, will appear the more inexcusable. He had already objected (p. 65) to this constitution that "it was new,"—"a mere experiment in politics." Without stopping to inquire whether it would have been honest or wise in the convention to reestablish the *old* constitution of France, which Sir Walter confesses (v. i, p. 68) afforded security neither to property nor person, and which was so utterly corrupt as to be deemed unsusceptible of improvement or regeneration, it may be affirmed that the fact of the newness of the constitution of the year 3, of its being "an experiment," or to use the language of Thiers, a system not yet "fixed in the manners of the people," rendered it the duty of the representatives to adopt such measures, as, without being inconsistent with morality, should appear likely to engraft the new institutions firmly in the habits of the nation, and protect them from the assaults of foreign, and the sap of domestic foes.

There is yet another observation suggested by a general view of the strictures of Sir Walter Scott, on these additional acts of the convention. The very ardent zeal with which he seems suddenly inspired in favour of a "representative body freely and fairly elected;"—"a legislative assembly chosen by the free voice of the people," must attract the notice of every reader. Throughout his work, he holds up the British constitution, in its unreformed

state, as a model of perfection in government, as v.i, p. 73) "the noble system of masculine freedom which had been consolidated by the successive efforts of so many patriots in so many ages." Yet, so far was this "noble system of masculine freedom" from admitting of "a representative body chosen by the free voice of the people," that seats in one of the branches of its legislature, were, and are held, like land and houses, by hereditary tenure, and a large proportion of places in the other, were filled without regard to the voice of the people, upon the avowed principle of introducing and continuing in the legislature, men of political talent and of experience in public business. So that, while an inveterate violation of the freedom of popular election of England is, in the scales of this writer's historical balance, the essence of "masculine freedom," a temporary encroachment on it in France, at a moment of the greatest danger, is a selfish "stretch of arbitrary authority," "an unjust and anomalous privilege," "an act of domineering and engrossing usurpation," of "unbounded wickedness or unlimited cowardice," which rendered its authors "unfit, not merely to rule, but to live."

Regarding, with closer attention, this tirade against the convention and their work, it is discoverable that Sir Walter attributes the additional acts to inconsistent motives; that is, to the cowardice of the convention in the first instance, and to their ambition in the second—to an excessive love of life, and an inordinate love of power. Now,

if it be true that they passed the additional acts, because they feared that, upon losing their places, they would lose their heads, it cannot be true that they enacted these laws, because they “wished to retain the power of tyranny,” and “*dared* to establish two-thirds of their number” in the new legislature from a “domineering and engrossing spirit.” These motives being antagonist, and each sufficient, the admission of either is the exclusion of the other. While, therefore, considered as causes, they cannot be connected with the conduct of the convention in passing the additional acts, and leave those salutary regulations to be drawn from the motives of patriotism and prudence, from which they have been justly deduced by the authors already referred to; considered as effects, they are to be traced distinctly to causes existing in the character and disposition of Sir Walter Scott, the consciousness of which should have deterred him from undertaking a work touching the honour of France, or the glory of Napoleon. These causes, excluding some which have been alluded to, are, first, the most contracted prejudice against the nation and the hero; second, the grossest infatuation in favour of that line of pretenders, whose claims and reputation were equally wounded by the freedom of the French people, and the renown of their emperor; and third, the habit of turning history into romance, and romance into history.

The absurdity of imputing want of courage and capacity to such men as Carnot, Sieyes, Louvet,

Legendre, Delacroix, Tallien, Fréron, Boissy d'Anglas, Thibaudeau, Cambacères, Rewbell, etc.,—men who had overthrown the tyranny of Bourbons and priests, of Robespierre and the jacobins, and had at the same time defended their devoted country against the force of more than half of Europe, aided by the mercenary influence of England and the machinations of the exiled princes; is, besides its injustice, as ridiculous as the pretext assigned for it; which is, that they did not overthrow Robespierre sooner. In specifying this charge, Sir Walter's words are (v. iii, p. 52), "If they had shown proper firmness, the revolution of the 9th Thermidor might as well have been achieved at the beginning of that frightful anarchy (that is, the reign of terror) as after that long period of unheard-of suffering." So that Brutus and Cassius were cowards because they did not kill Cæsar as soon as he crossed the Rubicon, instead of waiting until he had fought the battles of Pharsalia, Thapsus, and Munda; had destroyed Pompey and his sons, Scipio and Cato; and fixed his power so firmly, that it was perpetuated by his nephew. But, unfortunately, Sir Walter, in the previous volume, in which he was not quite so intent upon depreciating the character of Napoleon, had been at the pains to show that the overthrow of Robespierre, when it was accomplished, was attended by the greatest difficulty and danger. In relating the commencement of the struggle which ended in that fortunate catastrophe, he avers (v. ii, p. 351) that,

“had Robespierre possessed military talents, or even decided courage, there was nothing to have prevented him from placing himself that very night (the night previous to his downfall) at the head of a desperate insurrection of the jacobins and their followers. Payan actually proposed that the jacobins should instantly march against the two committees—surprise their handful of guards, and stifle the civil war that was menaced, even in the very cradle. This plan was deemed too hazardous to be adopted, though it was one of those sudden and masterstrokes of policy which Machiavel would have recommended.” Now, a stroke of policy which was not likely to succeed, could not be called a “masterstroke ;” and, as Robespierre proved destitute of courage, it would seem according to Sir Walter, that both parties in this desperate struggle were poltroons ! At a later moment of the contest he describes the scenes in the convention (p. 356) as “dreadful,” and asks (p. 357), “who was it that for two years had lived on other terms than under Robespierre’s permission ?” This is the formidable power which he likens to the crushing coils and devouring throat of “the huge Anaconda” (p. 345) that might have been so easily overturned. At a stage still later, he says, “The fate of France, perhaps, depended on the presence of mind and courage” of Henriot—who turned out to be “stupid and cowardly”—and continues (p. 361)—“Fortune, or the demon which he had served, afforded Robespierre another chance for

safety, perhaps for empire." The extreme difficulty of mastering the tyrant and his creatures thus confessed by Sir Walter, is confirmed by other accounts, particularly by that of Thiers; wherein (t. vi, ch. 7) the reader may see the various fluctuations and breathless chances of the struggle vividly pictured. These observations show that the allegation of cowardice and incapacity against the convention, is not only inconsistent with truth, but irreconcilable with the previous statements of Sir Walter himself. The digression into which they have run is no deviation from the subject, for the plain tendency and probable object of this vilification of the convention, its motives and labours, are, as their triumph on the 13th Vendémiaire was indisputably owing to Napoleon, to reflect upon him the discredit of having protected a pack of unprincipled usurpers, and of having volunteered his efforts to rivet upon France, the chains of their selfish domination.

Forbearing to notice other less flagrant falsifications of actual fact or natural inference, these gross misstatements remain to be exposed (v. iii, p. 68). "These decrees were sent down to the primary assemblies of the people, and every art was used to render them acceptable. But the nation, and particularly the city of Paris, generally revolted at this stretch of arbitrary power." One would think, that a writer, styling himself with pompous emphasis (v. ii, p. 358), "a British historian," would have produced some colour of authority for such

broad and positive assertions. The author of *Waverley*, however, seems to be independent of evidence as well as of fact. So far from truth is the assertion, that every art was used by the government to render the decrees acceptable, or to influence the votes of the people on the occasion, that according to the best authority, the very reverse was the fact. Thiers in describing the manner in which the votes were taken in Paris, says, (t. viii, pp. 23, 24): “The sections commenced taking the votes on the constitution and the decrees, by driving off without the least ceremony, the patriots who came to vote at their polls. In some sections they turned them out of doors; in others, they signified to them by handbills that they would have to stay at home; for if they came to the polls they would be insulted and driven away. Many individuals were thus deprived of their rights; they hastened to the convention to reclaim against the violence done to them. The convention disapproved the proceeding of the sections, *but refused to interfere, in order to avoid the appearance even, of recruiting votes, and that the abuse itself might prove the freedom of the deliberation.*” He relates other facts to prove the perfect liberty which was allowed to the popular mind—that in some few departments there were strong minorities—and that individuals here and there proposed a king.

The assertion that “the nation generally” as well as the city of Paris, revolted against this measure

of the government, is so bold a departure from fact, that it amazes as much as it disgusts the reader. Thiers affirms (t. viii, p. 27) "The constitution was accepted almost unanimously, and the decrees by an immense majority;" and (p. 28) says that the malcontents doubting or disputing this fact, demanded an inspection of the registers, scrutinized them, and casting up the enumeration of votes which had been proclaimed by the convention, "found it exact."

It is well known that Lemaitre, the royalist agent, and other factious leaders, used every exertion to excite opposition in the departments, and succeeded, after days of labour, only in provoking some slight movements at Orleans, Chartres, Dreux, Verneuil, and Nonancourt (Thiers, t. viii, p. 30). But if the nation at large as well as the capital was hostile to the constitution, why did not reinforcements pour into Paris to assist the sections? why did the armies, who were the *élite* of the nation, not recruits, accept the constitution and decrees by acclamation; and how could the *cowardly convention* have dared to resist "a general revolt of the nation and of Paris?"

That the reader may be the better able to comprehend the full extent of Sir Walter Scott's temerity and injustice, on the subject of the members of the French convention who formed the constitution of the year 3, and passed the additional acts, and whom the author of *Waverley* describes as "Molochs," and "Helots,"—"men unfit to rule or

to live ;” the following observations in regard to them from the Annual Register of 1795, is submitted to his attention :—“ The majority of the members were chosen on account of the moderation of their character and principles. Some were noted for their preference of a private to a public life, and none were suspected of intending to avail themselves of this opportunity of rising to power. It is more probable, therefore, that they sought to please the nation than to gratify their personal ends” (History of Europe, p. 98).

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(5) This last term was afterwards shortened to the 27th October.—Thiers—(t. viii, p. 73.)

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(6) Napoleon says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 109) that Mariette, one of the deputies he had rescued from the mob at Toulon, and who was at this time a member of the executive committee, recommended his appointment on this occasion; and he told Las Cases (t. i, p. 216) that the husband of Madame Thurreau was also in favour of his appointment, a fact which shows the imminence of the danger, the vivacity with which it was felt, and the confidence which the talents of Bonaparte already commanded.

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(7) The course of his reflections is sketched in the most lively colours by himself—(Las Cases, t. ii, p. 246).

(8) This account of the manner in which Napoleon came to be placed in command of the forces of the convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, is derived from his own relation of that event (Montholon t. iii, ch. 3), from the files of the *Moniteur* of that period (folio for the last six months of the year 1795), and from the *procès-verbal* of the convention (t. lxxi, p. 232, et t. lxxii, p. 16). The narrative of Sir Walter Scott, in reference to this subject, has evidently been constructed of very different materials. It is as follows (v. iii, p. 74): “The general management of affairs, and the direction of the conventional forces” (says this inventive historian) “was then committed to Barras; but the utmost anxiety prevailed among the members of the committee by whom government was administered, to find a general of nerve and decision enough to act under Barras in the actual command of the military force, in a season so delicate, and times so menacing. It was then that a few words from Barras, addressed to his colleagues Carnot and Tallien, decided the fate of Europe for well nigh twenty years. ‘I have the man,’ he said, ‘whom you want; a little Corsican officer, who will not stand upon ceremony.’ The acquaintance of Barras and Bonaparte had been, as we have already said, formed at the siege of Toulon.”—“On the recommendation of Barras, Bonaparte was sent for.” It is needless to insist on the direct contradiction to which this fabrication is

exposed by the declaration of Napoleon, that he had no acquaintance with Barras at Toulon, and that he went, of his own accord, to the committee; because there is one fact which ought to have satisfied Sir Walter that his story, whether formed by his own fancy, or furnished by some unmentionable slanderer, could not be believed by any person of common sense. It is, that Carnot and Tallien, with the knowledge of Barras, were members of the committee, with which, for many weeks, Napoleon had been in official and constant communication. It is impossible, therefore, that to men thus situated, Barras could have ejaculated the sudden discovery here ascribed to him, respecting the birth, stature, or character of Napoleon, or that, had he done so, Carnot and Tallien would have committed the safety of themselves, their families, their friends, and government, when they were under "the utmost anxiety," to an obscure officer, thus suddenly and queerly remembered. What renders the remark more incredible, is, that Napoleon, instead of being an obscure "little Corsican officer," [was personally known to a number of the leading members of the convention, as the most distinguished officer of his rank in the army. Norvins (t. i, p. 73) gives a fair, but not an exact representation of this matter. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 402, et s. viii) copies, without acknowledgment, the narrative of Napoleon, while, as the reader may suppose, Lockhart (v. i, p. 29) republishes the ridiculous fabrication of Scott, to which, with surprise and sorrow he it

said, the account of Thiers, to be examined hereafter, bears too close a resemblance.

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(9) Thiers (t. viii, p. 47) expresses an opinion that the best plan for Bonaparte would have been to act on the offensive, and disperse the insurgents by a brisk attack, without waiting for their aggression. This idea does not seem warranted by the relative condition of the parties, either in a political or military point of view. First, it was an object with the convention to keep their adversaries in the wrong; second, the danger of commencing the attack, and pursuing different detachments of insurgents through long and separated streets, was exemplified then by Menou, and has since been more fully by Marmont, in the revolution of July. Instead of eight thousand men, five thousand regular troops, and three thousand volunteers and police, Marmont had twelve thousand, all regular troops, including five thousand of the royal guard. But, instead of keeping these troops concentrated, he left but feeble detachments in the neighbourhood of the Tuileries, sent one column from the rue Royal up the boulevards; another by the quays along the river to the place de Grève; a third to the Marché des Innocens, and a fourth up the rue Richlieu and the boulevards to the place de la Bastille, and thence down to the place de Grève, while the 15th regiment was stationed beyond the river in three detachments, at the palace of Justice,

the Pantheon, and the Hotel des Invalids. The result of this dissemination of his force in order to act on the offensive, to attack and disperse crowds, was, that some of his detachments were overpowered by the populace, and some seduced; that others could not reach the points to which they were directed, form the junctions which were prescribed, or even return by the streets through which they had penetrated; and that while one column attacked the people with determined spirit, another refused to fire on them. It has been observed, that after affairs became desperate, and all offensive plans had failed, Marmont, when it was too late, collected his troops upon the same points which the eye of Napoleon had at once fixed on. As he was probably with Napoleon on the 13th Vendémiaire, and was a man of military talents and experience, his error is remarkable. Perhaps a secret repugnance to follow the example of a chief whose standard he had deserted, turned his view from the path of judgment. Perhaps he wanders an outcast from his country, because he proved a traitor to his friend.

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(10) This comparative estimate of the force on either side, differs from that of Sir Walter Scott, who, although he admits that Napoleon had but about eight thousand men, represents his force as formidable and imposing. To colour this misrepresentation, he describes the insurgents as feeble,

though numerous, and says (v. iii, p. 75) that Napoleon had "two hundred pieces of cannon." Now, the fact is, that the sections had at their disposal forty thousand national guards, who had been in regular training ever since August, 1794, and Napoleon, as he asserts (Montholon t. iii, p. 110; Las Cases t. ii, p. 248; see also Norvins t. i, p. 74) had but about forty pieces of cannon, which were however all-sufficient for his eight thousand men, if he meant to use musketry or bayonets at all. Lockhart, not willing to sanction the statement of Napoleon, nor daring to repeat the huge exaggeration of Sir Walter, asserts (v. i, p. 30), that the artillery of the camp of Sablons, for which Murat was despatched, consisted of "fifty great guns." This fabrication, though amid such a number of grosser and more artful ones, it might appear unworthy of notice, is deserving of attention, because it is obviously the design of both the Scotch biographers to discredit the word of Napoleon, by contradictions on immaterial points, so that when they come to examine important subjects, or to advance favourite calumnies, the reader may be disposed to consider his assertion as entitled to even less weight than their own.

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(11) Sir Walter Scott, it is evident, was almost as well qualified to command an army, as to canonize the virtues of a French hero. He insists upon it, that the best policy for the insurgents was to

barricade the streets, block up Bonaparte and his troops within the circuit of his posts, and wait the effect of famine. As an army of two hundred thousand men, and a population of several millions, might be daily expected in such a conjuncture, to pour their strength into Paris, this would be like advising a pack of sheep-stealers to surround the fold, and wait quietly until the shepherds with their dogs, should come upon them in the morning. It is singular that Thiers, who asserts so emphatically what Sir Walter attempts to conceal, the favourable disposition of the great majority of the nation, and the enthusiastic acquiescence of the army in the proposed constitution and the decrees, should have adopted the idea (t. vii, p. 49) that Bonaparte, after having provided for a retreat to Meudon, would suffer himself to be shut up in the Tuileries, while his cannon commanded the bridges, the Champs Elysées, and the plain of Grenelle; or that there would have been time to reduce him by famine in the centre of a country, of which the army and a vast majority of the people were on his side. Danican and Lafonde, knowing the state of public feeling, and the natural tendency of the turbulent passions to subside, saw that delay would to them be ruin.

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(12) It will be remembered that, on witnessing the violence of the populace on the 20th June, 1792, he said, if the king had, at the beginning, swept off a few hundreds of the rioters with cannon, "the rest would be running now."

(13) Different accounts exist of this appointment by the convention, but that given by Napoleon (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 255; Montholon t. iii, p. 116) is adopted in the text. The narrations of the biographers and historians, whose works I have consulted on this subject, are as various almost as their names. Scott (v. iii, p. 78) says, "But a separate triumph was destined to Bonaparte as the hero of the day. Five days after the battle, Barras solicited the attention of the convention to the young officer, by whose prompt and skilful dispositions, the Tuileries had been protected on the 13th Vendémiaire, and proposed that they should approve of general Bonaparte's appointment as second in command of the army of the interior, Barras himself still remaining commander in chief. The proposal was adopted by acclamation." Lockhart (v. i, p. 31) says, "This eminent service secured the triumph of the conventionalists, who now assuming new names, continued, in effect, to discharge their old functions. Barras took his place at the head of the directory, having Sieyes, Carnot, and other less celebrated persons for his colleagues; and the first director took care to reward the hand to which he owed his elevation. Within five days from the *day of the sections*, Bonaparte was named second in command of the army of the interior; and, shortly afterwards, Barras finding his duties as director sufficient to occupy his time, gave up the command in chief of the same army to his "little

Corsican officer." Hazlitt (v. i, p. 409) copies, without acknowledgment or explanation, the account of Napoleon, stating that he was chosen commander in chief; while Norvins (t. i, p. 76) asserts, that "the convention confirmed his nomination as second in command of the army of the interior." It will be perceived, that these accounts disagree with each other, while all but the blind translation of Hazlitt are at variance with the relation of Napoleon himself. As this juxtaposition demonstrates that but one of the four narratives can possibly be right, a slight analysis will prove that each of them is wrong. Scott and Lockhart however agree in one favourite point, in representing Napoleon as the protégé of Barras. The first affirms that "*Barras solicited the attention of the convention to the young officer,*" and "proposed that they should approve of general Bonaparte's appointment as second in command of the army of the interior, Barras himself still remaining commander in chief." According to Scott, therefore, Bonaparte must have been indebted to Barras, not only for his first employment on the night of the 12th Vendemaire as second in command of the conventional forces (see note 8 of this appendix), but for being confirmed in this command after the struggle of the 13th was over. Lockhart makes Napoleon equally the creature of Barras, representing the latter with remarkable ignorance of French history, as the colleague of Sieyes at this time, and as resigning his command *after* he became direc-

tor to his "little Corsican officer," It might be difficult to determine whether Sieyes, having been elected a director on the first occasion (though he refused the place, which was actually filled by Carnot; see *Histoire de France depuis 1789, par Toulangeon*, t. iii, p. 223), or his having served as successor to Rewbell four years subsequently (see Thiers t. x, p. 284), misled Lockhart into the absurdity of furnishing a directory of five members with six persons, either circumstance, however light, being cause sufficient for an effect so trivial. But, however this may be, if these writers are to be credited, the inference would arise, that inasmuch as Napoleon, in his repeated narratives of this part of his life, attributes no agency and confesses no obligation to Barras, he wantonly misstated a fact, and meanly suppressed the acknowledgment of a favour. As this miscreated inference has an obvious tendency to discredit his Memoirs, and to disparage his character, it is to be regretted that the narrative of Thiers should be found to enforce it. Reference has already been made to the slighting and defamatory neglect and contradiction to which the biographers of Napoleon, whether calumnious like Scott, impartial like Hazlitt, or laudatory like Norvins, subject statements, however earnest and positive, in his account of his own life, and one or two instances of similar unfairness have been noticed on the part of the best historian of the French revolution. Affirmations which Napoleon made in relation to facts of which he himself was the agent or witness,

these writers virtually deny, or captiously contradict, without pretending to the slightest personal knowledge of the subject, or condescending to assign the smallest reason for this modest valuation, indulged in by each of his own authority. The injustice of this proceeding, both in regard to the memory of Napoleon, and the confidence of their readers, need not be enlarged upon, inasmuch as every mind attentive to the matter, must at once discover the labyrinth of doubt and confusion, both as to character and events, into which these conflicting statements and arbitrary insinuations lead. With a view of sustaining my own narrative, and of enabling the reader to determine to which side the balance of truth inclines, between the statements of Napoleon and the asseverations of these writers, I shall select the account of Thiers, as being the latest and the fullest among them, and, from the nature and spirit of his work, the most free from partiality or prejudice. And in order to render the examination more clear and complete, I shall place the adverse statements in relation to the command of the army of the interior, in opposite columns.

Napoleon's was dictated almost word for word at different times to Las Cases and to Montholon. The transcript of the latter, beginning with the first appointment, is here quoted (t. iii, pp. 108, 109 et 10). "Each member proposed, as successor to Menou, the general who enjoyed his particular confidence; the Thermido-

Thiers after mentioning the agitation of the convention, says (t. viii, p. 40), "At this moment, which recalled all the dangers of Thermidor, they thought of the deputy Barras, who in his character of general of brigade, had been clothed with the command on that memorable day, and had acquitted himself with all the

riens proposed Barras ; but he was little acceptable to the other parties. Those who had been at Toulon, with the army of Italy, and the members of the committee of public safety who had daily intercourse with Napoleon, proposed him as the person most capable of extricating the convention from their dangerous position, by the quickness of his *coup d'œil*, the energy and moderation of his character. Mariette, who belonged to the moderate party, and was one of the most influential members of the committee of forty, approved this choice. Napoleon who heard all this from the midst of the crowd, deliberated nearly a half an hour with himself on the step which it was proper for him to take. At length he decided, and repaired to the committee, to whom he described in a lively manner the impossibility of his being able to direct so important an operation with three representatives who actually exercised the power and controlled the conduct of the commanding general ; he added, that he had witnessed the event in the rue Vivienne ; where the commissaries had been the most to blame, although they had presented themselves in the convention as triumphant accusers of Menou." "Struck by Napoleon's reasons, but not having the power to annul the authority of the commissaries of the convention without a long debate in that assembly ; the committee, in order to reconcile all their objects, for there was no time to lose, determined to propose Barras for general in chief, giving Napoleon at the same time the place of second in command. By

energy that was desirable. (p. 41) They appointed him general of the army of the interior, and gave him as adjoints the three representatives who had been charged before his appointment with the direction of the armed force. One circumstance rendered this choice very fortunate. Barras had near him an officer (Bonaparte) very capable of commanding, and he would not have had the littleness of mind to exclude a man more able than himself." (p. 42) "Barras thought of him the 12th Vendémiaire in the night ; and requested that he should be appointed his second in command, which request was granted. The two selections, submitted to the convention during the same night, were instantly approved. Barras confided the care of the military dispositions to the young general, who immediately charged himself with them all." (p. 55) "The convention accorded a brilliant reception to Barras and Bonaparte. Barras, already celebrated since the 9th Thermidor, became still more so by the day of Vendémiaire. To him was attributed the safety of the convention. Nevertheless he did not fear to assign a portion of his glory to his young lieutenant. 'It is general Bonaparte,' said he, 'whose prompt and skilful dispositions have saved this assembly (*enceinte*).' These words were applauded. The command of the army of the interior was confirmed to Barras, and the second in command to Bonaparte."

this expedient, the three commissaries were got rid of, without having any cause of complaint. As soon as Napoleon found himself charged with the command of the forces which were to protect the convention, he repaired to an apartment of the Tuileries in which was Menou, etc." (p. 116). "When, after this great event, the officers of the army of the interior were presented in a body to the convention, that assembly declared Napoleon by acclamation general in chief of the army of the interior, Barras not being able longer to combine the title of representative with military functions."

Previously to entering into a comparative analysis of these disagreeing recitals, it may be well to observe, that Napoleon's was prior in point of time, was dictated originally, without the advantage of reference to other accounts, was prepared in a situation not convenient for research nor conducive to meditation, and having once passed from his possession, was never afterwards in his power; while that of Thiers, subsequent in date, purports to be the product of extensive reference and industrious collation, and was composed in a position in the highest degree favourable to the detection of error and the discovery of truth. As far as regards the influence of predisposing circumstances, the record of the sedate historian would seem to prefer a stronger claim to belief than is presented by the statement of the personal narrator. But let us see. In the first place, Thiers affirms that Barras

was appointed general in chief on this urgent occasion, in consequence of his special qualifications, and creates the unavoidable inference, that he was thought capable of meeting the crisis. This, however, is altogether improbable, inasmuch, as if Barras had been thought competent for the emergency, why should the committee themselves have appointed a second in command? Was it the custom of the French government at the time, not only to furnish a commanding general with three deputies as commissaries or adjoints, but also with a designated second in command? Was it the case with respect to Pichegru, Jourdan, Moreau, or Hoche? Again, if the committee had full confidence in Barras, they could have no more in Bonaparte, and therefore his appointment as second in command would have been a useless, if not offensive innovation, at a moment of extreme and immediate danger. If it was not a superfluous formality involving unseasonable delay, and perhaps fatal embarrassment, it was the effect of a less degree of confidence being felt by the committee in the qualifications of Barras than in those of Bonaparte, which establishes a conclusion subversive of the statement of Thiers; that is, it proves that Barras was not appointed in consequence of his supposed capacity for the command, but for some other reason. This other reason is found in the statement of Napoleon. Barras was nominated by some members of the convention, in consideration of his activity on the 9th Thermidor; Bonaparte

was proposed by Mariette, and other members, on account of his military talents, of which they had witnessed the display, and of his firm and moderate character, with which Mariette was particularly acquainted. The compromise between these two opinions, and the necessity of employing decided military abilities, as well as of getting rid of the incumbrance of the commissaries, who were protested against by Bonaparte, induced the committee, in all probability with the concurrence of Barras, to give Barras the nominal command, in order that he might engross the attendance of the commissaries; and to confer on Bonaparte the real command, in order that he might meet and repel the insurgents. With respect to the next assertion, that Barras requested the committee to appoint Bonaparte his second in command before *he* confided the direction of the military dispositions to Bonaparte, the absurdity of the idea renders the statement incredible; for the moment Barras was appointed general in chief, he would have possessed, not only from the nature of his office, but from the letter of his commission, had his command been real, ample authority to appoint Bonaparte his second in command without the agency of the committee. The decree conferring the appointment on Barras was prepared by the executive committee; and runs thus:—“The national convention decrees, that the general of brigade, Barras, representative of the people, is appointed general in chief of the armed force of Paris, and of

the army of the interior, and that *all authorities, civil and military, are required to acknowledge and obey him as such.*" With this absolute authority, it is impossible to conceive, that (had it been more than nominal) Barras, in a moment of such critical peril, would have taken the trouble, time, or risk, of applying to a committee of forty members, to make an appointment which he himself had singly the power to make. If he could have committed so dangerous a blunder, he certainly was totally unfit to hold more than the qualified and negative trust which was really confided to him, and which from its nature, renders the idea of his application for Bonaparte's appointment inconsistent and absurd. From these considerations, it must be concluded, that Bonaparte's employment on this occasion, instead of being in compliance with a request of Barras, was the effect of his own reputation, the danger of the moment, and the impression he made on the committee. Thiers proceeds to declare, that these two appointments having been agreed on by the committee, were submitted to the convention the same night, and instantly sanctioned. It is impossible for me to judge of the weight of his authority for this naked assertion, as he refers to no document or writer in support of it, nor professes to have been a witness, as Napoleon says he was, of the events in question. This much, however, I can venture to state, that it is at variance with the account of the matter furnished by the contemporaneous report of the debates of the

convention in the *Moniteur*, and in the collection of documents entitled, *Procès-verbal de la Convention nationale*. From these official papers, it appears, that at half-past four in the night session of the 12th Vendémiaire, Merlin de Douai, on the part of the committee, proposed to the convention a decree appointing Barras general in chief, which proposition was proposed and adopted in the words already recited; and that immediately afterwards three deputies were appointed as his adjoints, according to the invariable rule in such cases. It further appears that on this occasion, not a word was said of Bonaparte, his name not being submitted to the convention. This fact, while it conflicts with the assertion of Thiers, confirms to the letter the statement of Napoleon, who says, that his appointment was the work of the committee alone. Moreover, from the late hour at which Merlin de Douai proposed the decree, half-past four A.M., it is evident, that in this crisis of the public distemper, Barras was exhibited by the executive committee as an absorbent to take up the annoyance of the superintending deputies. For Bonaparte had been on duty, and exercising the real command long before; as at one o'clock he had sent off Murat to the camp of Sablons in time to complete the conveyance of forty pieces of artillery to the Tuileries, within less than an hour after the proposition of Merlin was made. So much for the first appointment. With regard to the circumstances and character of the second, Thiers will be

found to be still more egregiously mistaken. He asserts that Barras, already celebrated on account of the 9th of Thermidor, gained an accession of glory by the day of Vendémiaire, and adds positively, in reference to the occasion of this second appointment, "to him was attributed the safety of the convention." (*On lui attribua le salut de la convention*). Here again I am forced to disclaim all acquaintance with his authority, and, of consequence, the ability of estimating its value. If however, the journals of the debates in the *Moniteur*, and the *procès-verbal*, one record corroborating the other, are to be relied on, it would appear that the invention of the historian, had it been exerted in emulation of sir W. Scott, could hardly have contrived a statement more remote from the truth than this is.

According to these official documents, on the 18th Vendémiaire, Fréron, a distinguished member of the convention, in a speech urging the propriety of correcting the arrangement which Aubry, while at the head of the war department, had adopted respecting the employment of general officers, said, "Forget not (*n'oubliez pas*) that the general of artillery, Bonaparte, appointed in the night of the 12th to replace general Menou, and who only had to the morning of the 13th to make the skilful dispositions of which you have seen the happy effects, was taken from his own line of service to be put in the infantry." This pregnant sentence shews how far the convention was from attributing their safety

to Barras. Fréron speaks of two facts connected by their relation to Napoleon. One he recalls to the memory of his hearers; the other he mentions as dwelling in their minds and obvious to their judgment. The first was, that Bonaparte had been unfairly treated by Aubry; the second, that as successor to Menou, or real commander in chief, he had saved the convention. The speech in question contains not the remotest allusion to Barras. It produced a motion of reference from Letourneur, a member of the committee which had concerted the two appointments, who by his silence confirmed the agency assigned by Fréron to Bonaparte, and the nullity implied against Barras.

The reader will not fail to observe, that although the members of the convention generally were ignorant of the appointment of Napoleon at the time it was made by the committee, they could not remain so many days afterwards; and had no doubt come to a full knowledge of his services at the time Fréron made his speech.

But Thiers assigns to Barras as large a portion of magnanimity as of glory. He says "He did not fear to transfer a portion of his glory to his young lieutenant. 'It is general Bonaparte,' said he, 'whose prompt and skilful dispositions have saved this assembly.' These words were applauded. Barras' appointment as commander in chief of the army of the interior was confirmed, and that of Bonaparte as second in command also."

If we trust to the journals of the convention,

every allegation of which this statement is composed, except the *very last*, is unfounded. At half past nine on the evening of the 13th, Barras entered the hall of the convention, and gave an account of the operations and success of the day, all in the first person, without the slightest allusion to Napoleon, and in a strain so egoistical, that had Barras really achieved the defeat of the insurgents, it would have been unbecoming. On the 14th, he spoke on the same subject, and in the same strain, saying not a word of Napoleon, although he mentioned his own colleague, Talot. On the 17th, he spoke three times in relation to the conflict with the sections, altogether omitting his nominal second in command. Finally, when Bonaparte and the other officers were introduced, he declined an opportunity that was afforded by another member, to draw the slightest distinction in his favour. For when Baraillon proposed that a set of arms should be presented to the officers who most distinguished themselves, Barras said, "they all had distinguished themselves—it was impossible to discriminate;" slighting at once the associated rank which Bonaparte held, and the committee who had conferred it. Does this seem like *not fearing to allow a fair share of glory to his young lieutenant*? However, after Bonaparte and the other officers had retired, and when Fréron in debating another subject, mentioned incidentally and by way of illustration, the real command and eminent and admitted services of Napoleon, "the

happy effects of whose skilful dispositions, as successor to general Menou, you have seen ;” then, when silence could no longer serve his purposes, Barras spoke out — although the subject did not require it — and attempting a transition from selfishness to liberality, from jealousy to patronage, said, — “ I will call the attention of the national convention to general Bonaparte ; it is to him, it is to his skilful dispositions that we are indebted for the defence of this hall around which he had distributed the posts with great ability. I move that the convention confirm the nomination of Bonaparte to the place of second in command of of the army of the interior.” This restricted praise might have been aptly added to the observation which Barras had made respecting the officers generally, on the occasion of Baraillon’s motion, and though it would not have been an evidence of magnanimity, it would have been an act approaching to justice. But when it is considered that on all appropriate occasions Barras had not permitted the name of Bonaparte to escape his lips, and uttered it only after the positive and uncontradicted assertion of an eminent member had rent asunder the veil of his concealment, and by an implied and sarcastic rebuke, forced him either to confess his injustice or to seem to repair it, it is difficult to form any other opinion respecting his conduct on the occasion, than that so far from its being that of a liberal patron to his “ little Corsican officer,” it was an ungenerous and mean attempt to appro-

priate to his own possession, credit which was due to a distinguished and successful general.

Another of the incredible assertions in this statement of the historian is, that the appointments of Barras and Bonaparte, as first and second in command of the army of the interior, were on this occasion of singular magnanimity in the life of the former, confirmed by the convention. He has before declared (p. 42) that these same appointments were submitted to the convention on the night of the 12th, and then confirmed. Yet he will have his readers believe that they were again confirmed on the 18th. That man must entertain a singular conception of legislative power, who will assert or believe that a law, perfect in its character, and unlimited as to time, must be re-enacted every six days by the authority from which it emanated, in order to preserve its force. The decree of the convention, which had not been repealed, was complete and effectual in the first instance, and could not be made more so by repetition. Approximating these two assertions of Thiers, it appears that one inevitably falsifies the other. But comparing them with the facts attested by the journals of the convention, it results that half of each is true, and half false—making the amount of error detected by either process the same, but the disposition of it different. Thus, it is true that the appointment of Barras was confirmed on the night of the 12th, and that of Bonaparte on the day of the 18th. It is not true that Bonaparte's appointment was con-

firmed on the night of the 12th, nor that Barras's was on the day of the 18th. The first member of this negative proposition has been demonstrated already by reference to the proceedings of the convention on the night of the 12th, in the official record of which, neither the name nor the appointment of Bonaparte occurs. The same record establishes the second, by showing that on the 18th, not a word was said respecting the appointment of Barras; while upon his constrained and ungracious motion, that of Bonaparte was confirmed. "The national convention confirms the nomination made by the committee of public safety, of general Bonaparte to the place of second in command of the army of the interior."—(*Procès-verbal de la Convention nationale*, t. lxxi, p. 26). This part of the great history of Thiers, can afford but little insight into the character of Barras, or the life of Napoleon; yet, considering this edition was published in 1832, the author announcing himself "minister of state, and a deputy," it will be apt to inspire foreigners with strange ideas of the legislative wisdom of France. According to this accomplished author and practised statesman, an appointment made by the executive, and confirmed by the legislature in one week, is, in the regular course of proceedings, to be confirmed over again by the same legislature the next week, in order to keep it in force; and that too, in cases where it is known to the legislature that the nature of the office is temporary, and that it is the intention, as well as the interest of the

incumbent, to resign it within a few days. That this much was known to the legislature in respect to Barras, is evident from the fact, that in sixteen days after this alleged second confirmation, he did resign, and with symptoms of impatience, his appointment as *provisional general* of the army of the interior (Procès-verbal, t. lxxii, p. 403); and also from the fact that he was then a candidate for a seat in the directory, into which, as we learn from Thiers himself (t. viii. p. 80) strong objections were entertained against admitting military commanders. Now, although Barras did not rank among the distinguished generals, he was not popular enough to risk the objection, as, after getting rid of his military appointment, and making all the advantage he could, both by concealing and confessing with equal fraud, the services and glory of "his young lieutenant," he obtained the smallest number of votes of the five persons who were elected directors. Out of the 218 votes that were given, Larévellière-Lepaux got 216, while Barras received but 129; the other three numbers being respectively 189, 176, and 156.

While these remarks satisfy the reader as to the fitness of Barras to the chief command of the conventional forces, and his magnanimity in the distribution of the glory of Vendémiaire, they will also show some of the errors into which Thiers entangled his narrative, by allowing his nimble invention, or fastidious taste, to deviate from the plain, firm, and consistent account, left by the principal actor in the scene he was describing.

Returning to the simple narrative of Napoleon, it will be easy to prove that it is true in every respect. It has already been shown, by explaining the nature of the appointment itself, and the circumstances in which it was made, as well as by the uncontradicted assertion of Fréron, that Napoleon was placed by the committee in nominal subordination to Barras, in order to render him really independent of the commissaries or adjoints. It has also been shown that the convention, with the knowledge of this antecedent fact, and of the prospective one, that Barras was soon to resign even his nominal superiority, confirmed this appointment made by the committee. When a government appoints a man second in command of an army, knowing that the first in command is never to exercise his nominal authority, and is in a few days to resign it, it is equivalent to conferring on this man the command in chief. In the particular case in question, it was more emphatically so, inasmuch as Barras was from the first the scape-goat to carry off the sins of the adjoints, and by that means to increase the power of Napoleon ; facts, avowed by Fréron, when he said that Bonaparte, notwithstanding Barras' appointment, was the successor of general Menou, who had just before been commander in chief. It is to be observed further, that while the appointment of Napoleon, formally as well as really, to the command in chief, would have been a harsh extrusion of Barras from his nominal rank, it would have subjected his suc-

cessor to the control of the commissaries before the danger of the crisis was entirely over — consequences, of which the first would have been unnecessary, and the second inconvenient. These observations, it is hoped, will be received as conclusive that Napoleon confined his narration strictly within the limits of truth, when he described himself as the *actual* commander in chief, from the time that, under his own conditions, he was appointed by the executive committee; and as the *acknowledged* commander in chief, from the moment the appointment of the committee, under the circumstances which are here explained, was confirmed by the unanimous vote of the convention, the highest authority of the state. The only remaining point of his narrative to be considered, is that in which he affirms, that, on being presented with the other officers to the convention, he was “named *by acclamation* commander in chief of the army of the interior.” This would seem to have been rather a spontaneous movement of the members, upon seeing the man whom they had by this time learned was their real deliverer, than a formal act of the legislative body, and can be more readily conceived to have happened, from the fact, that on the evening of the 13th, and the next morning, when the great mass of the convention supposed Barras was the saviour of the state, they hailed his appearance uniformly with acclamations. Besides, Thiers himself says, that Barras’ proposition that the appointment of

Bonaparte should be confirmed, "was applauded." So that, while there are many circumstances of probability in favour of this statement, besides the weight of Napoleon's word, there is not one against it.

An assertion, which is confined neither to sir Walter Scott, nor to the English language, has been hazarded, imputing to Napoleon that gross and disordered self-love which could induce him deliberately to misstate facts, and falsify events, in order to aggrandize his glory in the view of posterity. As a general charge, this general answer to it readily presents itself; that a man, conscious of possessing such substantial titles to renown as he must have been, would not be apt to desire or risk a reliance on false pretensions. Were this the proper place in the present work to investigate the grounds of this charge, it might be alleged, that the comparison which has just been made between the easy narrative of Napoleon, and the elaborate history of Thiers, does not invalidate the authority which the name of the former is likely to confer on his words. It might too be pertinently added, that another and a similar statement of his, which has been relied on in the text, and which, if unsupported, would be obnoxious to this odious charge, is fortified by the short but pregnant speech of Fréron, that has proved so fatal to the fictions of Thiers, and which attests so fully the veracity of Napoleon. In relating his difficulties with Aubry, the emperor says (*Montholon*, t.iii, p. 89), that the

other officers of artillery, who were discontented with Aubry's arrangements, referred to his case as the most glaring example of Aubry's injustice. If this assertion were disputed, which, with the generous confidence of truth he made on his own authority alone, although it is of a nature to be almost unsusceptible of direct proof, the observation of Fréron in his speech would suffice to confirm it, since he referred with the silent but virtual acquiescence of his colleagues, to Bonaparte's case, in addressing the convention, as the most flagrant instance of Aubry's injustice. For the naked assertions of the authors of these invidious charges, it is not likely that such apt and corroborating authority will often be found.

The failure of Thiers, as well as the four biographers of Napoleon, to notice his striking boldness in insisting on being freed from the encumbrance of adjoints, that he might meet the danger and responsibility of the crisis singly; a proposition which no other man in France would have made, shows that Thiers comprehended very imperfectly, both the peril of the occasion, and the spirit of Napoleon. From the hollow and blustering character of Barras, it is evident that at such a moment he would have deemed a crowd of commissaries the surest means of safety and of strength.

It is remarkable that, although Norvins states correctly the act of the convention confirming Napoleon's appointment as second in command, and Hazlitt copies literally the assertion of Napoleon,

that the convention appointed him general in chief, they should both be wrong ; neither apprehending the facts correctly, nor enabling their readers to do so. Napoleon's statement, essentially true when he made it, ceased to convey the truth after it had been contradicted in various ways by different authors, and especially after Norvins asserted that his nomination was confirmed by the convention, not as general in chief, but as " second in command." So that as Hazlitt did not explain and substantiate the laconic affirmation of Napoleon, by repeating it, he conveyed less than the truth, less than Napoleon intended to impart. On the other hand, Norvins, by simply retailing the literal import of the decree of the convention, without explaining those circumstances which made the appointment of second in command equivalent, at the least, to the command in chief, exposes his own text to contradiction with the declaration of Napoleon, leaves his readers destitute of a distinct knowledge of facts, and embarrassed with an unpleasant doubt as to the comparative value of the statements of Norvins himself and of his hero.

To recur to, enumerate, and demolish, the frontless, and contradictory misstatements of Scott and Lockhart ; both representing Barras as the maker of Napoleon's fortune, and the latter declaring that he resigned his office in Napoleon's favour, *after* he, Barras, became director, cannot, the imposing assertions of Thiers having been disposed of, be worth half the time it would require.

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(14) The parting of Hector and Andromache notwithstanding its tender and picturesque circumstances, is hardly more interesting than the meeting of Napoleon and Josephine. If the Trojan infant, terrified at the crested glitter of his father's helmet, touches every heart, the tears of the Gallic boy on receiving the sword of his murdered sire, swell with sympathy every generous breast. If the fate foreboded of the Trojan princess, condemned to suffer the taunts or loves of a barbarian victor, fills the mind with indignant melancholy; the doom of the French empress, forced to endure the cruelty of Austrian scorn and Muscovite pity, awakens the deepest sorrow. If the Dardan hero, overpowered by treachery and force—but the parallel is too mournful to be pursued.

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(15) In the pile of defamatory ordure, which the British press and the Bourbon coteries, created respecting Napoleon's life and character, one of the foulest materials was that which derived this appointment from the prostitution of his wife when she was madam Beauharnais. Considering the value which was attached to this literary filth during the war, in England, and after the restoration, in France, neither its quantity nor fetidness can occasion surprise. Perishable as it was putrescent, the light shed on the personal history of Napoleon,

first by Las Cases, and next by O'Meara, quickened the natural process of its destruction, and it would have long since disappeared entirely from the face of the earth, but for the delicate researches and vivifying genius of the author of *Waverley*. From this steaming mass, he occasionally condescended to extract materials in order to variegate, enlarge, and finish the biographical patchwork, with which, to fulfil a profitable contract, and to please the taste of lordly ministers and legitimate kings, he had undertaken to shroud the memory of Napoleon.

The calumny in question, as far as its outlines can now be traced, imports that madam Beauharnais was, at the time Napoleon married her, the mistress of Barras, and that Napoleon agreed to take her off the hands of the director and make her his wife, upon Barras engaging to procure for him the command in chief of the army of Italy—or, as sir Walter furtively intimates—make that appointment “the dowry of the bride.” This aspersion, which makes Josephine more infamous than Barras, and Napoleon than Josephine, was too enormous and offensive for sir Walter to touch without hesitation. Accordingly after approaching it in the first instance, with no little caution, he avoids the contaminating contact by saying (v. iii, p. 84): “Madame Tallien and her friend formed the soul of these assemblies,” at the apartments of Barras, “and it was supposed that Barras was not insensible to the charms of madame Beauharnais—a ru-

mour which was likely to arise, whether with or without foundation." This allusion, slight as it is, is discountenanced in the next paragraph, in which he says Josephine was in the bloom of beauty, and there was "no reason to doubt that Napoleon was induced by the effect solely of her personal charms to offer her his hand, his heart and his fortunes." This however was going too far, as it would suppress the slander altogether, and therefore, on the next page, the allusion is revived in the shape of a strong implication. "The marrying madame Beauharnais, was a mean of uniting his fortunes with those of Barras and Tallien, the first of whom governed France as one of the directors," etc. On the next page, this implication is reenforced by the assertion already quoted, that the command of the army of Italy, or, as sir Walter with euphonic boldness says, "of the Italian armies," was "the dowry of the bride." Thus it is impossible for the reader to shake from his mind the impression that the rumour in question had, in the opinion of the author of *Waverley*, foundation in truth. For how else could the marrying madam Beauharnais unite the fortune of Napoleon with that of the director Barras? Did sir Walter unite his fortune by marriage, with every gentleman on terms of acquaintance with lady Scott? With Tallien, the friendship existing between his wife and Josephine formed the bond of the alleged union; but Barras was a bachelor and a libertine. And why else was the command of

the "Italian armies," at the disposal of the director, "who governed France," to be "the dowry of the bride?" As this slander is effectually though slyly sanctioned by sir Walter, and is connected with his previous efforts to make Napoleon, on the 13th Vendémiaire, an obscure "little Corsican officer," indebted for notice and distinction to the patronage of this same Barras, it will not be improper to expose its undeniable falsehood. In the first place, madam Beauharnais is represented to have been "in the full bloom of beauty" and extremely agreeable in her manners. Can it be supposed that Barras, in possession of such a woman, would, not only transfer her to another man, but pay this other man for accepting her. Beauty and grace and social charms were never so disposed of before. Achilles did not bribe Agamemnon to force Briseis from his tent. But it may be said that as Bonaparte agreed to marry her, and Barras did not wish to form that sort of connection, Josephine preferred becoming the general's wife to remaining the director's mistress. Had that been the case, it cannot well be supposed that Barras would have rewarded Bonaparte for depriving him of his mistress, or would have endowed her liberally to induce her to desert him. If she preferred Bonaparte to Barras, the latter would not have recompensed her that she might gratify both the love and ambition of his successful rival. If she did not prefer Bonaparte, but married him for convenience, and at the instance of Barras, admitting that so proud

and promising a general as Bonaparte is said to have been would accept as his wife the mistress of another man, it is impossible to conceive that, loving Josephine as sir Walter declares Bonaparte did, with excessive ardour and "peculiar affection," he would have left her a few days after their marriage, at Paris, in the society of her old protector, and hastened away to a distant frontier. Thus, without reference to the damning origin of this slander, allowing it all the importance and plausibility which the tact and name of the author of *Waverley* impress it with, human nature herself stamps it with the seal of refutation and contempt. It may be added that had Josephine been the mistress of Barras, the sword of Beauharnais would not have been found by Eugene in possession of Bonaparte.

As to the appointment, supposing that Barras, the least able and the least respectable of the directors, "governed France," it is difficult to conceive what other general he could have selected for this frontier, who could be spared from some other station, and possessed adequate qualifications. Pichegru had become justly suspected of treason, and was replaced by Moreau in Holland. Hoche was fully and honourably employed against the Anglo-royalists and brigands in the west; and Jourdan had the more important command on the Rhine. Moreau had served all along in the north; Hoche was successfully completing the suppression of the civil war in the west; and the command on the

Rhine was the highest military appointment which the directory could bestow. Bonaparte was at least next in distinction to these generals, and was especially acquainted with the troops and the ground on the Italian frontier. Here are abundant motives for the appointment. So that unless we suppose more than plain and sufficient motives were required to induce the directory to entrust him with this command; and also suppose, not only that Napoleon and Josephine were vicious—unfeeling in the grossest possible degree—but that the human passions in Barras and Bonaparte deviated from their uniform direction, it is utterly impossible to regard otherwise than with incredulity and abhorrence the story by which sir Walter attempts to degrade the memory of his hero. The contrast between his readiness to calumniate Josephine and to vindicate Marie Antoinette, with equal feebleness and absurdity in both cases, deserves to be attended to.

The timorous and clandestine manner in which the author of *Waverley* dips his pen into the nameless and noisome receptacle whence he derived this slander, has been already noticed. Lockhart, if not more honest, is at least more bold. Instead of circling and hesitating like sir Walter, he, “with all the might of gravitation blessed” in stories like these, plunges in at once up to the knees (v. i, p. 33). “It was commonly said, *indeed it was universally believed*, that Josephine, whose character was in some respects *indifferent*, possessed *more than legitimate influence over the first*

director. Bonaparte, *however*, offered her his hand; she, after some hesitation, accepted it, and the young general *by this marriage cemented* his connection with the society of the Luxembourg, and in particular *with Barras and Tallien*, at that moment the most powerful men in France" (p. 34). 'Bonaparte was appointed to the *splendid* command. It is *acknowledged* in one of Josephine's letters, that Barras had promised to procure it for him before their marriage took place. 'Advance this man,' said this personage to the other directors, or, he will advance himself without you.'" The words of this extract which I have underscored, convey the calumny in all its dimensions—the *more than legitimate influence*, and the *indifferent character* of Josephine. Bonaparte's hand offered, *however*, and his connection with Barras the libertine, *cemented* by the marriage; and Josephine *acknowledging*, not mentioning, that the appointment had been promised, make up in a resolute but insidious form, the allegations—that Barras kept Josephine at the time Bonaparte offered her his hand—that Bonaparte believed in the existence of this concubinage, but nevertheless offered to marry her—that by taking to wife Barras' cast-off mistress, he cemented his connection with that director; and as Josephine herself confessed, obtained the promise of commanding the army of Italy.

However these cruel and unfounded insinuations, put forward with pretensions to historical truth, must excite the reader's indignation, the last

part of the falsehood by its ludicrous absurdity, may well compose his temper completely. *Every body believed, and most people said* that Barras had bribed Bonaparte to marry his cast-off mistress, by procuring him the command of the army of Italy, and of course the other directors, who were at the head of the society of the Luxembourg, must have believed and spoken of it. Yet, to these directors—the virtuous Larévellière, the stoical Carnot, and the tenacious Rewbell—(Thiers, t. viii, ch. 2. — Montholon, t. iii, ch. 3), Barras very coolly said, “I have got Bonaparte to marry my mistress, and therefore you must give him the command of the army of Italy!!” And more wonderful, still, these directors obeyed the dictation, and became parties to the contract; although except Carnot, they were all more popular than Barras, and Carnot was infinitely more respected. Now, to believe this slander, we must not only believe all the inconsistencies required by sir Walter’s story, but must conceive it possible that this scene and transaction between Barras and his colleagues, actually took place! But Lockhart (at p. 32) says, that Bonaparte, holding the chief command of the army of the interior, “had now passed into the order of marked and distinguished men.” Could it be supposed that such a man would have united his destiny with the cast-off mistress of Barras, from a motive of ambition; the alleged fact that Josephine’s connection with Barras was believed by every one, would have destroyed that motive, as it would have discredited

him necessarily with the other directors. On the other hand, if we impute it to the madness of love, that love would never have allowed Bonaparte to leave his new wife a few days after his marriage, in company with her old protector, while he was campaigning beyond the Alps. To make up his version of the slander, Lockhart puts into the mouth of Barras the remark of Dugommier, to the committee of public safety, after the siege of Toulon ; the least culpable falsification, by the way, in his blundering fiction. He calls it, too, "a splendid command" to make the alleged degradation of Napoleon the more probable. The fact is, it was an appointment which hitherto had yielded to the French generals more disgrace than glory ; for although Anselmn, Byron, Brunet, Dugommier, Dumerbion, Kellerman, and Scherer, had been appointed and removed in succession, the head quarters had never advanced beyond Nice, and the army was now, after much starving and slaughter, likely to be driven within the French frontier.

The plea of ignorance, to the benefit of which, as we have seen, Lockhart is occasionally entitled, cannot be urged in his behalf in this instance, for it is probable, from his own words, that while he was endeavouring to impress his readers with a belief in this story, he himself was convinced of its falsehood. Speaking of Josephine, and in allusion to her divorce, he says on the same page,—“Her subsequent fate will always form one of the darkest pages in the history of her lord.” Now if she had been

the mistress of Barras, and had been transferred as a mere instrument of pleasure, of which one was sated and the other desirous, surely no one could reproach Napoleon with excessive cruelty, in separating himself from such a wife ; considering that, according to Lockhart's insinuation, he found her a deserted concubine, and actually left her a crowned empress. It is needless to point out other claims to incredibility with which this part of Lockhart's work abounds. Jomini, who deserted Napoleon's colours, is more just to his memory than the Scotch novelist or critic. He treats the slander with contempt ; says that Bonaparte owed the appointment to his signal services under Dumerbion, and adds (t. viii, p. 49) : " History will vindicate this great captain from the calumnies retailed by envy, ignorance, and party hatred." In justice to Hazlitt and Norvins, it is proper to mention that neither of them countenances the silly and malignant tale. The latter, however, is grossly inexact in saying (t. i, p. 83) : " Bonaparte received the command in chief of the army of the interior, left vacant by the election of Barras to the directory. *A few days after*, married to Madame de Beauharnais, he was appointed general in chief of the army of Italy." The two appointments were separated by near half a year.

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(16) He said to O'Meara (v. i, p. 250), " Nothing has been more simple than my elevation. It

was not the result of intrigue or crime. It was owing to the peculiar circumstances of the times, and because I fought successfully against the enemies of my country."

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(17) Sir Walter Scott says (v. iii, p. 86) Napoleon left Paris for the army the fourth day after his marriage.

There is a diversity of dates as to this event. The marriage register proves that he was married at Paris on the 9th of March. Yet Norvins asserts (t. i, p. 85), that he left Paris on the 23rd of February! In the *Memoirs of Napoleon* (Montholon, t. iii, p. 120), his departure from Paris is dated the 4th of March, a typographical error probably, and only less extravagant than that of Norvins. Hazlitt, attempting, it would seem, a conjectural correction of this error, says (v. i, p. 44), he left Paris on the 14th of March. Lockhart's account is (v. i, pp. 33, 34), that he was married on the 9th of March, and left Paris ten days afterwards. Bourrienne (t. i, pp. 101, 103) dates his marriage the 9th of March, and his departure the 21st. I know not Sir Walter's authority for asserting that he quitted Paris and his new bride the fourth day after his marriage; but if design may be inferred of a misstatement, from the fact of its being employed to promote a favourite, though not a laudable object of its author, the reader will be apt to conclude that this apparent mistake is really one of the most artful and deliberate fictions ever con-

trived by the great novelist. These are his words: "Bonaparte remained with his wife only three days after his marriage, hastened to see his family, who were still at Marseilles, and, having enjoyed the pleasure of exhibiting himself as a favourite of fortune in that city which he had lately left in the capacity of an indigent adventurer, proceeded rapidly to commence the career to which fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Italian army."

Now, without this early date for his departure from Paris, the old figment about "*indigence*," and "*adventurer*," could not have been reproduced with any speciousness, nor could the new aspersion respecting the pleasure of exhibiting himself at Marseilles have been hazarded. For, as Nice is at least six hundred miles from Paris, there would have been no time for this contemptible display. But this is not the only shaft of defamation which sir Walter was enabled to aim by this simple contrivance. By means of it he makes Napoleon prefer the idle exhibition of his uniform and retinue at Marseilles, to the society of his wife, or to the command of his army. In this point of view, sir Walter's artifice is more to be admired than his hero; for it would be impossible to conceive a character more deserving of contempt than Napoleon's would be if his biographer were, even in this single instance, deserving of credit. But if dates did not destroy this fabrication, and if the consistency of character did not expose to the reader's scorn the attempted imposition, sir Walter him-

self would render it perfectly ineffectual ; for he says, as we have seen, that Napoleon loved his wife with peculiar affection, reproaches him, as we shall see, with the expression of excessive ardour, and at page 89, says he advanced with all imaginable delight to this "independent field of glory and conquest ;" and that his "proud heart throbbed to meet danger on such terms." So that if he loved Josephine, and longed to reach the army he commanded, he must have been more stupid and beastly than the ass between two bundles of hay, in stopping eight or ten days to display himself at Marseilles.

Here the reader will not fail to notice the unsparing nature, as well as the high degree, of sir Walter's injustice. As Napoleon, who was the testamentary and acknowledged head of his family, stopped a few hours at Marseilles to see his widowed mother, he is reproached with the childish vanity of loitering in that seaport to display himself and his good fortune ; yet as sir Walter has already upbraided his memory with a want of affection for the place of his birth, if on this occasion Napoleon had passed through or near Marseilles without stopping to see his mother, he would unquestionably not have omitted to accuse him of want of natural feeling and proper respect for his parent. The fact is, according to his biographical scheme, the actions of his hero are uniformly reprehensible, either in their motives or consequences—and generally in both.

But there was yet a further object to be gained

by this well-calculated mistake. By insisting that he was but the other day an "indigent adventurer," hanging loose upon the society of a secondary seaport, and representing him now as exulting in the astonishment of cits and brokers at the sudden change in his condition, such a degree of littleness and contempt is impressed upon the character of Napoleon, that sir Walter is enabled to forestall the dignity of his approaching exploits, by assigning them before hand to *fate*—by calling his career of conquest, that "to which fate had called him," a course of success which a perverse destiny had prepared for him. Thus the reader is predisposed to receive without surprise or question, every future disparagement with which chance or industry may supply sir Walter. It may be worth while to observe that admitting the date assumed by sir Walter, and supposing consequently that Napoleon left Paris on the 13th of March, it is very clear from his first letter to the directory from Nice, dated the 28th of March, that he could have had no time for idle display at Marseilles, had he been inclined to make so contemptible a figure. In this letter (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 1) he says: "I have been for several days within the cantonments (*enceinte*) of this army, of which I took the command yesterday." He then gives a minute account of the army, his means and plans, of a mutiny which he had suppressed, and other matters showing that he must have been some time in the neighbourhood of Nice. Now Nice is six hundred miles from Paris, so that even if he left Paris on the

13th, which is not probable, and reached the army several days before he took command of it, which is certain, he could have had no time for assisting in the disgusting display invented for him by the "British historian." It may here be added that in the *Victoires et Conquêtes* (t. v, p. 169) it is expressly and carefully asserted that Bonaparte arrived at Nice the 20th of March, the date which I have adopted.

The felicity with which the word *adventurer* is here used by the author of *Waverley*, may be estimated by reference to a former note (appendix, ch. 4, note 29), and by comparing its signification with the long service, the professional rank, and military distinction of Napoleon, when on his way to the capital of his native country, and attended by his aides de camp, Junot and Marmont, he passed through Marseilles in May, 1795.

Thus much for this defamation on the score of his vanity. On the same page, the author of *Waverley* furnishes a slander equally gross and easy of exposure, respecting his temper. Speaking of the character of Josephine, he says—"She had at all times the art of mitigating his temper, and turning aside the hasty determinations of his angry moments, not by directly opposing, but by gradually parrying and disarming them." If there was any doubt about the meaning of this—that it was intended to assure the reader that Napoleon's temper was sudden, fierce, and boisterous—the imitation of Lockhart would remove it. His version of it, which proves that a stream of falsehood, like

any other stream, gathers impetus when it flows in a declining channel, that is, descends from a great author to a little one, is in these words (v. i, p. 34): “She, and she alone, could overrule by gentleness, the excesses of passion to which he was liable; and her subsequent fate will always form one of the darkest pages in the history of her lord.” Now, in regard to this angry and impetuous temper, it is somewhat surprising that both these authors have pretended to conduct Napoleon from his birth to his twenty-seventh year, through the competitions of schools, the emulation of subalterns, the rivalry of generals; the contrarieties of stupid and the confidence of sensible commanders—the predilection of one set of deputies, the proscription of another set, and the contention and blood of a civil conflict—and yet not a single instance, not a solitary outburst of this quick and furious temper appears! Cartaux’s imbecility he dexterously managed; Dugommier’s confidence he faithfully answered; Aubry’s impertinence he coolly retorted; Barras’ illiberality he proudly overlooked; his flying countrymen he mercifully spared; Menou’s life he generously shielded; and Eugene’s tears he instantly felt. Does this look like a fierce and angry disposition? Ferocity “should be made of sterner stuff;” and had it inhabited Napoleon’s breast, would hardly have waited to show itself until he married a lovely, tender, and compassionate woman. It would seem from these authors that if the indignation and resentment of a man, melt away

before the softness and blandishments of the sex to which nature had assigned the offices of pity and intercession, his temper must necessarily be irascible and violent. There is no doubt that Josephine was a willing, active, and indiscriminate petitioner for mercy; and that from the generous and forgiving temper of Napoleon, she was almost always a successful one. This interesting truth, which reflects so much honour on the memory of the empress and "her lord," the boasted equity of "British historians" (v. ii, p. 368), converts into a foul imputation against the latter.

The prospective and criminating allusion of Lockhart to Josephine's divorce, and the use of the words "her subsequent fate," and "darkest pages in the history of her lord," forming, as they do, the grossest caricature of the open, respectful, and affectionate proceeding of Napoleon, and a just picture of the foul, sinister, and mysterious attempt of George IV against the crown, and the reputation, if not against the life of his queen, the mother of his child, and of the heiress to the British throne, forces upon the memory by so strong a contrast, the Milan spy, the *non mi ricordo* witness, the scuffle about the coronation, his subservient ministers, and her mysterious fate—that one might suppose this historical instructor of the families of England, was slyly endeavouring to stigmatize the memory of his "gracious sovereign," without incurring the guilt of disloyalty.

CHAPTER VI.

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(1) Sir Walter Scott, infusing into his misrepresentations more and more boldness, as the events in his hero's life increase in number and importance, prefaces the immortal campaign of 1796, by representing the invasion of Italy as unjust (v. iii, p. 88). "The French nation, in the times of which we treat, spoke indeed of the Alps as a natural boundary, so far as to authorise them to claim all which lay on the western side of those mountains, as naturally pertaining to their dominions; but they never deigned to respect them as such, when the question respecting their invading on their own part the territories of other states, which lay on or beyond the formidable frontier. They assumed the law of natural limits as an unchallengeable rule when it made in favour of France, but never allowed it to be quoted against her interest." But for the eager injustice of this passage it might be deemed the scribbling of a school boy, who was attempting a disquisition above the reach of his mind. Does a nation, by claiming a river or a range of mountains as a natural boundary, especially after having extended its conquests to this limit, renounce the right of

passing that boundary in time of war? The St. Lawrence is claimed by the United States along many miles of its course as a natural boundary ; but no interdiction to the invasion of Canada, in case of war, would arise out of that claim. The Pyrenees are admitted to be one of the natural boundaries of Spain ; yet Lord Wellington with his Spanish and Portuguese allies, did not feel scrupulous in pushing his bold invasion into France on that side. In the particular case alluded to by Sir Walter Scott, it happened that the coalition itself had been endeavouring to invade the French frontier from the time Lord Hood got possession of Toulon.

When a nation claims a chain of mountains or other natural limit, in time of war, as its boundary, it can only be understood as declaring its intention not to make peace without establishing this claim ; as France had done in reference to the countries conquered on her side of the Alps and the Rhine. It neither denies to its enemy nor renounces for itself, the right, in time of war of passing this boundary in martial array. Danger and difficulty are then the only obstacles.

In order to counteract completely the spirit of Sir Walter's observations, it may be proper to state that the war in prosecuting which Napoleon was then engaged, was on the part of France, a defensive one. Now, that the cloud of political falsehood and imposture which the

British press had spread over the civilized world, has been dispelled by the French revolution of July and the English parliamentary reform, no publicist of reputation or writer of common sense will venture to deny this position. In support of it, concurring authorities of both nations may be referred to. Thiers (t. ii, p. 82) says: "It must be confessed that this cruel war, which so long lacerated Europe, was not provoked by France, but by the foreign powers. France in declaring war, did no more than recognize by a decree the state in which they had placed her." Colonel Napier begins his manly and luminous work by asserting that (v. i, p. 1) "up to the treaty of 'Tilsit the wars of France were essentially defensive." It is true on the other hand, that Washington's famous proclamation of neutrality, by which he avoided the obligation of reciprocal guarantee in the treaty of 1778 between France and the United States, was founded on the assumption that France was the offensive party in the war with England (See *Marshall's Life of Washington*, v. ii, ch. 8, 2d edit.). But this decision of the American government, admitting that its justice was as evident as its prudence, had no reference to any other branch of the conflict, than that between France and Great Britain; while the campaign of Italy was directed chiefly against Austria and Sardinia.

As Napier's history is a work not to be mentioned without a sentiment of respect for its author, less cannot justly be said in his commendation, than that in all the substantial qualities of an historian, clearness of narration, dignity of sentiment, respect for truth, and sympathy for human virtues, he is the very opposite of Scott and Lockhart.

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(2) Sir Walter Scott, in his catalogue of the forces opposed to Napoleon in the opening of this campaign, not only omits enumerating among the members of the coalition, the Dukes of Parma and Modena, an error which, as we shall see, is not accidental, but also excludes from the list the English fleet, although the cooperating squadron was commanded by Nelson (Southey's *Life of Nelson*, ch. iv.). According to his account (v. iii, pp. 88-9), Napoleon was to contend only "with an Austro-Sardinian army, and a strong Neapolitan force which was to be added, so that in general numbers their opponents were much superior to the French, but a great part of this force was cooped up in garrisons which could not be abandoned." If any thing like an estimate of the allied force can be made out of this see-saw of assertions and qualifications, it is, that it would have been superior to that of the French but for the number of troops required for garrisons

which were to have no direct concern in the war; but that in consequence of such garrisons, they were not superior. Under his representation of the matter too the fortresses of Piedmont, were a positive disadvantage to the allies and consequently an advantage to the French! In stating the number of troops in the French army this restrained and hesitating style is exchanged for one absolute, ample, and swelling (v. iii, p. 95): "The forces which Bonaparte had under his command, were between fifty and sixty thousand good troops, having been many of them brought from the Spanish campaign, in consequence of the peace with that country." With these statements alone for his guidance, the reader would be led to conclude that taking quality and numbers together, the French fighting force was superior to that of the allies, which in reality doubled it.

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(3) This affirmation is contained in one of the notes made in pencil by Napoleon while at St. Helena, at the foot of the letter of instruction of the 6th of March. It appears, that in dictating his campaigns of Italy, he made use of two volumes containing this letter of instruction, one of which fell into the possession of Montholon, and the other was preserved by Marchand. The notes attached to that of Montholon are published in his fourth volume (p. 396). Of those preserved

by Marchand, a copy has been taken by general baron Pelet, the officer so well known for his merit in letters and in arms, and who is at the head of the *dépôt général de la guerre*. The liberality of general Pelet, has enabled me to compare the two copies thus preserved, and I discover that they are almost identical, excepting that the first note of the copy of general Pelet is omitted in that of Montholon. It contains the affirmation in question, and is, when translated, as follows :—“ This instruction is an indifferent amplification, full of contradiction and absurdity, of a luminous and original memoir, which Napoleon had presented to the directory in January, 1796.” The memoir here alluded to was dated January 19th, 1796, and was addressed to general Clarke, the secretary to the directory. Considering the mind from which it sprung, military men will agree that I can do no less than avail myself of general Pelet’s permission to lay it before the public. To the memoir of the 19th of January is attached a paper which appears to have been previously prepared, and to have particular reference to the inaction of general Scherer after his success in November. The existence and date of this memoir add to the many evidences which prove the accuracy of Napoleon’s statements of fact in regard to his own history. The reader will perceive that the importance which he attached to the position of La Sotta, in his letter to the directory of

the 8th of April, was founded on his previous acquaintance with the military points of this region of the Alps. In the printed copy of his letter of the 8th April (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 12), a blank is left where La Sotta should have been inserted, as I discovered by reference to the original despatch in the archives of the *dépôt général de la guerre*.

“ Head Quarters, Paris, 19th January, 1796.

“ *Buonaparte, general in chief of the army of the Interior, to general Clarck.*

“ I transmit to you, my dear general, the note which you requested of me. I will avail myself of the earliest opportunity of calling at your office.

(Signed)

“ BUONAPARTE.”

“ *Note, on the army of Italy.*

“ 19th January, 1796.

“ If the army of Italy suffers the month of February to pass without doing anything, as it has allowed the month of January to pass, the campaign of Italy may be considered to have totally failed. It is necessary to be well convinced that great successes can be obtained in Italy only during the winter season.

“ Supposing that the army of Italy were put

in motion immediately, it might march upon Ceva, and force the intrenched camp at that place, before the Austrians, who are quartered at Acqui, would be able to join the Piedmontese.

“ If, upon discovering the preparations made by the French, the Austrians by moving along behind the Tanaro should come into junction with the Piedmontese, it would be necessary for our army to make two marches upon Acqui; that is to say, that it march first to Cairo, and then to Spigno. It may be safely assumed that upon this the Austrians will hasten to return, in order to defend their communications with the Milanese.

“ The operations to be undertaken are in fact simple. If the Piedmontese are alone, march upon them directly by the way of Gressio, Bagnasco, La Sotta, Casteleroso, Montezumo, and having beaten them, and forced their intrenched camp, lay siege to Ceva—an operation preliminary to any other, whatever course may be then determined on.

“ Should the Austrians have the prudence to unite with the Piedmontese at Montezumo, it will be necessary to separate them; and for that purpose, to march upon Alexandria, and manœuvre so as to gain twenty-four hours, in order the moment their separation is effected, to return and force the intrenched camp of Ceva.

“ The intrenched camp of Ceva being in our possession, it will require a force double our

own to compel us to raise the siege of that fortress. The artillery of the siege will be landed at Vado ; a want of carriages need not be apprehended, the *Pays des Langes* abounding in means of transport, and the siege of Ceva not requiring more than 24 or 30 pieces.

“ Masters of Ceva, not a moment should be lost to advance the division which guards the Col de Tende, the Briga, and the heights of the county of Nice as far as Borgo. Its junction with the main army should be effected by the route of Mondovi ; and then the whole force should march direct upon Turin. The king of Sardinia would then make propositions for peace. In that case, the general should reply that he has not the right to make peace, and that a courier must be sent to Paris ; and, during this interval, in order to hasten a peace, the king of Sardinia will be obliged to make such proposals as cannot be refused, and as will completely fulfil the views of the government. If not, Turin may be laid in ashes without caring about the citadel.

“ For the rest, as the war in Italy depends altogether on the season, each month requires a new plan ; it will therefore be necessary that the government place entire confidence in their general, leaving him a latitude of discretion, and pointing out only their great object ; for it will require a month to get an answer to a despatch coming from Savona, during which time the face of affairs may have changed altogether.

“ When we shall have taken Turin, the siege of Alexandria and Tortona will be useless, and we may enter the Milanese without difficulty.

“ The government should direct that the bridge equipages and pontons for the Mincio and the Oglio, which I had caused to be prepared, be completed. Every thing necessary for bridges over the Po, the Adige, the Ticin, and the Tanaro, will be found in Italy, where also will be obtained transportation, clothing, and subsistence for the heroic army which shall make themselves masters of the plains of Piedmont and of the Milanese.

(Signed)

“ BUONAPARTE.”

Attached to the above, and apparently of a date, by some weeks earlier, is the following :—

“ Note, on the direction which should be given to the army of Italy.

“ An essential fault was committed in not forcing the intrenched camp of Ceva, while the Austrians after their defeat were retired to a point on the other side of Acqui, and the whole of our army was left disposable for attacking Ceva. Our success could not have been doubtful, since we should have had a force of thirty thousand men to attack from sixteen to twenty thousand Piedmontese.

“ Why did not the division of general Serrurier, which on the 3d was at Garessio and St.

Jacomi, that is to say, in less than four hours' march of Ceva, and the division of general Massena, which advanced as far as Cairo, within about the same distance of Ceva, profit by their victory? It was impossible not to comprehend, that the capture of Ceva, putting in our power a district of Piedmont, would procure for the army supplies of shoes, clothing, subsistence, and means of transport. The taking of Ceva, alone, would secure to the army healthy cantonments, and would terminate that perpetual game of prisoners base, which, for several years our army has been playing on the peaks of the Alps and Appennines.

“ The capture of Ceva, and the concentration of our army around that fortress, are operations of such great importance, that they would determine the court of Turin to make peace, and would diminish very perceptibly the enormous expense of the army of Italy. The Austrians, in falling back to Alexandria, have abandoned the Piedmontese; an error of which they ought to think better, if they have not done so already. We should march without delay upon Ceva, by way of Milessimo, Montezumo, and St. Jacomi, while a division should be pushed beyond Batiolo. Masters of the intrenched camp of Ceva, the heavy artillery for a siege must be sent forward, and the carriages of transport, which are in abundance in the neighbourhood of Ceva,

should be secured, and employed for the conveyance of balls and shells.

“ Ceva being once taken, and our army assembled there, we should find ourselves masters of a part of Piedmont, and threaten at the same time Coni, Turin, and Alexandria.

“ The division which now guards the Col de Tende, the Briga, and the intermediate passes, will then invest Coni, or at least establish itself at Borgo, so as to observe the movements of the garrison of Coni.

“ The united army, reenforced by the detachments expected from the Pyrenees, should march upon Turin in February. A division of the army of the Alps, four or five thousand strong, should pass by Mont Genève, and reenforce the army of Italy, under the walls of Turin. The snows which block up the passes of the Alps, oppose but slight obstruction to the march of a column, when it is sure of finding friends and succour on the other side of the mountains.

(Signed)

“ BUONAPARTE.”

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(4) In the debate in the house of commons on the address in answer to the king's speech in October, 1795, Mr. Fox said —” It was ridiculous to insist upon danger from treating with France, because they had subverted their former, and adopted a new, constitution; the permanence of a treaty depending on its equitableness, and cor-

respondence with the reciprocal interests of the contracting parties. It was become nugatory to talk of our allies; we had, indeed, mercenaries in our pay, whom we could only retain by excessive bribes, and who were every moment, hesitating whether to accept of them, or of the terms proffered by our enemies, to detach them from this country." (See Annual Register for 1796. History of Europe, p. 11).

These assertions of the parliamentary luminary of his country, which the course of events more than the lapse of time have inscribed on the tablets of history as the irreversible judgments of wisdom, were then scouted by a great majority in the house of Commons; while the sentiments and policy of his successful rival, Mr. Pitt, notwithstanding the splendour of his talents, the greatness of his character, and the authority of his name, if proposed to the house of Commons at this time, when the legitimate King of France is again expelled from his throne by a revolution, would be received as the ravings of a political bedlamite. So vast is the difference between the influence of the crown and the privileged classes in Great Britain at the present day, and their influence at the close of the last century. So perishable are the works of statesmen who build on temporary passions and factitious interests, and so steadfast the creations of minds, which employ the solid materials of reason, truth, and justice. In relation to these subsidies, la-

vished by the British government on the continental despots, it is certain that with half their amount lord Wellington or lord Grey might have purchased as large a quantity of war and slander against the French nation and government, since July, 1830, as Mr. Pitt and his disciples had done before that epoch.

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(5) Norvins appears to have misconceived the plan of the directory. He says (t. i, p. 85) "The directory prescribed to their general, as a preliminary operation, the conquest of Piedmont, the object of which was to be to force the Austrians to evacuate that country, and defend themselves in their own territory." This was the plan Napoleon adopted, not that which the directory prescribed; for they instructed the general not to pass the exterior garrisons of Piedmont, to mask them, and pursue the Austrians into Lombardy, in order that the King of Sardinia, left to his natural inclinations, might enter into an alliance with France against Austria; or if unnaturally inclined to adhere to the coalition, might be forced to abandon it. Jomini, in speaking of these instructions (t. viii, p. 59) says, "They form one among the most remarkable documents in the history of this war." The ambiguity of this language is to be lamented, when the admitted ability of the writer is taken into consideration, especially as at a subsequent

page (p. 88) in speaking of Bonaparte's advance upon Ceva he says: "The conquest of this flourishing country (Italy) depended then in the first place on success against the Sardinian army; and the general in chief, more wise than the directory, who had enjoined him not to operate upon his left, resolved to direct the greater part of his army against Colli."

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(6) In reference to this clause of the instructions Napoleon in one of his crayon notes, observed, "The first interest of the court of Turin was to stifle revolutionary sentiments, and to oppose the success of the French republicans.—How stupid this is!" And the directory in their reasoning having asked the question, "why, since it is the interest of the Piedmontese to join with the French in driving the Austrians out of Italy, does not the court of Turin hasten to unite its forces with those of the republic for that purpose."—Napoleon answers in a note, "In order not to be guillotined—The directors reasoned just as Louis XVI might have done."

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(7) Napoleon's concluding remark on the instructions is—"It may be seen from these stupid instructions that if Napoleon was victorious, it was in spite and in defiance of the instructions of the government." These instructions are said to be the work of Carnot (Thiers, t. viii, p. 236).

If so, they demonstrate the truth of Napoleon's description of Carnot's vaunted capacity as minister of war (Montholon, t. iii, p. 125). "In the committee of public safety, he directed the military operations, and was useful, without meriting the praise bestowed on him. He had no military experience, and his opinions were false, upon every part of the art of war," etc.

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(8) This estimate of the strength of the two armies it must be confessed, is only a conjectural one. The numbers given by various respectable authorities range through many degrees of enumeration. Napoleon states his own fighting force fit for duty (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 266; Montholon, t. iii, p. 176) at about thirty thousand men and that of the allies at eighty thousand. This estimate which is no doubt correct as to his own army, may have overrated that of the allies. It is however adopted by Norvins and Hazlitt (t. i, p. 87; v. i, p. 417). Thiers in stating the strength of the French army gives different numbers, as if they were matters of caprice, not of calculation. First he says (t. viii, p. 224) it amounted to thirty thousand men, next (p. 227) to "thirty-six thousand at most," and concludes by stating that the enemy opposed about sixty thousand men to the thirty thousand of Bonaparte. Jomini (t. viii, p. 59) rates the French force at forty-two thousand, four hundred. But

in his enumeration he includes the detachments under generals Macquart and Garnier or d'Almagne amounting to six thousand nine hundred, which were in garrison on the coast, or posted at the passes of the Alps on Bonaparte's left, and no part of which entered Italy until after the occupation of Cherasco. This would leave for the army of Italy thirty-five thousand, five hundred men. Deducting the sick, the active force would not exceed thirty thousand men. The strength of the allied army Jomini puts at fifty-two thousand, an estimate lower than is to be found in any other writer, and inconsistent with probability from the inference that, considering it was an allied force, its small superiority of numbers would not have made it an overmatch for the French estimated by him at forty-two thousand four hundred. Consequently the victories of Bonaparte, instead of being the effects of his great military genius and the incapacity of Beaulieu, as Jomini himself describes them to be (t. viii, ch. 56) would have been nothing more than the ordinary results of a contest between combined forces on one side, and an army of one nation on the other. It is possible that Jomini gave the number actually in the field excluding the numerous garrisons. But these garrisons furnished detachments to increase the field force, and were recalled as the French advance menaced the fortresses. Thus Colli, upon aban-

doning his intrenched camp at Ceva, threw a detachment into that fortress. Of these inconsistent estimates I have adopted a medium as the nearest approximation to truth in my power.

In the work entitled *Victoires et Conquêtes des Français*, (t. v, pp. 163 et 164) the effective force of the French army is estimated at thirty-four thousand men, upon the authority of a specific return signed by Berthier. With regard to this voluminous work the account it contains of this first campaign of Italy is so very defective, conjectural, and confused, that very little instruction can be derived from it. It was prepared, it would seem, before the *Memoirs of Napoleon*, or the *Memorial of St.-Helena* were published.

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(9) This fact, mentioned by Napoleon in his dictation to Las Cases (t. ii, p. 283) and to Montholon (t. iii, p. 192) a fact so honourable to the Spartan patriotism and courage of the French army, is strangely caricatured by sir Walter Scott (v. iii, pp. 95, 96). "Berthier preserved, as a curiosity an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga, which munificently conferred a gratuity of three louis d'or upon every general of division. Among the generals to whom this donation was rendered acceptable by their wants, were, or might have been, many whose names became afterwards the praise and

dread of war. Augereau, Masséna, Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes, and Murat, all generals of the first consideration, served under Bonaparte in the Italian campaign." In a note he adds: "This piece of generosity reminds us of the liberality of the kings of Brentford to their Knightsbridge forces :

““ *First king.* Here, take five guineas to these warlike men.

““ *Second king.* And here, five more, which makes the sum just ten.

““ *Herald.* We have not seen so much the Lord knows when !”

As to the assertions of fact contained in this passage, it may be observed that “the victory of Albenga” never was heard of before, being a later discovery than the *sea coast of Bohemia*. Napoleon’s peaceful phrase (Montholon, t. iii, p. 192, and Las Cases, t. ii, p. 283): “Un ordre du jour d’Albenga, *an order of the day of Albenga*,” that is, *dated at Albenga*, this romantic historian has heroically translated, “an order dated on the day of the victory of Albenga”—making the harmless words, “day of Albenga,” equivalent to *day of Marengo*, *day of Austerlitz*, phrases familiar in the annuals of French glory. His next assertion, that a “donation” of three louis d’or, which he mentions and ridicules as “a piece of generosity,” is a misrepresentation of another phrase of Napoleon, whose words

are, "a gratification of three louis d'or," that is, pieces of gold, "was granted to each general of division." No one in his senses can understand this to mean, that the commander in chief, made presents, or that lieutenant generals received presents, of three pieces of gold; the anecdote was introduced to shew penury instead of "munificence;" the destitution of pecuniary resources existing in the army; the emptiness of the military chest; and although sir Walter intimates that this gold was given by Napoleon to reward his generals for "the victory of Albenga, the gratification really consisted in Napoleon advancing to the generals of division a small part of their pay or expenses *in gold*, in louis d'or, at a time when that coin was extremely scarce and valuable, and when their pay was generally received in a description of currency of little value out of France; at a time too, when Napoleon said to the army—"the country owes you much, but can pay you nothing." These pieces of gold were public money, spared out of a fund which, small as it was, was all that the government could furnish for the use of the commander in chief, for gaining intelligence, etc., in the enemy's country; and therefore the advancing these few pieces of gold was deemed "according a gratification." That this is the meaning of the phrase is evident not only from the rank, character, and relation of the parties, two of the generals at least having pretensions

to the chief command—but from the fact of the advance being mentioned in an order of the day, shewing that it was an official transaction. It is so understood by Thiers, who says (t. viii, p. 228) “He procured for his soldiers a part of the pay which was due to them. He distributed to each of his generals *four* Louis in gold.” Showing by the word *distributed* that he deemed it an advance of so much public money on account to these officers; and by the substitution of the word *four* for *three*, either that Thiers had seen the order of the day, and found that Napoleon’s recollection was so far inaccurate, which is not probable; or that he himself had wantonly disdained accuracy in so small a matter, which is probable. Jomini, in order to describe the state of pecuniary distress under which the commander in chief laboured even after his entrance into the plains of Piedmont, says (t. viii, p. 96), “An idea of the penury of the army may be collected from the correspondence of the commander in chief, who sent Massena twenty-four francs in gold to provide for his official expenses.” In the fac simile of general Washington’s accompts, which has been lately published, there appears the following item—“19th of April, 1777, to specie” (or hard money, contrasted with depreciated paper) “to major general Greene for secret services, 3*l*.” being about the same amount which, in similar circumstances, Napoleon advanced for similar objets to the generals next to

him in command, and, like Washington, on public account. The third of sir Walter's assertions in the above cited passage is, that Lannes and Murat were among the generals of this time. He tells us himself, further on (p. 125), that the first was "colonel Lannes," and it is very certain that at the time of "the victory of Albenga," he was only a chief of battalion, and Murat but a colonel. So much for sir Walter's facts; his ridicule, borrowed from *The Rehearsal* and aimed at the fortitude and patriotism of the French officers, is below all contempt, and of course beneath further notice.—The manner in which the next bold "British historian" relates this matter of the louis d'or is worthy of attention on two accounts; one as verifying Aristotle's famous definition—"Man is an imitative animal;" the other, as shewing that on this occasion Lockhart did not adopt all the errors and illiberality which he found in Scott. These famous louis d'or he thus commemorates, for the special instruction of English families (v. i, p. 35): "Berthier used to keep, as a curiosity, a general order, by which three louis d'or were granted as a great supply to each general of division, dated on the very day of the victory of Albenga." Here is nothing about, "donation" or "generosity," nor is there the least sneering at the destitution and hardships of the French army. But the reader cannot fail to notice the tone of intimacy, of familiar and particular knowledge, af-

fectured by Lockhart respecting this order of the day, and "the victory of Albenga." "Berthier *used to keep,*" that is *when I knew him he used to keep this order of the day as a curiosity.* And it was "dated *the very day* of the victory of Albenga," that is, what is more remarkable I have discovered that this order was dated "the *very day* of the victory of Albenga." Now what boy or girl, or what gentleman or lady in England, reading for the sake of easy instruction or agreeable study, would not suppress instantly any doubt that might suggest itself in regard to this unheard of victory, upon observing the special, emphatic, and circumstantial manner in which the editor of the Quarterly Review had taken care to mention it. Let us suppose that two American historians had successively mentioned, the *battle of Brighton*, or the *victory of Windsor*, and to make their ignorance and imposture plausible had affected to know *the very day*, on which it took place—what measure would there have been to the sneers, the scorn, the scoffs, and taunts, of this very Mr. Lockhart, and his kindred reviewers; not excepting the quaint and eloquent editor of Blackwood's Magazine, who commends this work of Lockhart, for "generous candour," and "solid information:" the "generous candour" evinced in the stratagem by which Napoleon is made to call his brother "that fool Joseph;" and the "solid information" displayed in the ever memorable

“victory of Albenga.” This commendation, however monstrous, can hardly be ironical, since it is prefixed as a puff to Lockhart’s book. If the intrinsic faults of sir Walter’s work, did not render its non-existence desirable, its evident tendency to encourage the production of historical nonsense and critical deception would justify the most earnest efforts to expunge it from the tablets of English literature.

Hazlitt (v. i, p. 417) represents this advance of three louis d’or, as “an extraordinary gratification,” adding the word *extraordinary*, to those of Napoleon, and so far obscuring the sense. But my reason for referring to his work, which is informed with an impartial spirit, and contains many striking reflections, is to mention, not without regret, that Hazlitt’s account of the campaigns of Italy is almost a literal translation of Napoleon’s own narrative, of which paragraphs are here and there transposed; a fact which considering the character and position of the two men, may be said to constitute the most stupendous and most barefaced literary fraud, that was ever committed. Shall we live to see a translation of Cæsar’s Commentaires, published in England as an original work?

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(10) This fact which is stated by Thiers (t. viii, p. 228) and Jomini (t. viii, p. 61) will recall to the mind of the American reader the patriotic

conduct of general Jackson during the last war between the United States and England.

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(11) The existence of this natural feeling has been often mentioned by well informed French writers. Thiers (t. viii, p. 228) says: "Massena bore him ill will for having exerted an ascendancy over the mind of Dumerbion in 1794." Traces of this sensibility may be discovered in the answers both of Masséna and Augereau to Napoleon's letter's from Nice, announcing to them his assuming the command. The first says, under date of the 29th March: "I have received, general, your letter of yesterday. I make you my very sincere compliments on the command in chief of the army of Italy, which has been conferred on you. You have known for a long time the justice I have done to your military talents." Shewing that his acquiescence was not unconditional, was in consequence of his having long admitted Napoleon's military talents. Augereau's expressions reveal a similar state of mind. "I have received your letter of the 8th of this month, by which I learn that you have taken the command in chief of the army. I congratulate myself on being under your orders, *knowing your patriotism and military talents*. I will do my best to fulfil your instructions in whatever orders you may give me; and you may count on my zeal, my activity, and devotion, *in the pub-*

lic cause." Sensibility so natural, and founded in military pride, is far above censure. But when we think of the future career of the men and of the long existing relations between the commander in chief, and these condescending lieutenants, it is interesting to notice with some attention the point at which their connection commenced. Hazlitt (v. i, p. 416) seems to have misunderstood these letters of Masséna and Augereau. Both their letters throw a ludicrous light on the assertion of Thiers that at this time, Napoleon was "a young man *unknown*."

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(12) General Colli in sending an emigrant Frenchman in the character of a Sardinian officer, and under the protection of a flag of truce, abused the privilege attached to messengers of peace in time of war, inasmuch as France could not be at war with her own citizens. Napoleon was justified on general principles, and *à fortiori*, by reference to the mutiny in his army, in detaining Moulin. His letter to the directory of the 8th of April announcing this fact, shows that he was not disposed to enforce the law against this imprudent Frenchman, whose punishment it appears consisted only in temporary confinement. For a full account of the object and intrigues of the conspiracy carried on between Pichegru on one side, and the Prince of Condé, the Austrian general Klingin, and the British

envoy at Berne, Wickham, on the other, see the volumes entitled : “ *Correspondance trouvée à Offenbourg* ” — and the corroborating documents in the “ *Alliance des Jacobins avec les Anglais.* ”

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(13) See Napoleon’s order of the 30th of March (Correspondance inédite, t. i, p. 7).

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(14) Thiers (t. viii, p. 229), Jomini, t. viii, p. 62). An English officer who was then a lieutenant in Nelson’s squadron, mentioned the fact to me as it is here related. It is not alluded to by Scott or Lockhart.

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(15) Sir Walter Scott furnishes a translation of this address, which under the appearance of carelessness, conceals much art. He intersperses touches of his magical pencil for the purpose of bringing Napoleon’s sentiments into harmony with the dark colours in which he proposes to portray his character. For these plain expressions in the address, “ rich provinces, great cities will be in your power—you will there find honour, glory, and wealth,” sir Walter adroitly substitutes — “ rich provinces, opulent towns, honor, glory, wealth, all shall be at your disposal.” The reader will here perceive the difference between “ *will be in your power,* ” and

“*shall* be at your *disposal* ;” the absolute meaning of *shall* and the licentious force of *disposal*. Towns with their inhabitants and property are *in the power* of a victorious army ; but they are *at the disposal* of the general, who is bound to obey the laws of war, to consult the principles of justice, and to listen to the dictates of humanity. Again, when Napoleon asks with vigorous simplicity. “ Can you be wanting in courage and perseverance ” — the author of *Waverley* makes him exclaim, “ with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and constancy ” — that is, with the sure prospect of having the wealth and beauty of these fertile plains and populous cities at your absolute disposal, can you fail in courage and constancy ? It may be observed that the desire of misrepresentation leads Sir Walter into the absurdity of placing *honour* and *glory* under the action of the same verb, with *towns* and *provinces* — “ all shall be at your disposal,” as if honour and glory were material substances, or commodities of purchase and transfer. Napoleon says, “ provinces and cities will be in your power ” — “ You will *find* (or gain) honour, glory and wealth ; ” by connecting wealth with honour and glory evidently, excluding the ideas of plunder and licence, which sir Walter’s version studiously holds forth as the leading sentiment of the general and the ruling motive of his army. By these swift and shadowy stratagems of version, the mind of the

reader is prepared to receive unconditionally the animated illustration of the following remark — “This was shewing the deer to the hound when the leash is about to be slipped.” This is one instance of the easy omnipotence of that pen which has so often enchanted mankind; of the art possessed by sir Walter of introducing false impressions into the reader’s mind under the *envelope* of a metaphor. By representing the allied force as a deer, a timid inoffensive animal, their hostile intents, their desire to invade and subjugate France, their great superiority of numbers, of cavalry, artillery, supplies, and equipments; their numerous fortresses, the cooperating English fleet, the rocky Appennines, the snowy Alps, all disappear like frost work before the rays of the sun, from the contemplation of the reader; who, acquainted with the event of the campaign, looks upon Beaulieu, his army and allies, as innocent, defenceless beings, about to be cruelly overmatched and destroyed. On the other hand, by exhibiting the French general and an army under the figures of a huntsman and staghound, an impression of their strength and rapacity, of their power and will to overtake and devour, is created, which excludes from the mind, their war of self-defence, their inferiority of numbers, their suffering and unfurnished condition, the exhaustless patriotism of the troops, and the matchless genius and enterprise of their leader, in meeting

and overcoming with such odds against them, the forces of the coalition. This art of predisposing the reader to accept fiction for truth, of employing his fancy to deceive, or if need be, to debauch his judgment, no writer in the English language ever possessed in a higher degree than sir Walter Scott. In its exercise in the former sense consists much of the charm of his delightful romances, and in the latter, much of the vice of this pretended history. The extent of his injustice in the present case may readily be conceived by an English reader, if he will reflect that an army may obtain wealth without dishonour; that the soldier is as fairly entitled to the spoils of honourable war as the sailor. We hear a great deal of the Deccan prize money, in which English noblemen and generals participated. The amount of prize money distributed among the British seamen of all ranks during the last war, it might be difficult to calculate; yet who would be so unjust as to impute to the brave tars who gained it, the ignoble desire of plunder? Was that the motive of Nelson when at a sublime moment he uttered the sublimer expression — "*England expects every man to do his duty.*"

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(16) Hitherto the errors of sir Walter Scott, have consisted principally of matters of assertion, insinuation, or inference. On the present occasion, he formally suspends his narrative for

the sake of introducing a historical reflection on the art of war, which in point of military nonsense may well vie with his confident reference to the "victory of Albenga." The solemn bustle, with which it is ushered into view, was intended no doubt to command the reader's attentive consideration (v. iii, p. 90). "For victory, he relied chiefly upon a system of tactics hitherto unpractised in war, or at least upon any considerable or uniform scale. It may not be unnecessary to pause, to take a general view of the principles which he now called into action. Nations in the savage state being constantly engaged in war, always form for themselves some peculiar mode of fighting, suited to the country they inhabit and the mode in which they are armed. The North American Indian becomes formidable as a rifleman or sharpshooter, lays ambuscades in his pathless forests, and practices all the arts of irregular war. The Arab or Scythian manœuvres his clouds of cavalry, so as to envelop and destroy his enemy in his deserts, by sudden onsets, rapid retreats, and unexpected rallies, desolating the country around, cutting off his antagonist's supplies, and practising in short the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry." In this passage, notwithstanding the admirable freshness and animation of the style, the reader will at once discover that there is not a single fact truly affirmed, which is not erroneously proposed. The ge-

neral assertion that "nations in a savage state are constantly engaged in war," admits or rather requires this obvious qualification, *or the chase*, which last occupation not only engrosses the greater part of the lives of savages, but creates interests which constitute the principal cause of their wars. For the rest, the facts alleged as peculiar to savage nations, are common to them with civilized nations, who make war according to the mode in which they are armed and the country they inhabit.—Hannibal was famous for laying ambuscades. In 1755, the French adapting their warfare to the country they were in, defeated and killed general Braddock, by means of an ambuscade. In 1796, at the battle of Arcole, Napoleon placed the brave thirty-second in ambuscade, and by a sudden attack destroyed a column of three thousand Croats. The Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee riflemen, are better sharpshooters than the North American Indians, better horsemen, and more expert in the arts of irregular war. The Russian generals in 1812, manœuvred their clouds of Cossacks, and desolated the country far and wide. The English commanders when they make war on the banks of the Ganges, employ, like the natives, the huge elephant to transport the baggage of armies, and to break lines of hostile infantry. Napoleon himself formed a corps of dromedaries for pursuing his wild foe, through the deserts of Egypt. So that admitting there

could be the least possible relation between this reflection on savage warfare, and the principles on which Bonaparte conducted his invasion of Italy, its folly would make it abortive; as sir Walter Scott seems himself to discover in the closing paragraph wherein he describes his savages, whether Arab, or Scythian, as practising, "in short the species of war proper to a people superior in light cavalry." Now what more could a civilized commander, Turenne or Marlborough, Frederic or Wellington have done, "*who was superior in light cavalry.*"

He proceeds. "The first stage of civilization is less favourable to success in war. As nations advance in the peaceful arts and the character of the soldiers begins to be less familiarly united with that of the citizen, this system of natural tactics falls out of practice; and when foreign invasion or civil broils call the inhabitants to arms, they have no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers. An example may be seen in the great civil war of England, where men fought on both sides, in almost every county of the kingdom, without any combination or exact idea of uniting in mutual support, or manœuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of preponderating force. At least what was attempted for that purpose must have been on the rudest plan possible, where even in actual fight, that part of the

army which obtained any advantage pursued it as far as they could, instead of using their success for the support of their companions; so that the main body was often defeated when a victorious wing was in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken."

Here the imputed accidents of a civil war in England, at a time when the population of that country was divided by political and religious feuds, and had been estranged from martial duties by a long peace, are taken for military characteristics of the age in which that war occurred. Gustavus Adolphus flourished a little before, and Turenne a little after the great civil war of England, and if the French were more advanced in civilization than the English in the middle of the seventeenth century, the Swedes were probably less so. Yet who will say that these great commanders had "no idea save that of finding out the enemy, rushing upon him, and committing the event to superior strength, bravery, or numbers"—had "no exact idea of manœuvring so as to form their insulated bands into an army of preponderating force"—or that they suffered their "main body to be often defeated" by having "a victorious wing in pursuit of those whom their first onset had broken." This bold and feeble attempt at philosophising on the military history of society, of inducing general principles from an analysis and arrangement of particular facts, is carried to the length

of making the single instance and peculiar character of prince Rupert, whom in Rokeby sir Walter calls "hot Rupert," a fair sample of the warlike knowledge and skill likely to exist among nations in that state of civilization which the English had reached at the time of the great civil war. Prince Rupert made himself remarkable for pursuing the left wing of the parliamentary forces, in the battle of Naseby, so far, that before his return, Cromwell and Fairfax had irretrievably defeated the king's right and centre. Yet, on this single act, which might have occurred in any age of the world, of a single officer, whose character was peculiarly prompt and impetuous, is founded a general principle in the history of tactics which the reader is gravely requested to pause and reflect upon. With respect to the *imputed* accidents of the great civil war; of the parties being "without combination" and divided into "insulated bands," the assertion shows that sir Walter was indifferent to facts whether of English or of French history. At the battle of Marston Moor, as Hume relates, "fifty thousand British troops were led to mutual slaughter." These were probably the largest armies which were engaged in a conflict purely civil at any time during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. At the battle of Culloden, in 1745, the pretender had four thousand men, and the duke of Cumberland a much larger force (see Smollet's His-

tory of England, ch. 9). In the war of the American revolution, the forces engaged in battle in no instance amounted to forty thousand men.

Sir Walter continues—"But as war becomes a profession, and a subject of deep study, it is gradually discovered that the principles of tactics depend upon mathematical and arithmetical science; and that the commander will be victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides." Were Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, or Marlborough, or is Wellington, famous for discoveries in mathematical and arithmetical science; or were Newton and Laplace esteemed able tacticians, or well qualified to command armies? It is wonderful to see how boldly he connects propositions together which have no relation. Mathematical and arithmetical science, is put forward as leading to the discovery, that "the commander will be victorious who can assemble the greatest number of forces upon a given point." Now this idea, as it might be properly stated, would occur and has occurred to great commanders whether they understood mathematics or not. But it is not accurately expressed by sir Walter, for the commander must not only be able to assemble the greatest number of forces upon the same point,

and at the same moment; but he must be able to select a vital point and a proper time for the operation, matters which have no more relation to mathematical or arithmetical science, than they have to dancing a minuet. It would be as rational to talk of new principles of poetry as of war. Napoleon, upon whose character and military conduct, sir Walter is here speculating, was of opinion that his principles of war were the same that were practised by the great commanders before him — Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, and Frederick the great, men whose eras fill a space of more than two thousand years, and comprehend all degrees of civilization (Montholon, t. ii, notes vii et xvi). Respecting Napoleon's *secret*, as sir Walter says it was called, he himself, in speaking of these great captains, thus eloquently reveals it—(Montholon t. ii, p. 195): “Make offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, prince Eugene, the great Frederick; read and reread the history of their eighty-eight campaigns, model yourself on them; it is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of *surprising the secrets of the art*.” Here is nothing like mathematical or arithmetical science; but advice to study the conduct and exploits of great generals, to imitate, to imbibe their heroism, enterprise, activity, and prudence; to hold your force collected, to choose strong ground or to

make it so ; to march rapidly on important points ; to cherish the spirit of your troops, and the reputation of your arms ; to penetrate the character of your enemy ; to inspire him with fear and act on that fear ; to keep your troops well supplied ; your communications free ; and by political address and ascendancy to manage your allies. Thus you may become a great captain, but not by studying mathematics.

It would convey a reflection on the reader's understanding to expose these absurdities farther. But as the course of sir Walter's disquisition runs into less harmless misrepresentations, its examination in this direction must be pursued. After repeating a number of truisms about Napoleon's celerity, exact combinations, choice of agents, etc. (in which few men by the way, seem to have been more unlucky), he adds, "Great sacrifices were necessary to enable the French troops to move with that degree of celerity, which Bonaparte's combinations required. He made no allowance for impediments or unexpected obstacles ; the time which he had calculated for execution of manœuvres prescribed, was on no account to be exceeded ; every sacrifice was to be made of baggage, stragglers, even artillery, rather than that the column should arrive too late at the point of its destination. Hence, all that had hitherto been considered essential not only to the health but to the very existence of an army, was in a great measure dispensed with in the French service ; and for the

first time troops were seen to take the field without tents, without camp-equipage, without magazines of provisions, without military hospitals, the soldiers eating as they could, sleeping as they could, and dying as they could; but still advancing, still combating, and still victorious." The declaration that the "dying soldiers, still advanced still combated and were still victorious," is not the least unfounded assertion in this passage; for of all the commanders of his age Napoleon was the most careful about his communications, magazines, and hospitals. His attention to these subjects of military administration may almost be called excessive, as may be seen by his orders and letters in all his campaigns. In this particular campaign of Italy, so far from causing the destitution and marauding of the troops, he put an end to those evils as every body who has attended to the subject, except the author of *Waverley*, and it appears Lockhart (v. i, p. 37) must have discovered. In his first letter to the directory from Nice, dated the day after he assumed the command he says, "The administrative situation of this army is deplorable, but it is not desperate. Henceforward the troops will eat good bread and will have meat." Accordingly two days after appears this order (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 7). "Fresh meat is to be served out to the troops every other day. The battalions who receive salt meat to day will have fresh to-morrow; and those receiving fresh meat

will have salt." The fact is, that this regard for the comfort of his men, was one of the causes of their attachment to him. Can it be supposed that through good and through ill fortune, armies would have devoted themselves to a general who was regardless of their health and existence, and left them to eat, sleep, and die as they could? As to his making no allowance for difficulties, and insisting that the time prescribed for movements, must on no account to be exceeded, nothing is more contrary to truth. It is well known that at Marengo, he waited anxiously but in confidence for the return of Desaix's division from Novi—that in this very campaign of Montenotte, Masséna delayed his attack on Dego, many hours after it had been ordered, in consequence of the troops not joining him in time; and in the military correspondence of the same campaign occur the following expressions in two letters from Augereau, the first dated the 16th of April, and the second the 23d. In the first, written on the heights above Ceva, Augereau says, "I have this moment received your different orders, but I cannot put them in execution" — "Nevertheless, if you persist in the changes you prescribe I pray you to let me know." In the second, written from Castellino, below the confluence of the Tanaro and the Corsaglio, he says, "I received this morning, at 7 o'clock precisely, your order to march the same hour; which it is impossible for me to do. I will exert

myself however, to put my columns in motion without delay"—The truth is sir Walter wrote at random, and Napoleon fought with wisdom, with a knowledge of the capacity of men and a powerful control over their impulses; and though he performed great exploits, did not exact miracles from his troops, nor move them by mathematics. It is scarcely necessary to inform the reader that Lockhart epitomizes the folly and injustice of this part of sir Walter's book. Jomini, himself a soldier, holds the following language (t. viii, p. 61), "The first moments of the French general were consecrated to providing for the wants which might obstruct his operations, and to obtain a knowledge of the state of his troops."—"Carrying a severe scrutiny into the administrations, he very soon impressed them with his own activity, assured the different services, and seconded by the zeal and credit of a banker who was a contractor, he contrived to pay a part of their back pay to the troops, which restored their confidence, and attached them irrevocably to a chief who knew how to meliorate their condition." Napoleon himself says, in his first letter to the directory (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 2 "The troops will henceforward eat good bread, and will have meat, and already they have received a part of their back pay." Yet with this evidence of the fact before him, and with the order for furnishing fresh and salt meat alternately, Norvins (t. i,

p. 88) ventures on the following statement : "Besides, the government not having paid into the military chest but two thousand louis, and one million in bills which were almost all protested, *it was impossible to meliorate the condition of the army.*" This was not slander, but sheer folly; and as it was written after sir Walter Scott's book was published, furnished no authority for his misrepresentation.

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(17) In describing the plan by which Napoleon proposed to enter Italy, sir Walter Scott says (v. iii, pp. 101, 2), "he resolved to pass through the Genoese territory by the narrow pass called the Bochetta leading round the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea. Thus he proposed to penetrate into Italy by the lowest level which the surface of the country presented, which must be, of course, where the range of the Alps unites with that of the Appennines." Every reader knows that "the pass of the Bochetta," instead of leading around the extremity of the mountains, and betwixt these and the sea, is a pass across the Appennines leading directly from the sea at Genoa, to Voltaggio, Novi, Alexandria, and Turin. Why it should be a matter "of course" that the lowest level which the surface of the country presented *must* be where the range of the Alps united with that of the Appennines, would seem to be a geological discovery made

by "the great unknown." The pass of Cadi-bone whence the Alps and Appennines unite, and through which Napoleon proposed entering Piedmont, is at least thirty miles north-west of the Bochetta. There are numerous other errors equally flagrant in this part of sir Walter's work — thus he talks (p. 95) of "these Alpine *campaigns* being victoriously closed by the armistice of Cherasco." Sixteen days would seem a time sufficiently short for *one* campaign. Again, in affecting to recapitulate the motives of the government for entertaining the project of invading Italy, he mentions the murder of the French envoy Basseville by the populace of Rome, which the republic naturally resented, because no attempt was made to prevent, punish, or atone for it, by the papal authorities. The author of Waverley, who would have stigmatized the French as brutes, had they shown no resentment at this outrage on humanity and the rights of ambassadors, and had a similar murder occurred at Paris, would have held it up to detestation as the consequence of republican liberty, thus notices the indignation of the French government (v. iii, p. 99). "The French government considered this very naturally as a gross insult, and were the more desirous of avenging it, that by doing so they should approach nearer to the dignified conduct of the Roman republic, which, in good or evil, seems always to have been their model. The affair happened in

1793, but was not forgotten in 1796." At first sight it would seem to be a strange imitation of the conduct of the Roman republic to take vengeance on the citizens of Rome themselves, and capture their city, which were at one time the objects of the French republic in reference to the murder of Basseville. But it is difficult to conceive that a motive so slight as the imitation of this or that model, could have entered into the plans of a government desirous to avenge so cruel a wrong. It would be as fair and as rational to say that a husband and friend resenting the wrongs of a modern Lucretia, are actuated by a desire to "imitate the conduct" of Collatinus and Brutus. This light and sneering tone, on such a subject, is as revolting to common sense as to common feeling. The following is a short and unexaggerated account of the murder of Basseville, which sir Walter calls "an affair," and seems to think ought to have been speedily forgotten. "The third of January, 1793, the mob attacked the carriage of Basseville, as he was driving out, with stones. His coachman turned back and drove to his hotel. The doors were broken open, and Basseville stabbed with a bayonet in the belly. In his shirt, holding his intestines in his hands, he was dragged into the street, and at last laid down in a guard house on a camp bed, where he expired the next day" (Montholon, t. iii, p. 81).

Sir Walter next proceeds to assign the pur-

pose of avenging this outrage as one of the objects proposed by the French government in authorising Napoleon to invade Italy. In the elaborate instructions of the 6th of March the subject is not alluded to, nor is the name of Basseville or of Rome mentioned.

At a later period and a different stage of the campaign, after the armistice of Cherasco, when the directory saw that one of their two principal enemies in Italy was humbled and disarmed, they thought of Rome, as may be seen by their despatch of the 7th of May, (*Correspondance inédite* t. i, p. 143), and then with sentiments of moderated hostility. Yet sir Walter avers (v. iii, p. 97) that the object of the directory at the opening of the campaign was "to annihilate and dethrone the Pope." And, as if to accumulate misstatements upon the commencement of this campaign, he adverts to, as connected with it, the proposed *coup de main* against Rome in March, 1795, reference to which is made in the fourth chapter of this work, and in the twenty-first note of the appendix to that chapter. It was bad enough to omit all notice of this project and Napoleon's agency in counteracting it, in their proper place, but it is worse to introduce them out of season, and encumbered with misrepresentation about as silly and positive as that piece of *solid information*, "the victory of Albenga." After mentioning this project, but assigning to it no date, he says (v. iii, p. 99): "Bonaparte

who was consulted, recommended that the north of Italy should be first conquered, in order that Rome might be with safety approached and chastised." The absurdity of this proposition is a proof that it never could have entered the head of Napoleon. It is like advising that Great Britain should be first conquered in order that the isle of Anglesey might be got at and its inhabitants chastised—the power of Rome bearing that proportion to the strength of the coalition in the north of Italy. Napoleon, as has been already stated, advised nothing about the north of Italy, but insisted that unless the French fleet first obtained a mastery in the Mediterranean, the expedition to the mouth of the Tiber would be attended with disappointment and disaster. What seems to have misled the author of *Waverley*, or rather to have given occasion to his romance, is the following remark of Napoleon, when opposing the expedition in the council of war (Montholon t. iii, p. 81): "Napoleon was of opinion that this expedition would expose the army of Italy," (that is by depriving it of ten thousand troops) "and would itself end in disaster; that if notwithstanding it was to be undertaken, it would be necessary, at the same time, to surprise Mount Argentare, Orbitello, and Civita Vecchia, and then to disembark the army. But ten thousand men appeared to him too small a force for such a *coup de main*." etc. These three places on the Roman and Tuscan

coast, sir Walter conceived were in the Alps and the north of Italy, with the same geographical knowledge which persuaded him to call the Bochetta, a pass betwixt the Alps and the sea.

The next errors with which sir Walter's entrance upon this campaign is carpeted, are the reproduction of an old, and the commission of a new fabrication. Speaking of the plan of invading Italy, he says (v. iii, p. 100): it "suited in every respect the ambitious and self confident character of the general, to whom it was now intrusted. It gave him a separate and independent authority, and the power of acting on his own judgment and responsibility; for his countryman Salicetti, the deputy who accompanied him as commissioner of the government, was not probably much disposed to obtrude his opinions. He had been Bonaparte's patron, and was still his friend." From this we are to believe that a desire to obtain a chief command and independent authority, was peculiar to Napoleon as a general, and we are to feel persuaded, that ambition and self confidence are the principal qualities displayed by a commander who attacks and defeats an army double in number and strength to his own. But was it for the want of ambition on the part of Scherer, or self confidence on that of Kellerman, that this command of the army of Italy was misplaced in their hands—Kellerman who thought himself "the first general in

Europe." Were ambition and self confidence the leading qualities displayed by Miltiades at Marathon, Henry V at Agincourt, Henry IV of France at Ivry, Marlborough at Ramilies, Prince Eugene at Turin, Frederic the great at Lissa, Prince Ferdinand at Minden, and Jackson at New Orleans. Is there no such thing as heroic enterprise, contempt of death, collectedness in danger, or devotion to the cause of ones country? The *friendship* and *patronage* of Salicetti the reader will remember were proved by concurring with Albite and Laporte in arresting Napoleon and denouncing him to the convention as a mercenary traitor and an accomplice of Robespierre! Further, sir Walter Scott ought to have known that Salicetti was not the only commissioner in attendance upon the army of Italy, that Gareau was his colleague, that the expression of his opinion would not have been an obtrusion of it; and that if it was not expressed it was in consequence of the continued triumphs of the general, not from deference to his ambition or self confidence. It is very true that Napoleon was on principle opposed to the interference of civil agents with the commanders of armies, and as will be remembered had protested against it on the 12th Vendémiaire. This was not the effect of ambition; but the decision of common sense, sanctioned by common practice. The British government did not send members of parliament to regulate the movements of lord

Wellington. The Scotch writers and critics have never forgiven M. Frère to this day, for his interference with sir John Moore.

But sir Walter adds, “the young general’s mind was made up to the alternative of conquest or ruin, as may be judged from his words—“In three months I will be either at Milan or Paris.” Does this look like self confidence? Its introduction by sir Walter only shews the inherent inconsistency of predetermined error. As there appears to be nothing like common sense in the exclusion of greater qualities than self-confidence and ambition from this part of Napoleon’s career, so there seems no reason for supposing that the circumstances of disorder, disobedience, and destitution, in which he found the army of Italy, were likely to be peculiarly attractive to a person under the influence of a desire to gratify these last mentioned qualities. The command on the Rhine, or that on the Moselle, offered the prospect of more speedy, and less costly success.

It would disgust the reader were an enumeration of the pert fallacies of Lockhart to be added to this notice of sir Walter’s important blunders. As a general observation it may be affirmed, that his epitome shows a total ignorance of this part of the subject, and as much injustice of imputation and confidence in error, as are to be found in the work of the author of *Waverley* himself. Speaking of the resentment of the French government at the shocking and unatoned murder

of Basseville, he also represents it was one of the motives for invading Italy, alleging (v. i, p. 38) that "the haughty republic considered this as an insult which could only be washed out by seas of blood." How much Roman blood did the French army shed? Again, after describing the positions taken by Beaulieu for protecting Genoa and preventing the entrance of the French into Italy, stating that he placed one of his columns at Voltri, another at Montenotte, and kept the third at Ceva, this modern Polybius proceeds (p. 39) "The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies thus strangely posted." The main body of the French were in and around Savona and Loano; how they were to advance towards Genoa, by confronting the allies at Montenotte and Ceva, it is not easy to discover. We may expect next to hear that an army stationed at St. Cloud cannot advance upon Paris without confronting a force posted at Versailles! — or that a force landed at Dover could not march upon London without encountering an army encamped near Edinburgh.

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(18) Scott and Lockhart (v. iii, ch. 3, and v. i, ch. 4) seem to have supposed that Cervoni's movement upon Voltri, was directed by Napoleon; whereas his correspondence shows, it was made before his taking the command, and in direct opposition to his plans and wishes. But

Norvins wanders farther from the fact, and (t. i, p. 92) expressly asserts that it was one of Napoleon's first operations. In his despatch of the 6th of April, Napoleon tells the directory: "The movement which I found commenced against Genoa, has drawn the enemy from their winter quarters. I have been very sorry and extremely dissatisfied with this movement upon Genoa, so much the more inopportune, that is has obliged that republic to assume a hostile attitude, and has awakened the enemy whom I wished to take by surprise. It will cost us a sacrifice of men."

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(19) Among the innumerable arts and stratagems of detraction employed by the author of *Waverley* to diminish the fame of his hero, some are so low and palpable as to be among those practices of deception called *tricks*. Of these, one is attempted at the expense of general Beaulieu; an officer of experience, courage, and activity, who had been selected for the command of the allied forces in consequence of his services in this very war, and against French troops and commanders. In describing the character of Beaulieu, Thiers says (t. viii, p. 227) "He had distinguished himself in the Low Countries. He was a veteran with the ardour of a young man." Scott however describes him (v. iii, p. 101) "of great experience and some talent

but no less than seventy-five years old, accustomed all his life to the ancient rule of tactics, and unlikely to suspect, anticipate or frustrate those plans formed by a genius so fertile as that of Napoleon." The reader will detect in this asly and awkward attempt to make Napoleon's success as much the consequence of the age and imbecility of his antagonist as of his own wonderful genius. Yet the archduke Charles, when in the flower of youth and spring time of glory, after being instructed by the failures of Beaulieu, Wurmser, and Alvinzi, and after having worsted Jourdan and Moreau, when opposed to Napoleon, made no better resistance than Beaulieu did

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(20) We are told by sir Walter Scott (v. iii, p. 104), whose descriptions of battles in poetry and prose have been universally admired, that "Argenteau *descended* upon Montenotte;" the famous village of that name, being situated on a mountain of the Appennine range. It might as well be said that a traveller in Switzerland *descended* on Mont-Blanc. The truth is, that Argenteau occupied Dego and Sassello, and *ascended* by the route of Lower to Upper Montenotte. Even this ludicrous oversight does not arrest the prone imitation of Lockhart, who (v. i, p. 39) says—"On the 10th of April d'Argenteau *came down* upon Montenotte." He must have dropped from the clouds. Jomini, in describing

the *descent* of Argenteau (t. viii, p. 67) thus expresses himself. "He moved in three columns with the main body of his troops, to force the intrenched positions which a detachment of Laharpe's division occupied *on the summits* of Montenotte and Montelicino." And he adds:—"In order to give a just idea of the event we are going to describe, it is indispensable, that the reader should be convinced of the importance of the position of Montenotte. It is composed of a small chain of heights situated on the summit of the Appennines, etc."

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(21) Las Cases (t. ii, p. 293) justly observes that differences will be found between the official reports of Napoleon and his account dictated at St. Helena. Among them he says is one resulting from the statement in the former, that Argenteau had but fifteen thousand men when he attacked Rampon; while he had left a division of ten thousand in the rear to maintain his communications with Colli at Ceva. And he adds that it was against this division of ten thousand men that Masséna fired the first shot on the morning of the battle. It is obvious that in many respects Napoleon's reports were necessarily founded on what he supposed to be, at the time, the situation and intentions of his adversary.

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(22) Jomini says (t. viii, p. 72):—"The ge-

neral in chief placed himself on a ridge in the centre of his divisions, the better of judge of the turn of affairs, and to prescribe the manœuvres which might become necessary."

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(25) Sir Walter Scott's account of the combats of Voltri and Monteligino, is fair enough. His battle of Montenotte however is a curiosity (v. iii, p. 104). "Cervoni, who retreated before Beaulieu, had united himself with Laharpe, and both advancing northward during the night of the 11th, established themselves in the rear of the redoubts of Monteligino, which Rampon had so gallantly defended. This was not all. The divisions of Augereau and Masséna had marched by different routes on the flank and on the rear of Argenteau's column; so that the next morning instead of renewing his attack on the redoubts, the Austrian general was obliged to extricate himself by a disastrous retreat, leaving behind him colours and cannon, a thousand slain and two thousand prisoners. Such was the battle of Montenotte, the first of Bonaparte's victories; eminently displaying that truth and mathematical certainty of combination," etc. From this it would seem that if two corps of an army unite, and advance northward during the night, while two other corps had marched by different routes on the flank and rear of the enemy, that enemy is of necessity defeated with the loss of colours, cannon, slain, and prisoners, by virtue

of the truth and certainty of mathematical combinations; and without any thing like courage or generalship on the part of the victors. The commander who is attacked may not cut his way through the forces in his front, or turn successfully on those in his rear. The attacking troops may not behave badly, nor their general act timidly. Jomini, who really *describes* this battle, though partial to the allies (t. viii, pp. 71, 72, 73), attributes the success of the French to the vigour and rapidity of their attacks, the skill with which they were directed, as well as to their superiority of force collected suddenly on a single and vital point.

Lockhart's account (v. i, p. 39) is a meagre and close imitation of sir Walter's—both intimating that Augereau's division was in the action, though they both assert the contrary immediately afterwards (v. iii, p. 106, and v. i, p. 40). It is but fair to acknowledge that on this subject Thiers is not behind the *British historians*, in *solid information* or vapid romance (t. viii, p. 231). He says—"Bonaparte that very night withdrew his right formed by the division Laharpe, at this moment engaged with Beaulieu along the coast, and advanced it by the route of Montenotte, in front of Argenteau. He directed on the same point the division Augereau, in order to support that of Laharpe. Finally he caused the division Masséna to march by a circuitous route across the Appennines, so as to gain a position in the rear

even of Argenteau's corps. The 12th of April in the morning, all his columns were in motion: placed on a lofty hill himself, he saw Laharpe and Augereau marching on Argenteau." Now so far was Augereau from being with Laharpe and in the battle of Montenotte, that a physical impossibility existed to prevent it. For on the afternoon of the 11th, as all authorities agree in stating, his division was at Loano, from which place it would have required a march of thirty-six miles through the Alps and Appennines, between evening and day break in the month of April, to place him in front of the Austrians with Laharpe, while this general had but about eight miles and Masséna fourteen to reach their respective positions. This wanton error of Thiers is the more exceptionable, as it assigns to Napoleon an overwhelming superiority of force in the battle, and effaces from Augereau's conduct at Millesimo that colour of fierceness, which courage, exasperated by emulation, would be likely to take, in a character so ambitious, selfish, and vain.

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(24) Sir Walter Scott's narrative of these Alpine "campaigns" as he calls them, is so sketchy and imperfect, that it is difficult to mark individual errors. He asserts however (v. iii, p. 107) that Bonaparte "ordered three successive attacks," on Provera. Jomini, who

describes all these operations very minutely, says (t. viii, p. 77) that Bonaparte after ordering an attack on Provera, was called away while preparations were making for it by a brisk firing at Cencio, and that then three columns were formed which advanced against Provera simultaneously, on the three faces of the hill. These statements correspond with Napoleon's report to the directory (see *Moniteur* of the 27th April 1796), and with his concise narrative dictated at St. Helena, which furnish no authority for the "three successive attacks." In his report of the action he speaks of but one attack made by three columns with a fourth in reserve, and expressly mentions that before it took place he was called away by a firing which was heard on his right. In his dictation to Las Cases (*Memorial*, t. ii, p. 274), he says simply that the attack on Provera failed; and to Montholon (t. iii, p. 184) that "several attacks failed," and adds that during the battle of the 14th, the general in chief was present at all the important points of the line. Taking the accounts together, it appears that Napoleon was not present, that *several attacks* must have reference to the three distinct columns, that the three successive attacks of sir Walter did not take place, and that admitting their reality, they were ordered by Augereau and not by Napoleon in person. In a letter of the 14th of April, the day of the battle of Millesimo, Augereau, in reporting to Bo-

naparte the surrender of Provera, says (Correspondance inédite, t. i, p. 58): It were to be wished that this capitulation had taken place yesterday before the *attack*; we should not then have to regret the brave generals Banel and Quénin," etc. The tactics of Lockhart are equally romantic and much more confused. He affirms (v. i, p. 40) that in consequence of the battle of Montenotte, while Beaulieu retreated from Voltri to Dego, in order to reestablish his communication with Colli, Colli, "with the same purpose in view *fell back* also, and took post at Milessimo." Colli all this time, as Lockhart's own and other narratives shew (p. 39) was at Ceva, at least four leagues in the rear of Milessimo. So that as Argenteau had "descended" *upwards* upon Montenotte, Colli retreated *forwards* to Milessimo. This admirable historian goes on—"Next morning (the 14th) Bonaparte himself arrived at that scene of the operations. He forced Colli to accept battle, utterly broke and scattered him; and Provera, thus abandoned, was obliged to yield at discretion." This is as like the truth as black is like white. Bonaparte left that scene of operations on the morning of the 14th, and during that day was employed with the divisions Masséna and Laharpe in carrying the intrenched heights of Dego; where he received Augereau's written report of the surrender of Provera (Jomini, t. viii, p. 80). And so far was Colli from being "forced

to accept battle," that he himself attacked Augereau repeatedly with a view of rescuing Provera. Napoleon says (Las Cases, t. ii, p. 274) "all the attacks of Colli to disengage Provera were vain." Thiers (t. viii, p. 234), and Jomini (t. viii, p. 79) confirm this account.

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(25) This active and intrepid officer appears to have been but momentarily disabled on this occasion, for Napoleon in his report says :—"His soldiers believed him to be dead, but his wound is not dangerous," and the next day we find him engaged at the head of his brigade. Although he was under Masséna's command in the battle of Montenotte, he seems to have been generally attached to the division of Augereau. However from the prompt dispositions and rapid movements of the French commander and columns, the brigades belonging to the several divisions in these Alpine operations, were occasionally interchanged. Thus in the battle of Montenotte the brigade Dommartin was with Masséna, at Mondovi, with Serrurier.

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(26) It appearing useless to indicate minutely the imperfections of sir Walter Scott's narrative of these battles, which is altogether erroneous and defective, I have determined to notice only such prominent and positive errors, as

show not only how indifferent he was about furnishing his reader with facts, but how ready he was to supply him with fiction. In *sketching* the battle of Mondovi (v. iii, p. 3) he says: "The dispirited army of Colli was attacked at Mondovi during his retreat, by two corps of Bonaparte's army, from two different points, commanded by Masséna and Serrurier. The last general the Sardinian repulsed with loss; but when he found Masséna in the meantime was turning the left of his line, and that he was thus pressed on both flanks, his situation became almost desperate. The cavalry of the Piedmontese made an effort to renew the combat. For a time they overpowered and drove back those of the French; and general Stengel, who commanded the cavalry, was slain in attempting to get them into order. But the desperate valour of Murat, unrivalled perhaps in the heady charge of cavalry combat, renewed the fortune of the field." It would be difficult to convey a greater quantity of misrepresentation in the same number of words. The object of Colli was not to retreat beyond Mondovi, but at that place to make a stand where he had strong ground, important works, and magazines, and was actually fortifying himself when he was attacked. He did not repulse Serrurier with loss, and yield to the movement of Masséna. The victory was gained by Serrurier, with the brigade Guyeux on the left and those of Dommar-

tin and Fiorella in the centre. Napoleon in his concise account says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 189) "Serrurier carried the redoubt of Bicoque and decided the battle." Jomini, who having deserted the French colours, and entered the service of the allies, as aide de camp to the emperor Alexander, may be deemed the organ of the Sardinians in this campaign, says (t. viii, p. 95) after mentioning that Serrurier attacked the centre with the brigades Dommartin and Fiorella, "forced thus in the centre, and surrounded on both flanks by Meynier and Guyeux, Colli determined to repass the Ellero."—Norvins (t. i, p. 98) gives a similar account—"Serrurier carried the redoubt of Bicoque, and decided the success of the battle." And Thiers (t. viii, p. 239) mentions—"Serrurier decided the victory by taking the principal redoubt." This injustice to Serrurier seems to have been occasioned by sir Walter's confounding the check that general received at the bridge of St. Michel on the 19th, with his victorious attack at Mondovi on the 22d. But even his conduct at St. Michel was highly praiseworthy; and his misfortune, which was not a simple repulse, but the loss of an advantage which he had gained, was owing to the insubordination of his troops. Napoleon says (Montholon, t. iii, p. 188) "Serrurier would however have maintained himself at St. Michel, had not a regiment of light infantry given itself up to pillage." General Despinos,

in a letter of the 19th, confirms Napoleon's statement (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 80): "We were masters of St. Michel, of the castles and the heights—in short we were on the point of gaining a complete victory. A part of the division of general Serrurier unfortunately gave themselves up to pillage, in spite of the efforts of that officer to prevent it. The enemy profited of this folly to return to the charge, and the conquerors lost their advantage in an instant." Carnot in a despatch of the 28th of April to the general in chief says—"Congratulate on the part of the directory, the general of division Serrurier, on the conduct he displayed in the attack on St Michel and on the passage of the Corsaglio."

The next assertion, that the Piedmontese cavalry made an effort to renew the combat and overpowered the French horse, is perfectly unfounded. The cavalry, with the exception of a charge by Murat with a single regiment, was not engaged in the battle of Mondovi, nor could be, in consequence of the rough and precipitous ground. This is clear from the uniform silence of other authors respecting the cavalry; from the topography of the place, and from the following extract from a letter (probably the last he ever wrote) of the brave general Stengel dated the 21st, the day before the battle, and written on the heights of Vico, in the immediate front of Colli's right wing (*Correspondance inédite*).

dite, t. i, p. 69). “I regret that the ground does not *permit me to think of charging the enemy*, nor even *to draw out my cavalry from the place in which they are posted*, in order to approach the mountain; the reverse of which the enemy might occupy.”

It follows that the last assertions declaring that Stengel was killed in the battle of Mondovi, which was completely decided before he commenced his pursuit; and that Murat renewed the fortune of the field; are attributable solely to the ready and abundant invention of sir Walter. Stengel was killed, as the reader knows, after the battle was over, and beyond the river Ellero, in charging the rear guard of the flying Sardinians; and for any thing which took place in the battle of Mondovi, might have been alive now. Lockhart's epitome becomes more and more defective. He omits all mention of the combat of Dego on the 15th, where Lanusse so greatly distinguished himself, and where the prudence of Napoleon, which was so conspicuous among his military virtues, received an early and instructive lesson; as we see him immediately afterwards leaving the entire division of Laharpe and the brigade of Victor, to protect his rear, and sending back general Cenoni to reconnoitre Voltri.

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(27) At page 112 of his third volume, sir

Walter Scott gives a summary of this campaign. Although he admits that the invasion of Piedmont had been accomplished "with so much military skill," he overshadows this attempt at justice by previously ascribing it altogether to fortune. "Thus fortune, in the course of a campaign of scarce a month, placed her favourite in full possession of the desired road to Italy by command of the mountain passes, which had been invaded and conquered with so much military skill." The reader will have ascertained that the only stroke of fortune which occurred in the campaign, was the wandering arrival of Wuckassowich before day break on the 15th, in the rear of Dego; which gave the Austrians an unexpected advantage, that, for the time neutralized the hard-earned victory of the 14th; and which was retrieved, after Massena's effort had failed, by the promptness and energy of Napoleon in person. Indeed sir Walter himself fairly acknowledges that fortune bore no part in these victories, for (at page 115 and 116) he thus expresses himself. "The talents as a general which he had exhibited, were of the very first order. There was no disconnection in his objects, they were all attained by the very means he proposed, and the success was improved to the utmost. A different conduct usually characterises those who stumble unexpectedly on victory, either by good fortune or the valour of their troops. When the favourable opportunity

occurs to such leaders, they are nearly as much embarrassed by it as by a defeat. But Bonaparte who had foreseen the result of each operation by his sagacity, stood also prepared to make the most of the advantages which might be derived from it."

Notwithstanding the discriminating and manly temper of these observations, it is difficult to suppress a smile at finding them appended to sir Walter's confused, erroneous, and imperfect narrative, in which are found, "the victory of Albenga," the "pass of the Bochetta betwixt the Alps and the sea," "the *descent* upon Montenotte," and Serrurier's defeat in the battle of Mondovi, mistakes which independently of the more important and calumnious misrepresentations respecting the motives and character of the French general and his army, render sir Walter's history of these "Alpine campaigns," to which he subjoins this formal retrospect, perfectly unintelligible and ridiculous.

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(28) This correspondence consists of the following letters (Correspondance inédite, t. i, pp. 97-98-99-100).

"To the general commanding in chief the French army in Italy.

"From the head quarters of the Piedmontese army.

"23d of April, 1796.

"Having learned that his majesty the king of

Sardinia has sent plenipotentiaries to Genoa, there to treat for peace, under the mediation of the court of Spain, I believe, general, that the interest of humanity would require that hostilities should be suspended on both sides during the pendency of these negotiations. I therefore propose to you an armistice, either unlimited or for a definite time as you may prefer, with a view of sparing the useless effusion of human blood, etc., etc."

"COLLI."

"The general in chief of the army of Italy to general Colli, commanding in chief the army of the king of Sardinia.

"Head quarters, Caru, 24th of April, 1796.

"The executive directory has reserved to itself, sir, the right to treat of peace. It is therefore necessary that the plenipotentiaries of the king, your master, should proceed to Paris or wait at Genoa for the plenipotentiaries whom the French government may send there.

"The military and moral situation of the two armies, renders a pure and simple suspension of arms impossible. Although I am individually persuaded that my government will grant peace on honourable conditions to your king, I cannot, on this vague presumption stop my march. There is however a mode of accomplishing your object, conformably with the true interests of

your court, and which will spare an effusion of blood, useless, and therefore contrary to reason and the laws of war. This is to put in my possession two of the three fortresses, Coni, Alexandria, and Tortona, as you may choose. Then we can wait without hostilities the issue of the negotiations which may be entered upon. This proposition is very moderate. The reciprocal interests which ought to exist between Piedmont and the French republic, inspire me with a lively desire to see averted from your country the various calamities which threaten it, etc., etc.

“BONAPARTE.”

“*To the general in chief of the French army
in Italy.*”

“Head quarters of the Piedmontese army,
26th of April, 1796.”

“I have communicated, general, to the court of Sardinia the letter you have written in reply to that I addressed to you, to notify you of a plenipotentiary of the king having been sent to Genoa, charged to make overtures of peace at that place, and to invite you, while waiting their result, to spare the effusion of human blood by a suspension of arms.

“I am authorised by his majesty to inform you in the mean time, that the French minister at Genoa, to whom the plenipotentiary of the

king addressed himself on the subject of these overtures, has declared to him that neither he himself nor any other person at Genoa has authority to enter upon such negotiations, but that it is necessary to address them to the executive directory at Paris, which alone has the right of entertaining them. Upon which the plenipotentiary stated his intention of directing his further proceedings on the subject to the proper quarter. While by these means (which cannot fail to involve some delay) we may accomplish the desired and salutary work of a peace between the two states, the king desirous of sparing to both nations the calamities of all sorts, which hostilities inflict, has not hesitated to give his consent that the proposed suspension of arms, which you seem disposed to accept upon certain conditions, may take place and be determined upon without delay.

In consequence H. M. orders me to declare to you that he will consent to put into your power two of his fortresses; that is Coni, and Tortona, as you have demanded, during the negotiations about to be entered upon, and in the manner which shall be agreed to. In virtue of which all hostilities shall cease from this time to the termination of the said negotiations. And in case of difficulties which may arise from the actual situation of the allied army, it may not be in his majesty's power to surrender as above stated, the place of Tortona, H. M. is determined to

offer in lieu of it, the fortress of Demont. With exception of the surrender of these two places, every thing shall remain in *statu quo* with regard to the countries occupied by the two armies, without its being allowed to either to pass the line of their respective limits; and conformably to the manner in which the whole subject shall be settled specifically between us.

“COLLI.”

The reader will discover from this correspondence that the concessions demanded by Napoleon were as moderate as the ascendancy of his arms, the rights of his government, and the safety of his army, could possibly admit of; that he proposed the surrender of two out of three fortresses, and accepted the offer of two out of four. It may be also perceived that in requiring this security against the proverbial faithlessness of the court of Turin, he avoided all allusion to it. It may be observed too, that as his demands were not exorbitant, so his declarations were true. It was true that the directory had reserved to itself the right of treating for peace. It was true that he was persuaded they would grant honourable terms to the king; since their instructions expressed the greatest anxiety not only for a peace, but an alliance with the king of Sardinia.

This last observation brings into view a statement of Thiers in relation to the conduct of Na-

napoleon in the conference at Cherasco, which appears to be both unfounded and injurious. This author says (t. viii, p. 243 et 244) "Bonaparte could not suppose the directory would consent to give any part of Lombardy to Piedmont; for it was not yet conquered, and its conquest was desired only for the purpose of making it an equivalent for the Low Countries. But a vague hope of aggrandizement might dispose Piedmont to ally herself to France, which would have been worth a reenforcement of twenty thousand excellent troops. He promised nothing, but he contrived by letting fall a few words to excite the cupidity and hopes of the cabinet of Turin."

These statements are not only inconsistent with the character of Napoleon, which they degrade into a resemblance with Metternich or Talleyrand, but totally at variance with the truth. If he did, by a few words, intimate the probability that the French government would enter into an alliance with the king of Sardinia, by which they would agree, upon his furnishing a contingent of ten thousand troops, to conquer and cede to him districts of Lombardy, he was authorized by the letter and spirit of his instructions to do so, and was expressing himself in strict conformity with the written intentions of the directory. That this is the fact will be admitted by Thiers himself upon reading the instructions of the 6th of March; and more par-

ticularly the following clause, explaining and confirming them, in the next letter of instruction dated the 7th of May. In this letter Carnot says (*Correspondance inédite*, t. i, p. 147): "In the first place, make the conquest of the Milanese, whether it should be restored to the house of Austria as a cession necessary to assure peace with that power, or whether it may suit us to give it eventually to the Piedmontese, either as a recompense for the efforts we may engage them to make to aid in its conquest, or as indemnity for the departments of Mont Blanc and the maritime Alps" (that is Savoy and the county of Nice), "constitutionally united to the republic." It is impossible to read this passage without perceiving that Napoleon when conferring with the Sardinian agents upon the prospects of peace, could not fairly deny his impression that the directory would grant them honourable terms, and be disposed in consideration of an alliance offensive and defensive, to cede to Sardinia out of conquests that might be made in Lombardy, an equivalent for the king's relinquishment of all claim to Savoy and Nice. It is evident, therefore, that this misrepresentation of Thiers is as downright as it is gratuitous, and that for the colour of subtile and faithless adroitness, which it reflects upon the character of Napoleon, inconsistent with the tenor of his life and repugnant to his disposition, the world is indebted to the fancy of the French historian.

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(29) On the subject of this armistice, sir Walter Scott is thrown into convulsions of *legitimate* indignation, which, however ludicrous in a "British historian," may probably appear perfectly consistent with the rank and dignity of a new Scotch baronet. The effusion of this noble sentiment takes the following sonorous and magnificent form (v. iii, p. 113): "The sovereign of Sardinia, Savoy, and Piedmont, had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence, on the continent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor. Let it be remembered, that Victor Amadeus III was the descendant of a race of heroes, who, from the peculiar situation of their territories, as constituting a neutral ground of great strength betwixt France and the Italian possessions of the house of Austria, had often been called to play a part in the general affairs of Europe, of importance far superior to that which their condition as a second rate power, could otherwise have demanded. In general, they had compensated their inferiority of force by an ability and gallantry which did them the highest credit, both as generals and politicians; and now Piedmont was at the feet, in her turn, of an enemy weaker in numbers than her own" (*her own* what?). "Besides the reflections on the past fame of his country, the present humiliating situation of the king was rendered more

mortifying by the state of his family connections. Victor Amadeus was father-in-law of Monsieur (by right Louis XVIII), and of the comte d'Artois (the reigning king of France). He had received his sons-in-law at his court at Turin, and afforded them an opportunity of assembling around them their forces, consisting of the emigrant noblesse, and had strained all the power he possessed, and in many instances successfully, to withstand the artifices and the arms of the French republicans ; and now, so born, so connected, and with such principles, he was condemned to sue for peace on any terms which might be dictated, from a general of France, aged twenty-six years, who a few months before, was desirous of an appointment in the artillery service of the Grand Signior." The probable inaccuracy of the closing assertion having been shewn in the 4th chapter of this volume, and in the 28th note of the appendix to that chapter, it is worthy of attention here solely in consequence of its being a voluntary aggravation on the part of sir Walter, of the royal misfortunes which he so ruefully deplores. But if the service of the Grand Signior, a monarch whose power was much more ancient and extensive than that of Victor Amadeus III, or any other Victor Amadeus, was really derogatory to the character of a European officer, it might be demanded in what consisted the dignity of this house of Savoy, which it would appear to be

sacrilege to approach either by conquest or pacification. We are told by sir Walter, that one source of his dignity was in the king's birth, in his being "descended from a race of heroes," and being father-in-law to Louis XVIII and the comte d'Artois, being "so born and so connected." With respect to the circumstance of "being so born," the reader will remember (2d note of appendix to the 1st chapter) that sir Walter himself pronounced it to be "trivial and unworthy of notice." As to this "race of heroes," the only one of the king of Sardinia's royal predecessors who was famous in the history of Europe, was Victor Amadeus I; and his fame is thus described by a countryman of sir Walter's, on the authority of a king whose word has been held to be law, not only by Louis XVIII and the comte d'Artois, but by all who, like sir Walter acknowledge the fashionable and flourishing doctrine of the divine right of kings. Smollett, in his history of England (b. i, ch. 8), mentioning the low state of fortune to which the prospects of the emperor were reduced in Italy by the united arms of France and Savoy, observes,—“The emperor's prospect, however, was soon mended by two incidents of very great consequence to his interest. The duke of Savoy” (then in strict alliance with France), “foreseeing how much he should be exposed to the mercy of the French king, should that monarch become master of the Milanese, engaged in a secret negotiation with the empe-

ror" (with whom, as the ally of France, he was then at war), "which, notwithstanding all his caution, was discovered by the court of Versailles. Louis immediately ordered the duke of Vendôme to disarm the troops of Savoy that were in his army, to the number of two and twenty thousand men (Voltaire, *Siècle de Louis XIV*, reduces this number to five thousand); to insist upon the duke's putting him in possession of four considerable fortresses, and to demand that the number of his troops should be reduced to the establishment stipulated in the treaty of 1696. The duke, exasperated at these insults, ordered the French ambassador, and several officers of the same nation, to be arrested. Louis endeavoured to intimidate him by a menacing letter, in which he gave him to understand, that since neither religion, honour, interest, nor alliances had been able to influence his conduct, the duke of Vendôme should make known the intentions of the French monarch, and allow him four and twenty hours to deliberate." This is one of the many acts of unblushing perfidy performed by that father of "a race of heroes," (who was a stranger to the sentiments of *honour* and *religion*), which in the opinion of our "British historian," "did him the highest credit both as a general and as a politician." It may be observed that Louis XIV, the revered ancestor of those rightful kings, "Monsieur and the comte d'Artois," would not be satisfied, with his over-

whelming army under the duke of Vendôme, without the surrender "of four considerable fortresses," while Napoleon, "a general of France aged twenty-six years," with his small army, and with the Austrian forces before him, was satisfied with two. Yet Victor Amadeus I, had not encouraged the treason of Louis' subjects, nor by means of it, taken possession of Toulon, and a large French fleet. Passing from this heroic progenitor of heroes to his immediate successor in the illustrious line, Smollet (b. ii, ch. 4 and 5), says that Victor Amadeus I resigned his throne to his son Charles Emanuel; and that three years afterwards, "Victor Amadeus, the abdicated king of Sardinia, having, at the instigation of his wife, engaged in some intrigues in order to reascend the throne, his son the reigning king, ordered his person to be seized at Montcalier, and conveyed to Rivoli, under a strong guard. His wife, the marchioness of Spigno, was conducted to Serva. The old king's confessor, his physician, and eight and forty persons of distinction, were imprisoned." This will serve to convince the reader of the pious respect with which the "descendants of this race of heroes" were in the habit of looking back upon the character of their ancestors, and "on the past fame of their country." In respect to the warm affection for his sons-in-law by which it is alleged Victor Amadeus the third was engaged in war against "the artifices

and arms of the French republicans;" it may be observed that, inasmuch as, in the estimation of all loyal and true baronets, the affections, virtues, and rights, of legitimate monarchs, are exalted, sacred, and inviolable, in proportion to the extent of their dominions and the antiquity of their royal descent, it may be safely asserted that the king of Sardinia could not pretend to love his son-in-law more than the emperor of Austria loved his. Now in 1813 his apostolic majesty, provoked not by the ill faith, but by the misfortunes of his son-in-law, joined his most inveterate enemies in a war against him, and prosecuted it with unaffected cruelty and sincere ingratitude, until he had taken from him his crown, and separated from him his wife and child; and made that wife accept as her partner in a dance of triumph at his ruin, the man who not only enjoyed the reputation of being greatly instrumental in her husband's downfall, but in having him murderously relegated to a rock in the African sea. Taking this conduct of the emperor of Austria as the standard of monarchical feeling, it cannot with a proper respect for his imperial rank, be admitted that the fortitude of the king of Sardinia, was severely tried by being placed under the necessity of discontinuing inconvenient assistance to his sons-in-law. Yet sir Walter Scott seems to be of a different opinion, avers that Victor Amadeus III (p. 115) signed the treaty with France with the greatest reluctance, "and did not long sur-

vive it," language which the imitation of Lockhart interprets (v. i, p. 42) "died of a broken heart a few days after *the treaty of Cherasco*." But even if Napoleon could be held accountable for the tenderness of Victor Amadeus's heart, or for the treaty of *Paris*, with which he had as little concern, it would be difficult to prove that the death of the king was the effect of his conduct, since that monarch survived the treaty of Paris instead of "a few days," five months, and then died, in his seventy-first year, not by "a fall from a cherry tree," but of a fit of apoplexy. All the cruelty with which Napoleon can be reproached, consisted, as we have seen, in requiring and obtaining the cautionary surrender of Coni and Tortona, when as sir Walter himself confesses, "Victor Amadeus's capital, nay his existence on the continent," were at the mercy of Napoleon.

Coni and Tortona, both these authors denominate "keys of the Alps," Lockhart, with an abundance of *solid information*, describing them as *the only keys of the Alps* (v. i, p. 41). And lastly, wrested from his hands, Coni and Tortona, the two great fortresses called "the keys of the Alps." Every body, but these "British historians," who ever looked at a map of Italy, knows that Tortona is at least fifty miles from the Alps, at the opposite edge of the plain of Piedmont; and that an army invading Piedmont by the passes of the Alps, might take all the keys

of those mountains, and Turin itself, without being within a day's march of Tortona. Yet such trash as this, mixed up with calumny and contradictions, is sold and circulated in England, for the instruction, in political sentiment and historical knowledge, of families, whose parents studied the thoughtful and luminous pages of Hume, Robertson, and Gibbon!

In regard to the rhapsody about the kings of Sardinia playing "an important part, superior to that demanded by their condition as a second rate power," this circumstance instead of being a matter to boast of, was the effect of shameful imprudence on their part. Nations, like individuals, when they are made to attempt enterprises above their strength, and to assume characters out of the range of their position and qualities, are sure to be exposed sooner or later to calamity and disgrace.

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(30) In closing his reflections on the military operations, which eventuated in what Lockhart calls the "treaty of Cherasco," confounding in one pregnant blunder the armistice of Cherasco, signed 28th of April, and the *treaty of Paris* concluded the 15th May, observations escape the author of *Waverley* which, notwithstanding their folly, deserve consideration. He thus edifies his readers (v. iii, p. 116). "Bonaparte's style in addressing the directory, was at this period more modest and simple, and therefore more

impressive, than the figurative and bombastic style which he afterwards used in his bulletins. His self opinion, perhaps, was not risen so high as to permit him to use the sesquipedalian words and violent metaphors, to which he afterwards seems to have given a preference. We may remark also, that the young victor was honourably anxious to secure for such officers as distinguished themselves, the preferment which their services entitled them to. He urges the promotion of his brethren in arms in almost every one of his despatches, a conduct not only just and generous but also highly politic. Were his recommendations successful, their general had the gratitude due for the benefit; were they overlooked, thanks equally belonged to him for his good wishes, and the resentment for the slight attached itself to the government, who did not give effect to them."

In the first note of the Appendix to the first chapter of this volume, the reader will have observed an index pointing out the biographical intention, the *quo animo*, with which the author of Waverley undertook to descend from the regions of romance to the high road of history, and to furnish the public with a life of Napoleon. The passage of his work now under consideration, reveals most clearly the accordant spirit in which that intention was executed. If Napoleon recommended for promotion such of his officers in this active and sanguinary campaign, as emi-

mently deserved it, such as Rampon, Lanusse, and Lannes, it is first admitted that he was actuated by an honourable desire to reward patriotism and valour; but, lest the merit of this just and liberal, though common, sentiment, should attach itself to the character of his hero, sir Walter hastens to balance it by the imputation of a mean and interested policy—the more mean as it implies a design upon the reputation of the government, whose confidence he enjoyed and whose army he commanded. Regardless of metaphysical as of moral propriety, sir Walter thus crowds together upon a single and very natural act, the redundant and incongruous motives of justice, generosity, policy, and fraud. This compound of compliment and calumny, this equipoise of admitted honour and imputed baseness, while they disclose the *juste milieu* condition of the author's moral sentiment, demonstrate the distinct separation which the scheme of his work required him to maintain between the course of his narrative and the principles of justice, in regard to that important branch of his subject, consisting of the impulses of his hero's heart, and the motives of his conduct.

With respect to the less essential qualities of Napoleon, we shall find in this passage evidence of the same industrious artifice and anxious defamation. Although, in 1796, Napoleon's military reports and despatches are expressed in

language modest and simple, the reader is assured, upon the word of a baronet, that at a later stage of his career, they will be found to assume a style bombastic, inflated, and pompous. When, however, we come to *this later stage in his career*; when we find him on the banks of the Moscowa, in the zenith of power, conquest, and glory, and admire the heroic simplicity of these words:—"Soldiers! behold the battle which you have so long desired," etc.; sir Walter protests on the honour of "the great unknown," that, if we turn back to an *earlier stage of his career*, we shall find, notwithstanding the simple and impressive style of this address, that his orders and reports were (v. vii, p. 272) expressed in that "tinsel of oratory which he generally used on such occasions."

By this ingenious process it will be perceived, that the author of Waverley contrives to acknowledge the merit of Napoleon, and at the same time to defame him. If he performs an act of incontestable honour and generosity, the natural motive is artfully withdrawn, to make room for the farfetched imputation of selfish and treacherous policy. If he discovers a becoming modesty to-day, it is instantly asserted that he will become conceited and arrogant to-morrow, and therefore that there is no occasion for praising him; and if to-morrow he maintains a style of severe simplicity, it is boldly averred that his manner of expression yesterday was remark-

ably tinselled and tawdry, and of course that this single exception can entitle him to no credit. As this literary legerdemain when exposed, must disgust all persons of sense and dignity; so the attempt to contaminate with corrupt motives the ordinary solicitude of a commander for his deserving officers, cannot fail to offend military men, of whatsoever nation. They will say:—*If sir Walter Scott's rule of construction become general, our utmost gallantry may fail to extort recommendations for promotion from our commander in chief, who must either neglect us, or expose his own honour and delicacy.* It is clear that by this forked and poisonous process of defamation—the invention and practice of the greatest writer of his age—the courage of Leonidas, the integrity of Fabricius, the patriotism of Wallace, and the virtue of Washington, might be plausibly calumniated.

There can be no doubt that had Napoleon omitted to recommend the promotion of his meritorious officers, the author of *Waverley* would have imputed his neglect to a jealous policy, to a desire of engrossing the whole credit of the campaign to himself. So that in the plan of his work there was a positive certainty that the memory of his hero would incur censure on any given occasion; no matter what might be the nature of his motives or the tenor of his conduct.

In connection with the predetermined defamation, sir Walter on the next page misrepres-

sents and ridicules a passage of the speech of M. Daubermesnil, a member of the council of five hundred, in celebration of the exploits of Bonaparte and his army. It is possible that even a fair version of the passage in question, might expose the French orator to the charge of extravagance. But had the author of *Waverley* compared this French oration, with his own effusion on the death of George III, he might have found M. Daubermesnil's flourish about Orpheus, Tyrtæus, and Ossian, tame even to frigidity. In a memoir which was published in the *Edinburgh Journal* of the 8th of February, 1820, sir Walter Scott poured forth the following strain of idolatry, which besides shewing his incapacity to discriminate between rank and merit, and being repugnant to every sentiment of moral dignity and religious feeling, is beyond comparison the most successful example of the anticlimax, to be found in the whole compass of English literature. "Were a voice from heaven to proclaim aloud to us, that there is another and a better world, in which virtue may expect its assured reward, the testimony of a miracle could not impress the awful truth more deeply upon the mind, than the life and death of GEORGE the THIRD."

"Next comes Dalhoussey the great god of war,

"Lieutenant-colonel to the earl of Mar."

PAGE 281.

(31) No kingdom was ever before conquered by troops in the state Bonaparte's were in, during this victorious campaign against the king of Sardinia and his allies, in the close of which, as sir Walter Scott observes (v. iii, p. 113), that monarch "had no means of preserving his capital, nay, his existence on the continent, excepting by an almost total submission to the will of the victor." Their distress for subsistence and clothing is thus noticed by the Annual Register of the period. "No class of men had signalized their attachment to republican principles with such fervour and constancy as the French soldiery****. Hunger and nakedness had frequently been their portion in the midst of their most splendid successes.**** The army of Italy, in particular, had exhibited astonishing examples of fortitude in the most trying situations, that their enemies had concluded, from the reports of the difficulties to which they were reduced, in procuring the means of existence, that nothing else would be needed to compel them to abandon their positions and withdraw to France. ***** The coarse and disgusting food on which they subsisted, was compared to the Lacedæmonian broth of old, and none it was said, but Frenchmen, Greenlanders, or Scotch highlanders, could have fed on such messes."

The legions of Cæsar in the civil war, were

reduced to great extremity while investing the camp of Pompey in the neighbourhood of Dyr-rachium, and lived for the most part on bread made of the root of a plant called *chara* or wild cabbage. Loaves of this bread, the reader will remember, they were in the habit of throwing to the outposts of Pompey, in order to convince their adversaries that they were not likely to relax in their exertions, for want of food. But at this time Cæsar made no conquests. On the contrary Pompey made a sally in which he gained a victory, destroyed a number of Cæsar's best troops, and forced him to break up his camp, change the plan of the war, and march into Thessaly (Cæsar, *Bello Civili*, l. iii). In the Parthian war, Anthony and his troops exhibited, under privations of this kind, great courage, fortitude and patience; but it was in a retreat, in which their efforts were confined to self-preservation, in which they suffered great loss, and the Roman soldiers pillaged their commander's tent (Plutarch, *Life of Anthony*). In sir John Moore's retreat to Corunna, although his troops came to their colours whenever the enemy appeared, and constantly repulsed, and finally defeated marshal Soult, the British commander had renounced all hopes of conquest and fought only for safety (Napier's *Peninsular War*, v. i, ch. 5). Bonaparte's short campaign of Montenotte and Cherasco, in which with an army half as numerous as the one opposed to him, he subdued a

strong kingdom, in a fortnight, and, notwithstanding his exertions to procure regular supplies, comparatively speaking, without rations, cannon, or cavalry, stands alone in the annals of warfare.

PAGE 281.

(32) In a letter of the 1st of May, general Verdier, the adjutant general of Augereau's division, reported that a corporal and a private of the sixth regiment of carabiniers, had been shot under the sentence of a court martial, for the commission of thefts with violence (*Correspondence inédite*, t. i, p. 119). This fact would alone disprove all sir Walter Scott's assertions about Napoleon's system of *marauding*—(See also on this subject *Victoires et Conquêtes*, t. v, p. 214).

PAGE 282.

(33) Montholon, t. iii, pp. 192, 193,—“The minds of the people in Piedmont were greatly agitated; the court did not enjoy public confidence; it placed itself at the discretion of Napoleon, and solicited an armistice. Many persons would have wished that the army should march on Turin. Officers and even generals did not conceive it prudent to undertake the conquest of Italy, with so small a force of artillery, cavalry so badly mounted, and an army so feeble, and likely to be reduced every day by sickness and remoteness from France.” At page 197 of the same volume, Napoleon recites in substance the

arguments of the officers who were opposed to invading Lombardy, and who suggested "that it would be more advantageous to profit by the success already gained, and to revolutionize Piedmont and Genoa, before going farther."

In the instructions of the directory of the 6th of March, the reader will find the following sentence, "The general in chief will endeavour by all means in his power to excite the malcontents of Piedmont, and to make them break out in a general or partial insurrection, against the court of Turin." Having gone beyond the hopes of the directory, in conquering Piedmont, Napoleon could afford to disregard this odious instruction which was intended as a means of gaining advantages, which his campaign had without those means transcended.

PAGE 284.

(34) It appears from the despatch of Carnot of the 7th of May approving the armistice, that Napoleon had obtained the assent of Salicetti on the occasion, a form which although he makes no allusion to it in communicating to the government the terms of the truce, was no doubt pleasing to the directors, as it seemed to make the general's departure from the letter of their orders, less direct.

PAGE 285.

(35) In a letter to Napoleon of the 25th of April Carnot says—"All France, all Europe

ERRATA.

PREFACE, in the last page, line 1, after *and* erase the comma.

Page 12 line 23, for *ephemeræ* read *ephemera*.

32 line 7, for *drowed* read *drowned*.

86 — 7, for *with the* read *with his*.

112 — 2, after *coun* add *try*.

129 — 8, after *discussion* insert (6).

142 — 7, for *advance* read *advanced*.

154 — 23, for *dreached* read *proached*.

191 — 9, for *quai* read *quay*.

197 — 19, for *were* read *was*.

252 — 16, for *his* read *this*.

267 — 7, for *troops* read *troopers*.

281 — 27, for *in* read *his*.

311 — 8, for *examples* read *example*.

313 — 15, for *Buttofaco* read *Buttafoco*.

314 — 5, for *prococity* read *precocity*.

316 — 10, for *Arnoult* read *Arnault*.

319 — 23, for *fugitive* read *future*.

320 — 27, for *poscit* read *ponit*.

329 — 23, for *with* read *to*.

330 — 1, for *ven* read *even*.

467 — 8, the words *proposed and* to be erased.

485 — 10, after *vicious* insert *and*.

496 — 2, for *had* read *has*.

516 — 6, full stop after *gold*.

518 — 14, for *bold* read *bolddest*.

521 — 10, for *letter's* read *letters*.

525 — 23, erase *an*.

526 — 7, for *exercice* read *exercise*.

529 — 16, for *soldiers* read *soldier*.

539 — 2, for *whence* read *where*.


546 — 14, for *strangely* read *strongly*.


550 — 2, for *of judge*, read *to judge*.

559 — 27, for *Cenoni* read *Cervoni*.









William Bayler